Jogamaya Das, wife of late Amar Chandra Deb v. Anjali Deb
2018-10-03
S. TALAPATRA
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT & ORDER : Heard Mr. R.K.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the defendant No.8 in the suit being Title Suit No.60 of 2015 pending in the court of the Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Court No.1, West Tripura, Agartala. Also heard Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondents No.1 and 2, Mr. D. Sharma, learned counsel who has entered in appearance for the respondents No.3 to 8 and Mr. H. Deb, learned A.S.G.I. for the respondent No.9, the Accountant General (A & E), Agartala. 2. The suit being T.S. 60 of 2015 was instituted by the respondents No.1 and 2 herein for declaration that the plaintiffs are the legal heirs of Amar Chandra Deb since deceased. Further reliefs as prayed in the suit include the declaration that the decree of divorce dated 08.04.2012 as passed by the Judge, Family Court, West Tripura, Agartala in T.S. (Divorce) No.121/2011 is not binding upon the plaintiff No.1 and no consequence would visit her emanating from the said decree. 3. Further declaration and consequential reliefs are for having all the service benefits accruing from the death of Amar Chandra Deb. Even another declaration has been sought to the effect that the claim of the defendant No.8 that she was the lawfully married wife of Amar Chandra Deb since deceased is not genuine and/or not legal. The defendant No.8 has raised an objection in respect of the jurisdiction of the court to entertain and by the suit in view of the provision of Section 11 of the CPC. The said objection as raised by the defendant No.8 by the application dated 20.01.2016 has been rejected by the order dated 10.03.2016 delivered in Title Suit No.60 of 2015 by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, West Tripura, Agartala (Court No.1). In the said order it has been observed that : “It may be true to say that this court has no jurisdiction to decide the marital status of a party because of the bar provided under the Family Courts Act, but the relief for declaring the status as legal heirs and consequential relief for entitlement of service benefits as sought herein cannot be said to be barred without having a decision on merit.
If the declaration of marital status of defendant No.8 taken to be barred under the Family Courts Act, in that event this suit can be said to be barred partly by resjudicata and hence the plaint cannot be rejected as prayed for.” 4. Mr. R. K. P. Singh, learned counsel has clearly submitted that the suit is barred under Section 11 of the CPC and hence the court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, West Tripura, Agartala does not have any jurisdiction. That apart, Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act take away jurisdiction of the civil courts. According to Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, the Civil Judge, Senior Division or for that matter any other Civil Court does have any jurisdiction to declare the marital status in a suit or in a proceeding between the parties. 5. It appears from the records that the decree of divorce dated 28.06.2012 was issued in Title Suit (Divorce) 121 of 2011 by the Judge, Family Court, Agartala. By the said decree, the marriage between the plaintiff No.1 and her husband, namely Amar Ch. Deb was dissolved. The said judgment and decree dated 28.06.2012 has not been challenged by the plaintiff No.1. According to her the judgment and decree was passed ex-parte and no notice was even issued on the plaintiff No.1 and hence the respondent No.1 herein she was not aware of the proceeding for divorce being T.S. (Divorce) 121 of 2011. 6. According to the plaintiff respondent No.1, she is entitled to get the declaration that she is the legally married wife of Amar Chandra Deb since deceased and the plaintiff No.2 is her daughter who was born in the wed-lock of the respondent No.1 and Amar Chandra Deb, now deceased. Thus, not the defendant No.8- petitioner, but the plaintiff-respondent No.1 and the plaintiff-respondent No.2 are the legal heirs to inherit the properties left by Amar Chandra Deb. Thus, the right of the defendant No.8-petitioner has been challenged. 7. The first and foremost question that arises is in respect of jurisdiction whether the declaration as sought can be made by the court of the Civil Judge (Sr. Division) No.1, West Tripura, Agartala in view of Section 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.
Thus, the right of the defendant No.8-petitioner has been challenged. 7. The first and foremost question that arises is in respect of jurisdiction whether the declaration as sought can be made by the court of the Civil Judge (Sr. Division) No.1, West Tripura, Agartala in view of Section 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act deals with the jurisdiction of the Family Courts whereas Section 8 of the Family Courts Act, deals with the exclusion of jurisdiction and in respect of pending proceedings. Section 7 provides that subject to the other provisions of the act the family courts (a) have and may exercise all the jurisdictions exercisable by any district court or any subordinate civil court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the explanation; and (b) be deemed, for the purpose of exercising such jurisdiction under such law to be a district court or, as the case may be, such subordinate civil court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends. It has been further provided by way of explanation that: The suits and proceedings referred to in the sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely: “(a) a suit for proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void or, as the case may be, annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage; (b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person; (c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them, (d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship; (e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the legitimacy of any person; (f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance; (g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor.” 8.
Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 provides the jurisdiction to the Family Courts for dealing with the cases under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. But Section 8 deals with the exclusion of jurisdiction in the pending cases, but it clearly provides that where the Family Court has been established for any area (a) no district court for that matter any subordinate civil court referred to in sub-section 1 of Section 7 shall in relation to such area have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of any suit or proceeding of the nature referred to the explanation to the said sub-section. No Magistrate shall in relation to such area have or exercise any jurisdictional power under Chapter IX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1973. Every suit or proceeding of the nature referred to the explanation to sub-section 1 of Section 7 and every proceeding under Chapter IX of the Code of the Civil Procedure (i) which is pending immediately before the establishment of such family court before any district court or subordinate court referred to that sub-section or as the case may be, before any Magistrate under the said court and (ii) which would have been required to be instituted or taken before or such Family Court if before the date on which such suit or proceeding was instituted, if taken this Act has come into force and such Family Courts have been established, shall stand transferred to such Family Court on the date on which it is established. Therefore, the litigation of the natural mentioned under Section 7 is bound to be considered as excluded for the jurisdiction of the other civil courts. Those litigations would only lie in the Family Court in their respective jurisdiction. 9. Mr. Singh, learned counsel has further submitted that the defendant No.8 petitioner did not raise any objection in respect of the character of the plaintiff-respondent No.2 as the daughter of Sri Amar Chandra Deb since deceased not only that even the defendant No.8- petitioner has categorically acknowledged that fact. From the other side, Mr.
9. Mr. Singh, learned counsel has further submitted that the defendant No.8 petitioner did not raise any objection in respect of the character of the plaintiff-respondent No.2 as the daughter of Sri Amar Chandra Deb since deceased not only that even the defendant No.8- petitioner has categorically acknowledged that fact. From the other side, Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has submitted that the decree dated 28.06.2012 is not binding on the plaintiff-respondent No.1 inasmuch as she was not served with any notice when that proceeding being since T.S.(Divorce) 121 of 2011 was instituted and carried for its logical end she did not get any opportunities to deny the pleadings therein. As such the civil court has jurisdiction. The plaintiff - respondent No.1 is therefore, entitled to the declaration in respect of inheritance over the property left by Amar Chandra Deb, on the basis of her marital status as a “wife of the deceased.” 10. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has further submitted that the reason for instituting the suit is that after the decree of divorce was issued on 28.06.2012, Amar Chandra Deb died on 28.08.2012. Thus, the alternative remedial action that is available for making an application, is for setting aside the ex-parte decree passed by the Family Court. The question therefore falls for consideration whether in divorce suit whether the legal heirs can really represent the interest of the petitioner who is no more in this world? 11. The legal heirs do not have any interest or knowledge of the foundational fact constituting the grounds for dissolution of the marriage. It is not about the property. Only a civil court can deal with such circumstances and pass the appropriate order by declaring that the decree dated 28.06.2012 cannot have any effect so for the plaintiff -respondent No.1 is concerned. Further, that cannot restrict her on having the declaration that she is the legally married wife of the deceased. All these grounds were taken by the petitioner for challenging the maintainability of the suit on the ground of jurisdiction, resjudicata and the bar created by the Family Courts Act, 1984. 12. By the impugned order dated 10.03.2016, the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), West Tripura, Agartala Court No.1 has observed as reproduced above. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties including Mr. H. Deb, learned ASGI who is representing the respondent No.9.
12. By the impugned order dated 10.03.2016, the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), West Tripura, Agartala Court No.1 has observed as reproduced above. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties including Mr. H. Deb, learned ASGI who is representing the respondent No.9. But the respondent No.9 does not have any interest in the subject- matter of the suit, unless the inter se disputes are adjudicated. 13. Mr. Deb, learned ASGI has submitted that unnecessarily the respondent No.9 has been impleaded by the plaintiffs inasmuch as in respect of the decision of the succession or the marital status, the respondent No.9 cannot have any claim or any interest. After giving an anxious consideration to the facts and the circumstances of the case, this court is of the view considered that Section 7 and Section 8 of the Family Courts Act would operate on the face of the plaint. It is discernable that the plaintiff No.1 has tried to make out a binary situation by bringing in the plaintiff No.2 to claim the right of property left by the deceased, Amar Chandra Deb. There is no dispute in respect of the status of the plaintiff No.2 or her claim over the property. Ever no dispute has been raised by the defendant No.8 –petitioner. In the plaint, it has been categorically asserted that at the instance of the defendant No.8, when the survival certificate was issued by the concerned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the name of the plaintiff No.2 has been incorporated as the survivor of the deceased Amar Chandra Deb, meaning that at no point of time, the defendant No.8-petitioner made any attempt to deny the right of the plaintiff-respondent No.2. Thus, so for the plaintiff-respondent No.2 is concerned, she does not have any cause of action to institute a suit when there is no denial to her status and her right of property left by the deceased, Amar Chandra Deb. 14. The dispute fundamentally exists between the plaintiff No.1 and the defendant No.8 over their marital status the case of the defendant No.8 is that after the decree of divorce was issued on 28.06.2012, she got married to Amar Chandra Deb. But this particular fact has been seriously disputed by Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent No.1 stating that their marriage is illegal as the marriage had taken place on 09.10.2007.
But this particular fact has been seriously disputed by Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent No.1 stating that their marriage is illegal as the marriage had taken place on 09.10.2007. The said date has been recorded as the date of marriage in this service book of the defendant No.8. Be that as it may, all these facts are to be inquired into. Evidence in this regard, would be laid by the parties in the suit. It is not required by this court to make an immediate comment. But there is no challenge, even in the present suit, against the judgment and decree dated 28.06.2012 delivered in T.S. (Divorce) 121 of 2011. By the said judgment and decree, the marital relation between the plaintiff-respondent No.1 and Amar Chanra Deb was dissolved and as such w.e.f. 28.06.2012 there was/is no marital relation, unless the decree of divorce is not recalled or set aside. 15. The Civil Judge (Sr. Division), does not have jurisdiction either to recall the decree of divorce or to declare the marital status of the plaintiff-respondent No.1 in view of Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. The petition that was filed under order VII, Rule II of the CPC by the defendant No.8 petition has been rejected by the order dated 10.03.2016 with reasoning as stated above. But the objections as raised has not been properly evaluated and discussed with reasoning. Moreover, the reason as provided to discard the said objection, in the considered opinion of this court cannot survive the scrutiny of law. 16. The binary situation that has been created by the plaintiff No.1 appears to (a) strategic move to avoid the legal bar jurisdiction in respect of the as created by Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. This cannot be permitted, in view of the above discussion made herein in details.
16. The binary situation that has been created by the plaintiff No.1 appears to (a) strategic move to avoid the legal bar jurisdiction in respect of the as created by Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. This cannot be permitted, in view of the above discussion made herein in details. On the surface of the plaint the jurisdiction of the Civil Court appears to be based under Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act inasmuch as the declaration relating to the marital status or the property emerging there from is under exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court in terms of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and by operation of Section 8 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the jurisdiction of all other civil courts including the court of the District Judge of the District stand excluded. In such circumstances, the order dated 10.03.2016 cannot be sustained. Hence, the same is interfered with and set aside. 17. The plaint is to be rejected with liberty to the plaintiff-respondent No.1 to approach the appropriate court of competent jurisdiction for seeking the declaration of her status and for setting aside the ex-parte decree. For that purpose, this court is making the following observations: The date of knowledge of the plaintiff-respondent No.1 shall be treated as the starting point of limitation and the time that she has exhausted in prosecuting T.S. No.60 of 2015 be discounted under Section 14 of the Limitation Act from the date when in terms of this order, the suit will be disposed on record by the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), West Tripura, Agartala, Court no.1. 18. The Civil Judge (Sr. Division), West Tripura, Agartala, Court No.1 shall record the suit as disposed for rejecting the plaint. That day of disposal will be the effective date, up to which the discount under Section 14 will be available to the plaintiff-respondent No.1. Since there is no dispute regarding the status and the right to the property left by Amar Chandra Deb of the plaintiff-respondent No.2, she may not be arraigned as the party in the suit. However, the final decision shall remain with the plaintiff-respondent No.1. 19.
Since there is no dispute regarding the status and the right to the property left by Amar Chandra Deb of the plaintiff-respondent No.2, she may not be arraigned as the party in the suit. However, the final decision shall remain with the plaintiff-respondent No.1. 19. It has been reported in the bar that the Survival Certificate that was issued in favour of the defendant No.8-petitioner and the plaintiff-respondent No.2 has been cancelled by the SDM and at present no valid Survivable Certificate exists. If the plaintiff-respondent No.1 did not institute the suit within two months from the date when the suit will be disposed on record by the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), West Tripura, Agartala, Court No.1, it is directed that the Survival Certificate may be issued by the competent authority. However, if the plaintiff-respondent No.1 set in motion further action in the court of the Judge, Family Court, West Tripura, Agartala, such action shall not taken for issuance if the Survival Certificate. The exercise shall be taken only after the suit as contemplated is finally decided. 20. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has submitted that for death of Amar Chandra Deb, there may be the legal embargo of contesting the ex-parte decree cannot be accepted by this court, inasmuch as the apex court in R. Laxmi vs. K. Saraswati Ammal (judgment dated 27.09.1996) has observed that the wife should be in her competence to maintain application under Order IX Rule 13 even though husband is dead as the decree obtained by him determines the status of the appellant in that case. If the appellant says that it is an ex-parte decree and ought to be set aside, her application has to be heard on merit. The decree of divorce determines her status as wife, apart from determining her rights in the properties of the deceased husband. This gives her locus standi and right to contest the divorce proceeding even after death of her husband. 21. By virtue of the decree of divorce, the new interest has been created and a new status has been conferred on the defendant No.8-petitioner herein. As such if the plaintiff-respondent No.1 is inclined to challenge the ex-parte decree dated 28.06.2012, the defendant No.8-petitioner shall be made party to represent her interest qua the decree of divorce.
21. By virtue of the decree of divorce, the new interest has been created and a new status has been conferred on the defendant No.8-petitioner herein. As such if the plaintiff-respondent No.1 is inclined to challenge the ex-parte decree dated 28.06.2012, the defendant No.8-petitioner shall be made party to represent her interest qua the decree of divorce. Whether the plaintiff-respondent No.2 shall be a made party or not, in that proceeding is left to the election of the plaintiff-respondent No.1. 22. Having observed thus, this petition stands allowed to the extent as indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.