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2018 DIGILAW 276 (KER)

Vatakara Co-Operative Ayurveda Hospital Ltd. v. Puthalath Thazha Kuniyil Ayisha W/o Moidu

2018-03-21

DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN, P.N.RAVINDRAN

body2018
ORDER : Devan Ramachandran, J. The tenants, who have suffered the discomfiture of two orders against them from the courts below, ordering their eviction from the petition schedule properties, have come up before us in this revision. 2. The contentions of the tenants/petitioners herein are foundationalised on certain very specific legal issues impelled along with the rather routine defences against claims of landlords for eviction on grounds of bonafide need. 3. We will deal with the contentions presently, after we place on record certain essential facts. 4. R.C.P.No.6 of 2014 on the files of the Rent Control Court, Vatakara, from which this revision arises, was filed by respondents 1 and 2 herein, who concededly are the owners of the petition schedule shoprooms. The said schedule consists of three items: the first consisting of eight rooms, the second consisting of four rooms and the third consisting of one room of the same building. The third respondent is the father of the second respondent and the husband of the first respondent. In other words, respondents 1 and 2 are mother and daughter, who are the owners of the petition schedule properties and the third respondent, being their husband and father respectively, is said to be in possession and control of the petition schedule properties. 5. The Rent Control Petition was filed by the respondents herein projecting the case of bonafide need for the third respondent on the ground that he intends to start a business of his own. The third respondent, who got himself examined as PW1, stated unequivocally that he has no other business of his own and that he has been working pro bono as the Secretary of a charitable society. He expressed his desire to obtain the petition schedule rooms for starting an educational institution and for such purpose he contended that the said rooms are the most suitable and appropriate. 6. We notice that the Rent Control Court allowed the petition finding in favour of the respondents, which was challenged by the appellants by filing an appeal before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Vatakara, numbered as R.C.A.No.134 of 2014, which also has concluded against them, confirming the views and findings of the Rent Control Court. The appellants have filed this revision petition impugning the concurrent findings of the courts below, which have found against them and are consequently assailing the orders of eviction on various grounds. 7. The appellants have filed this revision petition impugning the concurrent findings of the courts below, which have found against them and are consequently assailing the orders of eviction on various grounds. 7. We have heard Sri. P.B. Krishnan and Sri. Zubair Pulikkool, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the revision petitioners and Sri. B. Krishnan, learned counsel who has entered appearance on behalf of the respondents. 8. Before we consider the merits of the legal contentions of the petitioners, we must also see certain specific assertions made by them on facts. 9. The first petitioner is stated to be a co-operative society, registered under the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and the second petitioner is an individual who claims to have been the erstwhile Secretary of the first petitioner. According to their pleadings, the first and second items of the petition schedule, totally comprising of 11 shop rooms, were let out by the landlords to the first petitioner by two agreements, dated 7.10.2004 and 16.4.2011; whereas the third item of the petition schedule which consists of one other shop room in the same building, was let out to the second petitioner in his individual name under another lease agreement dated 16.4.2011. 10. The first petitioner says that they are running an ayurvedic hospital in the petition schedule items 1 and 2 shoprooms while the second petitioner maintains that the room in his possession is being used for his own purposes. According to them, the plea of need of the third respondent now made by the respondents is not bonafide and they allege that this is only a ruse to obtain eviction of the shop rooms. In addition to this, they contend that the Rent Control Petition against the first petitioner, showing it to be represented by the second petitioner, was incompetent since, at the time when it was filed, the second petitioner was not its Secretary but a certain Sri. V. Vijesh. They thus assert that the entire proceedings against the first petitioner, which proceeded allegedly with a wrong person being shown as its Secretary, is untenable and liable to be declared null and void, because as it was incorrectly represented, it had been denied the opportunity to contest the claims and allegations of the landlords. 11. V. Vijesh. They thus assert that the entire proceedings against the first petitioner, which proceeded allegedly with a wrong person being shown as its Secretary, is untenable and liable to be declared null and void, because as it was incorrectly represented, it had been denied the opportunity to contest the claims and allegations of the landlords. 11. Even though not raised in their pleadings in the Rent Control Petition or in the appeal, the appellants have sought, in this revision, to raise for the first time a new contention, which they assert is one in law. They contend that the proceedings against them are bad on account of misjoinder of causes of action, since, according to them, the respondents have in the Rent Control Petition sought eviction of the petition schedule rooms, which are in occupation of the two revision petitioners under different lease agreements. They thus assert that the respondents could not have united the different causes of action, which they may have against the revision petitioners separately, in a single petition. They rely for support to this contention, on the judgment of the Full Bench of this court in Jamal v. Safia Beevi ( 2005 (2) KLT 359 (FB)). 12. We will begin by first assessing the contentions raised by the revision petitioners before the courts below and then deal with the afore legal contention relating to misjoinder of causes of action. 13. On the allegation that the first revision petitioner herein has been shown to be incorrectly represented in these proceedings, Sri. P.B. Krishnan, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that it is a co-operative society registered under the provisions of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act, and it is shown to be represented by its Secretary, Sri. V.K. Saseendra Babu, who is the second petitioner herein. The facts, as are available from the pleadings and the materials on record, would show that the petitioners contend that there are three lease agreements between them and the respondents herein; out of which two are exclusively in favour of the first petitioner, while the third one is in the personal name and for the sole benefit of the second petitioner-Sri. V.K. Saseendra Babu. 14. Sri. P.B. Krishnan, learned counsel, while conceding that Sri. V.K. Saseendra Babu. 14. Sri. P.B. Krishnan, learned counsel, while conceding that Sri. V.K. Saseendra Babu was indeed the Secretary of the first petitioner society at the time when the lease agreements were entered into in favour of the first petitioner society, asserts that subsequently, in the year 2013, another person by name Sri. V. Vijesh was appointed by the society in his place and, therefore, that the Rent Control Petition ought to have been filed only with that person representing the first petitioner. We understand that this submission is based on the factual assertion that the Rent Control Petition was filed in the year 2014, allegedly after the second petitioner ceased to be the Secretary of the first petitioner society. We notice that averments have been made to the above effect in a counter statement filed by the second petitioner jointly on his own behalf and on behalf of the first petitioner herein before the Rent Control Court. However, no material has been placed on record in proof of this averment and we notice that the courts below were not appraised of any circumstance or fact which would have warranted an inference that there was a change of the incumbent in the post of Secretary of the first petitioner society by the time the Rent Control Petition was filed. Interestingly, this assertion was made by the second petitioner herein in the counter statement filed on behalf of himself as well as the first petitioner society, and hence the onus probandi of establishing this was certainly on him and on no others. That being so, the revision petitioners did not make any effort, either by producing relevant materials or by such other appropriate means, to prove the credibility of their statement that someone else was the Secretary of the first petitioner society. In any event, as we have noticed above, all the pleadings available on record from the side of the petitioners herein have been made by the second petitioner on behalf of the first petitioner as well. Therefore, it can never be even suggested that any prejudice had been caused to the first petitioner society, even assuming that the second petitioner had ceased to be the Secretary and someone was in that seat. Therefore, it can never be even suggested that any prejudice had been caused to the first petitioner society, even assuming that the second petitioner had ceased to be the Secretary and someone was in that seat. This alleged change of incumbent in the post of Secretary of the first petitioner is not relevant either, because they have fully participated in all the proceedings, including before this court and they can never be heard to say that they were not aware of the Rent Control Petition or the appeal because their present Secretary has not been shown in the proceedings to be representing them. 15. This is more so, because pertinently, a certain Sri. V. Vijesh appears to have filed an application before the court below to bring himself on record stating that he is the present Secretary of the society, thereby cementing the ineluctable position that the society was fully cognizant of the proceedings. This can only guide us to conclude that the second petitioner was duly authorised to represent the society in the proceedings and the fact that Sri. V. Vijesh is now alleged to be the Secretary of the first petitioner can only be seen to be an after-thought, subsequent to the filing of their pleadings before the Rent Control Court. Pertinently, even in this petition before us, the first petitioner has been shown to be represented by Sri. Saseendra Babu, who is the second petitioner herein, without any attempt to change the description of the person shown in the cause title, which can also only lead to the indubitable conclusion that Sri. Saseendra Babu is either still continuing as its Secretary or is validly authorised by them. We, therefore, find no merit in this contention of the petitioners and we affirm the conclusions of the courts below relating to this. 16. Sri. P.B. Krishnan, learned counsel for the petitioners then brings our notice to the fact that the respondents have chosen to issue a notice seeking eviction only to the second petitioner herein and that there was no demand made therein for eviction of the first petitioner society from items 1 and 2 of the petition schedule rooms. 16. Sri. P.B. Krishnan, learned counsel for the petitioners then brings our notice to the fact that the respondents have chosen to issue a notice seeking eviction only to the second petitioner herein and that there was no demand made therein for eviction of the first petitioner society from items 1 and 2 of the petition schedule rooms. According to him, in such circumstances, it has to be presumed that the need of the respondents for eviction was only as against the one shop room in the personal possession of the second petitioner, described in item 3 of the petition schedule. He makes this submission on the basis that in the notice, a demand was made to the second petitioner to evict himself from the room, which is in his occupation, on the avowed need of starting a trade and attendant commercial activities for the third respondent. Sri. P.B. Krishan submits that, however, when the Rent Control Petition was filed, the need projected was completely altered and that what is stated by PW1, the third respondent herein, was that he requires all the petition schedule rooms for the purpose of starting an educational institution, with the support of a concern by name “M/s. Mac Tec” which, the third respondent says, is a knowledge and training provider with competence in areas of Information Technology education. Sri. P.B. Krishnan, therefore, says that this is a classic case of a ruse to obtain eviction of the petitioners. 17. Sri. P.B. Krishnan expatiates this submission of his by submitting that since the only notice on record is Ext.B2, which is one that is concededly issued by the respondents to the second petitioner personally, it can only be presumed that the claim of the respondents in the Rent Control Petition is completely an afterthought which was not real or for the reasons stated in the lawyer notice but for other oblique reasons to obtain eviction one way or the other. 18. In answer to these submissions made on behalf of the revision petitioners, Sri. B. Krishnan, the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent submits that it is now settled law that it is not mandatory to issue a notice before filing a Rent Control Petition under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (“the Act” for short). B. Krishnan, the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent submits that it is now settled law that it is not mandatory to issue a notice before filing a Rent Control Petition under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (“the Act” for short). According to him, Ext.B2 notice was issued to the second petitioner indicating the requirement of the third respondent herein with respect to that room but that the need projected by the third respondent was not confined to one room but to all the petition schedule rooms. He says that it is specifically pleaded, which is unchallenged according to him even in cross-examination, that PW1, the third respondent herein, required the room for the purpose of starting an educational institution in the field of Information Technology and that his intention was to start courses with the assistance of “M/s. Mac Tech”, who had offered their expertise and assistance to obtain Government approval for his proposed institution. We cannot find reasons enough to discredit this version of PW1 in his testimony, especially because his version stands unimpeached even in cross-examination and the revision petitioners have not been able to show us, in any credible manner, that the need projected cannot be accepted or found true, particularly in the circumstances as has been narrated by PW1 in his testimony. We, therefore, cannot find any reason to offer our approval to these contentions of the revision petitioners on this account and we find that the courts below have concluded correctly in rejecting these. 19. At this point Sri. P.B. Krishnan interjects to say that the revision petitioners also have a contention that the third respondent is not the landlord of the petition schedule rooms and therefore, he is incapacitated from seeking eviction on the ground of his bonafide need. We are afraid that these issues have been spoken to about and concluded several times before by this court and by the Honourable Supreme Court that the dependency of a person on his wife or child for accommodation is different from financial dependency or other types of dependency. It is now well settled that a person can be dependent on another for accommodation and not for any other purpose. 20. It is now well settled that a person can be dependent on another for accommodation and not for any other purpose. 20. In the facts of this case, we notice that it is the specific assertion of the third respondent that he has no other building in his name and that he is now unemployed. He has shown a desire to start a new business and he asserts that the petition schedule rooms are the only ones that are suitable for such purposes. On this score again, we cannot find favour with the contentions of Sri. P.B. Krishnan, because it is also on record that the third respondent, who is stated to have been earlier running a shop in another tenanted premises, has been directed to evict himself from the said premises under the order in R.C.P.No.43 of 2009 on the files of the Rent Control Court, Vatakara, which was confirmed by the judgment in R.C.A.No.7 of 2010 on the files of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Vatakara and PW1 says that he has thus been evicted from the said room. These facts are also not seen disputed or contested by the petitioners/tenants, which obviously lends support and strength to the need put forward by the third respondent in these proceedings. 21. We further notice from the grounds raised in the petition that the petitioners also contend that eviction of the petition schedule rooms was unnecessary since respondents 1 and 2 herein are already in possession of certain other rooms, over which they had allegedly obtained eviction in the year 2013. We see that both the Rent Control Court and the Rent Control Appellate Authority had bestowed their intent consideration to this issue and had found that the evidence would show that these rooms, after eviction was obtained, was let out to a company by name “Royal Aviation” and that they are still under the possession of this company and, therefore, because there are no other rooms presently available to be profitably enjoyed by the third respondent, these contentions were rejected. We see no reason to differ in any manner from the views taken by the court below and for such reason, we are compelled to affirm the same. 22. That finally brings us to the last contention raised by the petitioners that the Rent Control Petition itself is vitiated and incompetent on account of misjoinder of causes of action. We see no reason to differ in any manner from the views taken by the court below and for such reason, we are compelled to affirm the same. 22. That finally brings us to the last contention raised by the petitioners that the Rent Control Petition itself is vitiated and incompetent on account of misjoinder of causes of action. The factual foundation for this contention appear to be rooted on the fact that only one Rent Control Petition has been filed by the respondents to seek eviction of the petition schedule rooms even though, admittedly, they are covered by different lease agreements, favouring the two petitioners, independent of each other. 23. As we have already noticed above, it is virtually uncontested that the petition schedule items 1 and 2 rooms have been leased to the first petitioner society, whereas petition schedule item 3 is in the possession of the second petitioner by a separate lease agreement. Sri. P.B. Krishnan, learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently predicates that when this factum is conceded by the respondents, the Rent Control Petition itself becomes incompetent and hence liable only to be dismissed. 24. In support of this contention Sri. P.B. Krishnan cites before us the judgment of the Full Bench of this court in Jamal v. Safia Beevi (supra) and points out to paragraph 12 of the judgment wherein the conclusions of the Bench are recorded that a landlord cannot unite different causes of action in a single petition filed against various tenants, whether they are in occupation of the same or different building and that such a petition would be bad for misjoinder of causes of action. According to him, even though in Ext.B2 lawyer notice, the demand for eviction was made only against the second petitioner herein to evict himself on the pretext of a bonafide need of the third respondent, when the Rent Control Petition was filed, the respondents chose to seek eviction of not only that room, but also the other rooms under the tenancy of the first petitioner, merely because all these rooms are part of the same building. This is a classic case, he submits, where the principles of misjoinder of causes of action and misjoinder of parties would apply, since the bonafide need now projected covers even the rooms that are in the possession and occupation of the first petitioner society under a separate lease agreement and hence that the Rent Control Petition itself will have to be seen to be not maintainable and, therefore, liable to be dismissed. 25. The above submissions of Sri. P.B. Krishnan are replied to by Sri. B. Krishnan, learned counsel for the respondents by relying on a later decision of a Division Bench of this court in Kunhamu v. Arun Kumar ( 2010 (3) KLT 640 ). According to him, the view of the Division Bench, which has been indited after referring to the Full Bench judgment in Jamal (supra), is available in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 13 of the said judgment which reads as follows: “7. We have very anxiously considered the rival submissions addressed at the bar. We have gone through the pleadings raised by the parties particularly the Rent Control Petition. The order of the Full Bench in Jamal v. Safia Beevi was passed answering a reference made to the Full Bench on questions elsewhere indicated herein before, and hence the ratio of that order are the answers given, which we have already quoted. Answer No.2 given by the Full Bench clearly shows that the Full Bench was of the opinion that in a situation where a landlord seeks to evict his various tenants occupying different portions of the same structure on the ground of reconstruction under S.11(4)(iv), the landlord is suing for establishing a cause of action in which the tenants are jointly interested and not different causes of action which the landlord is having against the different tenants. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India & Anr. (2006 (4) KLT SN 6 (C.No. 8) SC = 2007 (2) SCJ 263) made an almost exhaustive survey of the statutory provisions and judicial precedents dealing with the concept of cause of action requisite for maintaining actions before courts and Tribunals. Arijith Pasayat (J) and Altamas Kabir (J) in the above judgment have inter alia referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bloom Dekor Ltd. v. Subhash Himatlal Desai & Ors. Arijith Pasayat (J) and Altamas Kabir (J) in the above judgment have inter alia referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bloom Dekor Ltd. v. Subhash Himatlal Desai & Ors. (1994) 6 SCC 322 ), Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar (1998 (2) KLT 765 (SC) = (1998) 6 SCC 514 ), South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises Pvt. Ltd & Ors. ( (1996) 3 SCC 443 ), Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association v. Union of India & Ors. ( (2001) 2 SCC 294 ), Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh ( (1977) 1 SCC 791 ), Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. ( (2000) 7 SCC 640 ), apart from quoting the definition given in Black's Law Dictionary and Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition) for cause of action. On appreciating the judgment of the Supreme Court and the various authorities referred to by the Supreme Court in the said judgment it can be concluded that the cause of action for a petition for eviction under S.11(3) is essentially the conception of a genuine need in the mind of a given landlord to occupy the tenanted premises either by himself or by any of his dependent family members. As cause of action takes in the whole bundle of facts which a plaintiff or a petitioner will have to establish, if traversed, for obtaining relief, it can be stated that cause of action for a proceeding under S.11(3) of Act 2 of 1965 will include the establishment of a landlord - tenant relationship between the parties; the unwillingness on the part of the tenant to vacate despite being informed of the landlord's need and the absence of statutory prohibitions/interdicts such as the third proviso to sub-s.(3), the first proviso to sub-s.(3) and sub-s.(9) of S.11. 8. The cause of action of a given suit or other proceedings can have no relation to the defence contentions taken up. 8. The cause of action of a given suit or other proceedings can have no relation to the defence contentions taken up. In fact we are fortified the above view by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India & another itself wherein their Lordships have stated clearly as follows: “The cause of action has no relation whether to the defence that may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff.” Understanding the concept of cause of action as above, it can be easily found that the cause of action on the basis of which the present Rent Control Petition was instituted by the landlord was one cause of action, which he was jointly having against both the tenants in respect of the whole building, two portions of which were in their possession, on the above view that we have taken regarding the cause of action for the Rent Control Petition, it has to be noticed that answer No.3 given by the Full Bench to the reference made in Jamal v. Safia Beevi cannot have application. Perhaps it is the reasoning behind answer No.2 which applies more to this case. Answer No.2 dealing specifically with S.11(4) (iv) is to the effect that as tenants are jointly interested in the cause of action and as the defences available to them are by and large common there will not be any misjoinder of causes of action or misjoinder of parties, if a single Rent Control Petition is instituted for evicting various tenants occupying different portions of one and the same building governed by different tenancies on the ground under S.11(4)(iv). 9. As for this case which is filed under S.11(3) we have already found that the cause of action is one and the same and that the same is a common or joint cause of action in respect of one and the same corpus i.e. the entire building portions of which are occupied by the two tenants. The cause of action basically is the conception of a need in the mind of the landlord to occupy the entire building for the purpose of doing business. We also notice that it is substantially the same contentions that have been raised by the two tenants. The cause of action basically is the conception of a need in the mind of the landlord to occupy the entire building for the purpose of doing business. We also notice that it is substantially the same contentions that have been raised by the two tenants. Variation between the contentions raised by the two tenants is that one of them raised the contention that the Rent Control Petition is vitiated by misjoinder of causes of action and parties while such a contention is not taken by the other tenant. * * * * * 13. The result of the forgoing discussion is that we are in a position to sustain the impugned judgment of the appellate authority notwithstanding the judgment of the Full Bench. We hold that the cause of action for a Rent Control Petition instituted by a landlord seeking eviction of his several tenants occupying different portions of one and the same building on the only ground under sub-s.(3) of S.11 that he needs to occupy the entire building, is a common or joint cause of action and not two different causes of action against the tenants. We also hold that cause of action for a suit or other proceedings cannot have relation to the defences taken. We also hold that no prejudice has been occasioned to either tenant in this case on account of the landlord instituting one Rent Control Petition seeking eviction of both of them as sufficient opportunity has been afforded to both of them for substantiating all the contentions raised by them. We, therefore, dismiss both the Rent Control Revision Petitions.” 26. We are afraid that an incisive examination of the above judgment of the Division Bench in Kunhamu (supra) from the touchstone of the views of the Full Bench in Jamal (supra) would give rise to certain uncomfortable questions. 27. Even though the ratio in Kunhamu (supra) would not be of aid to the petitioner herein, on account of certain other singular factual factors, to which we will come to later, we deem it necessary, this judgment having been cited before us with the submission that the view of the Full Bench in Jamal (supra) is not relevant or applicable, to express our opinion on the issue relating to misjoinder of causes of action as culled out from a reading of these two judgments, so as to make the position clear for future. 28. The singular issue before the Full Bench in Jamal (supra), as is discernible from the first line of the judgment, was whether 'a landlord can unite different causes of actions against different tenants in a single Rent Control Petition in the event of which such a petition will be bad for misjoinder of causes of actions or misjoinder of parties due to multifariousness'. The contention raised was that a single petition against several tenants is not maintainable and there would be misjoinder of causes of action. The discussion on this issue by the Full Bench is available in paragraphs 8 to 10 of the judgment, which requires to be read and therefore, is extracted as under: “8. Landlord may let out distinct portions of a single structure to various tenants of which one may sublease the premises to a third party which gives rise a cause of action to the landlord under S.11(4)(i) of the Act. Another portion of the same structure let out to another tenant may also be required for the landlord for own occupation which may give rise to a cause of action under S.11(3) of the Act. Failure to pay rent by the tenants may also give rise to a cause of action under S.11(2)(b) of the Act. Bona fide need for reconstruction under S.11(4)(iv) gives, rise to another cause of action against a solitary tenant or against different tenants occupying distinct portions of the same structure. Distinct and separate grounds of eviction are therefore available to the landlord for eviction of the tenants under Ss.11(3) and 11(4)(iv), 11(4)(i) etc. of the Act. So also distinct and separate grounds are available to tenants to defend a petition for eviction. Landlord has to show in an application under S.11(4)(iv) that the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction and the requirement is bona fide and that he has got plan and licence and also the ability to rebuild, he can then successfully prefer a petition. Rent Control Court can then order eviction against all the tenants who are in occupation of the distinct portions of the same structure. Joint interest in the Rent Control Petition is a condition precedent to the joinder of several causes of action against several tenants. Rent Control Court can then order eviction against all the tenants who are in occupation of the distinct portions of the same structure. Joint interest in the Rent Control Petition is a condition precedent to the joinder of several causes of action against several tenants. Causes of actions in such a situation is joint and united and there is no misjoinder of causes of actions and misjoinder of parties. The defences available to all the tenants in such a situation are also the same and generally common question of law and facts would arise for consideration. All the tenants have got the right to exercise their option and are entitled to allotment after reconstruction. All the tenants are also entitled to get the benefits of other provisos under S.11(4)(iv) as well. 9. The principle behind such an action is that even in cases the landlord seeks individual reliefs where the enquiry would be a large extend be identical in each individual Rent Control Petition the landlord may unite all the causes of action in one petition so as to avoid multiplicity of petitions and to avoid unnecessary expenditure. The trial of the petitions should not be embarrassed by simultaneous investigation of totally diversed causes of actions. We therefore affirm the judgment in Sultan v. Mohanan's case (supra). Landlord can also unite in the same petition several causes of action against single tenant. For example; landlord can unite grounds under S.11(4)(i), 11(4)(iii), 11(4)(iv), 11(8), etc. against single tenant. In such a situation also, petition is not bad for misjoinder of cause of action, because there would not be any conflict of interest between the tenants inter se. We are therefore of the view that a single petition for eviction under S.11(4)(iv) would lie against all the tenants who are in occupation of distinct portions of the same structure, in the event of which there is no misjoinder of causes of action or misjoinder of parties and the petition is not hit by multifariousness. 10. The difficulty arises when the landlord unites several causes of actions against various tenants who are in occupation of distinct portions of same building under separate tenancy arrangements. Question is whether in such case there is misjoinder causes of action. Landlord can file petition for eviction of various tenants who are in occupation of distinct portion of the same building under S.11(4)(i), 11(3), 11(4)(iii), 11(8), etc. Question is whether in such case there is misjoinder causes of action. Landlord can file petition for eviction of various tenants who are in occupation of distinct portion of the same building under S.11(4)(i), 11(3), 11(4)(iii), 11(8), etc. In such a case causes of action are distinct and separate and defences available to the tenants are also distinct and detached. For example, when landlord files petition under S.11(3) against various tenants occupying separate portions of same structure, different consideration may follow and defences available to the tenant would also be different. One of the tenants can defeat the claim of the landlord if he could establish that there is no bona fide need but also on the ground that the tenant is entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to S.11(3). Another tenant can also defeat the claim under the first proviso to S.11(3) if he could establish that landlord has got another building reasonably sufficient for his requirement Another tenant occupying a portion of the same structure would not be able to claim the benefit of the second proviso to S.11(3) if the tenant is not depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from the trade or business conducted in the tenanted premises. Defences available to the tenant could be distinct and different and there would be conflict of interest inter se. So also in a petition under S.11(8) as against different tenants who are occupying distinct portions of the same building, tenant can claim the benefit of the first proviso stating that the hardship caused to him would outweigh the advantage to the landlord. Even if cause of action against various tenants is the same, defence available to the tenants against the landlord may be distinct and different. In such a case there is likely to be conflict of interest between the tenants inter se and single petition for eviction against more than one tenants is bad for misjoinder of causes of action and misjoinder of parties.” 29. The Full Bench, thereafter, concluded as under: “We therefore answer the questions as follows: (i) Landlord can unite several causes of action against single tenant if he is occupying the same building in the event of which there will not be misjoinder of causes of actions and misjoinder of parties since tenant is single tenant occupying the same structure. The Full Bench, thereafter, concluded as under: “We therefore answer the questions as follows: (i) Landlord can unite several causes of action against single tenant if he is occupying the same building in the event of which there will not be misjoinder of causes of actions and misjoinder of parties since tenant is single tenant occupying the same structure. (ii) Landlord can prefer an application under S.11(4)(iv) against various tenants who are occupying distinct portions of the same structure since the tenants are jointly interested in the causes of action and the defence available to all the tenants would be by and large common and hence there will not be any misjoinder of causes of actions or misjoinder of parties. (iii) Landlord cannot unite different causes action in a single petition filed against various tenants whether they are in occupation of same building or different building. Such a petition would be bad for misjoinder of causes of actions and misjoinder of parties. (iv) Objection as to the misjoinder of causes of actions and misjoinder of parties should be taken at the earliest opportunity; failing which Court would not interfere unless it is shown that serious prejudice has been caused to the parties. (v) Rent Control Court can consolidate the applications for eviction if there are similarity or identity of the matters in issue in the petitions which is to be left to the discretion of the Rent Control Court, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. We are of the view, as far as the present case is concerned, Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority concurrently found that landlord is entitled to an order of eviction under Ss.11(2)(b), 11(4)(i) and 11(4)(iv) of the Act. Further, tenants could not establish that any prejudice has been caused to them by entertaining the petition. No such plea was raised by the tenants at the appellate stage and no evidence was adduced to establish that any prejudice has been caused to them. We therefore uphold the finding of the Appellate Authority and dismiss the Revision Petitions.” 30. Further, tenants could not establish that any prejudice has been caused to them by entertaining the petition. No such plea was raised by the tenants at the appellate stage and no evidence was adduced to establish that any prejudice has been caused to them. We therefore uphold the finding of the Appellate Authority and dismiss the Revision Petitions.” 30. The view of the Full Bench in Jamal (supra) is, therefore, clear that except in a case under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act, a landlord cannot unite different causes of action against various tenants and this is so, as far as the Full Bench judgment goes, with respect to causes of action under Section 11(3) of the Act also. The reasons why the Full Bench concluded as afore are clearly discernible from paragraph 10 of the judgment extracted at supra, wherein it was categorically held that defences of several tenants, against a claim for eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, may be at variance to each other and that each tenant can contest such a claim independently, if they are able to establish the requisite factual particulars, on different grounds and defeat it individually even when other tenants may not be able to do so. In other words, it is ineluctable from the judgment of the Full Bench that a claim of the landlord under Section 11(3) of the Act against each tenant, even though occupying portions of the same building, is distinct and independent of each other, particularly because such claims can be impeached by one tenant, even when eviction is ordered against others, since their defences may also be different and distinct. 31. However, while considering the same issue in Kunhamu (supra), after referring to the Full Bench judgment in Jamal (supra), the Division Bench recorded their views contrary to the Full Bench in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 13 of the judgment, which have already been extracted above. The conclusion of the Division Bench, as is perspicuous from paragraph 13 of the judgment, is that the claim of a landlord against several tenants is 'a common or joint cause of action and not two different causes of action against the tenants'. The conclusion of the Division Bench, as is perspicuous from paragraph 13 of the judgment, is that the claim of a landlord against several tenants is 'a common or joint cause of action and not two different causes of action against the tenants'. On such reasoning, the Division bench has concluded that notwithstanding the views of the Full Bench in Jamal (supra), the landlord can unite his claim against several tenants under Section 11(3) of the Act, since they are not different causes of action but a joint cause of action. 32. We are afraid that the view of the Division Bench is completely contrary to the declaration regarding the cause of action in the case of a claim by a landlord under Section 11(3) of the Act, as recorded in Jamal (supra), because it is irrefragible that the Full Bench had specifically adverted to this and has found that the causes of action with respect to the claim of a landlord under Section 11(3) of the Act against several tenants are distinct and not joint. The Division Bench has, however, recorded that the Full Bench had not adverted to this issue and we are, therefore, of the respectful opinion that this conclusion of the Division Bench is in error and that in the light of the specific declaration of law in Jamal (supra), the views and conclusions in law of the Division Bench in Kunhamu (supra) cannot, in our view, be followed as a precedent. 33. The above being said, and as we have said earlier, our view on the precedential value on Kunhamu (supra) would not aid the petitioners herein because it is without doubt from the unambiguous conclusions of the Full Bench in Jamal (supra) that an objection regarding misjoinder of causes of action would succeed only if the tenants are able to prove that substantial and serious prejudice has been caused to them, and further provided that they had raised such objection at the earliest instance. In the facts of this case, we notice that this plea was never taken by the tenants/petitioners herein before the Rent Control Court or even before the Appellate Authority but that it has been raised for the first time only before this court. In the facts of this case, we notice that this plea was never taken by the tenants/petitioners herein before the Rent Control Court or even before the Appellate Authority but that it has been raised for the first time only before this court. Obviously, therefore, going by the observations and conclusions in Jamal (supra), since objections regarding misjoinder of causes of action should have been taken at the earliest opportunity and since the revision petitioners had choosen not to do so, this court would not be justified in granting them any relief or benefit on account of that plea. We are certain that as per the ratio in Jamal (supra), the attempt of the petitioners/tenants to raise this issue for the first time before this court is also flawed and in any view of the matter, we see no reason to even entertain such a plea because nothing has been placed on record to prove that they have been prejudiced on account of the fact that a single Rent Control Petition was filed by the respondents to seek eviction of the petition schedule rooms from the petitioners herein. 34. When our views as afore was expressed at the Bar, Sri. P.B. Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners prayed that since the first petitioner is running an Ayurveda Hospital with an inpatient facility, it would not be in equity or in fairness to evict them peremptorily. He pleads that, in order to obtain an alternate suitable accommodation for them, this court may be indulgent enough to grant them two years time to evict themselves from the petition schedule rooms. 35. Sri. B. Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for the third respondent fairly concedes that a reasonable period can be granted to the first petitioner but submits that the request now made by Sri. P.B. Krishnan is excessive and absolutely devoid of rationale. We find this submission of Sri. B. Krishnan to be reasonable and for such reason, we deem it appropriate to grant time to the first petitioner herein to evict themselves from the petition schedule items 1 and 2 rooms, but not to the extent as prayed for by them through their counsel. 36. We find this submission of Sri. B. Krishnan to be reasonable and for such reason, we deem it appropriate to grant time to the first petitioner herein to evict themselves from the petition schedule items 1 and 2 rooms, but not to the extent as prayed for by them through their counsel. 36. In the result, we dismiss this rent control revision approving the order of the Rent Control Court in R.C.P. No. 6 of 2014, as affirmed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority in R.C.A. No. 134 of 2014. However, acceding to the request of Sri. P.B. Krishnan and as conceded by Sri. B. Krishnan as afore, we grant time to the first petitioner to evict themselves from the petition schedule building till 31.12.2018. The first petitioner will be obligated to pay occupancy charges until that day at the present rate of rent, as also arrears of rent, if any, on or before 20.4.2018. Such arrears, if any, shall be paid by the first petitioner by way of a demand draft drawn in favour of the first respondent herein on any nationalised bank and sent to her by way of registered post to reach her within the time granted herein. 37. The first petitioner will also be required to file an affidavit agreeing to these conditions appropriately before the Rent Control Court on or before 22.5.2018, along with an undertaking sworn to therein to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule items 1 and 2 rooms within the time granted by us herein, i.e., on or before 31.12.2018. 38. Needless to say, if the first petitioner defaults in payment of the arrears of rent as ordered herein or commits default in payment of the occupancy charges for more than two months or does not file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court as ordered by us herein, the benefits of this judgment will stand automatically withdrawn and they would be obliged to surrender vacant possession immediately thereafter. This rent control revision is thus ordered and on account of the peculiar facts we have noticed herein, we refrain from making any order as to costs and leave the parties to suffer their respective costs in this revision.