JUDGMENT : Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. 1. These are the two Writ Petitions, being Writ Petition (M/S) No. 831/2018 and Writ Petition (M/S) No. 832/2018, which has been preferred by the respective petitioners, almost claiming a similar relief pertaining to a challenge being given to Clause-8 of the Notification No. 310/XXIII/2018/04(01)/2018 dated 19.3.2018 issued by respondent no. 1, while exercising powers under Section 40 of Uttaranchal (United Provinces Excise Act, 1910) Adoption Order 2002 read with Section 40 of General Clauses Act 1904, alleging thereof the same to be opposed to public policy. 2. The reliefs as sought by the writ petitioners of Writ Petition No. 831/2018 is as under: “(i) Issue Writ or Order in the form and nature of certiorari or any other appropriate Writ, and may further be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned Notification bearing no. 310/XXIII/2018/04(01)/2018, dated 19th March, 2018 vice Clause 8 (Annexure-6), it being opposed to public policy. (ii) Issue Writ or Order in the form and nature of mandamus or any other appropriate Writ thereby directing the respondents to amend notification bearing no. 310/XXIII/2018/04(01)/2018, dated 19th March, 2018 vide Clause 8 in consonance to Notification No. 260/XXIII/2017/04(01)/2017 dated 19th May, 2017 (Annexure-5), it being opposed/against public policy. (iii) Pending disposal of the Writ Petition grant Ad-interim relief in the form of Stay to the effect and operation of the Notification bearing no. 310/XXIII/2018/04(01)/2018, dated 19th March, 2018 vide Clause 8 (Annexure-6). (iv) Grant any other relief in favour of the petitioner which this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts of the case, in the interest of justice.” 3. Whereas in the connected Writ Petition No. 832/2018 ‘The 7 Departmental Stores vs. State of Uttarakhand & Others’, the petitioner has sought the following reliefs: “(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the clause 8 of the notification issued on 19.3.2018. (ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing to the respondents to renew the licence of the petitioner which was granted on 30.12.2017 as recommended by the Excise Inspector by letter dated 03.03.2018. (iii) Issue any suitable writ, order or direction, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the case. (iv) Award the cost of the petition to the petitioner.” 4. (iii) Issue any suitable writ, order or direction, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the case. (iv) Award the cost of the petition to the petitioner.” 4. As the challenge given to the notification, by each petitioner of the above two petitions are being based upon marginally different set of facts, though its involving common interpretation, impact, and legal implications of Clause-8 of the impugned notification dated 19.03.2018. It becomes necessary for this Court to first independently deal with the factual backdrop of each Writ Petition, before dealing with the legal issues. 5. Briefly put the case of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 831/2018 is as follows: (i) The petitioner of Writ Petition No. 831/2018, in support of his contention, in relation to the relief claimed submits that the petitioner is carrying on a business of dealing with the liquor, under the name and style of “Allied Nidhi Spiritz and Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd.”. The licence thus granted in his favour has been numbered as Licence No. 5 of 2015-16 granted under FL-5 (DS) category, which on its scrutiny reflects that the same has been granted for dealing with the foreign liquor (FL), from retail outlets, for premium retail brands etc. exclusively from place of business referred in the licence i.e. 137/1, Dev Tower, Rajpur Road, Jakhan, Dehradun, exclusively for sale of liquor issued by the Excise Department. 6. exclusively from place of business referred in the licence i.e. 137/1, Dev Tower, Rajpur Road, Jakhan, Dehradun, exclusively for sale of liquor issued by the Excise Department. 6. The contention of the petitioner is that, his grievance agitated in the Writ Petition runs as against Clause-8, of the impugned notification which has been enforced by the notification No. 310/XXIII/2018/04(01)/2018 dated 19.3.2018, which for the purposes of brevity Clause-8 of the impugned notification is provided hereunder: ^^jkT; esa ekWYl@fMikVZesUVy LVksj esa fons'kh efnjk@okbZu dh fcØh&8 jkT; jkT; esa ekWYl@fMikVZesUVy LVksj esa fons'kh efnjk dh :i;s 400 izfr cksry bZŒMhŒihŒ ls vf/kd bZŒMhŒihŒ dh cksryksa@leqnzikjh; vk;kfrr ch;j@leqnzikjh; vk;kfrr okbZu ,oa Hkkjr esa cuh okbZu dh fcØh djus dh vuqefr nh tk;sxh rFkk budk vuqKkiu 'kqYd :i;s 3-00 yk[k izfro"kZ ;k o"kZ ds Hkkx ds fy, fu;r gksxkA ekWy@fMikVZesUVy LVksj dks fuEu ,eŒthŒMhŒ nj ij ,QŒ,yŒ 2 ls efnjk dk mBku djuk gksxk] fdlh ekWy esa vf/kdre 3 nqdku rd [kksyus ij fopkj fd;k tk;sxk%& Øe la[;k ,Dl vklouh dk ewY; ,eŒthŒMhŒ dh nj izfr cksry 1 400 ls vf/kd :i;s 522@& leqnzikjh; vk;kfrr ch;j@okbZu ij 'kqYd ,QŒ,yŒ&5 Mh ds leku ns; gksaxsA fMikVZesUVy LVksj esa fuxZr vFkok uohuhd`r fd;s tkus okys vuqKkiuksa gsrq lEcfU/kr LVksj esa efnjk ds vfrfjDr vU; inkFkksZ ¼mRikn½ dh fcØh dh U;wure lhek :i;s 5 djksM+ ¼ikap djksM+½ fu/kkZfjr dh tkrh gS vFkkZr~ fMikVZesUVy LVksj es u;k vuqKkiu ;k iqjkus vuqKkiu dk uohuhdj.k rHkh fd;k tk;sxk tc og lEcfU/kr foHkkx ls iznRr~ izek.k i= ¼thŒ,lŒVhŒ lfVZfQdsV½ izLrqr djsxk fd mldk xr~ foRrh;o"kZ esa vFkok vkosnu djus dh frfFk rd foRrh; o"kZ esa efnjk ds vfrfjDr vU; inkFkksZ ¼mRikn½ dh fcØh dk U;wure VuZvksoj :i;s 5 djksM+ ¼ikap djksM+½ jgk gSA** Consequent thereto the impact of Clause-8, on grant of licence because of its consequential implementation of policy permitting sale of liquor in Malls and Departmental Stores, which is the cause of action for the petitioner. 7. For a challenge being given to the Clause-8 of the notification dated 19.3.2018, the contention of the petitioner, as pleaded, in brief, is that, he is consistently running the foreign liquor shop/retail outlet based exclusively under the terms and conditions of the licence granted in his favour, way back in 2015-16 from the shop situated at 131/1, Dev Tower, Rajpur Road, Jakhan, Dehradun. He submits that for the year 2017-18, he had been issued with the licence for the sale of foreign liquor, which has been renewed till 31.3.2018, and in the light of the terms of licence granted, and on the basis of approximate assessment of sale from his retail outlet, he has accordingly assessed the requirement of probable annual sale and procured the stock of different brands of liquor to be disbursed for sale from his retail outlet. Accordingly, he has stored the liquor of different brands including those of foreign made liquors in the store for sale. 8. It is the contention of the petitioner that under the excise policies which are issued by State from time to time under Section 40 of, ‘The Uttaranchal (United Provinces Excise Act, 1910) and its Adoption Order 2002’, the State frames the excise policy for each year. Accordingly, the excise policy framed was named as “Uttarakhand Excise Policy Rules, 2018” which was published by State, has been enforced by the impugned notification dated 19.3.2018. He submits that in terms of the Act and the said notification, he had applied for the renewal of licence for the year 2018-19, which was granted in his favour after making the mandatory deposit i.e. the conditional amount of Rs. 2 lakhs before the competent authority and, accordingly, the renewal has been granted in his favour by the Excise Department. The renewal thus granted to the petitioners pertains to wholesale FL-2 of the brands referred in the licence granted on 10.3.2018 as FL-36 (Annexure-2) to Writ Petition. 9. The petitioner for ensuring the renewal of the licence he has submitted an affidavit too on 12.3.2018. It is a case of the petitioner that ever since the grant of licence in his favour and since he has been in the liquor trade for a considerable long time, he had been paying all the duties viz. cess and taxes payable to the Excise Department as well as Department of Sales Tax consistently without any fail. 10. It is a case of the petitioner that ever since the grant of licence in his favour and since he has been in the liquor trade for a considerable long time, he had been paying all the duties viz. cess and taxes payable to the Excise Department as well as Department of Sales Tax consistently without any fail. 10. The petitioners’ ground for challenging the impugned action was also from the view point that after the grant of permission for purchase of goods covered under the licence by way of FL-36, a dealer is required to deal with the liquor purchased in bulk within the period of licence granted in his favour, which ends on 31st March of each year, and in an event if the total stock is not sold out in that particular year of licence, it has to be surrendered or it goes waste. 11. On issuance of the notification dated 19.5.2017 being notification no. 260/23/17/04(01) of 2017, the petitioner contends that he has submitted his application for the licence under Clause-7 after fulfilling all the norms and conditions as stipulated in it. The Notification No. 260/23/17/04(01) of 2017 dated 19.5.2017 in its Clause-7 lays down the norms for sale of foreign liquor/wines in Malls and Departmental Stores. 12. According to the petitioner as per the terms of the licence for the sale of liquor issued in his favour for the period of 2017-18 he could have sold the liquor for the aforesaid period, which was ending on 31st March, 2018. Lest failing which, liquor procured under the licence of 2017-18 cannot be sold and will be a waste. 13. Petitioners are the licence holders dealing with the sale of liquor under the licence granted in their favour by the competent authority under the provisions as contemplated under the Act called as United Provinces Excise Act, 1910 (as adopted by the State of Uttarakhand in 2002), (hereinafter, to be called as “Act of 1910”) Under the said Act, ‘sale’ has been defined under Sub-section (16) of Section 3 of the Act. In its grammatical connotation, it means any transfer otherwise than by way of gift. Chapter-IV of the Act deals with various provisions which regulate manufacture, possession and sale of the liquor as defined under Sub-section (11) of Section 3 of the Act. In its grammatical connotation, it means any transfer otherwise than by way of gift. Chapter-IV of the Act deals with various provisions which regulate manufacture, possession and sale of the liquor as defined under Sub-section (11) of Section 3 of the Act. The definition of liquor, as contained under the Act, is quoted hereunder :- “(11) “liquor” means intoxicating liquor and includes spirits of wine, spirit, wine, tari, pachwai, beer and all liquid consisting of or containing alcohol, also any substance which the State Government may, by notification declare to be liquor for the purposes of this Act;” 14. Streamline of Section 24-A, as inserted by U.P. Act No. 20 of 1972, gives an exclusive power to the Excise Commissioner, to grant to any person a licence or licences for the exclusive or other privilege in respect of dealing with the foreign liquor, within the territory, specified in the licence. It confers ample powers to regulate the selling of liquor from the retail outlet and as well as by way of wholesale. All these provisions would fall to be within the policy making domain of authorities statutorily created under the State to lay parameters regulating the sale of liquor. 15. For the purposes of brevity, Section 24-A of the Act is quoted hereunder:- “[24-A. Grant of exclusive or other privilege in respect of foreign liquor. – (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 31, the Excise Commissioner may grant to any person a licence or licences for the exclusive or other privilege. – (a) of manufacturing or of supply by wholesale, or of both; or (b) of manufacturing or of supplying by wholesale, or of both and selling by retail; or (c) of selling by wholesale (to wholesale or retail vendors); or (d) of selling by retail at shops (for consumptions ‘off’ the premises only, any foreign liquor in any locality. (2) The grant of licence or licences under clause (d) of sub-section (1) in relation to any locality shall be without prejudice to the grant of licences for the retail sale of foreign liquor in the same locality in hotels and restaurants for consumption on their premises. (3) Where more licences than one are propose to be granted under clause (d) of subsection (1) in relation to any locality for the same period, advance intimation of the proposal shall be given to the prospective applicants for every such licence. (3) Where more licences than one are propose to be granted under clause (d) of subsection (1) in relation to any locality for the same period, advance intimation of the proposal shall be given to the prospective applicants for every such licence. (4) The provisions of Section 25, and proviso to Section 39 shall apply in relation to the grant of licence for an exclusive or other privilege under this section as they apply in respect of the grant of a licence for an exclusive privilege under Section 24.]” 16. The necessity for this Court to deal with Section 24-A of the Act, is essentially required to be discussed at this juncture itself on account of argument which has been extended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the restriction which has been imposed by Clause-8 of the Notification dated 19th March, 2018, issued by the State, while exercising powers under Section 40 of the Act, being arbitrary and violative of Article 19 (1) (g) and 301 of the Constitution of India, alleging thereof that by insertion of such Clause-8, it has resulted into infringement of the right to business as claimed by the petitioners, to be guaranteed under the Constitutional mandate. 17. On scrutiny of Section 24-A of the Act, at once, it is to be noticed that it uses the word “privilege”, meaning thereby, the State exercises its power to control and lay down the modalities under which the liberty for dealing with the liquor under licence granted under the Act, could be granted, regulated, controlled and curtailed. 18. Section 24-A of the Excise Act, 1910, uses the word a grant of “privilege”, the term privilege has not been dealt with under the Act. But, in its literal meaning, it means a right conferred under certain conditions to a person under a supposition of law, when they fulfilled a certain conditions to engage in a business under a law (privilege) granted by the State. Which otherwise in the absence of such legal grant or privilege, the individual would be disentitled to do the Act which is covered by the privilege conferred to him. Which otherwise in the absence of such legal grant or privilege, the individual would be disentitled to do the Act which is covered by the privilege conferred to him. In the instant case, the trade of liquor under the license is a grant of privilege u/s 24-A of the Act granted under the restrictions of under Section 40, which cannot be independent and unfettered and it is bound to be circumscribed by the restrictions within the framework Act or law as applicable. 19. This term “privilege” can also be visualized from another perspective. Though it carries variety of meaning, but that it is a distinct status conferred unlike other common right which is available to a citizen. In other words, it could be said that the term privilege connote some powers of the special grant by the state under the exercise of its sovereign powers and it would not be inappropriate to say it is a special permission or a consent which the sovereign act of State in its discretion has guaranteed to an individual, which otherwise is exclusively withheld by the State under the law. It would not be inappropriate also to construe that the words privilege carries the idea of permission or a permissive use of an authority and such a privilege cannot be immune to the restrictions taking into consideration the wider social perspective which is involved in the instant controversy. In a judgment reported in AIR 1988 Ker 75 (Full Bench) in the case of P. Bhaskaran and Ors. Vs. Additional Secretary, Agricultural (Co-operation) Department, Trivandrum and Ors. has dealt with the term “privilege”. It provides that it to be a broad and a comprehensive right or an advantage or a peculiar benefit or a favour given to a person, a firm, company beyond the common advantage which is available to a citizen. It has held that this privilege which is a peculiar in nature and advantage a person enjoys would always be subject to the stipulations and limitations of the grant under law and its enjoyment cannot be contrary to the general rule as it happens to be a special enjoyment by way of an exemption from general obligations and exceptions. Para 17 of the said judgment reads as follows: “17. Where there is a right, there is a duty. Where it is only a privilege, it is only liberty without any corresponding duty. Para 17 of the said judgment reads as follows: “17. Where there is a right, there is a duty. Where it is only a privilege, it is only liberty without any corresponding duty. Privilege provides an opportunity to choose among alternatives. Privilege can be the dispensation of a bounty, a conferment of a personal benefit or advantage, a sanction of immunity or the grant of an exemption. Privilege is thus essentially discretionary. It may or may not be granted Privilege has thus no compulsive element and is thus not judicially enforceable. When there is no duty to enforce a privilege, there can be sanction for its breach. Privilege cannot be equated with right, and failure to grant a privilege does not attract any sanction. Privilege is essentially personal while right is generally universal. Privilege is permissive, right is prerogative. Right has a larger content. Privilege is in a narrow compass. But both right and privilege can be regulated by statute and are subject to constitutional limitations, When once a privilege is granted, it ripens into a right The Government have thus the privilege of granting permission to conduct trade in liquor, for, none has a fundamental right to carry on such trade. The grant of privilege is itself subject to the Abkari laws. Privilege may extend to several aspects and embrace several fields. When thus the distinction between the two jural concepts of "privilege" and "right" is borne in mind, interpretation of Rule 200 does not pose serious complications. Moreover, the saving clause is intended to extend the advantage and benefits conferred on existing employees and not to carry forward the harmful hostile effects of the preexisting period. It, therefore, seems to us to be clear that Rule 200 intended to preserve all the rights which the existing employees were entitled before 1-1-1974 and also to the privilege of emoluments which they were so entitled under the earlier bye-laws or rules. The extent of the right preserved cannot be affected by limiting its application to emoluments and the contention that right to emoluments alone was saved under this rule cannot be accepted.” 20. AIR 1974 SC 2061 in the case of “Isha Valimohamed and Anr. Vs. The extent of the right preserved cannot be affected by limiting its application to emoluments and the contention that right to emoluments alone was saved under this rule cannot be accepted.” 20. AIR 1974 SC 2061 in the case of “Isha Valimohamed and Anr. Vs. Haji Gulam Mohamad and Haji Dada Trust, though the Apex Court was dealing with the matter under Bombay Rents, Holding and Lodging Houses Rates (Control), Act as applied to Gujarat State Saurashtra Rent (Control) Act, 1951, has laid privilege, is a legal freedom on part of one person as against another to do a given an otherwise restricted act as a legal freedom but within the scope of law. Paragraph 15 of the said judgment reads as follows:- “15. We think that the respondent-landlord had the legal freedom as against the appellants to terminate the tenancy or not. The appellants had no right or claim that the respondent should not terminate the tenancy and the respondent had, therefore, the privilege of terminating it on the ground that appellants had sub-let the premises. This privilege would survive the repeal. But the problem would still re-main whether the respondent had an accrued right or privilege to recover possession of the premises under S. 13(1) of the Saurashtra Act on the ground of the subletting before the repeal of that Act. The fact that the privilege to terminate the tenancy on the ground of sub-letting survived the repeal does not mean that the landlord had an accrued right privilege to recover possession under S. 13(1) of that Act as that right or privilege could arise only if the tenancy had been validly terminated before the repeal of the Saurashtra Act. 21. The Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment reported in AIR 1997 SC 1493 in the case of “State of Orissa and others Vs. Narain Prasad and others, etc. etc.” was a case dealing with the issue of lifting liquor under Bihar and Orrissa Excise Act, has also held that the privilege or a grant of a license/permit can too be described as a privilege but when it comes to the laws pertaining to the liquor, it has to be within the four corners of restrictions contemplated under the Act. Paragraph 34 of the said judgment reads as under :- ”34. It is difficult to agree with Mr. Sorabjee. Paragraph 34 of the said judgment reads as under :- ”34. It is difficult to agree with Mr. Sorabjee. Firstly, these observations are found in the opinion of Oza, J. alone. The majority opinion does not express any opinion on this aspect. Secondly, what does the expression "privilege" mean in the context of intoxicating liquors. The expression is not defined in the Act. In the context of excise enactments, the expression "privilege" really means the licence or permit granted by the State. We may explain : the State is entitled to prohibit the trade in intoxicating liquors altogether; it can impose a total ban; no citizen can claim any fundamental right to manufacture or to trade in these liquors; it is, however, open to the State to lift the ban partially and allow the trade in liquor to be carried on in the manner prescribed; the State says that a citizen can trade in liquor only under a licence to be granted by it for the consideration specified in that behalf and that the trade therein can be carried on only in accordance with the regulatory provisions prescribed by it in that behalf. It is this grant of licence/permit, which is called or is described sometimes as grant of "privilege". We do not think that the observations of Oza, J. relied upon by Mr. Sorabjee can be understood as disabling the State from granting licences and permits for trading in and/or manufacture of intoxicating liquors for a consideration. Nor can they be understood as precluding the State from carrying on the trade or manufacture of said liquors by itself or its agents. The learned Judge seems to have looked at the matter from an idealistic and moralistic angle. The learned Judge observed that in the light of Articles 47 and 21" it is not possible to accept any privilege of the State having the right to trade in goods obnoxious and injurious health." 22. There is another authority of Hon’ble Apex Court, which has elaborately dealt with the impact and purport of term “privilege” under law which has reported in (2007) 3 SCC 184 in the case of “Raja Ram Pal Vs. There is another authority of Hon’ble Apex Court, which has elaborately dealt with the impact and purport of term “privilege” under law which has reported in (2007) 3 SCC 184 in the case of “Raja Ram Pal Vs. The Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha and Ors.”, though privilege is a special right advantage or benefit conferred on a particular person or a class of person or a firm as against another person for doing a certain act since it being a distinct from a common right which is enjoyed by all persons, it is bound to be restricted by law. In this judgment, as rendered by five-Judges Bench of Apex Court, Chief Justice Sabharwal was writing himself as well as Justice K.G. Balakrishnan and D.K. Jain had dealt with the terms “privilege” in the following manner : “64. The term 'privilege in law' is defined as immunity or an exemption from some duty, burden, attendance or liability conferred by special grant in derogation of common right. The term is derived from an expression 'privilegium' which means a law specially passed in favour of or against a particular person. 65. May, in his "Parliamentary Practice", has defined parliamentary privilege as "the sum of the peculiar rights enjoyed by each House collectively as a constituent part of the High Court of Parliament, and by members of each House individually, without which they could not discharge their functions, and which exceed those possessed by other bodies of individuals". Thus, privilege, though not part of the law of the land, is to a certain extent an exemption from the ordinary law.” 23. The same judgment, a concurrent view has been expressed by the Hon’ble Judges while dealing with the term “privilege” as dealt in para 466 which means a privilege or right conferred to an individual within the framework of law. Paragraph 464 and 467 of the said case read as follows: “464.Though all the three expressions, powers, privileges and immunities are invariably used in almost all Constitutions of the world, they are different in their meanings and also in contents. 465. 'Power' means 'the ability to do something or to act in a particular way'. It is a right conferred upon a person by the law to alter, by his own will directed to that end; the rights, duties, liabilities or other legal relations either of himself or of other persons. 465. 'Power' means 'the ability to do something or to act in a particular way'. It is a right conferred upon a person by the law to alter, by his own will directed to that end; the rights, duties, liabilities or other legal relations either of himself or of other persons. It is a comprehensive word which includes procedural and substantive rights which can be exercised by a person or an authority.” 24. The Notification dated 19.03.2018, which has been partially put to challenge, petitioner confines its challenge to Clause-8 only. It is a Notification which has been issued by the State Government by exercising its powers under Section 40 of the Act read with Section 21 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904. Section 40 of the Act deals with the Rule making power of the State Government to make Rules for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of this Act, while dealing with the sale of liquor and excise business in the State. 25. On a reference to Sub-section (2) of Section 40 of the Act which deals with the Rule making powers of the State under which the impugned notification has been issued. It grants ample power to the State Government for regulating the wholesale or retail sale of liquor, period of licence, the localities for which the sale could be made and to prescribe the procedure to be followed for grant of licence and ascertaining the procedure before the licence is granted. Section 40 of the Act is quoted hereunder :- “40. Power of State Government to make rules. Section 40 of the Act is quoted hereunder :- “40. Power of State Government to make rules. – (1) The State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act or other law for the time being in force relating to excise revenue : [Provided that the Uttar Pradesh Licensing under the Surcharge Fee System Rules, 1968, made by the Excise Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh, with the previous sanction of the State Government, as amended by the Excise Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh, from time to time, before the commencement of this Act, shall, until altered or repealed by the State Government by rules made under this section, be deemed to be and always to have been as valid and effective as if the said rules were duly made by the State Government under this section.] (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the State Government may make rules- (a) regulating the delegation of any powers by the Excise Commissioner or Collector under Section 10(2)(h);] (b) prescribing the powers and duties of officers of the Excise Department; (c) prescribing the manner in which appeals or revisions shall be presented and the procedure for dealing with such appeals and revisions]; (d) regulating the import, export, transport or possession of any intoxicant; (e) regulating the periods and localities for which, and the persons to whom, licences for the vend by wholesale or by retail of any intoxicant may be granted; (f) prescribing the procedure to be followed and the matters to be ascertained before any licence for such vend is granted for any locality; (g) for the prohibition of the sale of any intoxicant to any person or class of persons; (h) for the grant of expenses to witnesses and compensation for loss of time to persons released under Section 49 on the ground that they have been improperly arrested and to persons charged before a Magistrate with offences punishable under the Act but acquitted; (i) regulating the power of excise officers to summon witnesses from a distance under the provisions of Section 49; (j) for declaring the excise officers to whom, and the manner in which, information or aid should be given under Section 56; (k) for the prohibition of the employment by the licence holder of any person or class or persons to assist in his business in any capacity whatsoever; (l) for the prevention of drunkenness, gambling or disorderly conduct in or near any licensed premises and the meeting or remaining of persons of bad character in such premises; (m) for the grant of rewards to officials, officers or informers by the Collector out of and upto fifty per cent, of composition fee and by the Magistrate trying the case, out of and upto fifty per cent, of fine recovered under the Act.]” 26. The Excise revenue has been defined under sub Section (1) of Section 3. Looking to the definition of excise revenue in the light of restriction which was being sought to be enforced by invocation of the Rules of 2018, as framed by the Notification u/s 40, it could be said that looking to the language of Section 40 of the Act, the notification also intended to ensure an augmentation and generation of excise revenue for the State. 27. Primarily, the cause of action, which the petitioner wants to enforce by virtue of the present Writ Petition by giving challenge to Clause-8 of the Notification No. 310 dated 19.03.2018, is on a premise that the provision incorporated under Cluase-8 to the effect that for carrying the business of liquor as defined under the Act in Mall or Departmental Store, the condition imposed by Clause-8 of the Notification, that the previous trends of business/sales of the licence holder is to be taken into consideration, and also that it is only those traders or licence holders who have achieved the total sale turn over of Rs.5 crores from their Departmental Store or Mall, for the previous financial year would be granted licence for retail sale of liquor. However, the condition also drawn that this fact was also directed to be established by the GST certificate and other documents which was required to be filed by aspirant of licence while applying for retail outlet licence. It is this Clause-8 which stipulates that there has to be minimum turn over of Rs.5 crores for the grant of licence for the sale of liquor in Malls and Departmental Store and is a grudge of the petitioner, alleging it to be arbitrary and mala fide, being violative of Article 14, 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India as it restricts trade opportunity of the applicants. 28. He submits that in terms of the policy as issued by Notification No. 260/XXIII/2017/04(01)/2017 dated 19th May, 2017, Clause-7 of the said notification dealt with the norms for grant of licence of sale of foreign liquor/wines in the Mall, Departmental Stores etc. 28. He submits that in terms of the policy as issued by Notification No. 260/XXIII/2017/04(01)/2017 dated 19th May, 2017, Clause-7 of the said notification dealt with the norms for grant of licence of sale of foreign liquor/wines in the Mall, Departmental Stores etc. The terms and conditions of Clause-7 of the notification dated 19.5.2017 is quoted hereunder: ^^7- izns'k esa ekWYl@fMikVZesUVy LVksj esa fons'kh efnjk@okbZu dh fcØh%& izns'k esa ekWYl@fMikVZesUVy LVksj esa fons'kh efnjk :i;s 400 izfr cksry bZŒMhŒihŒ ls vf/kd bZŒMhŒihŒ dh cksryksa@leqnzikjh; vk;frr ch;j@leqnzikjh; vk;kfrr okbZu ,oa Hkkjr esa cuh okbZu dh fcØh djus dh vuqefr nh tk;sxh RkFkk budk vuqKkiu 'kqYd :i;s 2-00 yk[k o"kZ ;k o"kZ ds Hkkx ds fy, fu;r gksxkA ekWYl@fMikVZesUVy LVksj dks fuEu ,eŒthŒMhŒ nj ij ,QŒ,yŒ&2 ls efnjk dk mBku djuk gksxk] ekWYl@fMikVZesUVy LVksj esa vf/kdre 3 nqdku rd [kksyus ij fopkj fd;k tk;sxk%& Øe la[;k ,Dl vklouh dk ewY; ,eŒthŒMhŒ dh nj izfr cksry 1 400 ls vf/kd :i;s 474@& leqnzikjh; vk;kfrr ch;j@okbZu ij 'kqYd ,QŒ,yŒ&5 Mh ds leku ns; gksaxsA** 29. Before the commencement of 2017-18 financial year, as a matter of fact the Notification No. 260/XXIII/2017/04(01)/2017 dated 19th May, 2017, was published laying down the modalities for dealing with the foreign liquor for its sale in Mall and Departmental Stores for the said financial year 2017-18, running from 01.6.2017 to 31.3.2018, as of now the same has lost its significance with lapse of time. Subsequently, yet another notification has been issued by the Excise Department of the State Government being Notification No. 250/XXIII/18/04(01)/2018 dated 19.3.2018, laying modalities for grant of licence for the year 2018-19. As compared to Clause-7 of the notification dated 19.5.2017 referred above, the notification of 19.3.2018 too in its Clause-8 also dealt with the condition of sale of liquor and the manner in which it is to be sold in Malls/Departmental Stores. As compared to Clause-7 of the notification dated 19.5.2017 referred above, the notification of 19.3.2018 too in its Clause-8 also dealt with the condition of sale of liquor and the manner in which it is to be sold in Malls/Departmental Stores. Clause-8 of Notification No. 250/XXIII/18/04(01)/2018 dated 19.3.2018 it qualified the earlier norms, same is quoted hereunder: ^^jkT; esa ekWYl@fMikVZesUVy LVksj esa jkT; fons'kh efnjk@okbZu dh fcØh&8 jkT; esa ekWYl@fMikVZesUVy LVksj esa fons'kh efnjk dh :i;s 400 izfr cksry bZŒMhŒihŒ ls vf/kd bZŒMhŒihŒ dh cksryksa@leqnzikjh; vk;kfrr ch;j@leqnzikjh; vk;kfrr okbZu ,oa Hkkjr esa cuh okbZu dh fcØh djus dh vuqefr nh tk;sxh rFkk budk vuqKkiu 'kqYd :i;s 3-00 yk[k izfro"kZ ;k o"kZ ds Hkkx ds fy, fu;r gksxkA ekWy@fMikVZesUVy LVksj dks fuEu ,eŒthŒMhŒ nj ij ,QŒ,yŒ&2 ls efnjk dk mBku djuk gksxk] fdlh ekWy esa vf/kdre 3 nqdku rd [kksyus ij fopkj fd;k tk;sxk%& Øe la[;k ,Dl vklouh dk ewY; ,eŒthŒMhŒ dh nj izfr cksry 1 400 ls vf/kd :i;s 522@& leqnzikjh; vk;kfrr ch;j@okbZu ij 'kqYd ,QŒ,yŒ&5 Mh ds leku ns; gksaxsA fMikVZesUVy LVksj esa fuxZr vFkok uohuhd`r fd;s tkus okys vuqKkiuksa gsrq lEcfU/kr LVksj esa efnjk ds vfrfjDr vU; inkFkksZ ¼mRikn½ dh fcØh dh U;wure lhek :i;s 5 djksM+ ¼ikap djksM+½ fu/kkZfjr dh tkrh gS vFkkZr~ fMikVZesUVy LVksj esa u;k vuqKkiu ;k iqjkus vuqKkiu dk uohuhdj.k rHkh fd;k tk;sxk tc og lEcfU/kr foHkkx ls iznRr~ izek.k i= ¼thŒ,lŒVhŒ lfVZfQdsV½ izLrqr djsxk fd mldk xr~ foRrh;o"kZ esa vFkok vkosnu djus dh frfFk rd foRrh; o"kZ esa efnjk ds vfrfjDr vU; inkFkksZ ¼mRikn½ dh fcØh dk U;wure VuZvksoj :i;s 5 djksM+ ¼ikap djksM+½ jgk gSA** 30. As per the terms of the said clause of the impugned notification, it provides that for the purposes of opening the retail outlet in the State Malls/Departmental Stores, and for permission for the sale of foreign liquor, a certain categories of wines, to be sold was permitted under the licence, and in particular, the wines thus available to be sold from Malls and Departmental Stores were to be indigenously manufactured. Another condition which was stipulated that in terms of the licence granted under Clause-8 for the sale of liquor from Departmental Stores or Malls it laid a stipulation, that apart from sale of liquor there had to be a minimum sales turnover of Rs. 5 crores by sale of products other than liquor from Malls or Departmental Stores, applicant for licence under the impugned notification. 5 crores by sale of products other than liquor from Malls or Departmental Stores, applicant for licence under the impugned notification. It was provided that either for the new licence or the renewal of the old licence for the sale of liquor from the Departmental Stores or Mall could be granted only when the applicant places on record the certificate issued by the competent authorities under the GST Act certificate to the effect that the turn over from the said store for the previous financial year was at least Rs. 5 crores. 31. The petitioners, in support of their contentions, had placed reliance on various judgments as referred in the Writ Petitions. These authorities would be dealt with independently at a later stage of the judgment. 32. The petitioners, herein, have harped upon the principle of Article 14 read with Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India, for the purposes of giving challenge to Clause-8 of the Notification. Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India though provides protection of rights, regarding the right of a citizen to practice any profession or carry on any occupation or trade and business but this right is not absolute in nature rather is subject to the condition as stipulated and to be falling under norms of Article 19 (6) of the Constitution of India. Article 19 (6) of the Constitution of India, confers power on the State to impose reasonable restrictions on any trade and business and gives an overriding power to restrict the rights protected under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, whereby, the State can impose reasonable restriction taking into consideration, the interest and welfare of the public at large. Article 19 (1) (g) is quoted hereunder :- “(g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. 33. Article 19(6) of the Constitution reads as under:- “19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. Article 19 (1) (g) is quoted hereunder :- “(g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. 33. Article 19(6) of the Constitution reads as under:- “19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. (6) Nothing in sub clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to, (i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise” 34. Language of Article 19(6) has had to be read as if it was imbibing in it a non-obstinate clause to circumscribe the effect of Article 19(1)(g). Rather Article 19(6) creates certain embargoes with regard to excise of rights under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, wherein, it provides a supremacy of law as contemplated when it intends to imposing a reasonable restriction taking into consideration the interest of the public, so far it prescribes and empowers the authority of the state, while exercising its rule making power, as prescribed or empower to the State by an authority under a statute. In the instant case, the rule making power of imposing reasonable restrictions is provided u/s 40 read with u/s 24-A of the Excise Act, 1910. Hence the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that clause 8 of the impugned notification dated 19.03.2018 is amounting to an infringement of Article 19(1)(g) cannot be accepted because the notification intends to achieve the objective and will fall to be within the exception clause of Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. 35. Hence the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that clause 8 of the impugned notification dated 19.03.2018 is amounting to an infringement of Article 19(1)(g) cannot be accepted because the notification intends to achieve the objective and will fall to be within the exception clause of Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. 35. It is settled law and need of modern ear too that no right conferred under a Constitution or a Statute could be an absolute or unrestricted for an individual as the same cannot exist in any modern society of a state. Though there happens to be a constitutional guarantee of fundamental rights in India, but the said guarantee cannot be eclipsed to meet the intentions and purpose contemplated under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. Under the laws the guarantee of fundamental rights as applicable in India is to be read in consonance to the Constitutional guarantee of fundamental rights as applicable in England and United States where it contemplates that there cannot be an unrestricted constitutional guarantee of fundamental rights to citizens. In its unqualified terms, it means that even a liberty of an individual in any Act, whatsoever covered by the fundamental rights under the constitutional is not an absolute and it must yield to the common good, if required. In our country too and as it has already been laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court as reported in AIR 1997 SC 128 in the case of “Krishnan Kakanth Vs. Government of Kerala and others” to be read with the judgment reported in AIR 1950 SC 27 in the case of “A.K. Gopalan Vs. The State of Madras.” Our constitutional mandate does not acknowledge any such type of uncontrolled liberty, nor it contemplates an absolute liberty which would lead to anarchy and disorder in the democratic concept of our Constitution. In other words, it postulates to mean that a liberty guaranteed under the constitution has had to be effectively poised, more particularly, when there arises adjusting the conflict interest of an individual with that of the society. The Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments has laid down the following ratio : (Durga Das Basu – Commentary on the Constitution of India – 8th Edition 2007 Pg.2120). “There cannot be any such thing as absolute or uncontrolled liberty wholly free from restraint for that would lead to anarchy and disorder. The Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments has laid down the following ratio : (Durga Das Basu – Commentary on the Constitution of India – 8th Edition 2007 Pg.2120). “There cannot be any such thing as absolute or uncontrolled liberty wholly free from restraint for that would lead to anarchy and disorder. The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed to the governing authority of the country to be essential it) the safety, health, peace, general order and morals of the community……….Ordinarily every man has the liberty to order his life as he pleases, to say what he will, to follow and trade, occupation or calling at his pleasure and to do any other thing which he can lawfully do without let or hindrance by any other person. On the other hand, for the very protection of these liberties the society must arm itself with certain powers………What the Constitution, therefore, attempts to do in declaring the rights of the people is to strike a balance between individual and social control – Art. 19 of the Constitution gives a list of individual liberties and prescribes in the various clauses the restraints that may be placed upon them by law so that they may not conflict with public welfare or general morality.” 36. The action, which has been put to challenge in the writ petition is in relation to a challenge to clause 8 of the impugned notification dated 19.03.2018 as it aims to meet social objective, the said restriction would satisfy the maxim “sic utere tuo ut alicnium now laedes”. This maxim has got a universal application which goes to say, which lays that it should be within the range of legislature and its action to define the mode and the manner in which any person may so use his rights but not at the cost of causing injury to the others or the society. 37. On scrutiny of Article 19 (6) of the Constitution, it means that the Legislature never intended to confer an unfettered power as protected by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution to a citizen as it has been left open to be regulated by the State under Law by imposing reasonable restriction. 37. On scrutiny of Article 19 (6) of the Constitution, it means that the Legislature never intended to confer an unfettered power as protected by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution to a citizen as it has been left open to be regulated by the State under Law by imposing reasonable restriction. The condition added by Clause-8 of the Notification dated 19th March, 2018, to the effect that for the purpose of grant of licence for the retail outlet in Malls and Departmental Stores, the applicant of the licence has had to have a sales turn over of Rs.5 crores per annum and it had to be duly certified by the competent authorities. This restriction, apart from the fact being a policy decision, it would amount to be a reasonable restriction because, it is the parameter which, in turn, intends to restricts the issuance of number of licence restricting opening of flood gates of retail outlets, confined to a particular class of licence holders having a requisite sales turn over, lest failing which, in the absence of Clause-8, the effect of the same would be that if such a Clause is taken away from the Notification issued under Section 40 of the Act and all the licence holders irrespective of their level of annual sale in a financial year could enjoy the rights of sale of liquor in Malls and Departmental Stores, it would have an effect as if the sale of liquor would be a business open within the domain of open market irrespective of its category. Thus, the restriction, which has been imposed by Clause-8, apart from the fact that it falls well within the ambit of powers given under Section 40 of the Act of 1910, it would also fall to be within the domain of Article 19 (6) of the Constitution of India and incorporation of such Clause cannot be treated as to be unreasonable restriction as it intends to achieve the social objectives by not making the sale of liquor open to all the licence holders irrespective of their quantum of annual sale, hence, such a claim would be regulatory in nature and will fall to be within the ambit of policy decision which cannot be subject to judicial review of a policy decision, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For reference ( AIR 1954 SC 220 , para 7 & 8). For reference ( AIR 1954 SC 220 , para 7 & 8). 38. The rationale which has been assigned by the learned counsel for the petitioners for giving challenge to Clause-8 of the Notification dated 19th March, 2018, is based on a premise that identical provisions, was contained in the Notification No. 260 as enforced w.e.f. 19th May, 2017, for the previous financial year, the same did not contain any such rider or restrictions with regard to the quantum of turn over as a pre condition for the purposes of grant of licence for the sale of liquor from Malls and Departmental Stores. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners to the effect that since the said restriction was not contained in the earlier Rules framed under Section 40 of the Act, and, in particular, as referred by the petitioners to be that of 26th December, 2013 and of 19th May, 2017. As such, Clause-8 of the Notification dated 19th March, 2018 also deserves to be rectified/amended in the light of the provisions of the earlier Notifications to make it compatible, this argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. The reasons being, it is always a policy decision of the State which falls to be within its rule making power under Section 40 of the Act to lay down modalities for the sale of liquor within its territorial domain, depending upon the circumstances and need of a particular time, age old principle or norms of business has always to be moulded to yield maximum result by way of profit/reserve to the State. Apart from it, a policy decision regulating liquor business can never act as a benchmark or precedent for any future or current action. Since the Notification made on 26th December, 2013, 19th May, 2017 and the impugned Notification dated 19th March, 2018, apart from the fact that they fall within the rule making power of the State, it also takes the shape of policy decision of the State Government, framed taking in consideration, requirement of time and situation. Since the Notification made on 26th December, 2013, 19th May, 2017 and the impugned Notification dated 19th March, 2018, apart from the fact that they fall within the rule making power of the State, it also takes the shape of policy decision of the State Government, framed taking in consideration, requirement of time and situation. Hence, as it being a policy decision, it will not fall to be within the domain of judicial review under Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as the policies until and unless being without competence or blatantly arbitrary, contrary to public policy, it cannot be put to judicial scrutiny invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India 39. Learned counsel for the petitioners though not argued but has referred to various authorities in his pleadings to support his contentions while giving challenge to the Clause-8 of the Notification dated 19th March, 2018. It would be unfair on the part of this Court to avoid to deal with the authorities, thus, referred by the petitioners. Hence, the Court, now proceeds to deal with each of the cases as referred in the Writ Petitions. 40. At the first place, the learned counsel for the petitioners has pleaded and placed reliance to the case of N.R. & F. Mills Vs. N.T.G. Brothers reported in AIR 1971 SC 264. Para 9 of the said judgment reads as under :- “9. The Parliament has by the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958, prescribed limitations that an existing rice mill shall carry on business only after obtaining a licence and if the rice mill is to be shifted from its existing location, previous permission of the Central Government shall be obtained. Permission for shifting their rice mill was obtained by the appellants from the Director of Food & Civil Supplies. The appellants had not started rice milling operations before the sanction of the Director of Food & Civil Supplies was obtained. Even if it be assumed that the previous sanction has to be obtained from the authorities before the machinery is moved from its existing site, we fail to appreciate what grievance the respondents may raise against the grant of permission by the authority permitting the installation of machinery on a new site. Even if it be assumed that the previous sanction has to be obtained from the authorities before the machinery is moved from its existing site, we fail to appreciate what grievance the respondents may raise against the grant of permission by the authority permitting the installation of machinery on a new site. The right to carry on business being a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, its exercise is subject only to the restrictions imposed by law in the interests of the general public under Article 19(6)(i)" 41. The said authority, on which, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied, would not be applicable in the present case for the reasons : 1. The said judgment was dealing with the provisions of Rice Milling Industries (Regulations) Act, 1958, which deals with the food-grains and it may not be adjudged on the same pedestal, as that of the provisions of the United Provinces Excise Act, 1910, which deals with the sale of liquor because the business of food-grains and business of liquor cannot be kept on the same pedestal because issue herein is in relation to liquor, where principle of demand and supply for food-grains like rice and that of liquor are entirely different, one caters basic essential need of masses, whereas, other is a luxury for few. 2. The sale of food-grains which falls to be within the ambit of essential commodities, it will meet the need of masses and it would fall to be within the domain of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution for the licence holder to deal with it in terms of the law prevailing and its business cannot be infringed under the Constitution, except as per law, since being a business not detrimental to public policy. But the sale of liquor under a licence granted in terms of the Rules framed under Section 40 of the Act, since being a business which has to be regulated looking its social and welfare aspect, its implications, it cannot be claimed as a matter of fundamental right envisaged under Article 19 (1) (g) as it has already been held by various judgments of the Apex Court that the sale of liquor is not a fundamental right which could be said to be protected under the Constitution of India. 3. 3. Besides this, the said judgment was dealing with the situation where the site of the Rice Mill was being sought to be changed under the Regulation of 1958 and the change of the site was challenged on the ground that it would affect the quantum of business. Hence, it would be unreasonable restrictions and is not a condition which is prevailing in the present case. Hence, this authority would be of no benefit to the petitioners and no reliance can be placed on the same. 42. In the light of the above, the restriction imposed by Clause-8 cannot be treated as to be unreasonable restriction to make it fall beyond the ambit of Article 19 (6) of the Constitution of India. 43. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Lakhanlal etc. Vs. State of Orissa and others reported in AIR 1977 SC 722 , a reference of which, has been made by petitioner, in its para 28, 29 and 32 has held as under : 28. The other question in this respect is whether the following direction in the State Government's order dated August 19, 1970 was valid- “It shall be at the discretion of the State Government to accept or reject any tender without assigning any reason there for to order for calling of fresh tender or otherwise as the case may be.” It will be recalled that the High Court has taken the view that the order dated August 19, 1970 and the tender notice issued in pursuance thereof were bad in law and were liable to be quashed. The High Court has taken the view that Section 29(2)(a) did not authorise the exercise of "such absolute and naked power in determining the sum of money" as was sought to be done by the order dated August 19, 1970. It appears to us however that the power to accept or reject a tender without assigning any reason cannot be said to be arbitrary as Section 29(2) (which has been amended with retrospective effect) itself provides that (i) it shall be exercised in the interest of the Excise revenue", (ii) by the specified authority, and (iii) under such" control as may be specified. As has been stated, the State Government retained the power of accepting or rejecting the tender, or for calling of a fresh tender, to itself, and such an order cannot be said to be an "absolute" or "naked" power of the nature apprehended by the High Court. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision in Jaiswal's case (supra) mentioned above. Moreover it is not disputed before us that the power to accept or not to accept the highest or any bid was expressly reserved under the impugned sale notification. Sub-section (2) of Section 79 of the Act was also amended by the Bihar and Orissa Excise (Second Orissa Amendment) Act 1971 (Act 10 of 1971) with full retrospective effect. Section 17 of the Act validated both the licenses granted and amounts paid or payable therefore, and its validity has not been challenged before us. “29. It will be remembered that Siba Prasad Saha had filed O.J.C. No. 786 of 1970 after the first judgment of the High Court dated May 15,1970, for refund of the license fee and for nonpayment of the fee in future. The State of Orissa feels aggrieved against the decision of the High Court in that case dated April 16, 1971 that a citizen has a fundamental right to deal in liquor. In taking that view the High Court relied on this Court's decision in Narula's case (supra). The decision in Narula's case was considered and explained by this Court in Nashirwar's care (supra) and it has been held as follows,- “It is not correct to read in the decision in Narula's case that there is a fundamental right to do business in liquor. The decision is that dealing in liquor is business and a citizen has a right to do business in that commodity and the State can impose reasonable restrictions on the right in public interest. If the State can prohibit business in liquor as is held in State of Bombay and Anr. The decision is that dealing in liquor is business and a citizen has a right to do business in that commodity and the State can impose reasonable restrictions on the right in public interest. If the State can prohibit business in liquor as is held in State of Bombay and Anr. v. F. N. Balsara [1951]2 SCR 682 this establishes that the State has exclusive right of privilege of manufacture, possession, sales of intoxicating liquor and therefore the State grants such a right of privilege to persons in the shape of license or lease.” In reaching this conclusion this Court took note of the decision in Bhamcha's case (1) that there was no inherent right in a citizen to sell intoxicating liquors by retail, and that it is not a privilege of a citizen of the State, and observed that as Bhamcha's case was a Constitution Bench decision like Narula's case, the latter could not be said to have overruled the former. As has been stated, the matter again came up for consideration in Har Shankar's case (supra) with specific reference to Narula's case, and it was reiterated that "there is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants" and that "in all their manifestations, these rights are vested in the State and indeed without such vesting there can be no effective regulation of various forms of activities in relation to intoxicants." The contrary view of the High Court in impugned judgment is incorrect and must be set aside. 32. ….We have given our reasons already for taking a contrary view, with reference to the decisions in Nashirwar's case and Har Shankar's case. The State has the exclusive right or privilege to manufacture, store and sell liquor and to grant that right to its license holders on payment of consideration, with such conditions and restrictions for its regulation as may be necessary in the public interest. The argument to the contrary is futile and is rejected.” 44. In reaching this conclusion this Court took note of the decision in Bhamcha's case ( 1954 SCR 873 that there was no inherent right in a citizen to sell intoxicating liquors by retail, and that it is not a privilege of a citizen of the State, and observed that as Bhamcha's case was a Constitution Bench decision like Narula's case, the latter could not be said to have overruled the former. As has been stated, the matter again came up for consideration in Har Shankar's case ( AIR 1975 SC 1121 , Har Shankar and others etc. etc. Vs. the Depurty Excise and Taxation Commissioner and others etc.) with specific reference to Narula's case, reported in AIR 1967, SC 1368, and it was reiterated that "there is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants" and that "in all their manifestations, these rights are vested in the State and indeed without such vesting there can be no effective regulation of various forms of activities in relation to intoxicants." The contrary view of the High Court in impugned judgment is incorrect and must be set aside.” Paragraph 53, 54 and 55 of the said judgment reads as under:- “53. In our opinion, the true position governing dealings in intoxicants is as stated and reflected in the Constitution Bench decisions of this Court in Balsara's case, Cooverjee's case, Kidwai's case, Nagendra Nath's case, Amar Chakraborty's case and the R.M.D.C. case, as interpreted in Harinarayan Jaiswal's case and Nashirwar's case. There is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants. The State, under its regulatory powers, has the right to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants-its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. In all their manifestations, these rights are vested in the State and indeed without such vesting there can be no effective regulation of various forms of activities in relation to intoxicants. In "American Jurisprudence", Volume 30 it is stated that while engaging in liquor traffic is not inherently lawful, nevertheless it is a privilege and not a right subject to governmental control, (page 538). This power of control is an incident of the society's right to self-protection and it rests upon the right of the State to care for the health, morals and welfare of the people. Liquor traffic is a source of pauperism and crime, (pp. 539. 540, 541) 54. This power of control is an incident of the society's right to self-protection and it rests upon the right of the State to care for the health, morals and welfare of the people. Liquor traffic is a source of pauperism and crime, (pp. 539. 540, 541) 54. It was unnecessary in Krishna Kumar Narula's case to examine the question from this broader point of view, as the only contention bearing on the Constitutional validity of the provision impugned therein was not permitted to be raised as it was not argued in the High Court, The discussion of the question whether a citizen has a fundamental right to do trade or business in liquor proceeded in that case, avowedly, from a desire to clear the confusion arising from the "different views" expressed by the two Judges of the High Court. This may explain why the Court restricted its final conclusion to holding that dealing in liquor is business and the citizen has a right to do business in that commodity. The court did not say, though such an implication may arise from its conclusion, that the citizen has a fundamental right to do trade or business in liquor. If we may repeat, Subba Rao C. J. said: “We, therefore, hold that dealing in liquor is business and a citizen has a right to do business in that commodity; but the State can make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the said right, in public interests.” It is significant that the judgment in Krishna Kumar Narula's case does not negate the right of the State to prohibit absolutely all forms of activities in relation to intoxicants. The wider right to prohibit absolutely would include the narrower right to permit dealing in intoxicants on such terms of general application as the State deems expedient. 55. Since rights in regard to intoxicants belong to the State, it is open to the Government to part with those rights for a consideration. By Article 298 of the Constitution, the executive power of the State extends to the carrying on of any trade or business and to the making of contracts for any purpose. As observed in Harinarayan Jaiswal's case, "if the Government" is the exclusive owner of those privileges, reliance on Article 19(1)(g) or Article 14 becomes irrelevant. By Article 298 of the Constitution, the executive power of the State extends to the carrying on of any trade or business and to the making of contracts for any purpose. As observed in Harinarayan Jaiswal's case, "if the Government" is the exclusive owner of those privileges, reliance on Article 19(1)(g) or Article 14 becomes irrelevant. Citizens cannot have any fundamental right to trade or carry on business in the properties or rights belonging to the Government, nor can there be any infringement of Article 14, if the Government tries to get the best available price for its valuable rights.'' Section 27 of the Act recognises the right of the Government to grant a lease of its right to manufacture supply or sell intoxicants. Section 34 of the Act read with Section 59(d) empowers the Financial Commissioner to direct that a licence, permit or pass be granted under the Act on payment of such fees and subject to such restrictions and on such conditions as he may prescribe. In such a scheme, it is not of the essence whether the amount charged to the licensees is predetermined as in the appeals of Northern India Caterers and of Green Hotel or whether it is left to be determined by bids offered in auctions held for granting those rights to licensees. The power of the Government to charge a price for parting with its rights and not the mode of fixing that price is what constitutes the essence of the matter. Nor indeed does the label affixed to the price determine either the true native of the charge levied by the Government or its right to levy the same.” 45. The Five-Judges Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Cooverjee B. Bharucha Vs. Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer and others reported in AIR 1954 SC 220 (vol.41 C.N.50), while dealing with almost identical issues pertaining to the impact of reasonable restrictions contemplated under Article 19 (6), pertaining to the business of intoxicating liquor and also the effect as to whether State exclude a particular class of person by creation of monopoly in the business has held that the State while imposing such restrictions has a right to do so as it would fall to be within the purview of Article 19 (6). Para 7 and 8 of the said judgment read as follows:- “7. Para 7 and 8 of the said judgment read as follows:- “7. Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution guarantees that all citizens have the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation or trade or business and clause (6) of the article authorises legislation which imposes reasonable restrictions on this right in the interests of the general public. It was not disputed that in order to determine the reasonableness of the restriction regard must be had to the nature of the business and the conditions prevailing in that trade. It is obvious that these factors must differ from trade to trade and no hard and fast rules concerning all trades can be laid down. It can also not be denied that the State has the power to prohibit trades which are illegal or immoral injurious to the health and welfare of the public. Laws prohibiting trades in noxious or dangerous goods or trafficking in women cannot be held to be illegal as enacting a prohibition and not a mere regulation. The nature of the business is, therefore, an important element in deciding the reasonableness of the restrictions. The right of every citizen to pursue any lawful trade or business is obviously subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, order and morals of the community. Some occupations by the noise made in their pursuit, some by the odours they engender, and some by the dangers accompanying them, require regulations as to the locality in which they may be conducted. Some, by the dangerous character of the articles used, manufactured or sold, require also special qualifications in the parties permitted to use, manufacture or sell them. These propositions were not disputed, but it was urged that there was something wrong in principal and objectionable in similar restrictions being applied to the business of selling by retail, in small quantities, spirituous and intoxicating liquors. It was urged that their sale should be without restriction, that every person has a right which inherits in him, i.e., a natural right to carry on trade in intoxicating liquors and that the State had no right to create a monopoly in them. This contention stands answered by what Field J. said in Crowley v. Christensen 34 Law. Ed. It was urged that their sale should be without restriction, that every person has a right which inherits in him, i.e., a natural right to carry on trade in intoxicating liquors and that the State had no right to create a monopoly in them. This contention stands answered by what Field J. said in Crowley v. Christensen 34 Law. Ed. 620 (A) : "There is in this position an assumption of a fact which does not exist, that when the liquors are taken in excess the injuries are confined to the party offending. The injury, it is true, first falls upon him in his health, which the habit undermines; in his morals, which it weakens; and in the self-abasement which it creates. But as it leads to neglect of business and waste of property and general demoralisation, it affects those who are immediately connected with and dependent upon him. By the general concurrence of opinion of every civilized and Christian community, there are few sources of crime and misery to society equal to the dram shop, where intoxicating liquors, in small quantities, to be drunk at the time, are sold indiscriminately to all parties applying. The statistics of every State show a greater amount of crime and misery attributable to the use of ardent spirits obtained at these retail liquor saloons than to any other source. The sale of such liquors in this way has therefore, been, at all times, by the courts of every State, considered as the proper subject of legislative regulation. Not only may a licence be exacted from the keeper of the saloon before a glass of his liquors can be this disposed of, but restrictions may be imposed as to the class of persons to whom they may be sold, and the hours of the day, and the days of the week, on which the saloons may be opened. Their sale in that form may be absolutely prohibited. It is a question of public expediency and public morality, and not of federal law. The police power of the State is fully competent to regulate the business -to mitigate its evils or to suppress it entirely. There is no inherent right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors by retail; it is not a privilege of a citizen of the State or of a citizen of the United States. The police power of the State is fully competent to regulate the business -to mitigate its evils or to suppress it entirely. There is no inherent right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors by retail; it is not a privilege of a citizen of the State or of a citizen of the United States. As it is a business attended with danger to the community, it may, as already said, be entirely prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evils. The manner and extent of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing authority. That authority may vest in such officers as it may deem proper the power of passing upon applications for permission to carry it on, and to issue licences for that purpose. It is a matter of legislative will only." These observations have our entire concurrence and they completely negative the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. The provisions of the regulation purport to regulate trade in liquor in all its different spheres and are valid. 8. The contentions that the effect of some of these provisions is to enable Government to confer monopoly rights on one or more persons to the exclusion of others and that creation of such monopoly rights could not be sustained under article 19(6) is again without force. Reliance was placed on the decision in Rashid Ahmad v. Municipal Board of Kairana (1950) S.C.J. 324. That decision is no authority for the proposition contended for. Elimination and exclusion from business is inherent in the nature of liquor business and it will hardly be proper to apply to such a business principles applicable to trades which all could carry. The provisions of the regulation cannot be attacked merely on the ground that they create a monopoly. Properly speaking, there can be a monopoly only when a trade which could be carried on by all persons in entrusted by law to one or more persons to the exclusion of the general public. Such, however, is not the case with the business of liquor. Reference in this connection may be made to the observations of Lord Porter in Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales (1950) A.C. 235 (C). This is what his Lordship said : "Yet about this as about every other proposition in this field a reservation must be made. Reference in this connection may be made to the observations of Lord Porter in Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales (1950) A.C. 235 (C). This is what his Lordship said : "Yet about this as about every other proposition in this field a reservation must be made. For their Lordships do not intend to lay it down that in no circumstances would exclusion of competition so as to create a monopoly either in a State or Common wealth agency or in some other body be justified. Every case must be judged on its own facts and it its own setting of time." Further it seems to us that this argument suffers from a fallacy. Under the rules every member of the public who wishes to carry on trade in liquor is invited to make bids. This is the only method by which carrying on of liquor trade can be regulated. When the contract is thrown open to public auction, it cannot be said that there is exclusion of competition and thereby a monopoly is created. For all these reasons we are of opinion that the contention that the provisions of the regulation are unconstitutional as they abridge the rights of the petitioner to carry on liquor trade freely cannot be sustained.” 46. The grant of exclusive privilege under Section 40 read with 24A was nothing but a taxing law to ensure assured generated revenue and acts as a tax to regulate, as no such tax on sale of liquor was permissible or provided under Entry 45 to 63 of List-II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, and further also that it was not excise duty on sale of liquor which had been brought within the meaning of Entry 51 or a fee as provided under Entry 66 of List-II. It has also to be analysed that Entry-8 embodied in the Seventh Schedule only deals with State rule making power, it can be invoked to sustain such imposition such as imposition of excise duty and also for restrictions on sale of liquor, thus, the policy of 19.03.2018 impugned in Writ Petition is well within the ambit of the intention of the Act. 47. 47. As already held that in the light of law as laid down by His Lordships of Apex Court holding that right to liquor trade is not a right which a citizen could claim to conduct as a matter of right embodied in the Fundamental Rights of Constitution. In that view and looking to the intention of Section 24-A of Excise Act, 1910, it is the State’s exclusive right to deal with the privilege to manufacture or sell liquor and while doing so, the State has the power under Section 40 to impose restrictions. 48. I have given my thoughtful reasons already for taking the view, in the light of the decisions in Nashirwar's case ( AIR 1975 SC 360 ) and Har Shankar's case ( AIR 1975 SC 1121 ), in particular, in the facts of present case, AIR 1954 SC 220 . The State has the exclusive right or privilege to manufacture, store and sell liquor and to grant that right to its license holders on payment of consideration, with such conditions and restrictions for its regulation as may be necessary in the public interest. The argument to the contrary is unsustainable and is to be rejected. 49. Apparently, from the aforesaid, it is exclusively the State’s prerogative to manufacture, regulate, sell liquor & store and the condition for the grant of licence to its licence holders on payment of consideration, with such conditions imposed therein would also be necessary for the public interest and it would fall to be within the domain of reasonable restrictions as dealt with under Article 19 (6) of the Constitution of India. 50. I am of the view that by the restriction imposed by Clause-8 of the Notification dated 19th March, 2018, it restricts the grant of licence only to those stores in Malls or Departmental Stores who have attained a particular turn over in the previous financial year perhaps is in the wider interest of the general public as it would result into regulating the sale and not making it as to be sale of liquor to be made in the open market, as that of any other commodity of human consumption. Because if Section 40 is taken into consideration, its intention is quite implicit as it endeavors to restrict the sale of liquor from its easy accessibility to a particular class of society and to a age group and, hence, it would be a reasonable restriction and in the interest of the general public. 51. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance and has pleaded a judgment in the case of Sukumar Mukherjee Vs. State of West Bengal reported in (1993) 3 SCC 724 (wrong citation). But looking to the pleadings in relation thereto, the said ratio which has been dealt with would not be applicable for the reason that the said judgment was dealing with the restrictions which was imposed by the State of West Bengal by enforcement of the West Bengal State Health Services Act, 1990, imposing a restrictions on carrying on the occupation or trade or business by way of private practice by Teachers and Doctors. In the said judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court was ceased with the provisions of Section 9 of the said Act. Rather the pleading of Article 19 (1) (g) in the said judgment was not accepted by the Hon’ble Apex Court even according to the petitioner, the plea of Article 19 (1) (g) for permitting private practice by Teacher and doctor was not accepted and was held to be reasonable restrictions contemplated under Section 19 (6) of the Constitution and held that the protection of Article 19 (1) (g) so far it imposes restrictions on private practice by the Doctors is not available and would be a reasonable restrictions under Article 19 (6) of the Constitution of India. 52. In this regard, it is also essential to point out that the effect of right to practice and process and business conferred under Article 19 (1) (g), has also be to seen from the view point of nature of business and condition prevailing in the business, which is a subject matter of consideration and a common yardstick cannot be extended for interrelating Article 19 (1) (g) and in particular when it has already been held out in various judgments that right to deal to liquor is not a fundamental right under the Constitution. 53. The petitioner had placed reliance on the judgment reported in AIR 1981 SC 873 , M/s Laxmi Khandsri etc. Vs. 53. The petitioner had placed reliance on the judgment reported in AIR 1981 SC 873 , M/s Laxmi Khandsri etc. Vs. State of U.P. and others etc., in which, a challenge was given to Clause-8 of the Notification impugned which was intending to impose restrictions on the crushers from producing khandsari. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the said case was ceased with the issue as to whether the restriction which was imposed from the manufacture of khandsari, to protect and to meet the requirement of white sugar to be made available to the consumer, i.e. general public at a reasonable price. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that such restriction in public interest to be a reasonable restrictions taking into consideration the provisions contained under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, which includes within its ambit the manufacture of sugar and since sugar itself being a commodity covered by List-III, Entry-33, read with Entry 26 of List-II of Seventh Schedule of Constitution, restriction was held to be reasonable and Article 19 (6) with evade applicability of Article 19 (1) (g). The Hon’ble Apex Court, accordingly, held that such a restriction is not protected by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. 54. The Hon’ble Apex Court, dealing with the while in the case of Madhya Bharat Cotton Association Ltd. Vs. Union of India, AIR 1954 SC 634 , has held as under :- “Cotton was listed as an “essential commodity” under Section 2(1) of Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (Act XXIV of 1946), so the right of the State to control, and even to prohibit, transactions in it is evident. “Hedging” is of vital in cotton trading. It not only acts as an insurance and protects cotton growers. Manufactures and merchants but also acts as a cheek on reckless speculation sequently, it is important to have this type of dealing under proper supervision and control, otherwise, s in the case of Banks and insurance companies, innocent persons may have to suffer for the reckless gambling and speculation of handful of persons anxious to get rich quickly. Further, cotton being a commodity essential to the life of the community, it is reasonable to have restrictions which may, in certain circumstances, extend to total prohibition for a time, of all normal trading in the commodity. Further, cotton being a commodity essential to the life of the community, it is reasonable to have restrictions which may, in certain circumstances, extend to total prohibition for a time, of all normal trading in the commodity. Accordingly, we are of opinion that Clause 4 of the Cotton Control Order of 1950 does not offend Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution because sub-clause (5) validates it. ” the Apex Court in this case was dealing with the issue of cotton as being an essential commodity and imposition of reasonable restrictions, in relation thereto, has held that any business dealing with the essential commodity, cannot be placed under the category of normal trading and thus any restriction imposed by the control orders would not offend Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. Para 47, 48 and 49 of the said judgment read as under :- “47. In Madhya Bharat Cotton Association Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr. AIR 1954 SC 634 while considering a restriction imposed for a short time, this Court observed as follows: “Further, cotton being a commodity essential to the life of the community, it is reasonable to have restriction which may, in certain circumstances, extend to total prohibition for a time, of all normal trading in the commodity. Accordingly , we are of opinion that Clause 4 of the Cotton Control Order of 1950 does not offend Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution [because Sub-clause (5) validates it.” (Emphasis supplied) 48. In that "case the restriction imposed on cotton was for a short period of one month in February 1954 and for another month in May 1954; and was held to be justified and a reasonable restraint so as not to be violative of Article 19(1)(g). The situation here is similar. After all the petitioners were working their crushers under a licence granted to them under the Licensing Order and the impugned notification merely seeks to regulate the right and not to abolish the same. 49. For the above reasons the first contention put forward by the petitioners that the restrictions imposed by the impugned notification are unreasonable is hereby overruled and it is held that such restrictions clearly contain the quality of reasonableness and when tested on the touchstone of the principles laid down by the various authorities referred to above, they fully satisfy all the requirements of a reasonable restriction.” 55. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the said authority has held that when the Notification which imposes a reasonable restriction while exercising the powers which are being, and being guided by the Act and Rules framed under law, under which it is framed and it derives its source, it cannot be held to be arbitrary and violative of the rights envisaged by the Constitution. More particularly, when it intends to regulate the condition and circumstances under which the sale has to be regulated. Para 53 of the said judgment is quoted hereunder :- “53. Moreover, the power cannot be said to be arbitrary or unguided because the impugned notification derives its source from Section 3 of the Act of 1955 which clearly lays down sufficient guidelines and the existence of certain conditions for proper distribution of an essential commodity. The said guidelines therefore, govern the authority passing the impugned notification.” 56. Identical circumstances also exist in this case too as the impugned Notification 19.03.2018, too derives its rule making power under Section 40 of the Act of 1910, which confers ample power on State to regulate and restrict the business of sale of liquor, thus the notification did had a statutory force and not arbitrary to bring it under Article 14 of the Constitution. 56. The petitioners place reliance on the case of Minerva Talkies and others Vs. State of Karnataka and others, reported in AIR 1988 SC 526 , wherein, by the said judgment, the licence issued by the State Government for exhibiting movies, prescribing the exhibition of movie in four shows in a day was held to be valid as the ratio was pertaining to the entertainment and would not apply in the present case which deals with the restriction on the sale of liquor in public Malls and Departmental Stores. Hence, the said ratio would not apply in the instant case. 58. The Hon’ble Apex Court had dealt with the concept of reasonable restriction in the case of Uppalapeda Venkataramiah and others Vs. Hence, the said ratio would not apply in the instant case. 58. The Hon’ble Apex Court had dealt with the concept of reasonable restriction in the case of Uppalapeda Venkataramiah and others Vs. Dadi Venkataramiah and others reported in (1983) 4 SCC 354, being imposed in a particular business holding thereof that such restrictions for the purposes either to be included or excluded within the ambit of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution has always to be considered in the light of the nature of business and the condition prevailing in the trade and as to the nature and conditions, and particularly, the social consequence of such business, as the same may differ from trade to trade and no hard and fast straight jacketed formula could be adopted. Para 18 of the said judgment reads as under :- “18. In order to determine the reasonableness of a restriction imposed upon the right guranteed by Article 19(1)(g), the Court must have regard to the nature and the conditions prevailing in that trade. It is obvious that these factors must differ from trade to trade and no hard and fast rules concerning all trades can be laid down. In other words, the pursuit of any lawful trade or business may be made subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be deemed essential by the legislature to be in the interests of the general public. Sub-section (6) of Section 7 undoubtedly restricts the freedom of a citizen to trade “as and where he wills”; indeed it was enacted for the very purpose of controlling business in agricultural produce, live-stock and products of livestock by the establishment of regulated markets in connection therewith. It is difficult to conceive how the restriction imposed by sub-section (6) of Section 7 which interdicts that no person shall purchase or sell any notified agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock in a notified market area, outside the market in that area, can be said to be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interests of the community. In Arunachala Nadar case, the Court repelled the contention based on a similar provision that a person who is having a licence to trade in or about the place where the market is fixed, will be deprived of his livelihood unless he resorts to the market and therefore it was an unreasonable restriction upon his right to do business. It was observed that such a provision was necessary for preventing the business in such agricultural produce being diverted to other places and the object of the scheme being defeated. ” 59. It has been invariably held that any licence holder under an Act or Law applicable to the nature of business is bound by the terms and conditions of the licence and the Rules framed thereunder, more particularly, when it intends to impose a reasonable restrictions in particular to the nature of business which may have an impact on the public at large and has its wide social implications. 60. Lastly, reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the case of Moti Lal and others Vs. The Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in AIR (38) 1951 Allahabad 257. It is a judgment which has been rendered by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court on an issue which was arising out of the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and was pertaining to the grant of temporary permit. Since the facts of the said case being different and distinct to the one at hand, which pertains to trade in liquor, the ratio therein, cannot be equated with liquor trade, will not apply and be of any benefit to the petitioner. As such, this Court is in absolute disagreement on its applicability. 61. Another foundation on the basis of which the petitioners questions Clause-8 of the Notification of 19th March, 2018 is that they are trying to seek parity to the policy of 2017 and 2018 alleging them to be contradictory to one another. 62. While extending the argument from the said view point, the learned counsel for the petitioner has lost sight of the fact that the policy regulating the sale of liquor in the State, which is statutorily regulated under the Rules framed under Section 40 of the Act, is on annual basis. 62. While extending the argument from the said view point, the learned counsel for the petitioner has lost sight of the fact that the policy regulating the sale of liquor in the State, which is statutorily regulated under the Rules framed under Section 40 of the Act, is on annual basis. There cannot be a uniform formula for entirety which could be adopted for continuing with the aged old principle regulating the business of liquor to continue for all times to come, because the Rule making power always intends to meet the changed requirement of the changed society, changed circumstances, the requirement of the public and to regulate the liquor business. Hence, no comparison can be derived from the convonents of policy of 2013 or 2017, further more, under law no parity would be sought on that basis under law as there is no legal force in the arguments extended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the same principle is to be followed for the liquor policy for all times to come. 63. Though unfounded and without any material being brought on record, the mala fide which is alleged that the State intends to help the liquor Mafias to manipulate the trade of liquor by insertion of Clause-8 of the Notification dated 19th March, 2018, is without any basis and material on record, rather to the contrary as it has already been held that the Notification dated 19th March, 2018 has a statutory force and it intends to meet a social objectives restricting the sale of liquor in open would be in the wider interest of public at large and of the society. Hence, it cannot be said that it was to assist the Liquor Mafias. Besides this, the pleading to this effect has been raised by petitioner of Writ Petition No. 831 of 2018, in para 21 of the writ petition. The said para is sworn on the basis of the information received, however, the petitioner has not divulged the source from which the information has been received and its nature, hence, cannot be relied. 64. The grievance and the contention of the petitioner that such a condition pertaining to the fixation of minimum limit of sales turn over of Rs. The said para is sworn on the basis of the information received, however, the petitioner has not divulged the source from which the information has been received and its nature, hence, cannot be relied. 64. The grievance and the contention of the petitioner that such a condition pertaining to the fixation of minimum limit of sales turn over of Rs. 5 crores, as to be the basis for consideration of renewal of a licence or grant of a new licence was creating an impediment in their business efforts and amounts to be an infringement of their rights conferred under Article-14&19 (1)(g) of the Constitution of India, on account of reasons already given in aforegoing paragraphs and reasons assigned therein cannot be sustained and is not acceptable by this Court, hence, rejected. 65. As far as relief No. 2 of Writ Petition No. 832 of 2018 (M/S) is concerned relating to the renewal of licence of the petitioner, based on the recommendation of the Excise Inspector dated 3rd March, 2018, it would be open for the respondents to consider and decide the application for renewal of licence in accordance with law. 66. For the reasons assigned above, this Court finds that no anomaly or error apparent in Clause-8 of the Notification dated 19th March, 2018. As such, the Writ Petition fails and is dismissed. 67. No order as to costs.