ORDER : The main prayer in Tr.P(C).No.4/2017 is as follows: “pass an order to transfer Annexure A2 O.P.No.1880/2016 from Family Court, Thrissur to Family Court, Ernakulam.” The main prayer in Tr.P(C).No.164/2017 is as follows: “pass an order to transfer Annexure A2 I.A.No.980/2017 and O.P.No.313/2017 from Family Court, Thrissur to Family Court, Ernakulam.” The main prayer in Tr.P(C).No.146/2017 is as follows: “Allow this transfer petition by ordering to transfer Anx B O.P 2405/2016 filed by the respondent seeking dissolution of marriage as per the Special marriage act pending before the family court, Ernakulam to Family court, Thrissur where O.P 1880/2016 is pending.” The main prayer in Tr.P(C).No.147/2017 is as follows: “Allow this transfer petition by ordering to transfer O.P 2406/2016 filed by the respondent herein before the family court, Ernakulam to Family court, Thrissur where O.P 1880/2016 is pending.” 2. The prayer in these petitions is for transfer of litigative proceedings between spouses from one Family Court to other Family Court. Accordingly, all these matters are disposed of as per this common order. The petitioner in Tr.P.(C).Nos.4 & 164 of 2017 is the wife of the petitioner in Tr.P.(C).Nos.146 & 147 of 2017. 3. Heard Smt.C.M.Charisma, learned counsel appearing for the wife and Sri. Dheeraj Rajan, learned counsel appearing for the husband. 4. Differences of opinion between the spouses involved in these cases have led to the matrimonial disputes, which in turn have led to litigative proceedings between them in two Family Courts. The wife has filed O.P.No.2406/2016 seeking return of gold ornaments before the Family Court, Ernakulam and she has also filed O.P.No.2405/2016 seeking divorce under Sec.27(d) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, before the Family Court, Ernakulam. The husband has filed O.P.No.1880/2016 before the Family Court, Thrissur, seeking divorce under Sec.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act and he has also filed O.P.No.313/2017 seeking custody of the child before the Family Court, Thrissur. The wife has also filed M.C.No.500/2016 before the Family Court, Ernakulam under Sec.125 of the Code of Criminal procedure. The present four Transfer Petitions are in relation to 4 out of the 5 litigative proceedings between the spouses. No application has been filed by the husband seeking transfer of M.C.No.500/2016 filed by the wife, which is now pending before the Family Court, Ernakulam. 5. The husband belongs to Christian religion and the wife is a Hindu. The present four Transfer Petitions are in relation to 4 out of the 5 litigative proceedings between the spouses. No application has been filed by the husband seeking transfer of M.C.No.500/2016 filed by the wife, which is now pending before the Family Court, Ernakulam. 5. The husband belongs to Christian religion and the wife is a Hindu. After a love affair, the parties have agreed for solemnizing and registering the marriage under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. Accordingly, the marriage of the parties was solemnized on 28.4.2012 in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter II of the Special Marriage Act and necessary marriage certificate has also been issued under the provisions of the Act. It is also the admitted case of the parties that later the parties had also solemnized the marriage in a Church (St.Antony's Church, Mannoothy, Thrissur), presumably as envisaged in the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 (which permits the marriage to be solemnized as long as one of the parties be a Christian and other need not be a Christian). A child (boy) was born in the said wedlock on 1.11.2013. The child, Shivshankar @ Allen is said to be 4 years old and he is with the mother, who is residing at Ernakulam, after the parties have started living separately. 6. The main contention raised by the wife is that she is now residing with her child at Ernakulam and she finds it extremely difficult to travel all the way from Ernakulam to Thrissur in respect of Divorce O.P.No.1880/2016 and G.O.P.No.313/2017 filed by the husband. It is the case that as per a catena of rulings of the Apex Court and High Court, the court while exercising power under Sec.24 of the C.P.C would give due consideration to the convenience of the wife in the conduct of the family litigative proceedings. It is thus urged that as 2 litigative proceedings out of 5 cases filed between the parties are already pending before the Family Court, Ernakulam and so the other 2 litigative proceedings at the Family Court, Thrissur may also be transferred to the Family Court, Ernakulam, so that all the 4 cases could be conducted before the same forum and joint trial of all the said 4 cases may be conducted along with M.C, which is already pending before the Family Court, Ernakulam. Per contra, the husband would contend that the plea of the wife seeking invocation of the general provisions contained in Sec.24 of the C.P.C., cannot be maintained in view of the special provisions contained in Sec.40A of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. It is the contention of the husband that the marriage was originally solemnized under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. It is the case of the husband that though he has stated in the memorandum of O.P.No.1880/2016 filed before the Family Court, Thrissur on 19.11.2016, that the said O.P was filed under the provisions of Sec.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act, that is a mistake committed by misquoting of the said provisions in the petition and that he has already moved an application for amendment of the said petition for treating the said petition as one filed under Sec.27(d) of the Special Marriage Act. To a specific query posed by this Court, the learned counsel for the husband would fairly submit that so far no orders have been passed by the Family Court permitting such correction so as to treat that petition as the one filed under Sec.27(d) of the Special Marriage Act. Accordingly, it is contended that since the substance of the plea made by the husband is that the petition is the one filed under Sec.27(d) of the Special Marriage Act, the provisions under Sec.40A of the Special Marriage Act would also come into play, which would regulate the transfer of cases and the said provision is a special provision, which will have overriding effect over the general provisions as contained in Sec.24 of the C.P.C. The second contention raised by the husband is that he is residing at Thrissur and that he would be unnecessarily put to great hardship and difficulty if the case is transferred to Ernakulam. It is also contended that not only the husband, but his parents, his sister and sister's husband are also arrayed as respondents in O.P.No.2406/2016 filed by the wife before the Family Court, Ernakulam, seeking return of gold ornaments and that the said parties would also be inconvenienced if the plea for transfer is allowed by this Court. 7. It is also contended that not only the husband, but his parents, his sister and sister's husband are also arrayed as respondents in O.P.No.2406/2016 filed by the wife before the Family Court, Ernakulam, seeking return of gold ornaments and that the said parties would also be inconvenienced if the plea for transfer is allowed by this Court. 7. The main contention raised by the husband is the one based on Sec.40A of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, which reads as follows: Sec.40A: Power to transfer petitions in certain cases.-(1) Where-- (a) a petition under this Act has been presented to the district court having jurisdiction, by a party to the marriage praying for a decree for judicial separation under section 23 or for a decree of divorce under section 27, and (b) another petition under this Act has been presented thereafter by the other party to the marriage praying for decree for judicial separation under section 23, or for decree of divorce under section 27 on any ground whether in the same district court, or in a different district court, in the same State or in a different State, the petition shall be dealt with as specified in sub-section (2). (2) In a case where sub-section (1) applies,-- (a) if the petitions are presented to the same district court, both the petitions shall be tried and heard together by that district court; (b) if the petitions are presented to different district courts, the petitions presented later shall be transferred to the district court in which the earlier petition was presented and both the petitions shall be heard and disposed of together by the district court in which the earlier petition was presented. (3) In a case where clause (b) of sub-section (2) applies, the court or the Government, as the case may be, competent under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), to transfer any suit or proceeding from the district court in which the later petition has been presented to the district court in which the earlier petition is pending, shall exercise its powers to transfer such later petition as if it had been empowered so to do under the said Code. The husband would contend that he had initially filed O.P.No.1880/2016 before the Family Court, Thrissur, seeking divorce on 19.11.2016 and it is only thereafter that the wife has filed O.P.No.2405/2016 before the Family Court, Ernakulam, seeking divorce under Sec.27(d) of the Special Marriage Act on 30.12.2016. On that basis, it is further argued that the jurisdictional fact as envisaged in clause (b) of sub-sec.2 of Sec.40A would come into play and therefore the Divorce O.P filed by the wife should be transferred to the Family Court, Thrissur, where the Divorce O.P already initiated by the husband is pending. Even if those arguments are taken on its face value, it is seen that as of now, the divorce petition filed by the husband as O.P.No.1880/2016 before the Family Court, Thrissur, is one filed under Sec.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act and not under the provisions contained in the Special Marriage Act. Whereas, O.P.No.2406/2016 filed by the wife before the Family Court, Ernakulam is one under the provisions of Sec.27(d) of the Special Marriage Act and the divorce petition filed by the husband is not under the Special Marriage Act. So it may not be right and proper for this Court to hold that the conditions stipulated in Sec.40A of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 are satisfied so as to warrant transfer of the divorce petition filed by the wife to the Family Court, Thrissur, where divorce petition filed by the husband has been initially filed. A bare reading of the Sec.40A of the Special Marriage Act would make it clear that both the petitions, which is either for divorce or judicial separation have to be under the Special Marriage Act. On this context, it will be profitable to refer to the provisions in Sec.21A of the Hindu Marriage Act, which is more or less para materia to the provisions in Sec.40A of the Special Marriage Act for the present purposes. On this context, it will be profitable to refer to the provisions in Sec.21A of the Hindu Marriage Act, which is more or less para materia to the provisions in Sec.40A of the Special Marriage Act for the present purposes. The provisions contained in Sec.21A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 read as follows: Sec.21A: Power to transfer petitions in certain cases.-(1) Where- (a) A petition under this Act has been presented to a district court having jurisdiction by a party to a marriage praying for a decree for judicial separation under Section 10 or for a decree of divorce under Section 13, and (b) Another petition under this Act has been presented thereafter by the other party to the marriage praying for a decree for judicial separation under Section 10 or for a decree of divorce under Section 13 on any ground, whether in the same district court or in a different district court, in the same State or in a different State, the petitions shall be dealt with as specified in sub-section (2). (2) In a case where sub-section (1) applies, - (a) If the petitions are presented to the same district court, both the petitions shall be tried and heard together by that district court; (b) If the petitions are presented to different district courts, the petition presented later shall be transferred to the district court in which the earlier petition was presented and both the petitions shall be heard and disposed of together by the district court in which the earlier petition was presented. (3) In a case where clause (b) of sub-section (2) applies, the court or the Government, as the case may be, competent under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) to transfer any suit or proceeding from the district court in which the later petition has been presented to the district court in which the earlier petition is pending, shall exercise its powers to transfer such later petition as if it had been empowered so to do under the said Code. That apart, even if it is assumed that the divorce petition filed by the husband is the one under the provision of the Special Marriage Act, that plea would apply only to the 2 divorce petitions filed by these spouses and not in respect of the other 2 matters involved in these 2 transfer petitions, out of which one is for return of gold ornaments and other for Guardian O.P for custody of the child. 8. A Division Bench of this Court in the judgment in Sankaran Nair v. E.Vijayalekshmi, reported in 2007 (3) KLT 280 (DB) = 2007 (3) KHC 91 , has held that for transfer of matrimonial cases as envisaged in Sec.21A(2)(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the mere pendency of matrimonial disputes between the parties in different Courts or in the same Court will not be sufficient to have either joint trial or transfer to the same Court. In Sankaran Nair's case (supra), a petition for restitution of conjugal rights was filed by one of the spouses before the Family Court and it was sought to be transferred to another court, where Maintenance Case filed by the wife under Sec.21A(2)(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is pending. It was held by the Division Bench in para 2 of Sankaran Nair's case (supra), that the pre-condition for exercise of power of transfer under Sec.21A of the Act is the pendency of a petition under Sec.10 of the said Act for judicial separation or a petition for decree of divorce under Sec.13 of the said Act before one District Court/Family Court, and that a petition either under Sec.10 or under Sec.13 of the said Act on any ground either before the same District Court or a District Court in the same State or a different State and only in such situations, an order can be passed transferring the petitions for joint trial, if pending before the same District Court or transferring the case to the Court, where the case earlier point of time was filed for joint trial. The mere pendency of various matrimonial disputes between the parties in different Courts or in the same Court will not be sufficient to have either joint trial or transfer to the same Court. The mere pendency of various matrimonial disputes between the parties in different Courts or in the same Court will not be sufficient to have either joint trial or transfer to the same Court. It will be profitable to refer to the relevant portion of para 2 of the said Division Bench decision in Sankaran Nair's case (supra), which reads as follows: “.....................................................The pre-condition for exercise of power of transfer under S.21-A of the Act is the pendency of a petition under S.10 of the Act for judicial separation or a petition for decree of divorce under S.13 of the Act before one District Court (presently Family Court), and a petition either under S.10 or under S.13 of the Act on any ground either before the same District Court or a District Court in the same State or a different State. Only in such situations, an order can be passed transferring the petitions for joint trial, if pending before the same District Court or transferring the case to the Court where the case earlier in point of time was filed for joint trial. The mere pendency of various matrimonial disputes between the parties in different Courts or in the same Court will not be sufficient to have either joint trial or transfer to the same Court. Only in a situation where a petition under S.10 for judicial separation or under S.13 for a decree of divorce filed by one party in one District Court and the petition/s for the same relief filed by the other party to the marriage either in the same Court or in a different District Court (Family Court) are pending, the power under S.21A(2)(b) can be exercised either for joint trial or for transfer and joint trial.” 9. This Court in the case in Sasikumar v. Bindu, reported in 2009 (2) KLT 235 , had an occasion to consider the interplay of the relationship between the provisions contained in Sec.24 of the C.P.C and Sec.21A of the Hindu Marriage Act and it was held that Sec.21A of the Hindu Marriage Act will not apply to a situation where the husband has filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights in a Family Court and thereafter the wife has filed petition for divorce in another Family Court. This Court in Sasikumar's case (supra) has held that, where one of the spouses files an application for restitution of conjugal rights and the other party files an application for divorce, then the scenario covered by Sec.21A of the Hindu Marriage Act will not come into play inasmuch as the said provisions envisage that the two petitions should be either for divorce or for judicial separation as per the provisions contained in the Hindu Marriage Act and not otherwise. It was held by this Court that Sec.21A as such would not apply, where one of the parties files a divorce petition before one Family Court and other party files a petition for maintenance or a petition for restitution of conjugal rights or a petition for return of ornaments or any other relief in a different Family Court. It was categorically held by this Court in Sasikumar's case (supra), that in cases where a transfer is sought for and despite Sec.21A, the Court can exercise the power for transfer under Sec.24 of the C.P.C. It will be profitable to refer to paras 5 & 8 of the said decision of this Court in Sasikumar's case (supra), reported in 2009 (2) KLT 235 p.p.238, 239, which read as follows: “5. The necessary ingredients to apply S.21A are: (1) A party to the marriage has filed a petition for a decree for judicial separation under S.10 or for a decree for divorce under S.13 of the Act. (2) The other party to the marriage has thereafter filed another petition under S.10 or under S.13 either in the same District Court (Family Court) or in a different District Court (Family Court). If the petition is not under S.10 or S.13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, S.21A would have no application. The purpose of S.21A is clear from sub-s.(2) thereof. In a case where sub-s.(1) applies, both the petitions shall be tried and heard together by the same Court. If the petitions are presented before the same District Court (Family Court), they shall be heard by that District Court (Family Court) and if the petitions are presented before different District Courts (Family Courts), the later one shall be transferred to the District Court in which the earlier petition was presented. This provision is intended to avoid conflicting decrees being made by different Courts. This provision is intended to avoid conflicting decrees being made by different Courts. S.21A as such would not apply where one of the parties files a divorce petition before one Family Court and the other party files a petition for maintenance or a petition for restitution of conjugal rights or a petition for return of ornaments or any other relief in a different Family Court. xxx xxx xxx 8. S.21 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that subject to the other provisions contained in the Act and to such rules as the High Court may make in that behalf, all the proceedings under the Act shall be regulated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. S.21 of the Hindu Marriage Act does not as such provide for any discretion to be exercised by the Court in the matter of transfer. However, by the introduction of S.21 A, specific provision has been made to deal with a situation where one party has filed a petition before one Court and the other party has filed a petition for a similar relief in the other Court. However, the application of S.21A is restricted to a petition under S.10 or a petition under S.13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. But S.21A is not exhaustive in the matter of transfer of cases. S.21A does not cover the several situations warranting transfer of one case to the other Court either for simultaneous disposal or for joint trial. These situations are covered by S.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The special provision, namely, S.21A of the Hindu Marriage Act, would not curtail the general power of the Court contained in S.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, in cases where a transfer is sought for and it is not covered by S.21A, still the Court can exercise the power for transfer under S.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 10. The Apex Court has dealt with a case involving interplay of relationship between Secs.21 & 21A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 vis-a-vis Sec.25 of the C.P.C, in the case in Guda Vijayalakshmi v. Guda Ramachandra Sekhara Sastry, reported in (1981) 2 SCC 646 = AIR 1981 SC 1143 . The Apex Court has dealt with a case involving interplay of relationship between Secs.21 & 21A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 vis-a-vis Sec.25 of the C.P.C, in the case in Guda Vijayalakshmi v. Guda Ramachandra Sekhara Sastry, reported in (1981) 2 SCC 646 = AIR 1981 SC 1143 . The provisions contained in Sec.21 of the Hindu Marriage Act reads as follows: Sec.21: Application of Act 5 of 1908.-Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act and to such rules as the High Court may make in this behalf, all proceedings under this Act shall be regulated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Sec.25 of the C.P.C, which is dealing with power of Supreme Court to transfer suits, reads as follows: “25. Power of Supreme Court to transfer suits, etc.-(1) On the application of a party, and after notice to the parties, and after hearing such of them as desire to be heard, the Supreme Court may, at any stage, if satisfied that an order under this section is expedient for the ends of justice, direct that any suit, appeal or other proceeding be transferred from a High Court or other civil court in one State to a High Court or other civil court in any other State. (2) Every application under this section shall be made by a motion which shall be supported by an affidavit. (3) The court to which such suit, appeal or other proceeding is transferred shall, subject to any special directions in the order of transfer, either retry it or proceed from the stage at which it was transferred to it. (4) In dismissing any application under this section, the Supreme Court may, if it is of opinion that the application was frivolous or vexatious, order the applicant to pay by way of compensation to any person who has opposed the application such sum, not exceeding two thousand rupees, as it considers appropriate in the circumstances of the case. (5) The law applicable to any suit, appeal or other proceeding transferred under this section shall be the law which the court in which the suit, appeal or other proceeding was originally instituted ought to have applied to such suit, appeal or proceeding.” Paras 3 & 4 of the said judgment of the Apex Court in Guda Vijayalakshmi's case (supra) read as follows: '3. In my view, on proper construction of the relevant provisions it is not possible to uphold the preliminary objection. In the first place it is difficult to accept the contention that the substantive provision contained in Section 25, CPC is excluded by reason of Section 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Section 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act merely provides: “Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act and to such rules as the High Court may make in this behalf, all proceedings under this Act shall be regulated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.” In terms Section 21 does not make any distinction between procedural and substantive provisions of CPC and all that it provides is that the Code as far as may be shall apply to all proceedings under the Act and the phrase “as far as may be” means and is intended to exclude only such provisions of the Code as are or may be inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act. It is impossible to say that such provisions of the Code as partake of the character of substantive law are excluded by implication as no such implication can be read into Section 21 and a particular provision of the Code irrespective of whether it is procedural or substantive will not apply only if it is inconsistent with any provisions of the Act. For instance, it is difficult to countenance the suggestion that the doctrine of res judicata contained in Section 11 of the Code which partakes of the character of substantive law is not applicable to proceedings under the Act. Res judicata, after all, is a branch or specie of the Rule of Estoppel called Estoppel by Record and though estoppel is often described as a Rule of evidence, the whole concept is more correctly viewed as a substantive Rule of law. [See Canada and Dominion Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Canadian National (West Indies) Steamships Ltd. 1947 AC 46, 56 (PC)] 4. So far as Section 21-A of the Hindu Marriage Act is concerned the marginal note of that section itself makes it clear that it deals with power to transfer petitions and direct their joint or consolidated trial “in certain cases” and is not exhaustive. Ltd. v. Canadian National (West Indies) Steamships Ltd. 1947 AC 46, 56 (PC)] 4. So far as Section 21-A of the Hindu Marriage Act is concerned the marginal note of that section itself makes it clear that it deals with power to transfer petitions and direct their joint or consolidated trial “in certain cases” and is not exhaustive. Further subsection (3) of Section 21-A on which strong reliance was placed runs thus: “21-A. (3) In a case where clause (b) of sub-section (2) applies, the Court or the Government, as the case may be, competent under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) to transfer any suit or proceeding from the District Court in which the later petition has been presented to the District Court in which the earlier petition is pending, shall exercise its powers to transfer such later petition as if it had been empowered so to do under the said Code.” This provision in terms deals with the power of the government or the court on whom powers of transfer have been conferred by the CPC as it then stood, that is to say, old Sections 24 and 25 of CPC. It does not deal with the present Section 25, CPC which has been substituted by an amendment which has come into force with effect from February 1, 1977 (Section 11 of the Amending Act 104 of 1976). By the amendment very wide and plenary power has been conferred on this Court for the first time to transfer any suit, appeal or other proceedings from one High Court to another High Court or from one civil court in one State to another civil court in any other State throughout the country. Conferral of such wide and plenary power on this Court could not have been in the contemplation of Parliament at the time of enactment of Section 21-A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the contention that Section 21A of Hindu Marriage Act excludes the power of transfer conferred upon this Court by the present Section 25 of CPC in relation to proceedings under that Act.' Further the Apex Court in paras 8 & 9 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Guda Vijayalakshmi's case (supra) has held as follows: '8. In my opinion, this argument of the learned counsel for the respondent husband is without any substance. In my opinion, this argument of the learned counsel for the respondent husband is without any substance. I have earlier set out Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure and I have pointed out that an analysis of the section makes it abundantly clear that for the ends of justice, wide power and jurisdiction have been conferred on this Court in the matter of transfer of any suit, appeal or proceeding from any High Court or other civil court in one State to a High Court or other civil court in any other State. A suit or a proceeding for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act in a civil court is necessarily a suit or proceeding and must on a plain reading of Section 25(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure be held to come under Section 25(1) of the Code, as the said section speaks of any suit, appeal or other proceeding. This Court must necessarily enjoy the power and jurisdiction under the said provisions of transferring such a suit or proceeding for the ends of justice, unless the power and jurisdiction of this Court are specifically taken away by any statute. If the jurisdiction clearly conferred on any court has to be ousted, the exclusion of such jurisdiction must be made in clear and unequivocal terms. Section 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act does not deal with the question of jurisdiction of any court. As no procedure with regard to the proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act has been laid down in the said Act, Section 21 of the Act only provides that “all proceedings under this Act shall be regulated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure”. Section 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act cannot be construed to exclude the jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It does not become necessary in the instant case to decide whether the provision in relation to jurisdiction of this Court contained in Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure is one of substantive law or it belongs to the domain of procedure. It does not become necessary in the instant case to decide whether the provision in relation to jurisdiction of this Court contained in Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure is one of substantive law or it belongs to the domain of procedure. Even if I accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that Section 25 does not form any part of the procedural law and is a part of the substantive law, I am of the opinion that jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not in any way, affected by Section 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act which, as I have already noted, only provides that “all proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act shall be regulated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908”. 9. Section 21-A of the Hindu Marriage Act, in my opinion, has indeed no bearing on the question of jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 21-A of the Hindu Marriage Act makes provisions for transfer of petitions specified in the said section and for hearing and disposal of such petitions together by the District Court in which the earlier petition has been presented. Such power has been conferred on the court or the government. Section 21-A has no application to the case of transfer of any suit or proceeding from one State to another. As I have earlier noted, very wide power and jurisdiction have been conferred on this Court in the interest of justice for transferring any appeal, suit or proceeding from one State to another under Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the instant case, the petitioner has applied for transfer of the suit pending in the District Court at Udaipur in the State of Rajasthan to the appropriate Court at Eluru in the State of Andhra Pradesh. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this Court enjoys the power and jurisdiction to entertain this application under Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Sections 21 and 21-A of the Hindu Marriage Act do not, in any way, exclude, affect or curtail the power conferred on this Court under Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I may incidentally add that the present Section 25 in the Code of Civil Procedure came into force after Sections 21 and 21-A had been incorporated in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.' It was categorically held by the Apex Court that Sec.21A of the Hindu Marriage Act has indeed no bearing on the question of jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court under Sec.25 of the Code of Civil Procedure for transfer of cases and Sec.21A of the Hindu Marriage Act makes provisions for transfer of petitions specified in the said section and for hearing and disposal of such petitions together by the District Court in which the earlier petition has been presented. 11. It is now well settled that in cases where a transfer is sought and it is not covered by Sec.21A, still the court can exercise the power under Sec.24 of the C.P.C. The said dictum would also apply with equal vigour to the scenario covered by Sec.27(d) of the Special Marriage Act, vis-a-vis, Sec.24 of the C.P.C. That apart, it has been held by the Apex Court in the decisions as in S.Prakash & anr. v. K.M.Kurian & ors., reported in (1999) 5 SCC 624 , that if the intention of legislature was to establish a rule of universal application, in such cases, a special provision must give way to general provision and if the language is clear and unqualified, in such cases, General Rule would prevail. It would be relevant to note paras 8 & 17 of the judgment in the case in S.Prakash's case (supra), which read as follows: '8. Before appreciating the rival contentions, we would first refer to the established principles for interpreting the effect of amendment in Rule 5 of the General Rules vis-à-vis the Special Rules for recruitment, which prescribes the ratio or percentage of appointment by direct recruitment and by transfer. The law on this point is well settled to the effect that from the consideration of the general enactment if the intention of the legislature was to establish a rule of universal application, in such cases, a special provision must give way to the general provision. (Re: Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 953 at p. 531.) Dealing with a similar situation in the case of Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. (Re: Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 953 at p. 531.) Dealing with a similar situation in the case of Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. CIT ( AIR 1958 SC 816 at p. 737) this Court observed: “Now the rule of construction expressed in the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant is well settled, and we shall also assume in favour of the appellant that the agreement, Ex. A, is a special law in the nature of a private Act passed by the British Parliament, and that accordingly Section 3 of the Ordinance should not be construed, unless the contrary appears expressly or by necessary implication, as repealing the provisions of Ex. A. But ultimately, the question is what does the language of the enactment mean?” (emphasis supplied) If the language is clear and unqualified, the general rule would prevail.' xxx xxx xxx “17. In our view, the aforesaid submission is without any substance. As discussed above, Rule 5 of the General Rules is enacted to govern the Special Rules with regard to the method of recruitment in cases when appointments are by direct recruitment and by transfer in any substantive vacancies in permanent cadre. The language used in Rule 5 is clear and unqualified. The intention of the legislature of adding Note (3) is also clear and is added to fill in the existing lacuna in the method of recruitment provided in the Special Rules. As stated above, for appointment to Category 3, i.e., to the post of Agricultural Income Tax Officers and others, the method of appointment only provides that 20% of successive substantive vacancies shall be filled or reserved to be filled by direct recruitment and the remaining vacancies are to be filled or reserved to be filled by transfer. On what basis the substantive vacancies are to be determined was not provided and therefore that lacuna is filled up by the aforesaid Note (3) in Rule 5. In any case, even if there is a repugnancy or inconsistency, the law is settled to the effect that the general rule later in time prevails over the earlier special rule if it clearly and directly supersedes the special rule. It is also well settled that the special rule can be altered, abrogated or repealed by the general rule by an express provision. It is also well settled that the special rule can be altered, abrogated or repealed by the general rule by an express provision. In the present case, the language of Note (3) specifically makes it applicable to the General Rule stating “whenever” the ratio or percentage is fixed for different methods of recruitment, the method prescribed therein would apply. So the word “whenever” would cover the Special Rule prescribing ratio or percentage of appointment between the direct recruit and by transfer and the rule-making authority has specifically provided that the ratio or percentage for the vacancies is to be computed on the basis “not to the vacancies existing at that time,” but on the basis of the cadre strength. Hence, there is no question of repugnancy between Rule 5 Note (3) and the method of appointment provided in the Special Rules.” Therefore, the contention raised by the husband that the petition filed by the wife seeking transfer of the 2 cases filed by the husband to the Family Court, Ernakulam, by virtue of the enabling powers contained in Sec.24 of the C.P.C., is not maintainable in view of the prior application made by the husband for divorce as envisaged under Sec.40A of the Special Marriage Act, is not tenable and sustainable in the facts and circumstances of this case. Firstly, as of now, the divorce petition filed by the husband is one under the provisions contained in the Divorce Act and not under the Special Marriage Act. Secondly, the other 2 cases concerned are not for divorce or judicial separation, but for return of gold ornaments and for custody of the child. Sri.Dheeraj Rajan, learned counsel for the husband would submit that there was only a misquoting of the provisions in the petition filed and in substance it is the one filed under Sec.27(d) of the Special Marriage Act. Per contra, Smt.C.M.Charisma, learned counsel appearing for the wife would contend that though the marriage was initially solemnized as per the provisions contained in the Special Marriage Act, 1954, later the parties had solemnized the marriage in Church as per Christian ceremony and that therefore the provisions contained in the Divorce Act would apply. A contention is also made by the wife that in view of the provisions contained in Sec.4 of the Divorce Act, 1869, the said provision in that enactment will have a overriding effect over any other law. A contention is also made by the wife that in view of the provisions contained in Sec.4 of the Divorce Act, 1869, the said provision in that enactment will have a overriding effect over any other law. Sec.4 of the Divorce Act, 1869, reads as follows: “Sec.4: Matrimonial jurisdiction of High Courts to be exercised subject to Act--Exception-The jurisdiction now exercised by the High Courts in respect of divorce a mensa et toro, and in all other causes, suits and matters matrimonial, shall be exercised by such Courts and by the District Courts subject to the provisions in this Act contained, and not otherwise: except so far as relates to the granting of marriage-licenses, which may be granted as if this Act had not been passed.” 12. It is urged by Smt.C.M.Charisma, learned counsel for the wife that it has been categorically held by the Full Bench of this Court in the case in George Sebastian v. Molly Joseph, reported in 1994 (4) KLT 387 (FB), that the grounds enumerated and envisaged in Sec.19 are exhaustive for nullifying a marriage and a court is not empowered to go outside the contours of the Divorce Act for granting a decree of divorce or a decree of nullity and that this is clear from Sec.4 of the Divorce Act. The message contained in Sec.4 is, therefore, unambiguously clear particularly with the words “and not otherwise” that the court cannot exercise jurisdiction outside the boundaries fixed in the Divorce Act. In that connection the learned counsel for the wife would also place reliance on the provisions contained in Sec.42 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, which reads as follows: Sec.42: Saving.-Nothing contained in this Act shall affect the validity of any marriage not solemnized under its provisions; nor shall this Act be deemed directly or indirectly to affect the validity of any mode of contracting marriage. Thus, it is argued by the learned counsel for the wife that it has been unambiguously declared that the provisions contained in the Special Marriage Act shall not affect the validity of any marriage not solemnized under the provisions nor shall the Special Marriage Act be deemed directly or indirectly to affect the validity of any mode of contracting marriage, etc. It is thus contended that as per the provisions under Sec.42 of the Special Marriage Act, the marriage of the parties, which has been subsequently solemnized in a Christian Church, presumably under the provisions of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872, shall not be affected in any manner by the provisions in the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and that the provisions in the Special Marriage Act cannot be deemed to be directly or indirectly to affect the validity of any mode of contracting marriage. Thus, it is contended that it has been abundantly made clear by the Parliament that the provisions contained in the Special Marriage Act, 1954, are not in derogation of the existing laws, but only in addition to the existing laws. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the wife that Sec.2 of the Divorce Act 1869, makes it clear that the said Act applies where the petitioner/respondent professes Christian religion. Therefore, it was clear that one of the parties need be a Christian and the other one could profess any other religious faith. Further, it is pointed out by the wife that sub-sec.(1) of Sec.10 of the Divorce Act which provides for dissolution of marriage, explicitly provides that any marriage solemnized whether before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, could be presented to the District Court concerned either by the husband or wife for divorce on the grounds enumerated therein. It has been reiterated by the legislature that even if one of the parties is not a Christian, the parties to the marriage, which is so solemnized, could maintain an application for divorce on the grounds enumerated under Sec.10 so long as one of the parties to the said marriage is a Christian. It has been held by this Court in the case in Kunhiraman Nair v. Annakutty, reported in 1967 KLT 24 , that the Indian Christian Marriage Act does not stand in the way of a Christian marrying a non-christian, but such marriage will have to be solemnized under the provisions of the said Act. It has also been held by the Madras High Court in Mariasoosai v. Clara Mary, reported in AIR 1995 Mad. It has also been held by the Madras High Court in Mariasoosai v. Clara Mary, reported in AIR 1995 Mad. 35 , that even if the marriage, not solemnized in accordance with the provisions of Sec.5 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872, a petition to declare the marriage null and void is maintainable in view of Sec.7 of the Divorce Act. (That Section was later deleted as per Amendment Act, 2001 dated 3.10.2001). In Petricia v. Purushothaman, reported in 2006 (2) KLT 800 , this Court has held that even if the parties are Hindu and Christian by religion, there is no bar to have a legally valid marriage between them under the Christian law and if there is evidence that a marriage was conducted, parties can be held to be legally married. However, it is to be noted that the provisions contained in Special Marriage Act are a subsequent law and though the said subsequent law is not in derogation of existing law but it is an addition to the existing law. The wife would thus contend that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the parties had the option to file their matrimonial litigation proceedings either under the provisions of the Divorce Act, 1869 or under the provisions of Special Marriage Act, 1954 and that in view of the doctrine of election, the parties have to consciously elect and choose either of the two remedies and once the party consciously chooses to elect one of the remedies, then the said party is estopped from electing to resile that option. Accordingly, it is contended by the wife that the husband had consciously elected to choose one among the option of remedies by filing his divorce petition under Sec.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 and therefore he is estopped from resiling that option. Therefore, the plea made by the husband that the application for divorce is not maintainable under the Divorce Act and it is only maintainable under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, etc., are clearly untenable and therefore he cannot now turn around to say that his divorce petition is one of the provisions contained in the Special Marriage Act. Therefore, the plea made by the husband that the application for divorce is not maintainable under the Divorce Act and it is only maintainable under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, etc., are clearly untenable and therefore he cannot now turn around to say that his divorce petition is one of the provisions contained in the Special Marriage Act. The counsel for the husband would place reliance on the judgment of the Gauhati High court in the case in Anupam Das v. Mampi Das, reported in Laws (Gau) 2007 10 6, wherein it has been held that if an authority is conferred with the power, the said source of power cannot be whittled down merely on the ground of misquoting of the provisions. Prima facie, this Court is of the view that the contention made by the wife that after having consciously elected to choose one of the remedies, the party cannot resile therefrom, appears to be tenable. However, there is no necessity for this Court to pronounce any final opinion on this issue as the divorce petition, as now filed by the husband is one under the Divorce Act, 1869. As held by this Court in Sasikumar v. Bindu, reported in 2009 (2) KLT 235 , that in cases where the transfer is sought and if it is not covered by Sec.21A of the Hindu Marriage Act, still the court can exercise the power under Sec.24 of the C.P.C. Therefore, in a case like this, it cannot be said that the larger power conferred on this Court under Sec.24 of the C.P.C., is in any manner whittled down or diluted merely the due to the claim made by the husband that, in substance, his petition for divorce is under the Special Marriage Act. The situation covered by Sec.24 of the C.P.C., stand on a different and broader level than the narrow compass envisaged in Sec.40A of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and Sec.21A of the Hindu Marriage Act. In this regard, it will be profitable to take note that specific provisions have been made by the Parliament as in Sc.45 of the Divorce Act and Sec.40A of the Special Marriage Act and Sec.21 of the C.P.C, which provides that applicability of C.P.C as far as may be practicable. Sec.21 of the C.P.C., has already been quoted hereinabove. In this regard, it will be profitable to take note that specific provisions have been made by the Parliament as in Sc.45 of the Divorce Act and Sec.40A of the Special Marriage Act and Sec.21 of the C.P.C, which provides that applicability of C.P.C as far as may be practicable. Sec.21 of the C.P.C., has already been quoted hereinabove. Sec.45 of the Divorce Act reads as follows: “Sec.45: Code of Civil Procedure to apply.-Subject to the provisions herein contained, all proceedings under this Act between party and party shall be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).” Sec.8 of the Family Courts Act reads as follows: “Sec.8.-Exclusion of jurisdiction and pending proceedings.- Where a Family Court has been established for any area,- (a) no district court or any subordinate civil court referred to in sub-section (1) of section 7 shall, in relation to such area, have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of any suit or proceeding of the nature referred to in the Explanation to that sub-section; (b) no magistrate shall, in relation to such area, have or exercise any jurisdiction or powers under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); (c) every suit or proceeding of the nature referred to in the Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 7 and every proceeding under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),- (i) which is pending immediately before the establishment of such Family Court before any district court or subordinate court referred to in that sub-section or, as the case may be, before any magistrate under the said Code; and (ii) which would have been required to be instituted or taken before or by such Family Court if, before the date on which such suit or proceeding was instituted or taken, this Act had come into force and such Family Court had been established, shall stand transferred to such Family Court on the date on which it is established.” 13. Varied situations and scenarios might arise which are never envisaged within the narrow compass of the provisions as in Sec.40A of the Special Marriage Act or Sec.21A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Varied situations and scenarios might arise which are never envisaged within the narrow compass of the provisions as in Sec.40A of the Special Marriage Act or Sec.21A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. In the instant case, there are 5 litigations between the spouses, out of which two are for divorce and the other three for custody of child and for return for money and gold ornaments, etc. True that the Maintenance Case is one filed under Sec.125 of the Cr.P.C. But in view of the provisions in the Family Courts Act, the petition for maintenance under Sec.125 of the Cr.P.C is also to be adjudicated by the Family Court concerned. Therefore, consideration of a petition filed under Secs.24 or 25 of the C.P.C., stand on a different and broader footing than the one envisaged in Sec.40A of the Special Marriage Act and Sec.21A of the Hindu Marriage Act. The provisions contained in Sec.8 of the Divorce Act appear to be quite different from the one contained in Sec.40A of the Special Marriage Act and Sec.21 of the Hindu Marriage Act. In view of the provisions contained in Sec.21 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which envisage the applicability of the provisions contained in the C.P.C., as far as possible and in view of the specific powers conferred on the High Court and and District Court under Sec.24 of the C.P.C, on the Supreme Court under Sec.24 of the C.P.C., the said courts have to deal with varied situations, more so, in view of the change in the legislative landscape after the enactment of Family Courts Act, 1984, so that the request of this nature should be considered in a holistic manner to ensure that as far as possible the litigative proceedings be conducted before the same forum which would only ensure to the benefit of all the disputing parties concerned. Therefore, in the light of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the decisions as in Sasikumar v. Bindu, reported in 2009 (2) KLT 235 , Sankaran Nair v. E.Vijayalekshmi, reported in 2007 (3) KLT 280 (DB) = 2007 (3) KHC 91 and of the Apex Court decision in the case Guda Vijayalakshmi v. Guda Ramachandra Sekhara Sastry, reported in (1981) 2 SCC 646 = AIR 1981 SC 1143 , the power under Sec.24 of the C.P.C., conferred on this Court could be befittingly invoked in the facts and circumstances of this case. If a narrow and pedantic view of the matter is taken as urged by the husband, it would lead to anomalous and unjust hardships and difficulties not only to the wife but also to the husband. In the light of these aspects, this Court is inclined to consider the plea for transfer made by the wife in the transfer petitions and correspondingly, this Court is not inclined to consider the transfer petitions filed by the husband. 14. Before parting with this case, it is also pertinent to note some of the submissions made by Smt.C.M.Charisma, learned counsel appearing for the wife, that the wife and child have been constrained to live with her parents at Ernakulam and she is unemployed and that she is a M.Sc degree holder in Electronics and she is not employed and fully depending on the financial support not only for her but also for the minor child and that not even a single paise has been paid by the husband towards maintenance either to her or to the child. It is pointed out that the wife has filed an application seeking maintenance as M.C.No.500/2016 before the Family Court, Ernakulam and that in view of the stay order granted in these transfer petitions, the wife had not moved any separate application for grant of interim maintenance and her party has now filed Interlocutory Application in the M.C for grant of interim maintenance to the wife and child. During the course of hearing, this Court had queried with the learned counsel for the husband as to whether the husband could make any payment by way of interim maintenance at least to the child, who is an innocent victim in the “battle” between the spouses. Sri. During the course of hearing, this Court had queried with the learned counsel for the husband as to whether the husband could make any payment by way of interim maintenance at least to the child, who is an innocent victim in the “battle” between the spouses. Sri. Dheeraj Rajan, learned counsel for the husband would submit that despite his diligent efforts he could not contact his party but through instructions from the lower court counsel it is submitted that the husband has forced to leave his employment at Bangalore as he has to look after his aged parents, who are suffering from old age ailments and the husband is also suffering from thyroid and the husband and his parents are undergoing treatment for which expenses are involved. This Court need not enter any further on the aspects in that area as those are aspects which are fully within the domain of the Family Court concerned, which is considering the M.C.No.500/2016 filed by the wife. As it is brought to the judicial cognizance of this Court that a 4 year old child is allegedly not getting any financial support from his father and he is fully depending upon the goodwill of the child's maternal grandfather, this Court would only observe that the wife should move the Interim Application in the M.C, and such application will be considered by the Family Court, Ernakulam seeking interim maintenance claimed for both the wife and the child without much delay and after hearing hearing both sides, preferably within a period of 6 weeks from the date of filing of such application. Sri.Dheeraj Rajan, learned counsel for the husband would submit on the basis of instructions that the husband would file counter affidavit/written objections to any such Interlocutory Application for interim maintenance without much delay, preferably within 2-3 weeks from the date of receipt of such application. The said submission made by both sides are recorded and it is for the Family Court, Ernakulam to deal with that matter without much delay and take a decision on the request for interim maintenance on its merits and in accordance with law. It is also pertinent to note that G.O.P.No.313/2017 has been filed by the husband before the Family Court, Thrissur. It is also pertinent to note that G.O.P.No.313/2017 has been filed by the husband before the Family Court, Thrissur. The wife has specifically submitted in her Transfer Petition that the child is residing with her in her parental home at Ernakulam and that it is pertinent in that regard to note Sec.9 of Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, which provides as follows: “Sec.9: Court having jurisdiction to entertain application.- (1) If the application is with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor, it shall be made to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides. (2) If the application is with respect to the guardianship of the property of the minor, it may be made either to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides or to a District Court having jurisdiction in a place where he has property. (3) If an application with respect to the guardianship of the property of a minor is made to a District Court other than that having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides, the Court may return the application if in its opinion the application would be disposed of more justly or conveniently by any other District Court having jurisdiction.” The said claim of the wife in her Transfer Petition that the child is residing with her parents at Ernakulam has not in any manner been denied or rebutted by the husband. Therefore, it is only to be held that the Family Court, Thrissur does not have territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter in G.O.P.No.313/2017 regarding the claim made by the husband for custody of the child. Sub-sec. (5) of Sec.24 of the C.P.C., provides as follows: “Sec.24. General power of transfer and withdrawal.- xxx xxx xxx (5) A suit or proceeding may be transferred under this Section from a Court which has no jurisdiction to try it.” Therefore, this Court is constrained even to order transfer of the case, which is not having territorial jurisdiction to try the subject matter of the suit or proceedings. 15. In the light of the above said aspects, it is ordered that the prayers in Transfer Petitions filed by the wife, viz., Tr.P.(C).Nos.4 & 164 of 2017 will stand allowed. 15. In the light of the above said aspects, it is ordered that the prayers in Transfer Petitions filed by the wife, viz., Tr.P.(C).Nos.4 & 164 of 2017 will stand allowed. It is further ordered that the prayers made by the husband in the Transfer Petitions, viz.,Tr.P.(C).Nos.146 & 147 of 2017 will stand declined. Consequently, it is ordered that O.P.No.1880/2016 filed by the husband before the Family Court, Thrissur, seeking divorce under Sec.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act, will stand transferred to the Family Court, Ernakulam. It is also ordered that G.O.P.No.313/2017 filed by the husband seeking custody of the child filed before the Family Court, Thrissur, will stand transferred to the Family Court, Ernakulam. 16. The parties will forward a certified copy of this order to the Family Court, Thrissur and Family Court, Ernakulam. Upon receipt of the judgment, the Family Court, Thrissur, will take necessary steps to ensure that the case papers and case records in relation to O.P.No.1880/2016 & G.O.P.No.313/2017 on the file of that court are transmitted to the Family Court, Ernakulam, without much delay. Upon receipt of the case papers and case records in those matters, the Family Court, Ernakulam will issue notice to both sides and proceed with the matter in accordance with law. Smt.C.M.Charisma, learned counsel for the wife would submit that this Court may direct the Family Court, Ernakulam for joint trial of all these 4 cases as well as M.C. This Court is not now apprised about the stage of each of the 5 cases as to whether evidence has been commenced or not. Accordingly, it is ordered that it will be open to the parties concerned to make necessary application for conduct of joint trial before the Family Court, Ernakulam in respect of all the 5 cases. It is also ordered that in case such an application is filed, then the Family Court, Ernakulam shall consider such application and pass necessary orders thereon after hearing both sides and taking note of the well settled legal principles which regulate the matters in relation to joint trial. Taking note of the difficulties expressed by both parties, the parties will be at liberty to file appropriate applications for exemption from personal appearance, upon which, the Family Court, Ernakulam shall take a favourable decision thereon, provided the parties are represented through Advocates concerned. Taking note of the difficulties expressed by both parties, the parties will be at liberty to file appropriate applications for exemption from personal appearance, upon which, the Family Court, Ernakulam shall take a favourable decision thereon, provided the parties are represented through Advocates concerned. However, it is made clear that the parties will have to appear before the Family Court concerned at the time of counselling and mediation process, etc., and as and when specifically so directed by the Family Court. With these observations and directions, the aforecaptioned Transfer Petitions (Civil) stand finally disposed of.