JUDGMENT : 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 04.10.2017 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Deoghar- respondent no.4, whereby the Election Petition No.4 of 2016 filed by the respondent no.6 (Soni Kumari) has been allowed and the petitioner has been declared ineligible under section 152(1)(Gha)(i) of the Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2001 (in short ‘the Act, 2001’). 2. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that the petitioner alongwith respondent nos.6 to 11 had contested the election for the post of Mukhiya of Mednidih Panchayat, P.S. Mohanpur, District Deoghar held on 22.11.2015. The petitioner was declared successful in the said election. The respondent no.6 challenged the notification declaring the result of the petitioner as Mukhiya of Mednidih Panchayat under Sections 151, 152 and 153 of the Act, 2001 before the respondent no.4, which was registered as Misc. Petition (Election Petition) No.4/2016. The said election petition was finally allowed and the petitioner was declared ineligible on the ground that her name was not in the voter list of panchayat election. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent no.4 had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the dispute of eligibility as per rule 124 of Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Rules, 2001 (in short ‘Rules, 2001’) rather the said power is vested with Munsif. The present dispute was also raised at the time of nomination and the same was already clarified by the Returning Officer. It is further submitted that the name of the petitioner appeared at serial no.198, however, her husband’s name was wrongly typed as Pradeep Yadav instead of Rakesh Jha. The respondent no.6 failed to establish that the name of the petitioner was appearing at any other place. On the contrary, the petitioner produced several documents before the respondent no.4 in support of the contention that her name was appearing in the voter list of Mednidih Panchayat. It is also submitted that rule 113 of the Rules, 2001 specifically provides that while hearing the election petition, the procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short ‘CPC’) has to be followed, however, the respondent no.4 did not follow the provision of the CPC while adjudicating the case of the petitioner. It is also submitted that rule 113 of the Rules, 2001 specifically provides that while hearing the election petition, the procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short ‘CPC’) has to be followed, however, the respondent no.4 did not follow the provision of the CPC while adjudicating the case of the petitioner. The impugned order dated 04.10.2017 has been passed without providing any opportunity of hearing and thus the same also violates the principles of natural justice. The name of the petitioner was appearing in all the voter lists prepared from time to time, as would be apparent from the voter lists provided to her under the Right to Information Act, 2005, except that, in the year 2015, there was a clerical mistake in her husband’s name in the voter list which was subsequently rectified. It is further submitted that the in-laws of the petitioner are the Jamabandi raiyats of village - Dahuwa, P.S Mohanpur, District - Deoghar and the names of the entire family members are running in the voter list since long. The respondent no. 4, however, proceeded to adjudicate the election petition in an arbitrary manner without following the Rules, 2001 as well as the procedure laid down under the Act, 2001. 4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State Election Commission submits that under the provisions of Part IX of the Constitution of India read with the Act, 2001, the State Election Commission has been assigned duties of conducting elections for various posts of Panchayat. After the elections are over, it becomes functus officio having no role in the proceedings initiated against one or the other candidate by way of election petition. 5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-State submits that the respondent no. 4 has acted according to law and there is no infirmity in the impugned order. It is further submitted that a writ petition being W.P.(C) No.2015 of 2017 filed by the respondent no.10 is still pending adjudication before this Court for the same cause of action. It is also submitted that ample opportunity was given to the petitioner by the respondent no.4 to plead her case and after hearing both the parties at length, the impugned order dated 04.10.2017 was passed. It is also submitted that ample opportunity was given to the petitioner by the respondent no.4 to plead her case and after hearing both the parties at length, the impugned order dated 04.10.2017 was passed. It is further submitted that the petitions relating to Sections 19, 30, 38 and 53 of the Act, 2001 are only to be heard by the Civil Court as mentioned in rule 124 of the Rules, 2001. The present petition was, however heard u/s 151 and 152 of the Act, 2001 and the respondent no.4 had the jurisdiction to hear and decide the said matter. 6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.6 submits that the petitioner had filed her nomination papers giving wrong details claiming that her name was appearing at serial no.198 of the voter list of the Panchayat, Medinidih. It is further submitted that the election petition was maintainable before the SDM under the provisions of Sections 151, 152 and 153 of the Act, 2001 as the petitioner was not eligible for the post of Mukhiya and she was also liable for misconduct. It is further submitted that the provisions of rule 124 of the Rules, 2001 is not applicable in the present fact and circumstances of the case. The SDM while hearing the election petition has followed the procedure lay down under CPC. Moreover, the only issue involved in the said Election Petition was as to whether the petitioner was a voter of Medinidih Panchayat, or not and such contention of the private respondents before the SDM was based on the certified copy of the voter list. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for petitioner is that the respondent no.4 had no jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate the matter relating to disqualification of the petitioner, rather in view of specific provisions contained in rule 124 of the Rules, 2001, it was only the Munsif within whose jurisdiction the said panchayat is situated, could have heard any challenge put to the election of the petitioner. 8. 8. To appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for the parties, I have gone through Rule 124 of Rules, 2001 which provides that the question of disability contemplated under section 19, 30, 38 and 53 shall be decided by the Munsif in the case of Gram Panchayat. I have also gone through Sections 151 and 152 of the Act, 2001. Section 151 provides that any election petition challenging the election of Gram Panchayat shall be entertained by the Sub Divisional Officer. Section 152 provides the basis on which any election may be rejected. In view of Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 152, if the candidate was not holding requisite eligibility for being elected as a member, the election shall be declared void by the prescribed authority. In the present case the election petition was filed by the respondent no. 6 claiming that the petitioner was not holding eligilbity at the time of her election as her name was not appearing in the voter list. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent no.4 had no jurisdiction to entertain the present matter has no leg to stand. 9. The respondent no.4 in the impugned order has quoted clause-1 of the notification no.1474 dated 10.06.2015 published by State Election Commission, Jharkhand which provides that only those persons whose names appear in the voter list relating to the State Assembly Election published on 19.03.2015 will have a voting right in the panchayat election and for the said election, the name of any person will neither be added nor deleted from the said voter list and if there appears any clerical error in the said list, the same shall be corrected. 10. The specific stand of the State as well as the private respondents is that the name of the petitioner was not in the voter list and the said fact has been sought to be clarified by the petitioner that in the voter list, the name of her husband was wrongly written as Pradeep Yadav which was later on corrected. Thus, admittedly in the voter list of Panchayat Election 2015 at serial no.198 Rita Devi W/o of Pradeep Yadav was written. Thus, admittedly in the voter list of Panchayat Election 2015 at serial no.198 Rita Devi W/o of Pradeep Yadav was written. Even if it is assumed that the name of the petitioner’s husband was wrongly printed in the voter list, the manner and extent of correction was provided in the notification dated 10.06.2015. However it has not been averred in the writ petition that the petitioner had made any application for correction of the same after publication of the draft voter list. Thus, I do not find any infirmity in the order of the respondent no.4 observing that at the relevant point of time the name of the petitioner was not found in the voter list. 11. The next limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Sub Divisional Magistrate did not follow the procedure provided in CPC as mandated under rule 113 of Rules, 2001 and as such the impugned order is liable to be set aside on this score alone. 12. In the case of Municipal Board, Sitapur v. Prayag Narain Saigal and Firm Moosaram Bhagwan Das, reported in (1969) 1 SCC 399 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “4. The respondents raised three objections against the validity of the imposition of the water tax: (1) omission to publish the preliminary proposal separately in the manner prescribed by Section 131 sub-section (3), read with Section 94; (2) non-publication of the modified proposal in accordance with Section 132 sub-section (2); and (3) non-publication of the special resolution directing the imposition of the tax in accordance with Section 94. The procedure laid down by the Act was not strictly complied with before imposing the tax. But all the procedural defects in the imposition of the tax are cured by Section 135 sub-section (3), where, as in this case, the Municipal Board has the power to levy the tax and has passed the special resolution necessary for the imposition of the tax and the defects are not of a fundamental character. The procedural defects cannot be regarded as fundamental or as invalidating the imposition, if no substantial prejudice is caused thereby to the inhabitants of the municipality. The issue of the notification under Section 135 sub-section (2), is conclusive proof that all necessary steps for the imposition of the tax have been taken in accordance with the provisions of the Act.” 13. The issue of the notification under Section 135 sub-section (2), is conclusive proof that all necessary steps for the imposition of the tax have been taken in accordance with the provisions of the Act.” 13. Further in the case of CST v. Subhash & Co., reported in (2003) 3 SCC 454 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- “12. Whether service of notice is valid or not is essentially a question of fact. In the instant case, learned Single Judge found that certain procedures were not followed while effecting service by affixture. There was no finding recorded that such service was nonest in the eye of the law. In a given case, if the assessee knows about the proceedings and there is some irregularity in the service of notice, the direction for continuing proceedings cannot be faulted. It would depend upon the nature of irregularity and its effect and the question of prejudice which are to be adjudicated in each case on the basis of surrounding facts. If, however, the service of notice is treated as non est in the eye of the law, it would not be permissible to direct de novo assessment without considering the question of limitation. There also the question of prejudice has to be considered.” 14. Thus, merely by any procedural irregularity which is not fundamental in character will not vitiate the entire proceeding more so if no such prejudice is caused due to the same. Section 99 of the CPC provides that no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied for any error, defect or irregularity in any proceeding in the suit not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. In the present case, the question before the respondent no.4 was as to whether the name of the petitioner was there in the Panchayat Election Voter List 2015. The dispute was based entirely on the said fact and as such even if it is assumed that the CPC was not strictly followed by the respondent no.4 while passing the impugned order, the same would not have improved the case of the petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner did not place sufficient material touching the merit of her case before this Court as well. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on the judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Sarita Kandhway Vs. Moreover, the petitioner did not place sufficient material touching the merit of her case before this Court as well. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on the judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Sarita Kandhway Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. [W.P.(C) No.524 of 2012] and submits that the while hearing the election petition, the Sub-Divisional Officer was required to follow the procedure laid down in Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. I have gone through the said judgment wherein it is held as under:- “On perusal of the order sheet of learned Tribunal in Election Petition (Appeal) No. 26/2011, I find that the writ petitioner, who is the returned candidate and against whom the election petition was filed, for the first time appeared on 16.11.2011 by filing Vakalatnama. Thereafter, 29.11.2011 was fixed as the next date. On perusal of the order sheet dated 29.11.2011, it is evident that on that date, the parties were heard and the case was fixed for order for 10.01.2012. The impugned order is dated 10.01.2012 whereby learned Commissioner-cum-Tribunal has held that there was irregularity in counting and that the result was wrongly declared. He has directed for re-counting of votes. …… It has been clearly provided in the said rule that the election petition shall be heard in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The Civil Procedure Code, 1908 prescribes for appearance of the parties, giving opportunity to file written statement and filing of documents and extensive procedure for hearing and examining the parties, discovery and inspection, production of the documents, settlement of issues, summoning, attendance and examination of witnesses and arguments before pronouncing the judgment. Admittedly the said procedure has not been followed in this case. The election petition has been summarily disposed of just on the next date of appearance without affording opportunity to the petitioner for hearing the petition in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. 16. In the aforesaid case it was observed by a Bench of this Court that the election petition was summarily dismissed on the very next date of the appearance of the returned candidate without affording any opportunity of hearing to him. However, in the present case, the parties were given sufficient opportunity to adduce evidence in their favour. 16. In the aforesaid case it was observed by a Bench of this Court that the election petition was summarily dismissed on the very next date of the appearance of the returned candidate without affording any opportunity of hearing to him. However, in the present case, the parties were given sufficient opportunity to adduce evidence in their favour. Moreover, it is not the claim of the petitioner that the opportunity of hearing was not at all given to her, rather she has laid much emphasis on the contention that the procedure prescribed in the CPC has not been followed. However, she has failed to substantiate that the said irregularity was so fundamental in nature which caused serious prejudice to her. 17. In view of the discussions made herein above, the present writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed being devoid of any merit. 18. I.A. No.9048 of 2018 also stands dismissed.