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2018 DIGILAW 2745 (JHR)

Principal Dav Public School v. Rahul Kumar Singh

2018-12-13

H.C.MISHRA

body2018
JUDGMENT H. C. Mishra, J. - Heard learned counsel for the appellant DAV Public School, RMD-SAIL, Gua, Singhbhum East. 2. The appellant is aggrieved by the impugned order dated 20.9.2017, passed by the Jharkhand Education Tribunal, Ranchi, in Case No. 34 of 2016, allowing the application filed by the respondent No.1, who was a teacher of the DAV Public School, RMD-SAIL, Gua, directing to clear the dues of the said teacher, who has since been removed from service of the appellant school. 3. The impugned Order shows that a charge-sheet was issued against the respondent No. 1 on 16.2.2009, by the Regional Director of DAV, for some misconduct. The respondent No.1 challenged the initiation of departmental proceeding in Jharkhand Education Tribunal, Ranchi, alleging violation of the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal directed the respondents to follow the due steps in the departmental proceeding, giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the respondent No. 1, before passing the final order. 4. In the meantime, the respondent No.1 approached the President of DAV, CMC, New Delhi, by filing the statutory appeal, whereupon, the matter was considered and the order contained in letter No. 1815 dated 28/30.7.2015 was passed, according to which, the charge-sheet against the appellant was to be withdrawn by the Management, subject to the following conditions:- (a) With a strict warning that he should conduct himself in a manner worthy of a teacher in future. (b) Any indiscipline on his part will severely be death with in accordance with law. (c) He should not be posted to the place where he was serving. It was further stated in the letter that these recommendations would only be implemented, if the present respondent No.1 withdraws all the pending cases in the court of law against the DAV College Managing Committee and an undertaking to this effect was given by him. As regards the payments of arrears, it was directed that the payments shall be made from the funds of the school, where he was working during the said period. 5. As this order of the apex Management Committee of the DAV body, was not followed by the appellant, the respondent No.1 approached the Jharkhand Education Tribunal, Ranchi, in Case No. 34/2016, with a prayer for implementation of the directions of the apex Management Committee of the DAV body. 6. 5. As this order of the apex Management Committee of the DAV body, was not followed by the appellant, the respondent No.1 approached the Jharkhand Education Tribunal, Ranchi, in Case No. 34/2016, with a prayer for implementation of the directions of the apex Management Committee of the DAV body. 6. The said Case No. 34 /2016 was adjudicated by the Jharkhand Education Tribunal, Ranchi, hearing both the sides, in which, it was noted that subsequently, the respondent No.1 was removed from service, again for his other misconduct. However, that removal from service was not the matter of challenge before the Jharkhand Education Tribunal. It also finds mentioned in the impugned order that admittedly, all the cases filed by the respondent No.1 had been withdrawn by him, and the appellant Management had also withdrawn the charge-sheet against the respondent No.1, in compliance of the order, contained in letter No. 1815 dated 28/30.7.2015, referred to above. 7. The plea was taken by the appellant in the Jharkhand Education Tribunal that there was an agreement between the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) and DAV College and Trust Management Society, according to which, it was the responsibility of the SAIL to make the payments and not of the DAV School, where the respondent No.1 was working. This submission of the appellant was rejected by the Tribunal, taking note of the fact that the salary of the respondent No.1 was held up during the period of departmental proceeding pending against him. As it was an admitted fact that the charge-sheet, on the basis of which, the dues were held up, had been withdrawn by the Management, the employee concerned was held to be treated as on duty, and he was entitled to all the consequential benefits of the salary and other allowance. The Tribunal accordingly, held that the salary and the allowances of respondent No.1 could not be withheld as per the directions of the apex Management Committee, in letter No. 1815 dated 28/30.7.2015, and the payment of the dues had to be made by the school and not by the SAIL. Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the appellant to clear all the dues of the respondent No.1 within three months from the date of the order, thus, allowing the petition filed by respondent No. 1. 8. Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the appellant to clear all the dues of the respondent No.1 within three months from the date of the order, thus, allowing the petition filed by respondent No. 1. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant DAV School submits that the impugned order, passed by the Jharkhand Education Tribunal, Ranchi, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, in as much as it was the responsibility of the SAIL to make the payments to the respondent No.1, and to clear his dues, and not of the DAV School. He draws the attention of this Court towards the agreement between the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) and DAV College and Trust Management Society, a copy of which has been brought on record by way of Annexure-4 to the Memo of Appeal. A bare perusal of this agreement also shows, that though the SAIL had taken up upon itself the responsibility of running the school with the financial implications, but it was clearly stated that the company shall be required to meet the total deficit in running the school, after deducting the income of the school realised as fees etc. In the present case, it is not at all the case of the appellant that the school was running in deficit. As such, the submission of learned counsel of the appellant that as per this agreement it was the responsibility of the SAIL to make the payments of dues to the respondent No.1, and not of the DAV School, is only misconceived, and cannot be entertained. Admittedly, as per the directions of the apex Management Committee of the appellant, as contained in letter No. 1815 dated 28/30.7.2015, it was the appellant school, which had to make the payment, and not the SAIL. 9. In the facts of the case, I do not find any illegality in the impugned order dated 20.9.2017, passed by the Jharkhand Education Tribunal, Ranchi, in Case No. 34/2016, worth any interference by this Court. 10. There is no merit in this appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed, in limine.