ORDER : 1. The petitioner Mr. S.N. Baalsubramaniam/son of late Shamanna has filed this writ petition before this Court on 24.2.2018 with the following prayers: (a) Issue a writ of appropriate nature to declare that the incorporation of qualification criteria under Section 6 of the tender document Annexure-F, insofar as it provides for the experience of 64 kms per day of mechanized sweeping and clause 4 as provided for the requirement of ownership and the mechanized sweeping machines as on the date of submitting the tenders/bids is arbitrary and malafide and does not seek to achieve any purpose under the tender notification; (b) Issue a writ of appropriate nature to declare that the inviting of short term tender for the procurement of 17 mechanical sweeping machines which is worth more than Rs.2 crores by means of short term tender is violative of Rules 17(1) and 17(2) of the KTPP Rules, 2000; (c) Pass such other orders as may be deemed appropriate under the circumstances of the case, in the ends of justice.” 2. The challenge of the petitioner is to the Notice inviting Tenders vide Annexure-E dated 14.2.2018 issued by the respondent – BBMP for the solid waste management of the city of Bengaluru. Interalia, the Work Order sought to be given in these tenders was for sweeping and cleaning the roads of the city in eight different zones. The challenge is laid in the present writ petition mainly on the ground that the qualification for Tenderer as prescribed in Section VI of the Tender Documents interalia requires that the Tenderer should have experience of regular cleaning or sweeping of Municipal public roads or streets for at least 64.00 kilometers per day by using similar mechanical sweeping machines for a period of at least three years and shall upload a Certificate issued from officer of the rank of not lower than Executive Engineer. The other condition No.4 in the said Section VI, which the learned Counsel urged as arbitrary is that, the bidder as an individual, private or public limited company shall own the mechanical sweeping machines in their names and shall upload the ownership documents in this regard. 3. Learned Counsel Mr. The other condition No.4 in the said Section VI, which the learned Counsel urged as arbitrary is that, the bidder as an individual, private or public limited company shall own the mechanical sweeping machines in their names and shall upload the ownership documents in this regard. 3. Learned Counsel Mr. D.R. Ravishankar appearing for the petitioner submitted before the Court that as per the Notice inviting Tenders Annexure-E dated 14.2.2018, the calendar of events shows that the last date of receipt of Tenders is 28.2.2018 upto 4.00 p.m. and the notice itself has been published on 14.2.2018. Thus, a short period of only 14 days is given to the independent bidders and for them, it may be difficult to purchase and own machines qualifying for such Tenders to be given by them. He also submitted that these conditions have been tailor-made to favour some of the persons who, to the knowledge of BBMP, are the only eligible persons to apply for such work in question. He also submitted before the Court that during the course of pendency of this writ petition, subsequently on 21.2.2018, the respondent/BBMP has issued a clarification/errata by which the condition with regard to experience has been modified by the respondent in the following manner: “Shall have experience of regular cleaning or sweeping of Municipal public roads or streets for at least 64.00 kms per day by using similar mechanical sweeping machines for a period of at least three years and shall upload a certificate issued from officer of the rank of not lower than Executive Engineer Or shall have the experience of road sweeping of 64 kms per day by mechanical/manual means for past 5 years in any of the municipal limits and in this regard a certificate from an authority of rank not less than executive engineer shall be uploaded along with the bid or shall own ecofriendly/hybrid/any mechanical sweeping machines and in this regard ownership document in the name of the tenderer uploaded along with the bid.” He submitted that as per the said qualification prescribed by the respondent - BBMP now, the petitioner would become eligible to participate in the said Tender process, however, since the period for receiving tenders is expiring on 28.2.2018 only i.e., tomorrow, the said process deserves to be interfered by this Court. 4. On the other hand, Mr. 4. On the other hand, Mr. V. Sreenidhi, learned Counsel for the respondent – BBMP vehemently submitted that said tender process is taken in the larger public interest for cleaning of the roads of Bengaluru City within the limits of Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike, by improved mechanized machines. The said tender process has been intended to give contract to the competent persons with the right equipments, from the duly selected contractors and they are put in place as quickly as possible, so that the menace of piling garbage in the city and cleaning of roads is taken care of immediately. He submitted that the said process does not require interference by this Court, as there is no arbitrariness in the conditions of tender document issued by the respondent – BBMP in this regard. 5. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner is absolutely frivolous and unnecessarily seeks to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court against the intended process of Tender issued by the respondent – BBMP. 6. The settled legal position for interference by courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India governing the contractual and Tender process is that such interference should be normally ruled out and no interference should be made except if the court comes to the conclusion on an established material that there is gross arbitrariness in the action of the public bodies or instrumentalities of the State in undertaking such contractual process. 7. The Court are not supposed to undertake any such hair-splitting exercise at the instance of complainants looking into each and every aspect and steps of such contractual process undertaken by the public bodies and instrumentalities in the litigation process, completely dislocating their contractual freedom causing loss to the larger public interest, for which they intend to undertake such contractual process. 8. In fact, the interference by the Courts in such cases, does more harm than good and nobody pays the price of that. But the public at large suffers in the process and is condemned unheard. 8. In fact, the interference by the Courts in such cases, does more harm than good and nobody pays the price of that. But the public at large suffers in the process and is condemned unheard. The courts have to be, therefore, very circumspect and vigilant, while taking up such matters at the instance of private parties, who are more often than not disgruntled competitors or persons rendered ineligible because of the benchmarks set by the public authorities to select the contractors in such cases. A bundle of facts which are required to be taken into account while determining such eligibility can hardly be closely scrutinized in the extra-ordinary jurisdiction like under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. Learned Counsel for the respondent – BBMP Sri. Sreenidhi rightly contended before the court that the very purpose of the project like cleaning of the roads in the present case is likely to be defeated, if at all the court takes upon such a hair-splitting exercise about the criteria laid down in the tender documents and the process is delayed in deference to the pending litigation before the court. None of the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has impressed the court enough to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court. Merely because the petitioner, who had been undertaking such work under the contract of work orders given by the respondent/BBMP in the past and for his private business interest, he would not like a change in the set up for more advance machineries or equipments to come in through other contractors, the court cannot allow the process of this court to be invoked for this purpose. If the petitioner or the complainant falls within the prescribed criteria, he is always free to participate in the bidding process, if he is eligible and if he does not satisfy the conditions of Tender, he cannot raise the bogie of discrimination and seek the striking down of contractual process itself. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has again laid down and reiterated the guidelines with regard to the interference in contractual matters under Article 226 of the Constitution of India recently in the case of State of Kerala vs. M.K. Jose, (2015) 9 SCC 433 , in the following manner:- “12. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has again laid down and reiterated the guidelines with regard to the interference in contractual matters under Article 226 of the Constitution of India recently in the case of State of Kerala vs. M.K. Jose, (2015) 9 SCC 433 , in the following manner:- “12. As the factual narration would reveal, the respondent has been invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution on various occasions challenging every action which pertain to extension of time, denial of revised estimate by the State Government and many other facets of that nature and the High Court, we must say, has been generously passing orders for consideration by the appropriate authority, for grant of opportunity of being heard to the contractor and to consider his representation in accordance with law. This kind of orders in a contractual matter, in our considered view, is ill-conceived. They not only convert the controversy to a disturbing labyrinth, but encourage frivolous litigation. The competent authority might have mentioned that more than 50% work remained to be done but that should not have prompted the Appellate Bench hearing the intra-court appeal to appoint a Commission of two advocates and granting them liberty to take assistance of a competent engineer. As the Report would show, the Commission of two advocates have taken assistance of a retired Assistant Executive Engineer and submitted the Report. Though, the learned counsel for the State had not objected to the same, yet we really fail to fathom how a writ jurisdiction can be extended to cause a roving enquiry through a Commission and rely on the facts collected without granting opportunity to the State to file objections to the same and in the ultimate eventuate, cancel the order of termination of contract. What precisely was the quantum of work done and whether there had been a breach by the owner or the contractor, are required to be gone into by the appropriate legal forum. 13. A writ court should ordinarily not entertain a writ petition, if there is a breach of contract involving disputed questions of fact. The present case clearly indicates that the factual disputes are involved. 14. 13. A writ court should ordinarily not entertain a writ petition, if there is a breach of contract involving disputed questions of fact. The present case clearly indicates that the factual disputes are involved. 14. In State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd. [ (2002) 1 SCC 216 ], a two-Judge Bench reiterating the exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of enforcement of contractual obligations has stated: (SCC p. 217, para 3) “3. … It is to be reiterated that writ petition under Article 226 is not the proper proceedings for adjudicating such disputes. Under the law, it was open to the respondent to approach the court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate relief for breach of contract. It is settled law that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to the litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Equally, the existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to issue writ, but ordinarily that would be a good ground in refusing to exercise the discretion under Article 226.” In the said case, it has been further observed: (SCC p. 218, para 7) “7. … It is true that many matters could be decided after referring to the contentions raised in the affidavits and counter-affidavits, but that would hardly be a ground for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in case of alleged breach of contract. Whether the alleged non-supply of road permits by the appellants would justify breach of contract by the respondent would depend upon facts and evidence and is not required to be decided or dealt with in a writ petition. Such seriously disputed questions or rival claims of the parties with regard to breach of contract are to be investigated and determined on the basis of evidence which may be led by the parties in a properly instituted civil suit rather than by a court exercising prerogative of issuing writs.” 21. The procedure adopted by the High Court, if we permit ourselves to say so, is quite unknown to exercise of powers under Article 226 in a contractual matter. We can well appreciate a Committee being appointed in a public interest litigation to assist the Court or to find out certain facts. The procedure adopted by the High Court, if we permit ourselves to say so, is quite unknown to exercise of powers under Article 226 in a contractual matter. We can well appreciate a Committee being appointed in a public interest litigation to assist the Court or to find out certain facts. Such an exercise is meant for public good and in public interest. For example, when an issue arises whether in a particular State there are toilets for school children and there is an assertion by the State that there are good toilets, definitely the Court can appoint a Committee to verify the same. It is because the lis is not adversarial in nature. The same principle cannot be taken recourse to in respect of a contractual controversy. It is also surprising that the High Court has been entertaining series of writ petitions at the instance of the respondent, which is nothing but abuse of the process of extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. The Appellate Bench should have applied more restraint and proceeded in accordance with law instead of making a roving enquiry. Such a step is impermissible and by no stretch of imagination subserves any public interest”. 11. Article 14 of the Constitution of India while guaranteeing equal protection and equal opportunities also takes within its fold the concept of reasonable classification and it equally approves that un-equals not be allowed to be treated as equals. Somewhere some eligibility criteria is bound to be set and drawn in such Tender process and it is not open to the independent bidders to dictate terms in this regard. Unless the conditions of Tender documents are shockingly arbitrary or are apparently designed to favour the selected few blue-eyed persons for which, specific relevant material and evidence should be placed on the record of the court by the complainants, the court should not over-zealously enter into the realm of enquiry and investigation in such cases. As aforesaid, such exercise can not only end up as an exercise in futility, but can cause more harm than good to the individual complainant/petitioners or even the public at large. 12. The present case is a glaring example of misuse of process of this Court by the petitioner. As aforesaid, such exercise can not only end up as an exercise in futility, but can cause more harm than good to the individual complainant/petitioners or even the public at large. 12. The present case is a glaring example of misuse of process of this Court by the petitioner. The Writ Petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed with exemplary costs, which is quantified at Rs.50,000/- to be paid by the petitioner to the respondent – B.B.M.P within a period of four weeks from today.