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2018 DIGILAW 278 (JK)

Sami Ullah v. State

2018-05-08

M.K.HANJURA

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioners have knocked at the portals of this Court for seeking their release on bail in FIR No.02/2014, registered against them on 04.01.2014 at Police Station Mendhar for the commission of the offences under Sections 302/120-B RPC. 2. The facts as these emerge from the study of the file under consideration are that the deceased-Shaheen Akhter was married to the petitioner No.1 in the year 2012. After this marriage, the relationship of the petitioner No.1 and his wife did not remain cordial. The petitioner No.1 started maltreating her in her matrimonial home. A case under Section 498-A RPC was registered against the petitioners for the ill treatment meted out to the deceased. Thereafter, they arrived at an amicable settlement in which the petitioner No.1 assured the deceased that he will not subject her to any torture, where after the deceased went to her matrimonial home. However, the agony of the deceased did not end here. She was again subjected to beating by the accused under the pretext that she could not fetch dowry from her parental home. It is also stated that at the time of marriage, an amount of Rs.10 lacs was fixed as Dower, out of which, an amount of Rs.1 lac only was paid to the deceased in the form of jewellery and the balance amount reckoned and calculated at Rs.9 lacs was fixed as deferred dower. The deceased wanted to put an end to the marriage by a divorce but the petitioner No.1 avoided the matter for the reason that he had to pay the Dower on the anvil of divorce. Therefore, she was neither divorced nor did her agony end and she was subjected to continuous torture. Finally on the fateful night intervening between 12/13 December, 2013, the petitioners in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy put the deceased to death by strangulating her and after concealing the dead body for some time threw the same in a river/nallah at Ari Mendhar. It was on the 4th of January, 2014 that the body of the deceased was fished out of the said Nallah. 3. The petitioners have contended in their petition that on the culmination of the investigation of the case, a charge-sheet for the commission of the aforesaid offences was laid against them before the committal Court, which ultimately landed in the Court of Sessions at Poonch. 3. The petitioners have contended in their petition that on the culmination of the investigation of the case, a charge-sheet for the commission of the aforesaid offences was laid against them before the committal Court, which ultimately landed in the Court of Sessions at Poonch. It is further contended by the petitioners that they were charged for the commission of offences under Sections 302/120-B RPC vide order dated 11.06.2014 of the trial Court. The petitioners have proceeded to state that during the course of the trial of the case, the prosecution examined PW-1 Mohd. Rafiq, PW-2 Haji Mohd Sadiq and Ishtiaq Ahmed, whereafter petitioner No.4 filed an application on 26.08.2014 for the grant of bail in his favour before the trial Court chiefly, on the ground that he is infirm and the enlargement of the prostate and cyst in both his kidneys has necessitated for him to undergo a surgery. However, the said application came to be rejected by an order dated 29.10.2014 on the ground that no medical record is available on the file which would justify the indulgence of the Court for the grant of bail in his favour. It is also stated that on 25.10.2014, the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 filed an application for the grant of bail before the trial Court on the ground that there is no evidence to support the charge framed against them. The said application also met the same fate and was rejected by the trial court vide order dated 30.12.2014 on the ground that a prima facie case for the commission of aforesaid offences is made out against the petitioners and that no delay has been caused in examining the prosecution witnesses. 4. The petitioners made yet another attempt and filed an application for the grant of bail in their favour before this Court, which was withdrawn with the liberty to file a fresh one before the trial Court. On the examination of three doctors cited as prosecution witnesses in the case who performed the post mortem of the deceased, the petitioners filed another application before the trial Court on 05.03.2016 seeking bail on merits as well as on medical grounds. The trial Court dismissed the said application vide order dated 26.11.2016, attached to the file. 5. It is also contended that petitioner Nos. The trial Court dismissed the said application vide order dated 26.11.2016, attached to the file. 5. It is also contended that petitioner Nos. 2 and 4 have been implicated as accused in the case on the ground that they hatched a conspiracy with the other petitioners in order to commit the crime imputed to them. However, there is not even a whisper of evidence to state so in the prosecution case. During the course of the arguments advanced in the bail application, the attention of the trial Court was drawn towards the statement of PW Pankaj Kumar, the then PSI, who carried out the inquest proceedings and who stated that Aijaz, the brother of the deceased, had filed an application on 14.12.2013 stating therein that on the said day at about 8.30 AM the deceased was thrown out of the matrimonial home after being thrashed. The trial Court failed to take into consideration the statement of the brother of the deceased while rejecting the bail. The statement of Pankaj Kumar is relevant and important to rule out the death of the deceased during the night intervening 12/13 December, 2013. It is also contended that the petitioner No.4 is 65 years of age and is suffering from serious ailments, in support of which, medical record was submitted before the trial Court but the trial Court did not accord any consideration to these submissions made by the petitioner No.4. The trial Court made a casual reference in the order that the medical record does not state anywhere that the petitioner No.4 is suffering from such ailment, which is dangerous to his life. The order impugned is cryptic in details and is perverse in nature. It is based on surmises. The petitioners are entitled to be admitted to bail in light of the Statements of the material witnesses recorded so far particularly in light of the statement of Dr. Ghazala, who has categorically deposed that 72 hours before the conduct of the post-mortem, the deceased was alive which clearly points out that the deceased had died 72 hours before 04.01.2014. This excludes the possibility of her death on 12/13 December, 2013 as claimed by the prosecution. It is also stated that the petitioners shall not flee from Justice in case they are admitted to bail and that they shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence. This excludes the possibility of her death on 12/13 December, 2013 as claimed by the prosecution. It is also stated that the petitioners shall not flee from Justice in case they are admitted to bail and that they shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence. In the end the petitioners have urged that they be admitted to bail in the interest of justice and fair play. 6. The State has resisted and controverted the application of the petitioners on the grounds, inter alia, that the application seeking bail is bereft of any merit and is as such, liable to be dismissed out-rightly. It is also contended that after the thorough investigation of the case a challan was produced before the learned Sessions Judge, Poonch. There is no illegality in the order passed by the trial Court and there is no merit in the instant petition. The petitioners have not established that the order passed by the trial Court is irregular or unsustainable. The order of the trial Court is based on cogent and sound reasoning. It is neither perverse nor illegal and as such, no interference is warranted. The offences for which the petitioners have been charged are heinous in nature and need to be viewed under a different scale in the matter of the grant of bail. It is incumbent on the Court before the grant of bail to derive satisfaction on the count that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. There is every likelihood of the accused misusing the liberty if they are enlarged on bail. They may jump the bail having regard to the circumstances, including the gravity and the nature of the offences, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offences and the potential of a lengthy term of imprisonment to be awarded to them. 7. Heard and considered 8. It is well settled principle of law that one of the main considerations in the grant of bail in non bailable offences is the gravity and nature of the offence. The law is that the fundamental right of an undertrial prisoner under Article 21 of the Constitution is not absolute. Such a fundamental right is circumscribed by the prison manual and other relevant statutes imposing reasonable restrictions on such right. The law is that the fundamental right of an undertrial prisoner under Article 21 of the Constitution is not absolute. Such a fundamental right is circumscribed by the prison manual and other relevant statutes imposing reasonable restrictions on such right. Detention is all the more necessary in order to ensure public confidence in the institution and administration of justice. 9. In the case of Anil Kumar Tulsiyani Vs. State of U.P. & Anr., reported in 2006 (4) Supreme 67 , the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the paraments on the strength of which an application for bail has to be judged and tested and the relevant excerpts thereof are reproduced follow: ‘This court in State of U.P. vs. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21 , has considered various decisions of this Court and observed that the circumstances to be considered in an application for bail are (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail. In the present case, admittedly, the respondent is an advocate. Being an advocate he is in a commanding position and standing in the society. Keeping in view his position in the background, a reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with or won over, coerced, threatened or intimidated by using his influence and position cannot be ruled out. In fact, going through the entire order of the High Court granting bail, we do not find any mitigating circumstances, which warranted the High Court in granting bail in a non-bailable grave offence under Section 302/201 IPC.’ 10. Taking into consideration the gravity and the seriousness of the crime imputed to the petitioners, which is one of the tests enunciated in the law laid down above the grant of bail in favour of the petitioners cannot be considered at this stage when the a majority of the prosecution witnesses are yet to be examined. Taking into consideration the gravity and the seriousness of the crime imputed to the petitioners, which is one of the tests enunciated in the law laid down above the grant of bail in favour of the petitioners cannot be considered at this stage when the a majority of the prosecution witnesses are yet to be examined. The order dated 26.11.2016 passed by learned Sessions Judge, whereby the petition of the petitioners for the grant of bail has been rejected is not niggard, denude or bereft of reason. It is lucid and clear. The Learned trial Court has by express and expatiate reasons delineated the application for bail. The learned Judge has stated that a majority of the witnesses are on record to state about the factum of indifferent attitude, behaviour and torture meted out to the deceased in her matrimonial home. He has also stated that the filing a of complaint under Section 498-A RPC against the petitioners by the relatives of the deceased also lends prima facie credence to the prosecution case. He has also viewed that the prosecution witnesses have stated that the demand of dowry to be arranged by the deceased emanated from the petitioners. It is also stated that the deceased was lastly spotted in her matrimonial home and her whereabouts were not traceable after 12/13-12-2013. It is also contended that the medical evidence confirms that the deceased had multiple wounds on her body and the death was caused due to head injury and by strangulation leading to cardio respiratory arrest. It is also stated that on the face of the evidence on record against the petitioners, they cannot be admitted to bail in a case wherein the punishment provided is death or imprisonment of life. No fault can be found with the order of the trial Court which is pellucid in content. 11. The main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the witnesses examined by the prosecution have not supported the prosecution version and therefore, the petitioners are entitled to be admitted to bail. No fault can be found with the order of the trial Court which is pellucid in content. 11. The main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the witnesses examined by the prosecution have not supported the prosecution version and therefore, the petitioners are entitled to be admitted to bail. What requires to be reiterated in answer to this argument is, that a major chunk of the witnesses have not been examined as yet, and it cannot be assumed or presumed as to how and in what manner the prosecution case will tilt after their examination in the court and above all the appreciation of the prosecution evidence is in the domain and power of the trial Judge. This aspect of the matter has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in case titled “Narayan Ghosh @ Nanu v. State of Orrisa”, in Criminal Appeal No. 251 of 2008 (Arising out of SLP (Criminal No. 6875 of 2007), decided on 04.02.2008, wherein it has been held as under: “…………..There is no dispute about the principles stated in the ruling, however, we do not think that it would be proper for us to discuss at this juncture about prima facie finding. In our opinion it would be for the trial court to consider and appreciate the evidence which comes before it in support of the plea of conspiracy and to arrive at the correct finding. We will not, at this stage, comment upon the nature of the evidence one way or the other. In that view of the matter we do not think that the High Court was in error in refusing the bail to the appellants.” 12. In the case titled “Ved Prakash @ Kalu (JC) v. State through the Nct (Delhi)” reported in (2007) 1LR 2 Delhi 176 which also assumes significance in the context of the decision of the instant application it has been viewed as follows: “10. After having considered the arguments advanced by the counsel for the parties and the decisions referred to by them, I am of the view that there is no difficulty with the principles which have been laid down in the decisions which have been referred to by Mr Hariharan. After having considered the arguments advanced by the counsel for the parties and the decisions referred to by them, I am of the view that there is no difficulty with the principles which have been laid down in the decisions which have been referred to by Mr Hariharan. However, those principles would be more applicable at the stage of a judgment being passed by the trial Court upon an appreciation of the entire evidence on record. At present I am concerned with an application for bail. In a recent decision the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi made it clear that the matters to be considered in a-n application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behavior, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail. 11. “………. Taking a prima facie view of these factors as also taking note of the fact that the trial is towards its end, I do not think that it would be appropriate to grant bail to the petitioner at this stage. This application for bail is rejected with the hope that the trial would be concluded at an early date. It is made clear that nothing expressed in this order shall be taken into consideration by the trial Court while delivering its judgment on the case”. 13. Applying the ratio of the law laid down above to the application on hand, the evidence of the prosecution can be analyzed at the outcome of the trial and doing so is within the domain and power of the trial court. This principle of law has been evolved in Narayan Ghosh @ Nantu’s case, referred to herein before in which the Supreme Court held that we cannot discuss the evidence threadbare as any expression of ours would undoubtedly affect the trial, although, it was admitted during the debate that some of the witnesses who are witnesses for conspiracy were examined and declared to be hostile. The Supreme Court further held that if that is so, that is all the more reason for us not the release the applicants when the trial is at a precarious stage. In Ved Prakah @ Kalu’s case cited above, it has been laid down that since the trial is towards its end, it will not be appropriate to grant the bail to the applicant. 14. No record to justify and detail out that the petitioner No.4 is suffering from a life consuming disease has been placed on record in order to give a semblance of fairness to this argument and contention of the said petitioner. Even otherwise also such an eventuality can be guarded against and looked into by the trial court by directing the Incharge District Jail where the petitioner NO.4 is lodged, to extend proper medical care to him. 15. The other aspect of the case which cannot be lost sight of is that in a case of murder grant of bail is not the rule. Public policy, societal concerns and the general state of crime of such a nature are allied considerations which should weigh with the court while dealing with an application for bail. In view of the demands of the public policy courts are loath to release the offenders on bail in a horrendous crime of murder subject to exceptions. Grant of bail in a case of murder not based on merits will neither save the ends of Justice and law nor of the society at large. The present scenario where the cases of murder are on an increase cannot afford to be liberal. Judicial health and discipline demands that reasons which are conducive should be spelt out while determining and deciding an application for bail as otherwise it is bound to considerably affect the administration of justice. The moral fibre of the society cannot be allowed to be weakened by passing reckless orders in a petition seeking bail in a case of murder. Liberty of those who are law abiding has to be treated on a higher pedestal than the ones who break the law as they themselves relinquish and damage it. The arms of law cannot be allowed to be twisted. Mischievous elements cannot be allowed to go on a rampage destroying everything in their view. 16. Liberty of those who are law abiding has to be treated on a higher pedestal than the ones who break the law as they themselves relinquish and damage it. The arms of law cannot be allowed to be twisted. Mischievous elements cannot be allowed to go on a rampage destroying everything in their view. 16. In view of the preceding analysis there is no merit in the instant bail application as a consequence of which the same is dismissed. A copy of this order shall be sent to the trial court for information. Nothing said herein before shall be construed to be an expression of opinion on the merits of the case which shall be dealt with and decided on its own footing.