ORDER : 1. Learned counsel for the petitioners is permitted to remove Defect Nos. 2 to 7 and 11 to 16, as pointed out by the office, in course of the day. 2. At the request of learned counsel for the petitioners, the remaining defects are ignored. 3. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the notices dated 03.10.2018 and 11.12.2018 u/s 13(2) and 13(8) of the Securitization of Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (in short SARFAESI Act, 2002) respectively on the ground that they are the bona-fide purchaser of the flats in the building constructed on the mortgaged property. 4. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that the petitioners have purchased flats in the first floor and ground floor, respectively, of the building constructed over a piece of land situated in mouza-Mango, Jamshedpur through registered sale deed nos. 3348 & 3347, both, dated 03.10.2017 from one Sumit Kumar. The respondent-bank had granted various credit facilities by way of financial assistance to the seller of the property, namely, Sumit Kumar (the borrower) and when the account of the borrower got irregular, the same was declared NPA on 29.09.2018. The respondent no. 3 vide legal notice dated 11.04.2018 instructed the petitioner no. 1 to cancel the sale deed which was replied by her stating that the said property was sold by the borrower keeping her in dark for which a criminal case has also been instituted. Thereafter, a notice u/s 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 was issued on 03.10.2018 in the name of borrower directing him to repay the dues of Rs. 21,70,924/- together with suitable interest and the same was pasted at the residential property of the petitioners. On 15.10.2018 the husband of the petitioner no. 1 objected the notice dated 03.10.2018 through pleader’s notice however without deciding the said objections, a notice dated 11.12.2018 purportedly issued under Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 was pasted on the residence of the petitioners on 13.12.2018. Hence, the present writ petition. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned A.C. to S.C. V appearing for the State of Jharkhand as well as perused the materials available on record. Hence, the present writ petition. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned A.C. to S.C. V appearing for the State of Jharkhand as well as perused the materials available on record. The petitioners have put challenge to the notices dated 03.10.2018 and 11.12.2018 under section 13(2) and 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 respectively contending that they are the bona-fide purchaser of the flat standing on the mortgaged property. The petitioners, however, have not annexed the notice dated 11.12.2018 with the writ petition. The learned counsel for the State has challenged the maintainability of the present writ petition on the ground that the petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy available before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi. 6. To appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to go through the provisions of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, which are reproduced herein-below:- “17. Application against measures to recover secured debts - (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application alongwith such fee, as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken: PROVIDED that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower. Explanation - For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under sub-section (1) of section 17. (1A) An application under sub-section (1) shall be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction: (a) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. (b) where the secured asset is located. (c) the branch or any other office of a bank or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding for the time being. (b) where the secured asset is located. (c) the branch or any other office of a bank or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding for the time being. (2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. (3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder and require restoration of the management or restoration of possession of the secured assets to the borrower, it may by order:- (a) declare the recourse to any one or more measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor as invalid. (b) restore the possession of secured assets or management of secured assets to the borrower or such other aggrieved person, who has made an application under sub-section (1), as the case may be. (c) pass such other direction as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13. (4) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under sub-section (4) of section 13 to recover his secured debt. (4A) Where – (i) any person, in an application under sub-section (1), claims any tenancy or leasehold rights upon the secured asset, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts of the case and evidence produced by the parties in relation to such claims shall, for the purposes of enforcement of security interest, have the jurisdiction to examine whether lease or tenancy:- (a) has expired or stood determined. (b) is contrary to section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882). (c) is contrary to terms of mortgage. (d) is created after the issuance of notice of default and demand by the Bank under sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act. (ii) the Debt Recovery Tribunal is satisfied that tenancy right or leasehold rights claimed in secured asset falls under the sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) or sub-clause (d) of clause (i) then notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Debt Recovery Tribunal may pass such order as it deems fit in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (5) Any application made under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within sixty days from the date of such application: PROVIDED that the Debts Recovery Tribunal may, from time to time, extend the said period for reasons to be recorded in writing, so, however, that the total period of pendency of the application with the Debts Recovery Tribunal, shall not exceed four months from the date of making of such application made under sub-section (1). (6) If the application is not disposed of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the period of four months as specified in sub-section (5) any party to the application may make an application, in such form as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal for directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal for expeditious disposal of the application pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal may, on such application, make an order for expeditious disposal of the pending application by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. (7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the application in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and the rules made thereunder.” 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners has given much stress on the argument that despite the fact that the petitioners are the purchaser of the mortgaged property, the objection raised on their behalf has not been decided by the Bank while proceeding further to take in possession of the mortgaged property. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners has given much stress on the argument that despite the fact that the petitioners are the purchaser of the mortgaged property, the objection raised on their behalf has not been decided by the Bank while proceeding further to take in possession of the mortgaged property. 8. Section 17(1) specifically provides that any person aggrieved including the borrower may challenge the action taken by the secured creditor under section 13(4) before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Section 17(3)(b) further provides that if the action taken under section 13(4) is found not in accordance with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 as well as the rules, the DRT may declare it invalid and put the borrower or other aggrieved person in possession of the property. The words “other aggrieved person” thus also include the purchaser of the mortgaged property. Section 19 provides for giving compensation and cost to the borrower or other aggrieved person if the action taken by the secured creditor is found not in accordance with the provisions of the said Act and rules framed thereunder. The SARFAESI Act, 2002 is thus a complete code which delineates elaborate procedure for taking action against the borrower as also the remedies available to the borrower or any person aggrieved by such action. The forum before which the action of the secured creditor is to be challenged has also been provided in the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an alternative/efficacious remedy being available to any person in relation to the matters of debts of the banks/financial institutions, a writ petition ought not to be entertained unless any exceptional circumstance emerges. The intendment of the legislature while enumerating that the borrower or any aggrieved person may challenge the action u/s 13(4) and 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 only after taking over possession of the property, is that the secured creditor should not be kept waiting for a long period of time to take possession of the secured assets. If the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is accepted, then the very purpose of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 would get frustrated. Every case is required to be dealt with in its own facts and circumstances which can only be determined by the fact finding court after appreciating the factual details laid by the parties. If the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is accepted, then the very purpose of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 would get frustrated. Every case is required to be dealt with in its own facts and circumstances which can only be determined by the fact finding court after appreciating the factual details laid by the parties. The writ jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly only when any exceptional circumstance arises in any particular case. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon and Others, (2010) 8 SCC 110 , has held as under: “42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression “any person” used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. 43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.” 11. In the case of Standard Chartered Bank vs. Noble Kumar and Others, (2013) 9 SCC 620 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- “27. The “appeal” under Section 17 is available to the borrower against any measure taken under Section 13(4). Taking possession of the secured asset is only one of the measures that can be taken by the secured creditor. Depending upon the nature of the secured asset and the terms and conditions of the security agreement, measures other than taking the possession of the secured asset are possible under Section 13(4). Alienating the asset either by lease or sale, etc. and appointing a person to manage the secured asset are some of those possible measures. On the other hand, Section 14 authorises the Magistrate only to take possession of the property and forward the asset along with the connected documents to the borrower (sic the secured creditor). Therefore, the borrower is always entitled to prefer an “appeal” under Section 17 after the possession of the secured asset is handed over to the secured creditor. Section 13(4)(a) declares that the secured creditor may take possession of the secured assets. It does not specify whether such a possession is to be obtained directly by the secured creditor or by resorting to the procedure under Section 14. We are of the opinion that by whatever manner the secured creditor obtains possession either through the process contemplated under Section 14 or without resorting to such a process obtaining of the possession of a secured asset is always a measure against which a remedy under Section 17 is available.” 12. In the case of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Another vs. Mathew K.C. (2018) 3 SCC 85 it is held as under:- “15. In the case of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Another vs. Mathew K.C. (2018) 3 SCC 85 it is held as under:- “15. It is the solemn duty of the court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex-parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the taxpayer's expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tondon (supra), has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order: (SCC pp. 123-124, para 46) “46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari vs. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.” 16. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter-affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference.” 13. Thus, keeping in view that the petitioners have efficacious/statutory remedy provided under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, I am not inclined to entertain the present writ petition at this stage. 14. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed as not maintainable. The petitioners are, however, at liberty to take appropriate steps in accordance with law, as provided under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. It is made clear that the observation made hereinabove is confined only with regard to the maintainability of writ petition and the same would not affect the merit of the respective cases of the parties before other forums.