JUDGMENT : 1. W.P.(C) No. 5735 of 2018 has been filed by the tenant (hereinafter referred to as the “petitioner-tenant”) for quashing the order passed by the District Magistrate, Seraikella-Kharsawan, vide Order No. Vidhi 616 dated 21.08.2018 under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the “SARFAESI Act, 2002”). A further prayer has been made for issuance of direction upon the respondents for securing the possession of the petitioner on the premises in question till the term of the lease i.e., till 30.09.2021. 2. W.P.(C) No. 5850 of 2018 has been filed by the borrower (hereinafter referred to as the “petitioners-borrower”) for quashing the notice dated 07.11.2014 under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. A further prayer has been made for quashing the order dated 23.08.2018 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi in SARFAESI Application No. 63 of 2018, whereby it has declined to grant interim order of stay against the auction sale scheduled on 24.08.2018. 3. Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocate, appearing for the petitioners-borrower submits that on 02.04.2013, the petitioners-borrower was extended Overdraft Facility of Rs. 10 lakhs on the terms and conditions as incorporated in the loan agreement. Collateral deposit made by the petitioners-borrower against the OD facility is an immovable property identified as 436, 4th Floor, Ashiana Trade Centre, Adityapur, District Saraikela-Kharsawan, Jharkhand (hereinafter referred to as the “demised premises”) and the value of which extends much beyond the OD facility. It is contended that without issuing any notice and without giving any opportunity of hearing to them, the notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 was issued for taking possession of the mortgaged property. In the meantime, the petitioner entered an OTS and also deposited 10% of the outstanding amount. The petitioner filed SA No. 63 of 2018 before the DRT, Ranchi for restraining the e-auction sale of the demised premises on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice which was, however, rejected. It is further submitted that the authorized officer has obtained the valuation of the property on considerably lower side and during evaluation of the same, no notice was issued to them. It is further submitted that the authorized officer has obtained the valuation of the property on considerably lower side and during evaluation of the same, no notice was issued to them. The property was put on auction on 24.08.2018 and the highest bidder who bid marginally higher than the offset price has been given opportunity till 23.09.2018 to pay the balance auction price. 4. Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocate also appearing on behalf of the petitioner-tenant submits that on 17.10.2012, the petitioner-tenant entered into a lease agreement for the period from 01.10.2012 to 30.09.2021 with one Smt. Laxmi Singh, wife of Shri Ramesh Kumar Singh with regard to the demised premises. It is further submitted that the impugned orders have been passed without issuing any notice to him. It is further submitted that the petitioner’s right under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is protected notwithstanding Section 37 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the petitioner cannot be evicted by the use of force taking recourse under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The petitioner is the occupant of the premise by virtue of a valid and subsisting lease. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent-Bank submits that in view of the amendment made in the SARFAESI Act, 2002 by inserting sub-section (4-A) in Section 17 of the principal Act through Act 44 of 2016 (w.e.f 01.09.2016), the tenant can also challenge any action taken against him under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and as such, the writ petition is not maintainable. It is further submitted that the interim relief sought by the borrower was rejected by the DRT after allowing sufficient opportunity of hearing and as such, no interference is required by this Court. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the respondent-Bank as well as perused the materials available on record. The petitioners have challenged the notice issued under Section 13(2) and the order passed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 in pursuance of which the possession of the demised premises has been taken. The learned counsel for the respondent-Bank has challenged the maintainability of the present writ petition on the ground that the petitioner has an efficacious/alternative remedy of appeal before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The learned counsel for the respondent-Bank has challenged the maintainability of the present writ petition on the ground that the petitioner has an efficacious/alternative remedy of appeal before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The specific stand of the respondent-Bank is that Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 has been amended by the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Act, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “the Amendment Act, 2016”) and in view of the insertion of Section 4-A in Section 17, the borrower as well as the tenant have the remedy before the DRT. 7. To appreciate the said contention of the learned counsel for the parties, I have perused Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 as amended vide Amendment Act, 2016 (Act 44 of 2016) and the same is reproduced hereinbelow: “17. Application against measures to recover secured debts - (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application alongwith such fee, as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken: PROVIDED that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower. Explanation - For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under sub-section (1) of section 17. (1A) An application under sub-section (1) shall be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction— (a) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises; (b) where the secured asset is located; or (c) the branch or any other office of a bank or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding for the time being. (2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. (3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management or restoration of possession of the secured assets to the borrower, it may by order, (a) declare the recourse to any one or more measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor as invalid; and (b) restore the possession of secured assets or management of secured assets to the borrower or such other aggrieved person, who has made an application under sub-section (1), as the case may be; and (c) pass such other direction as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13. (4) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under sub-section (4) of section 13 to recover his secured debt. (4A) Where— (i) any person, in an application under sub-section (1), claims any tenancy or leasehold rights upon the secured asset, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts of the case and evidence produced by the parties in relation to such claims shall, for the purposes of enforcement of security interest, have the jurisdiction to examine whether lease or tenancy,— (a) has expired or stood determined; or (b) is contrary to section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882); or (c) is contrary to terms of mortgage; or (d) is created after the issuance of notice of default and demand by the Bank under sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act; and (ii) the Debt Recovery Tribunal is satisfied that tenancy right or leasehold rights claimed in secured asset falls under the sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) or sub-clause (d) of clause (i), then notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Debt Recovery Tribunal may pass such order as it deems fit in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (5) Any application made under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within sixty days from the date of such application: PROVIDED that the Debts Recovery Tribunal may, from time to time, extend the said period for reasons to be recorded in writing, so, however, that the total period of pendency of the application with the Debts Recovery Tribunal, shall not exceed four months from the date of making of such application made under sub-section (1). (6) If the application is not disposed of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the period of four months as specified in sub-section (5), any party to the application may make an application, in such form as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal for directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal for expeditious disposal of the application pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal may, on such application, make an order for expeditious disposal of the pending application by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. (7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the application in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and the rules made thereunder.” 8. Further, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of “B. Satyanarayanan Vs. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate & Ors.” reported in (2018) SCC online Madras 999 while dealing with the effect of the amendment in Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 held as follows: 6. In view of the amendment, by way of Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Act, 2016 (44 of 2016), an effective and alternative remedy is provided to a person, who claims to be a tenant or has lease hold rights, on the secured asset and that if any application is filed, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts of the case and evidence produced by the parties, in relation to such claim shall, for the purpose of enforcement of security interest, has jurisdiction to examine whether the lease or tenancy and other parameters, mentioned in Section 4 A of the Amended Act and to pass such orders, as deems fit, in accordance with the provisions of Securitisation and Reconstructions of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, taking note of the amendment. 9. I am complete in agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant has given much stress to his argument that no opportunity of hearing was provided to him before passing the impugned order under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. Section 17(4A) specifically empowers the DRT to entertain and adjudicate any claim of tenancy and leasehold right of any person and pass such order as it deems fit in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Section 17(3)(b) specifically provides that if the action is found to have been taken not in accordance with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 as well as the rules, the DRT may declare it invalid and put the borrower or other aggrieved person in possession of the property. Section 17(3)(b) specifically provides that if the action is found to have been taken not in accordance with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 as well as the rules, the DRT may declare it invalid and put the borrower or other aggrieved person in possession of the property. Section 19 further provides for giving compensation and cost to the borrower or other aggrieved person, if the action taken by the secured creditor is found not in accordance with the provisions of the said Act and rules made thereunder. The SARFAESI Act, 2002 is thus a complete code which delineates elaborate procedure for taking action against the borrower as also provides the remedies to the borrower or any person aggrieved by such action. The forum before which the action of the secured creditor is to be challenged has also been provided in the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that if an efficacious/alternative remedy is available to any person in relation to the matters of debts of the banks/financial institutions, a writ petition ought not to be entertained unless in some exceptional circumstances emerge. The intendment of the legislature while providing that the borrower or any person would challenge the action under Section 13(4) and 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, only after taking over possession of the property, is that the secured creditor should not be kept waiting for a long time to take in possession of the secured assets. If the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is accepted, then the very purpose of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 would get frustrated. Every case is required to be dealt with in its own facts and circumstances which can only be determined by the fact finding court after appreciating the evidence laid by the parties. The writ jurisdiction is exercised sparingly in such matters only when any exceptional circumstance arises in any particular case and normally, no interference is warranted under the said plenary jurisdiction. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors.” reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 , has held as under: “42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors.” reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 , has held as under: “42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression “any person” used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. 43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.” 11. In the case of “Standard Chartered Bank Vs. Noble Kumar & Ors.” reported in (2013) 9 SCC 620 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “27. The “appeal” under Section 17 is available to the borrower against any measure taken under Section 13(4). In the case of “Standard Chartered Bank Vs. Noble Kumar & Ors.” reported in (2013) 9 SCC 620 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “27. The “appeal” under Section 17 is available to the borrower against any measure taken under Section 13(4). Taking possession of the secured asset is only one of the measures that can be taken by the secured creditor. Depending upon the nature of the secured asset and the terms and conditions of the security agreement, measures other than taking the possession of the secured asset are possible under Section 13(4). Alienating the asset either by lease or sale, etc. and appointing a person to manage the secured asset are some of those possible measures. On the other hand, Section 14 authorises the Magistrate only to take possession of the property and forward the asset along with the connected documents to the borrower (sic the secured creditor). Therefore, the borrower is always entitled to prefer an “appeal” under Section 17 after the possession of the secured asset is handed over to the secured creditor. Section 13(4)(a) declares that the secured creditor may take possession of the secured assets. It does not specify whether such a possession is to be obtained directly by the secured creditor or by resorting to the procedure under Section 14. We are of the opinion that by whatever manner the secured creditor obtains possession either through the process contemplated under Section 14 or without resorting to such a process obtaining of the possession of a secured asset is always a measure against which a remedy under Section 17 is available.” 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of “State Bank of Travancore & Anr. Vs. Mathew K.C.”, reported in (2018) 3 SCC 85 , has held thus: “15. It is the solemn duty of the court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the taxpayer's expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in SatyawatiTondon (surpa.), has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order: (SCC pp. 123-24, para 46) “46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marksand Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.” 16. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter-affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference.” 13. Thus, considering the fact that the petitioners have efficacious/statutory remedy provided under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, I am of the view that the present writ petition is not maintainable at this stage. 14. I have also gone through the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In the case of “Harshad Govardhan Sondagar Vs. International Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd. & Ors.” reported in (2014) 6 SCC 1 and “Vishal N. Kalsaria Vs. Bank of India & Ors.” reported in (2016) 3 SCC 762 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Rent Control Act being a separate enactment for eviction of tenant, the eviction of a lessee cannot be made under the SARFAESI Act as the Rent control Act and SARFAESI Act operate exclusively in different fields. The learned counsel further puts reliance on the judgment of the Madras High Court rendered in the case of “M/s Telesat Media Matrix Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai” (W.P. No. 17840 of 2015 and M.P Nos. 1 to 2 of 2015), wherein the learned court, after observing that the lessee of the mortgaged property was not given any opportunity of hearing before passing the order for taking possession of the property, has set-aside the impugned order. 15. Both the aforesaid judgments have been passed prior to coming into force of the Amendment Act, 2016 by which the insertion of sub-section 4-A and substitution of sub-section (3) in Section 17 were made when there was no remedy available to the tenant having been dispossessed under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. However, after the incorporation of Section 17 (4-A), the tenant can also challenge any action taken qua his dispossession as a lessee or tenant under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 16. However, after the incorporation of Section 17 (4-A), the tenant can also challenge any action taken qua his dispossession as a lessee or tenant under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 16. So far the challenge made to the order of the DRT dated 23.08.2018 by the petitioners-borrower is concerned, in view of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, any person aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal and as such, the writ petition of the petitioners-borrower is also not maintainable at this stage. 17. Both the writ petitions are accordingly dismissed on the point of maintainability. The petitioners are, however, at liberty to take appropriate steps in accordance with law, as provided under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. It is made clear that the observation made hereinabove is confined only with regard to the maintainability of writ petition and the same would not affect the merit of the respective cases of the parties before the other forums.