ORDER : Petitioner has sought a declaration that the scheme of acquisition and the impugned notification dated 14-05-1980 bearing No.HUD.49/MNJ.78 in respect of Sy.No.292 of Banaswadi village, Bangalore-560043 (Annexure-A) has lapsed insofar as the schedule property is concerned. The schedule property is detailed as under: SCHEDULE PROPERTY All the piece and parcel of property bearing No.16 (new No.2CC 601), 2nd ‘C’ Cross, 6th Main, H.R.B.R. 2nd Block, BDA Layout unacquired portion of survey No.292 of Banaswadi village, BBMP ward No.88, Bangalore-560 043 measuring 26’ x 50’ in all measuring 1300 sq.ft. bounded on: East by :: 2CC 603 West by :: 6th Main Road North by :: 2DC 602 South by :: 2nd ‘C’ Cross 2. According to the petitioner, in respect of Banaswadi Scheme, Bangalore Development Authority (for short ‘the BDA’) had issued preliminary notification on 05-05-1977 under Section 17(1) of the BDA Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for the sake of brevity). Thereafter, declaration and final notification dated 14-05-1980 was issued under Section 19(1) of the Act. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that petitioner’s mother late C.Mary had purchased the suit schedule property in the year 2006, to be precise on 02-09-2006 under a registered sale deed. Thereafter, she had filed W.P.No.8199/2007 before this Court assailing the public auction of site Nos.2CC-601 and 2DC-602 of HRBR Layout, Main, ‘C’ and ‘D’ Cross, Bangalore43. The said writ petition was dismissed by order dated 24-07-2007. Thereafter, she filed W.A.No.1675/2007. The Division Bench also dismissed the said writ appeal. 4. Petitioner’s counsel further submits that legal representatives of late C. Mary including the petitioner herein had preferred O.S.No.8193/2013 before the City Civil Court seeking relief of permanent injunction against the Bangalore Development Authority and Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike on the premise that the plaintiffs are in physical possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The suit property and the schedule property herein are one and the same. In the said suit, the BDA has filed an application under Order VII Rule 1 of CPC contending that the said suit is not maintainable. In the circumstances, the present writ petition has been filed seeking a declaration that acquisition in respect of the schedule property has lapsed. The said declaration is sought under Section 27 of the BDA Act. In the said suit, the BDA has filed an application under Order VII Rule 1 of CPC contending that the said suit is not maintainable. In the circumstances, the present writ petition has been filed seeking a declaration that acquisition in respect of the schedule property has lapsed. The said declaration is sought under Section 27 of the BDA Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that this Court has jurisdiction to grant such a declaration and as the Civil Court does not have such a jurisdiction to do so. In the circumstances, petitioner has sought such a declaration. 5. Learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for Respondent No.1 on advance notice submits that the writ petition is highly belated. The acquisition notifications are of the year 1977 and 1980. But, petitioner has approached this court in November 2017 seeking such a declaration after not being able to seek order of temporary injunction in O.S.No.8193/2013. That this writ petition has been filed so as to over come the lacuna in the civil suit; the same is not maintainable. In the circumstances, learned Additional Government Advocate submits that the writ petition may be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material on record, it is noted that the petitioner herein is one of the legal representatives of Late C. Mary. The latter had purchased the schedule property under a registered sale deed dated 02-09-2006. It is also stated that the schedule property is in Sy.No.292 of Banaswadi village. It is an admitted fact that Sy.No.292 was acquired under Notifications dated 05-05-1077 and 14-05-1980 which are preliminary and final notifications issued under Sections 17(1) and 19(1) of the BDA Act respectively. It is the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that said notifications have not been acted upon insofar as schedule property is concerned and therefore, a declaration may be granted to the effect that there is lapse of acquisition. It is the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that said notifications have not been acted upon insofar as schedule property is concerned and therefore, a declaration may be granted to the effect that there is lapse of acquisition. The concept of lapse of acquisition under Section 27 of the BDA Act arises if within a period of five years from the date of publication of the final declaration and notification under sub-Section (1) of Section 19 of the Act in the gazette, if the authority i.e., BDA fails to execute the scheme substantially, in such circumstances, the scheme shall lapse and provision of Section 36 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall become inoperative. Therefore, even under Section 27 of the Act, the time period stipulated is five years for execution of the scheme substantially. The petitioner is not able to point out as to in what way it can be contended that the scheme has not been implemented substantially within a period of five years from the date of issuance of declaration in the instant case. The petitioner on the other hand has approached this court in November 2017 for seeking such declaration long after final declaration and notification was issued on 14-05-1980 i.e. nearly after 37 years. Further petitioner’s mother is a subsequent purchaser and has purchased the schedule property under registered sale deed dated 02-09-2006 whereas the acquisition was commenced in the year 1977 and final declaration and notification was issued in the year 1980. Subsequently, the award might have been passed in the name of the notified khatedars from whom, mother of petitioner has purchased the schedule property that is, long after conclusion of the acquisition proceedings. Nodoubt, subsequent purchaser can seek a declaration with regard to lapse of acquisition having regard to the latest dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI v/s MANAV DHARAM TRUST AND ANOTHER (AIR 2017 SUPREME COURT 2450). 7. However, such a declaration ought to be sought either by notified khatedar or by subsequent purchaser within a reasonable time. In the instant case, the petitioner’s mother purchased the schedule property in the year 2006 whereas acquisition in respect of Banaswadi scheme was completed way back in 1980’s by the BDA. 7. However, such a declaration ought to be sought either by notified khatedar or by subsequent purchaser within a reasonable time. In the instant case, the petitioner’s mother purchased the schedule property in the year 2006 whereas acquisition in respect of Banaswadi scheme was completed way back in 1980’s by the BDA. Therefore, the petition filed at this point of time is highly belated and this Court cannot consider or grant belated claim as sought for by the petitioner by making an investigation at this stage as to, whether impugned acquisition has lapsed insofar as Banaswadi scheme is concerned in general and as far as the schedule property in particular is concerned. Therefore, the writ petition being highly belated would have to be dismissed by placing reliance on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 8. But before doing that, it would also be necessary to note that the BDA had in fact, sought to auction the schedule site to third parties. That itself would indicate that the BDA on taking possession of the schedule properties intended to auction the said sites which is permissible under the provisions of BDA Act and Rules made there under. Therefore, it cannot be construed that there has been lapse of acquisition insofar as the schedule sites are concerned on that score. 9. In this context, a plethora of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the issue regarding delay and as to how a Court of equity exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot extend its hands to such persons who approach the Court after several years can be relied upon. In fact, the Apex Court has held in several decisions that stale claims ought not to be entertained by High Courts exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The recent decisions in that regard are as follows: (a) In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1332 [State of Orissa & Anr. The recent decisions in that regard are as follows: (a) In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1332 [State of Orissa & Anr. V. Mamata Mohanty] the consideration of an application where delay and laches could be attributed against a person who approaches in a writ petition is discussed by stating that though the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to writ jurisdiction, however, the Doctrine of Limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions could be dismissed at the initial stage on the ground of delay and laches. (b) In the case of Shankar Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. M.Prabhakar & Ors. [2011 AIR SCW 3033], the Apex Court at Para 53 has given the relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches in approaching the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The same reads as follows; “53. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are: (1) there is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its owns facts. (2) The principle on which the court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay.” (c) Similarly, the Apex Court in the case of Sawaran Latha and others v. State of Haryana and others [ 2010(4) SCC 532 ] has held that when the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in the year 2001 and the award was passed in the year 2004, writ petitions filed for quashing of the notification in the year 2009 have to be dismissed on the ground of delay as the litigants who dare to abuse the process of the Court in disregard of the law of limitation, delay and laches should not be encouraged. (d) In Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai v. M. Meiyappan & Others [2010 AIR SCW 7130], when the acquisition proceedings were challenged ten years after notifications were issued, the Apex Court held that the High Courts should not have entertained the writ petition particularly after passing of the award and that the High Court should have dismissed the writ petition at the threshold on the ground of delay and laches. (e) In Swaika Properties (P) Limited and another v. State of Rajasthan & others [ 2008 (4) SCC 695 ], the Apex Court has followed its earlier decisions in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. The Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. & others [ (1996) 11 SCC 501 ] by observing as follows: “After the award under Section 11 of the Act was made by the Collector he is empowered under Section 16 to take possession of the land, if the possession was not already taken, exercising power under Section 17(4). Thereupon, the land shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. It is well settled law that taking possession of the land is by means of a memorandum (Panchnama) prepared by the Land Acquisition Officer and signed by Panch witnesses called for the purpose. Subsequently, the collector hands over the same to the beneficiary by means of another memorandum or panchnama, as the case may be. It is well settled law that taking possession of the land is by means of a memorandum (Panchnama) prepared by the Land Acquisition Officer and signed by Panch witnesses called for the purpose. Subsequently, the collector hands over the same to the beneficiary by means of another memorandum or panchnama, as the case may be. But in this case Section 91 of the BMC Act statutorily comes into play which would indicate that the Land Acquisition Officer while making award should intimate to the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of the amount of compensation determined and all other expenses. The Corporation shall pay over the same to the Land Acquisition Officer.” It was held that the writ petition had been filed after possession was taken over and the award had become final and therefore, the writ petition had to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. (f) The order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition was confirmed by the Apex Court in Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Motilal Agarwal and others [ (2011) 5 SCC 394 ], as the filing of the writ petition was 9 years after the declaration was issued under Section 6(1) of the Act and the delay of six years after passing of the award and the delayed filing of the writ petition was a reason for refusing to entertain the prayer made in the writ petition. It was held that in a challenge made to the acquisition of land for the purpose of public purpose Courts have consistently held that the delay in filing the writ petition should be viewed seriously, if the petitioner fails to offer plausible explanation for the delay. (g) Reference can also be made to another decision of the Apex Court reported in (1996) 6 SCC 445 in the case of State of Rajasthan & Others v. D.R. Lakshmi & others, wherein it has cautioned the High Court not to entertain writ petitions where there is inordinate delay, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (h) Similarly, in the case of The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar & anr. (h) Similarly, in the case of The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar & anr. v. Shah Hyder Beig & others [(2002) 2 SCC 48], it has been opined thus: “The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time as such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the petitioner has moved the Writ Court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.” (i) In fact in S.S. Balu and others v. State of Karnataka [ (2009) 2 SCC 479 ], it has been held that delay defeats equity and that relief can be denied on the ground of delay alone even though relief is granted to other similarly situated persons who approach the courts in time. (j) To a similar effect is the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. v. Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao & others [ (2012) 12 SCC 797 ]. (k) In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu [(2014)4 SCC 109], on the doctrine of delay and laches and approach of the Court in that regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has ruled as under: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, ‘procrastination is the greatest thief of time’ and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” (l) Further, recently in the case of State of Jammu and Kashmir v. R.K. Zalpuri and others [ (2015) 15 SCC 602 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has opined that the writ Court while deciding a writ petition he has to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless noninterference would cause grave injustice. The aforesaid decisions are squarely applicable having regard to the facts of the present case. 10. In the circumstances, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of delay and latches.