JUDGMENT : R. Hemalatha, J. The appellants 1 to 4 are the defendants in O.S.No.714 of 1995 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Ulundurpet. Since the 4th appellant died during the pendency of this appeal, his legal heirs have been impleaded as appellants 5 to 8. Similarly, the first respondent, who is the plaintiff in O.S.No.714 of 1995 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Ulundurpet died during the pendency of this appeal and his legal heirs have been impleaded as respondents 2 to 8. 2. The first respondent/plaintiff filed the suit in O.S.No.714 of 1995 before the Principal District Munsif, Ulundurpet for declaration of his title over the suit property and also for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment over the suit property. The suit property is described in the plaint as Punja land in survey No.41/4 of Sirupuliyur Village, Thirunavalur Sub District, Cudalore District measuring 0.50 cents. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties are called as per their ranking before the trial court. 4. The brief averments of the case of the plaintiff are as follows. The suit property originally belonged to Govinda Padaiyachi, father of the defendants 1 to 3 (appellants 1 to 3). Govinda Padayachi and his sons entered into a partition on 09.07.1986, in an by which, the suit property and other properties belonging to the said Govinda Padaiyachi were allotted to the share of the first defendant. The first defendant was enjoying the suit property as per the partition deed dated 09.07.1986. On 06.05.1993, the first defendant sold the suit property in favour of the plaintiff for a sale consideration of Rs. 28,250/-. According to the plaintiff, he was cultivating casuarina trees in the suit property and since the defendants attempted to destroy the causuarina crops raised by him, he filed the suit for declaration and permanent injunction and for mesne profits. 5. The first defendant filed a written statement and the same was adopted by the defendants 2 and 3. According to the defendants (present appellants), the first defendant' s daughter Shanthi was given in marriage to one Sakthivel, son of the plaintiff and that the suit property was conveyed in favour of the plaintiff by the first defendant as dowry and that there was no consideration for the sale deed dated 06.05.1993 (Ex.A2). According to the defendants (present appellants), the first defendant' s daughter Shanthi was given in marriage to one Sakthivel, son of the plaintiff and that the suit property was conveyed in favour of the plaintiff by the first defendant as dowry and that there was no consideration for the sale deed dated 06.05.1993 (Ex.A2). It is further contended by them that the possession of the suit property was not handed over to the plaintiff. In the meanwhile, unfortunately, the first defendant's daughter Shanthi committed suicide. According to the defendants, since the sale deed is executed in contravention of the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, the sale made in favour of the plaintiff is void ab-initio. 6. On the basis of the above said pleadings, the learned Principal District Munsif, Ulundurpet framed the following issues. 1. Whether the sale deed dated 06.05.1993 is true and valid? 2. Whether the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property? 3. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled? 7. In the trial court, the plaintiff examined himself and three other witnesses and marked Ex.A1 to Ex.A5. The first defendant examined himself and one another witness and marked Ex.B1 to Ex.B3. The advocate commissioner's report and plan were marked as Ex.C1 and Ex.C2 respectively. 8. After full contest, the trial court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. Aggrieved over the same, the plaintiff filed an appeal in A.S.No.68 of 2000 before the Principal District Judge, Villupuram. After analysing the entire documents, the learned Principal District Judge, Villupuram, set aside the decree and judgment dated 27.06.2000 passed in O.S.No.714 of 1995 by the Principal District Munsif, Ulundurpet. 9. The present appeal has been filed against the decree and judgment dated 15.10.2001 passed in A.S.No.68 of 2000 by the Principal District Judge, Villupuram. 10. In the second appeal, the following substantial questions of law are framed for consideration. 1. Whether in law the lower appellate court was right in ignoring that the sale transaction was invalid as it was only by way of dowry for the daughter of the first appellant and that no interest was conveyed to the respondent? 2. 10. In the second appeal, the following substantial questions of law are framed for consideration. 1. Whether in law the lower appellate court was right in ignoring that the sale transaction was invalid as it was only by way of dowry for the daughter of the first appellant and that no interest was conveyed to the respondent? 2. Whether in law the lower appellate court was not wrong in omitting to see that under Section 6 of the Dowry Prevention Act, the dowry received by the respondent had to be transferred to the first appellant's daughter and that he was only a trustee? 3. Whether in law the lower appellate court was right in failing to note that the transaction was illegal and opposed to public policy and hence could not be sustained by a court of law? 11. Mr.J.Ramakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the appellants contended that since the sale deed dated 06.05.1993 (Ex.A2) was executed only for payment of dowry and possession has not also been handed over to the first respondent/plaintiff, he cannot maintain the suit in O.S.No.714 of 1995 and that the first appellate court has erroneously decreed the suit even though the trial court found that the sale deed was executed only for the purpose of dowry in favour of the plaintiff. 12. It is an admitted fact that the suit property originally belonged to one Govinda Padaiyachi and through a partition deed dated 09.07.1986 (Ex.A1), the suit property was allotted to the share of the first defendant. The first defendant's/first appellant's daughter Shanthi was in love with one Sakthivel, son of the plaintiff and both of them got married. Thereafter, the said marriage was registered in the office of the Registrar of marriage, Cuddalore on 07.05.1993, as evidenced by the extract of Marriage Register Ex.B1. A perusal of Ex.B1 shows that the marriage between Sakthivel and Shanthi was solemnized on 07.05.1993. The first defendant in his evidence has alleged that the marriage between his daughter Shanthi and Sakthivel was solemnized on 30.04.1993 at Kailasanadar temple, Ulundurpet. It is also contended by him that his daughter Shanthi and Sakthivel eloped and married on their own. The specific contention of the first defendant is that the suit property was given as dowry, as the plaintiff insisted the first defendant to execute the sale deed dated 06.05.1993 (Ex.A2). 13. It is also contended by him that his daughter Shanthi and Sakthivel eloped and married on their own. The specific contention of the first defendant is that the suit property was given as dowry, as the plaintiff insisted the first defendant to execute the sale deed dated 06.05.1993 (Ex.A2). 13. The main point to be considered in this case is whether the sale deed dated 06.05.1993 (Ex.A2) was given in lieu of dowry, as contended by the first defendant? 14. A perusal of the sale deed dated 06.05.1993 (Ex.A2) shows that the first defendant agreed a portion of sale consideration of Rs. 6,000/- to be utilized for the discharge of a registered mortgage deed dated 10.10.1990 (Ex.A5) executed by him (respondent) in favour of one Paramanandam. It is also mentioned in the sale deed that the vendor had received Rs. 10,000/- towards his family expenses and a sum of Rs. 12,250/- was received in cash on the date of the sale deed. Ex.A4 is the Registered Discharge Receipt dated 06.05.1993, under which the plaintiff paid Rs. 6,000/- to the mortgagee Paramanandam and got the mortgage discharged. The said Paramanandam is the son-in-law of the first defendant. The plaintiff examined one Ponnambalam (Pw2), who is an attestor to Ex.A2 in order to prove that he paid a sum of Rs. 6,000/- for the discharge of the mortgage and also to show that a portion of sale price of Rs. 12,250/- was paid in cash to the first defendant. The Pw3 (Ramamoorthy) is one of the attestors to Ex.A4, Registered Mortgage Receipt. He had deposed that since Paramanandam did not turn up on 06.05.1993, on which date the sale deed was executed, it was registered only on 11.05.1993. He has also deposed that the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 6,000/- to the first defendant through Ponnambalam. The evidence of Pw3 further shows that he was present at the time of negotiation between the plaintiff and the first defendant with regard to the execution of Ex.A2 and he specifically contended that on the date of negotiation, the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 10,000/- to the first defendant through one Subramanian. 15. The daughter of the first defendant committed suicide by hanging and a case was registered against Sakthivel, the plaintiff and their family members and subsequently, all of them were acquitted. 10,000/- to the first defendant through one Subramanian. 15. The daughter of the first defendant committed suicide by hanging and a case was registered against Sakthivel, the plaintiff and their family members and subsequently, all of them were acquitted. Though the first defendant contends that an appeal was preferred before this court against the order of acquittal, he has not furnished any details with regard to the same. The first defendant during the course of cross examination admitted that Ex.A2 was attested by his son-in-law (Paramanandam) as well as by Ponnambalam (Pw2). He has also admitted the execution of Ex.A4. According to the first defendant, both Ex.A4 and Ex.A5 were in his custody, but both of them were found missing. At this juncture, it is to be borne in mind that Ex.A4 and Ex.A5 are produced from the custody of the plaintiff and the execution of Ex.A4 has also been proved. 16. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied upon the decision in Janak Dularidevi and another Vs. Kapildeorai and another, (2011) 6 SCC 555 and contended that where the intension of the parties is that passing of title would depend upon the passing of consideration, evidence is admissible. He would further contend that a combined reading of Section 8 and 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 suggests that though on execution and registration of the sale, the ownership title and all interest in a property will pass on to the transferee, yet that would be on terms and conditions embodied in the deed indicating the intention of the parties. As far as the present case is concerned, it is clearly mentioned that the part of sale consideration of Rs. 10,000/- has already been paid to the first defendant and a sum of Rs. 6,000/- was paid to Paramanandam, son-in-law of the first defendant, with whom the first defendant entered into a Registered Mortgage Deed dated 10.10.1990 (Ex.A5). The Sale Deed dated 06.05.1993 (Ex.A2) further recites that a sum of Rs. 12,250/- was paid to the first defendant in cash. Therefore, the above ruling relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants would not apply to the facts of the present case. 17. The Sale Deed dated 06.05.1993 (Ex.A2) further recites that a sum of Rs. 12,250/- was paid to the first defendant in cash. Therefore, the above ruling relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants would not apply to the facts of the present case. 17. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants further contended that since the sale itself is for the illegal purpose of payment of dowry, the same is hit under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. It is relevant to extract Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 6. Dowry to be for the benefit of the wife or her heirs.- (1) Where any dowry is received by any person other than the woman in connection with whose marriage it is given, that person shall transfer it to the woman- -(1) Where any dowry is received by any person other than the woman in connection with whose marriage it is given, that person shall transfer it to the woman-" (a) if the dowry was received before marriage, within [three months] after the date of marriage; or (b) if the dowry was received at the time of or after the marriage, within [three months] after the date of its receipt; or (c) if the dowry was received when the woman was a minor, within [three months] after she has attained the age of eighteen years, and pending such transfer, shall hold it in trust for the benefit of the woman. (2) If any person fails to transfer any property as required by sub-section (1) within the time limit specified therefor, or as required by sub-section (3), he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years or with fine 4[which shall not be less than five thousand rupees, but which may extend to ten thousand rupees or with both. (3) Where the woman entitled to any property under sub-section (1) dies before receiving it, the heirs of the woman shall be entitled to claim it from the person holding it for the time being: (a) if she has no children, be transferred to her parents; or (b) if she has children, be transferred to such children and pending such transfer, be held in trust for such children. (3-A) Where a person convicted under sub-section (2) for failure to transfer any property as required by sub-section (1) or sub-section (3)] has not, before his conviction under that sub-section, transferred such property to the woman entitled thereto or, as the case may be, her heirs, parents or children, the Court shall, in addition to awarding punishment under that sub-section, direct, by order in writing, that such person shall transfer the property to such woman or, as the case may be, her heirs, parents or children within such period as may be specified in the order, and if such person fails to comply with the direction within the period so specified, an amount equal to the value of the property may be recovered from him as if it were a fine imposed by such Court and paid to such woman or, as the case may be, her heirs, parents or children. (4) Nothing contained in this section shall affect the provisions of section 3 or section 4. 18. The first appellant's/first defendant's daughter Shanthi who was in love with Sakthivel, son of the plaintiff married him and their marriage was registered on 07.05.1993 (Ex.B1) before the Registrar of Marriages at Cuddalore. It is mentioned in Ex.B1 that the marriage was solemnized on 07.05.1993. The specific contention of the first defendant is that since his daughter eloped with Sakthivel and married on 30.04.1993, a panchayat was convened, in which, the plaintiff insisted the first defendant to execute a sale deed as Sridhana and accordingly, the sale deed dated 06.05.1993 (Ex.A2) was executed without any consideration. Merely because the sale deed was executed on 06.05.1993, it cannot be presumed that the transaction was made in lieu of dowry, especially when the respondent/plaintiff has proved passing of consideration for the sale Ex.A2 by adducing acceptable evidence. 19. It is also relevant to extract Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement. Merely because the sale deed was executed on 06.05.1993, it cannot be presumed that the transaction was made in lieu of dowry, especially when the respondent/plaintiff has proved passing of consideration for the sale Ex.A2 by adducing acceptable evidence. 19. It is also relevant to extract Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement. When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms: Proviso (1) - Any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, [want or failure] of consideration, or mistake in fact or law. Proviso (2).--The existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which a document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be proved. In considering whether or not this proviso applies, the Court shall have regard to the degree of formality of the document. Proviso (3).--The existence of any separate oral agreement, constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved. Proviso(4).--The existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved, except in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in writing, or has been registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the registration of documents. Proviso (5).-- Any usage or custom by which incidents not expressly mentioned in any contract are usually annexed to contracts of that description, may be proved: Provided that the annexing of such incident would not be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the express terms of the contract. Proviso(6).--Any fact may be proved which shows in what manner he language of a document is related to existing facts. Proviso(6).--Any fact may be proved which shows in what manner he language of a document is related to existing facts. Thus, this section deals with several grounds of exclusion of extrinsic evidence. Further, Section 55(4)(a) of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 deals with the rights of the vendor, who was not paid consideration and the remedy is to sue for unpaid consideration. 20. In the instant case, the plaintiff has produced the original sale deed dated 06.05.1993 (Ex.A2) from his possession. The parent document of Ex.A2 namely the partition deed dated 09.07.1986 was also produced by the plaintiff. The mortgage deed dated 10.10.1990 (Ex.A5) executed by the first defendant in favour of his son-in-law Paramanandam and the discharge receipt dated 06.05.1993 (Ex.A4) were also produced from the custody of the plaintiff. Thus, the intention of parties to convey the title of the property is clear from all these circumstances. It is also clear from the evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiff that Ex.A2 is fully supported by consideration. 21. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants is that, if a woman dies within 7 years of marriage, other than due to natural causes, the property in question would be transferred to her parents, if she has not left any children. As far as this case is concerned, the first defendant had executed a sale deed (Ex.A2) in favour of the plaintiff and this court has already held that the sale is valid and consideration is also paid. 22. As regards possession, the rule is, possession follows title and the first appellate court has analysed the evidence on record and decreed the suit as prayed for by the plaintiff. All the observations made by the first appellate court are well founded and therefore, I do not see any reason to interfere with the findings of the first appellate court. 23. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed. No costs.