JUDGMENT : K.M. Joseph, J. 1. These appeals raise several common issues and, hence, we deem it appropriate to dispose of the same by this common judgment. 2. Appellants, in all these cases, are the respondents in the writ petitions. The questions, which we are called upon to pronounce on, revolve around the true position of the Governor under the Constitution, with regard to delimitation of boundaries of Municipalities and Municipal Corporations. To put it differently, the question is whether, when an area is specified to be a municipality within the meaning of Article 243-Q, read with Section 3 of The Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916 (hereinafter referred to as the “1916 Act”), it is to be done by the Governor using his personal discretion, or, whether the word “Governor” is to be understood as the “Government”? An identical issue is to be decided in relation to Municipal Corporations, falling under the provisions of The Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the “1959 Act”), involving almost an identical interpretation on the debated issue. 3. In all these cases, the writ petitioners have called in question the Notification, which has been issued under Section 3(1) of the 1916 Act. Also, challenge is made to Notification issued under Section 3(2) of the 1959 Act. Section 3 of the 1916 Act reads as follows: “3. Declaration etc. of transitional area and smaller urban area - (1) Any area specified by the Governor in a notification under clause (2) of Article 243-Q of the Constitution with such limits as are specified therein to be a transitional area or a smaller urban area, as the case may be. (2) The Governor may, by a subsequent notification under clause (2) of Article 243-Q of the Constitution, include or exclude any area in or from a transitional area or a smaller urban area referred to in sub-section (1), as the case may be. (3) The notifications referred to in sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be subject to the condition of the notification being issued after the previous publication required by Section 4 and notwithstanding anything in this section, no area which is, or is part of, a cantonment shall be declared to be a transitional area or a smaller urban area or be included therein under this section.” Section 3 of the 1959 Act reads as follows: “3. Declaration of larger urban area - (1) Any area specified by the Governor in a notification under clause (2) of Article 243-Q of the Constitution with such limits as are specified therein to be a larger urban area, shall be known as a City, by such name as he may specify. (2) Where, by a subsequent notification under clause (2) of Article 243-Q of the Constitution the Governor includes any area in a city, such area shall thereby become subject to all notifications, rules, regulations, bye-laws, orders and directions issued or made under this or any other enactment and in force in the city at the time immediately preceding the inclusion of such area and all taxes, fees and charges imposed under this Act, shall be and continue to be levied and collected in the aforesaid area.” 4. Having read Section 3 of the 1916 Act, it is axiomatic that we must, next, refer to Section 4 of the 1916 Act. It reads as follows: “4. Preliminary procedure to issue notification: (1) Before the issue of a notification referred to in Section 3, the Governor shall publish in the Official Gazette and in a paper approved by it for purposes of publication of public notices, published in the district or, if there is no such paper in the district, in the division in which the local area covered by the notification is situate and cause to be affixed at the office of the District Magistrate and at one or more conspicuous places within or adjacent to the local area concerned a draft in Hindi or the proposed notification along with a notice stating that the draft will be taken into consideration on the expiry of the period as may be stated in the notice. (2) The Governor shall, before issuing the notification consider any objection or suggestion in writing which it receives from any person, in respect of the draft within the period stated.” No doubt, we may notice that there is no provision in the 1959 Act, which is similar to Section 4 of the 1916 Act. 5. Undoubtedly, we should not omit reference to Article 243-Q, as much turns on its words for the purpose of declaration of areas bodies thus to be constituted under, both, the 1916 Act and 1959 Act. It reads as follows: “243Q. 5. Undoubtedly, we should not omit reference to Article 243-Q, as much turns on its words for the purpose of declaration of areas bodies thus to be constituted under, both, the 1916 Act and 1959 Act. It reads as follows: “243Q. Constitution of Municipalities - (1) There shall be constituted in every State:- (a) a Nagar Panchayat (by whatever name called) for a transitional area, that is to say, an area in transition from a rural area to an urban area. (b) a Municipal Council for a smaller urban area. (c) a Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area, in accordance with the provisions of this Part: Provided that a Municipality under this clause may not be constituted in such urban area or part thereof as the Governor may, having regard to the size of the area and the municipal services being provided or proposed to be provided by an industrial establishment in that area and such other factors as he may deem fit, by public notification, specify to be an industrial township. (2) In this article, a “transitional area” and “a smaller urban area” or “a larger urban area” means such area as the Governor may, having regard to the population of the area, the density of the population therein, the revenue generated for local administration, the percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities, the economic importance or such other factors as he may deem fit, specify by public notification for the purposes of this Part.” 6. In these cases, the writ petitioners are either the Gram Sabhas or they are individuals. 7. We treat Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1047 of 2018, from which Special Appeal No. 347 of 2018 arises, as the leading case. Therein, the following reliefs were sought: “(i) Issue a writ, order in the nature of certiorari to quashing the impugned notification bearing No. 920/IV(3)/2018-I[6Na.Ni)/2017, Dehradun dated 5.4.2018 passed by Urban Development Department (Contained as Annexure No. 1 to this writ petition). (ii) Issue a writ, order in the nature of certiorari to quashing the impugned notification bearing No. 939/IV(3)/2018-I[6Na.Ni]/2017, Dehradun dated 5.4.2018 passed by Urban Development Department (Contained as Annexure No. 2 to this writ petition). (iii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to include the petitioner’s village panchayat into the larger urban area of Municipal Corporation of Kotdwar. (iii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to include the petitioner’s village panchayat into the larger urban area of Municipal Corporation of Kotdwar. (iv) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to give effect to the consequential acts of the notification dated 5.4.2018.” 8. The reliefs sought in the other writ petitions are, more or less, the same. In one of the cases, namely, Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1101 of 2018, from which Special Appeal No. 346 of 2018 arises, the case of the writ petitioners is that they have challenged all the Notifications. In Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1107 of 2018, from which Special Appeal No. 364 of 2018 arises, the writ petitioners have also challenged the preliminary Notification. 9. Many of the writ petitioners were before this Court in an earlier round of litigation, namely, Writ Petition (M/S) No. 3094 of 2017 and connected cases. It is necessary to advert to judgment dated 09.03.2018 in full as the respondents rest their stand based on part of the findings recorded therein by the learned Single Judge and we extract the same as under: “In this bunch of writ petitions, the petitioners have challenged the inclusion of their “Gram Sabha” into “Nagar Panchayat” and in some cases into “Nagar Palika Parishad” and even “Nagar Nigam.” Petitioners rely upon Article 243-Q as well as Article 243-U of the Constitution of India read with relevant provisions of the U.P. Municipal Corporation Act as well as U.P. Municipalities Act and the relevant provisions of the Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016, and would argue that the entire exercise undertaken by the Government in this regard is illegal. In some of the petitions, the issue is also regarding up-gradation of Nagar Palika Parishad to Nigam and its fallout as stated above. 2. The combined argument of all the petitioners is that proper hearing as visualized under the law has not been given to the petitioners, before the up-gradation of the local bodies. 3. On two occasions, hearing was given to the petitioners as well as to the State, which is being represented before this Court by the learned Advocate General Sri S.N. Babulkar. On 08.03.2018, these matters were adjourned for today i.e. 09.03.2018. 4. 3. On two occasions, hearing was given to the petitioners as well as to the State, which is being represented before this Court by the learned Advocate General Sri S.N. Babulkar. On 08.03.2018, these matters were adjourned for today i.e. 09.03.2018. 4. It was also a prima facie opinion of this Court earlier that the only issue which has to be seen by this Court is as to whether a proper hearing has been given to the petitioners by the State/State Authorities in these matters or not, as when a “Gram Sabha” or any local body is upgraded, though no opportunity of hearing is required, but when as a consequence of it, a “Gram Sabha” or “Nagar Panchayat” or “Nagar Palika Parishad” as the case might be, is to be dissolved, in order to facilitate its inclusion in the upgraded body, then rights of the persons who are elected representatives, as well as rights of ordinary members of “Gram Sabha” are involved, and therefore an opportunity of hearing is mandatory. This has also been laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in its judgment dated 23.06.2011 in the case of State of Uttarakhand and Another vs. Dinesh Randhawa and Others, Special Appeal No. 103 of 2011 along with connected special appeal. 5. Today, before the matters could be heard, the learned Advocate General Sri S.N. Babulkar has very fairly and generously given a statement before this Court that in order to bring the controversy to an end, the State Government is prepared to give a “reasonable hearing” to all the petitioners and in fact to every affected person. 6. In view of this statement of the learned Advocate General Sri S.N. Babulkar, which needs to be appreciated by this Court, nothing further needs to be done. 7. In view of the above, all the writ petitions stand disposed with the directions to the petitioners to raise their objections, if any, before the Committee or the Authority, which is authorized under the law to hear such objections. The State Government shall also give an advertisement in two daily newspapers which have wide circulation in the State of Uttarakhand so that every other affected person may also file objections. Let a proper advertisement be given within forty-eight hours from today. The State Government shall also give an advertisement in two daily newspapers which have wide circulation in the State of Uttarakhand so that every other affected person may also file objections. Let a proper advertisement be given within forty-eight hours from today. Let all the affected persons be heard, who shall be given at least one week’s time to file their objections from the date of advertisement and within one week thereafter, the State Government shall decide their objections in accordance with law. 8. In view of the above, all the notifications which have been challenged by the petitioners in these writ petitions, including the Notification dated 1411/IV(3)/2017 dated 22.09.2017, IV (3)/2016-01 (13)/2010 dated 05.07.2016, IV (3)/2015-01 (15)/2013 dated 29.11.2015, 1416/IV-(3)/2017-387/2001dated 22.09.2017, 1879(2)/ IV(3)/2017-01 dated 24.10.2017 stand quashed. Interim order of this Court dated 11.01.2018 and 19.02.2018 stand vacated. 9. Let a certified copy of this order be issued today itself on payment of usual charges.” 10. The cause of action, which is pleaded in the present writ petition, apparently, is an offshoot of the judgment in the earlier round, which we have extracted above. Findings of the learned Single Judge: 11. In the impugned judgment under challenge in these appeals, the learned Single Judge has proceeded to find merit in the writ petitions mainly regarding one point only. The learned Single Judge took the view that power under Article 243-Q must be exercised by the Governor himself. The law vests in him a discretion and this discretion is to be exercised without reference to any advice by the Council of Ministers provided under Article 163 of the Constitution of India. In arriving at this conclusion, the learned Single Judge has placed reliance on the words “as he may deem fit” to be found in clause (2) of Article 243-Q inter-alia. The learned Single Judge took the view that this is one of those cases, where the discretionary power is available to the Governor. The learned Single Judge did refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (1974) 2 SCC 831 and also a recent judgment of the Apex Court, discussing the word “Governor” in the case of Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix vs. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 1 . This is what the learned Single Judge has held in respect of the latter judgment: “44. In Nabam Rebia (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has thoroughly dealt with the discretionary powers of the Governor, and where that can be exercised. It reiterates the settled position of law, that the “satisfaction of the Governor” wherever such satisfaction is mentioned, such as under Articles 213 or 311(2) of the Constitution of India, that would mean not a “personal satisfaction” of the Governor, but it means a satisfaction in the constitutional sense of his Council of Ministers. The above judgment then goes on to explain that the source of discretionary power which the Governor has, are in clause (1) of Article 163 and not in clause (2) of Article 163. Since the source of discretionary powers of the Governor lies in clause (1) of Article 163, it comes with severe limitations. In other words, these powers can only be exercised where it has been expressly given by or under the Constitution. The Hon’ble Apex Court defined three areas where a Governor might function and these are: “(1) Areas in which he can act only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. This is in all areas of the executive functions of the State Government [Article 166]. (2) Areas in which he can act in his discretion by or under the Constitution and in which he does not need to take the advice of the Council of Ministers [Article 163] – “except insofar as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion”.] or, areas in which he might take the advice of the Council of Ministers but is not bound by it enabling him to act in his individual judgment by or under the Constitution. (3) Areas that have no concern with the Constitution. For example, where he is acting eo nominee. We are not concerned with this area at all.” 12. The learned Single Judge felt that closer to the case is a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Champa Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, Civil Appeal No. 4554 of 2018, a decision, which is rendered by the Apex Court under Article 243-Q of the Constitution. We will make more detailed reference to the same. The learned Single Judge felt that closer to the case is a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Champa Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, Civil Appeal No. 4554 of 2018, a decision, which is rendered by the Apex Court under Article 243-Q of the Constitution. We will make more detailed reference to the same. No doubt, the learned Single Judge has referred to Articles 154, 163 and 166 of the Constitution. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge also placed reliance on a judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Anil Trivedi and Another vs. State of M.P. and Others, Writ Petition No. 3538 of 2014 and also on a judgment of the Jharkhand High Court in Jawaharlal Sharma vs. State of Jharkhand and Others, AIR 2006 Jharkhand 135. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that he has no doubt in his mind that the powers, which have to be exercised under clause (2) of Article 243-Q, are the powers, which are to be exercised keeping certain factors in mind and, therefore, to that extent, the discretion is not a complete discretion; but, yet, these powers have to be exercised by none other than the Governor himself. Thereafter, he referred to an order dated 26.09.2012, which the learned Advocate General, it is stated, has claimed to be an order passed under clause (2) of Article 243-Q. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge, in his decision, has stated as follows: “59. A perusal of the said order undoubtedly shows that the factors mentioned therein are indeed the factors which are contemplated in Clause (2) of Article 243Q. These are the factors which have to be considered by the Governor. But that is precisely the question: Has this been done by the Governor. Evidently it does not appear to be so. On the contrary, this exercise has been done by the Secretary to the Government. In fact it is not even an “order”, passed by the Governor. It is simply a letter written by the Secretary to the two Divisional Commissioners asking for certain details and that too for a particular period i.e. for the elections of local bodies for the year 2012-13. In fact it is not even an “order”, passed by the Governor. It is simply a letter written by the Secretary to the two Divisional Commissioners asking for certain details and that too for a particular period i.e. for the elections of local bodies for the year 2012-13. It is not an order which sets down definite parameters which have to be looked into while including a rural area or an urban area in terms of Clause (2) of Article 243Q. But most importantly it is an order which has been passed by a Government Official, not by the Governor. Therefore, it cannot be called a notification under Clause (2) of Article 243Q of the Constitution of India.” 13. The learned Single Judge, thereafter, stated that the Notifications in question dated 05.04.2018, which are challenged by the writ petitioners, are the Notifications, which are passed by the Secretary, Urban Development Department, and they are ostensibly issued under clause (2) of Article 243-Q, read with Section 3(1) of the 1916 Act. The learned Single Judge noted that the Advocate General has very fairly submitted that this has been done under the Rules of Business of 1975 and, therefore, it may be deemed to be an order passed by the Governor. It was noted by the learned Single Judge that a bare perusal of the Notification dated 05.04.2018 shows that it is not an order, which has been passed by the Governor under his discretionary power, and that it is admitted by the State that, in the present case, the file was never put up before the Governor. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge stated as follows: “62. The learned Advocate General has been very candid while making his submissions before this Court. His submissions are that a notification under clause (2) of Article 243Q of the Constitution of India can be made under the “Rules of Business” by a Secretary of the Government. It is not a discretionary power of the Governor. The notification has been made by the Government, but it has to be read as an act done by the Governor himself for the simple reason that under clause (1) of Article 154 all executive power of the State vests in the Governor, and under Article 166 (1) all executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor.” 14. The learned Single Judge, though referred to a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. and Others vs. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti and Others, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 305, he felt that the said judgment may not advance the case of the appellants. It was found that the said judgment did not deal with the aspects touching the discretionary powers of the Governor under clause (2) of Article 243-Q. Emphasis was laid, apparently, on the absence of the words “as he may deem fit” which are found in clause (2) of Article 243-Q. It is also stated that, under Sections 3 & 4 of the 1916 Act, the power to issue a notification is not given to the Government and it is given to the Governor. Even prior to 1994, the words were “State Government” which were replaced by the word “Governor” in the year 1994 by way of an amendment. The learned Single Judge noted that this amendment is significant and, therefore, the judgment of the Apex Court in Pradhan Sangh’s case (supra) was not relied upon. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge reasoned as follows: “69. Lastly, in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1047 of 2018, the learned Senior Advocate Sri Vijay Bahadur Singh Negi has also submitted that there is a specific ban on delegation of these powers in the U.P. Municipalities Act. Section 327 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 reads as under: “327. Delegation of powers by the State Government - The State Government may, by notification, delegate to the Prescribed Authority in respect of any specified municipality or municipalities within his or its jurisdiction any one or more of the powers vested in it by this Act, with the exception of the powers detailed in Schedule VII.” 70. The powers which are detailed in Schedule VII of the U.P. Municipalities Act cannot be delegated at all. Under Schedule VII, item no. 1 and 2 are the powers given under Section 3(1) and 3(2), respectively, and given as under: “SCHEDULE VII POWERS OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT THAT MAY NOT BE DELEGATED [See Section 327] Section Powers of duties 3(1) To specify with limits any area to be a transitional area or a smaller urban area, as the case may be. 1 and 2 are the powers given under Section 3(1) and 3(2), respectively, and given as under: “SCHEDULE VII POWERS OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT THAT MAY NOT BE DELEGATED [See Section 327] Section Powers of duties 3(1) To specify with limits any area to be a transitional area or a smaller urban area, as the case may be. 3(2) To include or exclude any area in or from a transitional area or a smaller urban area, as the case may be.” 71. Admittedly, in all these cases, the authority which has heard the objections, which has made the recommendations, etc. is not even the State Government but the District Magistrate and this Committee and in some cases, the District Magistrate has sub-delegated these powers to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and another committee. Therefore, this delegation in any case being bad in the eyes of law, the recommendations and the orders passed subsequently are liable to be quashed, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would argue.” 15. Finally, the learned Single Judge took the view that, once the court has reached the conclusion that the power to define an urban area under the Acts, in its various forms, is a discretionary power of the Governor, the Court need not deal with the delegation aspect at all, for the reason that it is settled that, normally, a discretionary power can never be delegated. Survey work, detailing of areas, etc. can be given to subordinate officers; but, the ultimate power to take a decision remains with the Governor. It is important to notice the last paragraph of the judgment, wherein the learned Single Judge has granted the relief and the basis for the same. It reads as follows: “73. Having considered the arguments of both the sides at length, in my considered opinion, the notifications dated 05.04.2018 have not been issued by the authority empowered under the law. The notifications under Article 243Q of the Constitution of India read with Sections 3 and 4 of the U.P. Municipalities Act are the notifications, which have to be issued by none other than the Governor, in his discretionary powers. Since this has not been done, the notifications do not have the validity of law. The notifications under Article 243Q of the Constitution of India read with Sections 3 and 4 of the U.P. Municipalities Act are the notifications, which have to be issued by none other than the Governor, in his discretionary powers. Since this has not been done, the notifications do not have the validity of law. Consequently, all the writ petitions succeed and are hereby allowed and the impugned notifications dated 05.04.2018 (in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1047 of 2018) and in other connected writ petitions are hereby quashed and set aside.” 16. We have heard Mr. S.N. Babulkar, learned Advocate General, along with Mr. R.K. Raizada, learned Additional Advocate General and Mr. Paresh Tripathi, learned Chief Standing Counsel on behalf of the appellants/State. We also heard Mr. V.B.S. Negi, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Anil Kumar Joshi, Advocate on behalf of the writ petitioners in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1047 of 2018, which we have treated as the leading case; besides, Mr. Mr. Subhash Upadhyaya; Mr. B.D. Pande; Mr. Lalit Samant; Mr. Yogesh Pacholia; Mr. Vijay Bhatt; Mr. Raveendra Singh Bisht; Mr. D.S. Mehta; Mr. Mohd. Azmeen holding brief of Mr. Lalit Sharma; Mr. D.P. Bhatt; Mr. M.K. Chand holding brief of Mr. M.S. Bisht and Mr. Siddhartha Sah, Advocates appearing for the writ petitioners in connected matters. Contentions of the Parties: 17. Learned Advocate General would primarily challenge the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge mainly on the score that the learned Single Judge has erred in understanding of the position of the Governor under the constitutional scheme. According to him, the use of the word “Governor” in Article 243-Q and also in Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the 1916 Act, does not denote the presence of any personal discretion with him. The line of argument is that, in keeping with the law laid down by a catena of judgments of the Apex Court, the function in question is an executive function and, therefore, this is a matter, where “the Governor” would mean “the Government” and the matter is governed by the Rules of Business. In fact, the Rules of Business were produced and referred to in the counter affidavit. Learned Advocate General would submit that the learned Single Judge has erred in the findings, which he has rendered, and he would, therefore, submit that the judgment cannot be sustained. 18. Per contra, Mr. In fact, the Rules of Business were produced and referred to in the counter affidavit. Learned Advocate General would submit that the learned Single Judge has erred in the findings, which he has rendered, and he would, therefore, submit that the judgment cannot be sustained. 18. Per contra, Mr. V.B.S. Negi, learned Senior Counsel, would reiterate before us that it is true that, when the satisfaction of the Governor is required, it only means the satisfaction of the Governor in the constitutional sense, which means the satisfaction of the Council of Ministers. But, he would submit that, having regard to Article 243-Q, read with Sections 3 & 4, the learned Single Judge is right. He would point out that, consequent upon the 74th Amendment, changes were brought about in Sections 3 & 4 of the 1916 Act and the word “Governor” was inserted. He also relied upon certain judgments of the High Courts, which we will refer to at the appropriate stage. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that a perusal of Article 166(3) of the Constitution would show that Rules are made in respect of matters, which do not relate to the discretionary power available to the Governor. He would submit that it is the specific case of the appellants/State that the matter was never placed before the Governor. The reason for this as per the respondents/writ petitioners is that, according to the appellants/State in the counter affidavit, is that this is not a matter, which comes under Rule 8 of the Rules of Business, which required it to be placed before the Governor. Therefore, he would submit that this would go a long way to show that, matter being outside the purview of the Rules of Business, this was a matter, which fell within the exclusive zone of consideration of the Governor and was a matter for his discretion entirely. He also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Champa Lal’s case (supra). The learned Senior Counsel would also submit before us that there is no power to sub-delegate. The argument is expanded as follows: It has come out that the objections were considered and hearing was done by a Committee, as the Additional District Magistrate has sub-delegated it to a sub-committee. This is impermissible in law. 19. The learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners in other connected matters adopted the arguments of Mr. V.B.S. Negi. The argument is expanded as follows: It has come out that the objections were considered and hearing was done by a Committee, as the Additional District Magistrate has sub-delegated it to a sub-committee. This is impermissible in law. 19. The learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners in other connected matters adopted the arguments of Mr. V.B.S. Negi. No doubt, Mr. Yogesh Pacholia, in addition, would submit that there is no Notification under clause (2) of Article 243-Q, which has been brought out. Mr. Yogesh Pacholia also lays stress on Article 40 of the Constitution. 20. The issue, which has to be answered, can be broken down into several aspects and questions. They are as follows: (i) What is the role of the Governor under the Constitution of India as regards the issue in question? (ii) Whether the power of the Governor under Article 243-Q is to be exercised by him in his discretion? (iii) Whether the power under Section 3 of the 1916 Act is to be exercised by the Governor and the same is to be exercised in his discretion? (iv) What is the impact of Article 166(3) dealing with Rules of Business? (v) Whether the discretionary power is to be traced to Article 163(1) or Article 163(2)? (vi) What is the effect of Section 327 of the 1916 Act, read with the Seventh Schedule? (vii) What is the effect of hearing being conducted by the District Magistrate/Committee? (viii) Whether the matter should have been placed before the Governor? Discussion and Findings: 21. The founding fathers have inserted in the Constitution various features, which they have drawn upon from various Constitutions in the world. In regard to, for instance, fundamental rights, they have found inspiration from the United State’s Constitution. As far as the system of Government is concerned, there can be no doubt that the founding fathers contemplated parliamentary democracy based on Westminster’s model. The Westminster’s model contemplates elections being conducted to various bodies, the formation of the Government on the principle of it being able to command majority in the House and, thus, an Executive, which will run the Government for all practical purposes. The power is lodged, subject no doubt to the Constitution, with the elected representatives, who are able to form a Government, which, in turn, is accountable to the Legislature. The power is lodged, subject no doubt to the Constitution, with the elected representatives, who are able to form a Government, which, in turn, is accountable to the Legislature. There is a broad separation of powers between the three organs of the State, namely, the Legislature, the Judiciary and the Executive. As far as Governor is concerned, the position of the Governor is that of a formal head. It is in his name that all executive actions are made or are to be made. 22. Since the Apex Court has spoken on this in a number of decisions, it is sufficient that we refer to a few of them. In Sardari Lal vs. Union of India and Others, (1971) 1 SCC 411 , the question arose for consideration was as to whether the President, when he acts under Article 311 of the Constitution, is to act upon his personal satisfaction or whether it is a matter, which is to be governed by the Rules of Business. The Apex Court took the view that, having regard to the use of the words, which indicated that the President is to be satisfied, the satisfaction must be that of the President and it is not sufficient that a concerned Joint Secretary, as per the Rules of Business, had issued the order. 23. This came to be doubted and a Bench of Seven Judges proceeded to consider the matter in the decision in the case of Samsher Singh (supra). Since this judgment has been followed in all the latter decisions, it is apposite that we refer to certain paragraphs of the same. They are as follows: “14. In all the Articles which speak of powers and functions of the President, the expressions used in relation thereto are is satisfied is of opinion as he thinks fit and if it appears to. In the case of nor, the expressions used in respect of his powers and functions are is satisfied, if of opinion and as he thinks fit. (This formed part of the submission of the Union of India) 20. Articles where the expression "acts in his discretion" is used in relation to the powers and functions of the Governor are those which speak of Special responsibilities of the Governor. These Articles are 371A(1) (b), 371A(1) (d), 371A (2) (b) and 371A(2) (f). (This formed part of the submission of the Union of India) 20. Articles where the expression "acts in his discretion" is used in relation to the powers and functions of the Governor are those which speak of Special responsibilities of the Governor. These Articles are 371A(1) (b), 371A(1) (d), 371A (2) (b) and 371A(2) (f). There 826 are two Paragraphs in the Sixth Schedule., namely, 9(2) and 18(3) where the words "in his discretion" are used in relation to certain powers of the Governor. Paragraph 9 (2) is in relation to determination of amount of royalties payable by licensees or lessees prospecting for, or extracting minerals to the District Council. Paragraph 18(3) has been omitted with effect from 21 January, 1972. 21. The provisions contained in Article 371A (1) (b) speak of the Special responsibility of the Governor of Nagaland with respect to law and order in the State of Nagaland and exercise of his individual judgment as to the action to be taken. The proviso states that the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final and it shall not be called in question. 22. Article 371A(1) (d) states that the Governor shall in his discretion make rules providing for the composition of the regional council for the Tuensang District. 23. Article 371A(2)(b) states that for periods mentioned there the Governor shall in his discretion arrange for an equitable allocation of certain funds, between the Tuensang District and the rest of the State. 24. Article 371A(2) (f) states that the final decision on all matters relating to the Tuensang District shall be made by the Governor in his discretion. 26. There are two significant features in regard to the executive action taken in the name of the President or in the name of the Governor. Neither the President nor the Governor may sue or be sued for any executive action of the State. First, Article 300 States that the Government of India may sue or be sued in the name of the Union and the Governor may sue or be sued in the name of the State. Second, Article 361 states that proceedings may be brought against the Government of India and the Government of the State but not against the President or the Governor. Articles 300 and 361 indicate that neither the President nor the Governor can be sued for executive actions of the Government. Second, Article 361 states that proceedings may be brought against the Government of India and the Government of the State but not against the President or the Governor. Articles 300 and 361 indicate that neither the President nor the Governor can be sued for executive actions of the Government. The reason is that neither the president nor the Governor exercises the executive functions individually or personally. Executive action taken in the name of the President is the action of the Union. Executive action taken in the name of the Governor is the executive action of the State. 28. Under the Cabinet system of Government as embodied in our Constitution the Governor is the constitutional or formal head of the State and be exercises all his powers and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers save in spheres where the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to exercise his functions in his discretion. 29. The executive power is generally described as the residue which does not fall within the legislative or judicial power. But executive power may also partake of legislative or judicial actions. All powers and functions of the President except his legislative powers as for example in Article 123 viz. ordinance making power and all powers and functions of the Governor except his legislative power as for example in Article 213 being ordinance making powers are executive powers of the Union vested in the President under Article 5 3 (1) in one case and are executive powers of the State vested in the Governor under Article ‘54(1) in the other case. Clause (2) or Clause (3) of Article 77 is not limited in its operation to the executive action of the Government of India under clause (1) of Article 77. Similarly, clause (2) or clause (3) of Article 166 is not limited in its operation to the executive action of the Government of the State under clause (1) of Article 166. The expression "Business of the Government of India" in clause (3) of Article 77, and the expression "Business of the Government of the State" in clause (3) of Article 166 includes all executive business. 30. The expression "Business of the Government of India" in clause (3) of Article 77, and the expression "Business of the Government of the State" in clause (3) of Article 166 includes all executive business. 30. In all cases in which the President or the Governor exercises his functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers he does so by making rule - for convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India or the Government of the State respectively or by allocation among his Ministers of the said business, in accordance with Article 77 (3) and 166(3) respectively. Wherever the Constitution requires the satisfaction of Presidents the Governor for the exercise of any power or function by the President or the Governor, as the case may be, as for example in Articles 123, 21-3, 311(2) proviso (c), 317, 352(1), 356 and 360 the satisfaction required by the Constitution is not the Personal satisfaction of the President or of the Governor but is the satisfaction of the President or of the Governor in the Constitutional sense under the Cabinet system of Government. The reasons are these. It is the satisfaction of the, Council of Ministers on whose aid and advice the President or the Governor generally exercises all his powers and functions. Neither Article 77(3) nor Article 166(3) provides for any delegation of power. Both Articles 77(3) and 166(3) provide 828 that the President under Article 77(3) and the Governor under Article 166(3) shall make rules for the more convenient transactions of the business of the Government and the allocation of business among the ministers of the said business. The rules of business and the allocation among the Ministers of the said business all indicate that the decision of any Minister or officer under the rules of business make under these two Articles viz., Article 77(3) in the case of the President and Article 166(3) in the case of the Governor of the State is the decision of the President or the Governor respectively. 31. 31. Further the rules of business and allocation of business among the Ministers are relatable to the provisions contained in Article 53 in the case of the President and Article 154 in the case of the Governor, that the executive power shall be exercised by the President or the Governor directly or through the officers subordinate. The provisions contained in Article 74 in the case of the President and Article 163 in the case of the Governor that there shall be a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President or the Governor as the case may be, arc sources of the rules of business. These provisions are for the discharge of the executive powers and functions of the Government in the name of the President or the Governor. Where functions entrusted to a Minister are performed by an official employed in the Minister’s Department there is in law no delegation because constitutionally the act or decision of the official is that of the, Minister. Ile official is merely the machinery for the discharge of the functions entrusted to a Minister (See Halsubry’s laws of England 4th Ed. Vol. I paragraph 748 at p. 170 and Carleton Ltd. vs. Works Commissioners. 35. The Scheme was upheld for these reasons. The Governor makes rules under Article 166(3) for the more convenient transaction of business the Government of the State. The Governor can not only allocate the various subjects amongst the Ministers but may go further and designate a particular official to discharge any particular function. But that could be done on the, advice of the Council of Ministers. The essence of Cabinet System of Government responsible to the Legislature is that an individual Minister is responsible for every action taken or omitted to be taken in his Ministry. In every administration, decisions are taken by the civil servants. The Minister lays down the policies. The Council of Ministers settle the, major policies. When a Civil Servant takes a decision, he does not do it as a delegate of his Minister. Ho does it on behalf of the Government. The officers are the limbs of the Government and not its delegates. Where functions are entrusted to a Minister and these are performed by an official employed in the Ministry’s department, there is in law no delegation because constitutionally the act or decision of the official is that of the Minister. 40. Ho does it on behalf of the Government. The officers are the limbs of the Government and not its delegates. Where functions are entrusted to a Minister and these are performed by an official employed in the Ministry’s department, there is in law no delegation because constitutionally the act or decision of the official is that of the Minister. 40. The Rules of Business in the Bejoy Lakshmi Cotton Mills case (supra) indicated that the business of the Government was to be transacted in various departments specified in the Schedules. Land and Land Revenue was allocated as the business of the Department of the Minister with that portfolio. The Minister-in-charge had power to make standing Order regarding disposal of cases. This Court held that the decision of any Minister or officer under Rules of Business is a decision of the President or the Governor respectively. The Governor means, the Governor aided and advised by the Ministers. Neither Article 77(3) nor Article 166(3) provides for any delegation of power. Although the executive power of the State is vested in the Governor actually it is carried on by Ministers under Rules of Business made under Article 166(3). The allocation of business of the Government is the decision, of the President or the Governor on the aid and advice of Ministers. 54. The provisions of the Constitution which expressly require the Governor to exercise, his powers in his discretion are contained in Articles to which reference has been made. To illustrate, Article 239(2) states that where a Governor is appointed an Administrator of an adjoining Union Territory he shall exercise his functions as such administrator independently of his Council of Ministers. The other Articles which speak of the discretion of the Governor are paragraphs 9(2) and 18(3) of the Sixth Schedule and Articles 371(1)(b), 371A(1)(d) and 371A(2)(b) and 371A(2)(f). The discretion conferred on the Governor means that as the constitutional or formal head of the State the power is vested in him. In this connection, reference may be, made to Article 356 which states that the Governor can send a report to the President that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. In this connection, reference may be, made to Article 356 which states that the Governor can send a report to the President that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. Again Article 200 requires the Governor to reserve for consideration any Bill which in his opinion if it became law, would so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which the High Court is designed to fill under the Constitution. 55. In making a report under Article 356 the Governor will be justified in exercising his discretion even against the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. The reason is that the failure of the Constitutional machinery may be because of the conduct of the Council of Ministers. This discretionary power is given to the Governor to enable him to report to the President who, however, must act on the advice of his Council of Ministers in all matters. In this context Article 163(2) is explicable that the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final and the validity shall not be called in question. The action taken by the President on such a report is a different matter. The President acts on the advice of his Council of Ministers. In all other matters where the Governor acts in his discretion he will act in harmony with his Council of Ministers. The Constitution does not aim at providing a parallel administration within the State by allowing the Governor to go against the advice of the Council of Ministers. 56. Similarly Article 200 indicates another instance where the Governor may act irrespective of any advice from the Council of Ministers In such matters where the Governor is to exercise his discretion has must discharge his duties to the best of his judgment. The Governor is required to pursue such courses which are not detrimental to the State.” 24. We may notice that this judgment has, in particular, been referred to in the specific context, which we are presently dealing with, in Pradhan Sangh’s case (supra). Therein, the issue related to the issuance of a Notification under Article 243-G in regard to Panchayats, which defines the word “village”. Therein, the court, inter-alia, held as follows: “40. We may notice that this judgment has, in particular, been referred to in the specific context, which we are presently dealing with, in Pradhan Sangh’s case (supra). Therein, the issue related to the issuance of a Notification under Article 243-G in regard to Panchayats, which defines the word “village”. Therein, the court, inter-alia, held as follows: “40. We also find no merit in the contention that the first part of Section 2 [t] which defines village to mean any local area recorded as a village in the revenue records of the district in which it is situate, goes counter to the provisions of Article 243 [g] in that it forecloses the authority of the Governor to specify the village for the purposes of establishing a gram panchayat as envisaged by Part IX of the Constitution. The argument ignores that whereas the Constitution permits the Governor to specify village by a notification, it does not prevent the State from enacting a law for the purpose. As pointed out earlier, the notification issued by the Governor is in fact a notification issued by the State Government. An enactment of the legislature is certainly a higher form of legal instrument than a notification. What is further, the Act has received the assent of the Governor on 22nd April, 1994. Hence, there is not only no conflict between the provisions of Sections 2 [t] of the Act and those of Article 243 [g] but there is an over-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution.” 25. Now, we must advert to another Constitution Bench decision in the case of State of Gujarat and Another vs. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retd.) and Others, (2013) 3 SCC 1 . Therein also, the court came to consider the position of “the Governor.” The issue in the said case related to the appointment of Lokayukta in the State of Gujarat. In the context of the same, the court adverted to the decision in Samsher Singh’s case (supra) and proceeded to hold, inter-alia, as follows: “34. Whether the Constitution intends to confer discretionary powers upon the Governor or to permit him to exercise his individual judgment, it has done so expressly. For the purpose, the provisions of Articles 200, 239 (2), 371-A(1)(b), 371-A(d), 371-A(2)(b) and 371-A(2)(f), Schedule-VI, Para 9(2) [and Schedule VI Para 18(3), until omitted with effect from 21.1.1972], may be referred to. Whether the Constitution intends to confer discretionary powers upon the Governor or to permit him to exercise his individual judgment, it has done so expressly. For the purpose, the provisions of Articles 200, 239 (2), 371-A(1)(b), 371-A(d), 371-A(2)(b) and 371-A(2)(f), Schedule-VI, Para 9(2) [and Schedule VI Para 18(3), until omitted with effect from 21.1.1972], may be referred to. Thus, discretionary powers exist only where they are expressly spelt out. 36. The Governor shall act with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, save in a few well-known exceptional situations. Without being dogmatic or exhaustive, this situation relates to the choice of the Chief Minister, dismissal of the Government, and dissolution of the House. 41. Thus, where the Governor acts as the Head of the State, except in relation to areas which are earmarked under the Constitution as giving discretion to the Governor, the exercise of power by him must only be upon the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, for the reason that the Governor being the custodian of all executive and other powers under various provisions of the Constitution is required to exercise his formal constitutional powers only upon and in accordance with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. He is, therefore, bound to act under the Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution. (Vide Pu Myllai Hlychho vs. State of Mizoram). 43. However, a different situation altogether may arise where the Governor ex officio becomes a statutory authority under some statute.” 26. Finally, we have the judgment of the Apex Court in Nabam Rebia’s case (supra). Therein, we may advert to the conclusions in regard to the discussion on the position of the Governor, which are contained in the following paragraphs: “155. We may therefore summarise our conclusions as under: 155.1 Firstly, the measure of discretionary power of the Governor, is limited to the scope postulated therefor, under Article 163(1). 155.2 Secondly, under Article 163(1) the discretionary power of the Governor extends to situations, wherein a constitutional provision expressly requires the Governor to act in his own discretion. 155.3 Thirdly, the Governor can additionally discharge functions in his own discretion, where such intent emerges from a legitimate interpretation of the concerned provision, and the same cannot be construed otherwise. 155.2 Secondly, under Article 163(1) the discretionary power of the Governor extends to situations, wherein a constitutional provision expressly requires the Governor to act in his own discretion. 155.3 Thirdly, the Governor can additionally discharge functions in his own discretion, where such intent emerges from a legitimate interpretation of the concerned provision, and the same cannot be construed otherwise. 155.4 Fourthly, in situations where this Court has declared, that the Governor should exercise the particular function at his own and without any aid or advice, because of the impermissibility of the other alternative, by reason of conflict of interest. 155.5 Fifthly, the submission advanced on behalf of the respondents, that the exercise of discretion under Article 163(2) is final and beyond the scope of judicial review cannot be accepted. Firstly, because we have rejected the submission advanced by the respondents, that the scope and extent of discretion vested with the Governor has to be ascertained from Article 163(2), on the basis whereof the submission was canvassed. And secondly, any discretion exercised beyond the Governor’s jurisdictional authority, would certainly be subject to judicial review.” 27. Having adverted to the aforesaid position of law as declared by the Apex Court, we are of the view that the following conclusions are inevitable regarding the position of the Governor under the Constitution: (i) The Governor, for the most part, is a formal head of the State. All executive action of the State is to be done in his name. He must act in accordance with the advice of the Council of Ministers. As far as the interpretation of the words “those matters which are under the Constitution to be done in his discretion” is concerned, the position has been authoritatively laid down by the Seven Judges’ Bench in Samsher Singh’s case (supra). They are those Articles under the Constitution, where discretion is expressly conferred on the Governor. They include Articles 371A(1)(b), 371A(1)(d), 371A(2)(b) and 371A(2)(f). In all these Articles, it is clearly discernible that the founding fathers have conferred a clear discretion on the Governor. The words are unmistakable and cannot admit any ambiguity. They all are situations, where the founding fathers contemplates that the Governor is not to be controlled by the advice by the Council of Ministers. In all these Articles, it is clearly discernible that the founding fathers have conferred a clear discretion on the Governor. The words are unmistakable and cannot admit any ambiguity. They all are situations, where the founding fathers contemplates that the Governor is not to be controlled by the advice by the Council of Ministers. (ii) That apart, it may be taken to be the law that, when the Governor sends a report under Article 356 of the Constitution, for reasons which are far too apparent, namely, that the Council of Ministers may not be in a position to tender fair advice, it would be in consonance with the requirement of the Constitution and he would have to exercise his discretion and he is expected to act in a dispassionate manner and he is not bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers. The President, in turn, is to be advised by his Council of Ministers. (iii) Thirdly, there could arise a situation, where the advice of the Council of Ministers is not to prevail upon the Governor. Such a situation arose in M.P. Special Police Establishment vs. State of M.P. and Others, (2004) 8 SCC 788 . Therein, sanction was sought against a Minister. In the context of the same, for the obvious reason that the Council of Ministers may not be able to give fair and dispassionate advice regarding the question of sanction against one of them, it is again a situation, where the Governor would enjoy a discretion, though it is not expressly conferred under the Constitution. (iv) The Governor may act ex-officio. This frequently happens when he becomes a statutory authority under an Act. Such situations are common when he is appointed ex-officio the Chancellor of the Universities under various Acts. In such cases, the Governor does not act as the Governor. He acts as a statutory authority. In such cases, quite clearly, he is not bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers - Vice-Chancellor, University of Allahabad and Others vs. Dr. Anand Prakash Mishra and Others, (1997) 10 SCC 264 . (v) Another instance is the decision in Bhuri Nath and Others vs. State of J&K and Others, (1997) 2 SCC 745 . In such cases, quite clearly, he is not bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers - Vice-Chancellor, University of Allahabad and Others vs. Dr. Anand Prakash Mishra and Others, (1997) 10 SCC 264 . (v) Another instance is the decision in Bhuri Nath and Others vs. State of J&K and Others, (1997) 2 SCC 745 . Therein, it was held by the Apex Court that the Governor, who was appointed as an authority under the Jammu and Kashmir Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1988, was not bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers. “The constitutional mechanism, i.e. Cabinet system of Government is devised for convenient transaction of business of the executive power of the State. Though constitutionally the executive power of the State vests in the Governor, he does not, unless Constitution expressly conferred on him, personally take the decision. The decision are taken according to business rules at different levels and ultimately the decision rests with the authority specified in the business rules and is expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. In substance and in reality, decisions are taken by the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister or the Minister or Secretary as per business rules. But they are all expressed to be taken by the Council of Ministers in the name of the Governor and authenticated by an authorised officer. The Governor being the constitutional head of the State, unless he is required to perform the function under the Constitution in his individual discretion, the performance of the executive power, which is coextensive with the legislative power, is with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister. The Governor of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is required to exercise his ex-officio power as Governor to oversee personally the administration, management and governance of Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine, Shrine Fund and the properties vested in the Board. The decision is his own decision on his personal satisfaction and not one the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The decision is his own decision on his personal satisfaction and not one the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The exercise of the powers and functions under the Act is distinct and different from those exercised formally in his name for which responsibility rests only with his Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister.” No doubt, this is apart from the well recognised exceptions recognised in law, namely, (i) the choice of a Chief Minister and (ii) dismissal of the Government and dissolution of the House. (vi) Thus, apart from the conferment of discretion expressly on the Governor, as has been culled-out in the judgment in Samsher Singh’s case (supra), the Apex Court has developed, over a period of time, situations, which detract from what can be treated as a foundational principle of parliamentary democracy, but which are the products of absolute necessity, which we have already referred to. 28. Coming to the specific question, which is raised in these cases, the learned Single Judge has given emphasis on the employment of the words “as he may deem fit” in clause (2) of Article 243-Q. We have noticed that in paragraph 14 of the judgment in Samsher Singh’s case (supra). It was the specific case of the learned Attorney General that, in many Articles of the Constitution, words are used, which, at first blush, give an impression that the President or the Governor, as the case may be, has a personal discretion. We have already noticed the decision of the Apex Court in Samsher Singh’s case (supra). In Samsher Singh’s case (supra), the Apex Court has proceeded to over-rule the decision in Sardari Lal’s case (supra). The ideal illustration for demonstrating the error in the submission of the writ petitioners, which has found acceptance at the hands of the learned Single Judge, is furnished by Article 311(2)(c), which reads as follows: “311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State:- (1)............ (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges: .................... Provided further that this clause shall not apply: (a)............ (b)............ (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges: .................... Provided further that this clause shall not apply: (a)............ (b)............ (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.” 29. It is on the basis of the words, which tend to show that the President must act upon his own satisfaction, that the decision in Sardari Lal’s case (supra) was rendered. But, with the judgment of the Apex Court in Samsher Singh’s case (supra), it is clear as daylight that such words do not detract from the fundamental principle that the Government of the States and that of the Union are to be run on the model of parliamentary democracy, which we have borrowed from England. The actual power is wielded by the elected representatives, who are in a position to form the Government, being accountable to the Legislature. The Governor is only the formal head. When the words “satisfaction of the Governor” are used, by whichever modes including the words “as he thinks fit” it must, at once, be remembered that it is not the personal satisfaction of the Governor; but, it is the satisfaction in the constitutional sense, as has been declared, namely, the satisfaction of the Council of Ministers. This is fundamental to the democratic set-up envisaged under the Constitution. 30. Therefore, we would think that the employment of the words “as he thinks fit” does not create what would become a parallel power centre, which is what would happen if the argument of the writ petitioners is accepted. It is to be remembered that executive power of the State is to be exercised through the machinery of the elected representatives, who form the Executive. The Executive viz. the elected Government and the Bureaucracy runs the Government for the most part, as has been laid down in Samsher Singh’s case (supra). The Government is run on the basis of collective responsibility. Power is shared among the Ministers on the basis of allocation of subjects to the various Ministries; but the Ministers perform their functions on the basis of collective responsibility. The Government is run on the basis of collective responsibility. Power is shared among the Ministers on the basis of allocation of subjects to the various Ministries; but the Ministers perform their functions on the basis of collective responsibility. They are, finally, responsible to the people through the elected representatives, namely, the Parliament or the State Legislature. They last only as long as they are able to command the majority in the House. Thus, the people, who elect them, retain control over them. The business of the Government is to be carried out under various Ministries. It is for the said purpose that the Rules of Business are contemplated under Article 166(3). The Rules of Business are themselves framed and issued, again, in the name of the Governor or the President, as the case may be. More about this will follow at a later stage when we deal with the question more specifically. 31. Suffice it to say, there is a machinery, by which the Government is expected to run, and the Governor is not expected to exercise any personal discretion, save in those matters which we have already adverted to. The fact that is emphasised before us by the writ petitioners is that, after the amendment to the Constitution, by which Article 243-Q was introduced, there was a substitution in Sections 3 and 4 of the 1916 Act, where, in place of the word “Government” the word “Governor” has been used. This, apparently, is in keeping with the requirement under Article 243-Q, where the word used is “Governor.” 32. We must, at once, pose the question and answer the same as to whether the use of the word “Governor” in Article 243-Q and in Sections 3 & 4 of the 1916 Act will, in any way detract from the fundamental principle of parliamentary democracy being displaced and a personal discretion being vested with the Governor. We are of the clear view that, by the amendment, which was carried out in the Constitution, and by the insertion of Article 243-Q and by the substitution of Sections 3 & 4 of the 1916 Act, as has been done, there was no intendment to confer any personal discretion on the Governor. 33. We are of the clear view that, by the amendment, which was carried out in the Constitution, and by the insertion of Article 243-Q and by the substitution of Sections 3 & 4 of the 1916 Act, as has been done, there was no intendment to confer any personal discretion on the Governor. 33. In the first place, unlike the various Articles, which have been referred to in Samsher Singh’s case (supra), this is not a case, where there is an actual conferment of discretion. A case in point, which will illustrate the golden thread, which runs through all these Articles, is Article 371A(1)(b). It reads as follows: “371A. Special provision with respect to the State of Nagaland:- (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution:- (a)..................... (b) the Governor of Nagaland shall have special responsibility with respect to law and order in the State of Nagaland for so long as in his opinion internal disturbances occurring in the Naga Hills Tuensang Area immediately before the formation of that State continue therein or in any part thereof and in the discharge of his functions in relation thereto the Governor shall, after consulting the Council of Ministers, exercise his individual judgment as to the action to be taken: Provided that if any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the Governor is under this sub clause required to act in the exercise of his individual judgment, the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final, and the validity of anything done by the Governor shall not be called in question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in the exercise of his individual judgment: Provided further that if the President on receipt of a report from the Governor or otherwise is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the Governor to have special responsibility with respect to law and order in the State of Nagaland, he may by order direct that the Governor shall cease to have such responsibility with effect from such date as may be specified in the order.” 34. The founding fathers have employed similar language in all the other Articles. The founding fathers have employed similar language in all the other Articles. It was the compelling nature of the language, which is used, which, apparently, persuaded the Apex Court to take the view that these are the provisions in the Constitution, which are relatable to Article 163(1) of the Constitution. Article 163(1) reads as follows: “163. Council of Ministers to aid and advise Governor:- (1) There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion.” 35. We see nothing in the language of clause (2) of Article 243-Q, which is absolutely independent, to come to the conclusion that it is comparable with the Articles, which have been understood by the Apex Court as conferring discretion on the Governor. The language, in fact, is more or less like the language used in Article 311(2)(c), which was interpreted in Sardari Lal’s case (supra), which interpretation does not hold good after the decision in Samsher Singh’s case (supra). 36. We may now refer to a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Maru Ram vs. Union of India and Others, (1981) 1 SCC 107 . A Constitution Bench in the said case has taken the view that Governor is nothing but a shorthand expression for the State. 36. We may now refer to a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Maru Ram vs. Union of India and Others, (1981) 1 SCC 107 . A Constitution Bench in the said case has taken the view that Governor is nothing but a shorthand expression for the State. We deem it appropriate to refer to the same as under: “61.........The constitutional conclusion is that the Governor is but a shorthand expression for the State Government and the President is an abbreviation for the Central Government.” Wherever the word “Governor” is, in other words, used, unless it is an express case of conferment of individual discretion or it is a case, where there is compelling necessity, as in the case of sanction to prosecute a Minister, or is a case, where the Governor acts ex-officio or as a statutory authority under an enactment, the court would be slow to infer from the mere use of the words “as he may deem fit” in Article 243-Q or the use of the word “Governor” in Sections 3 & 4 of the 1916 Act even after the amendment, which was carried out pursuant to the 74th Amendment to the Constitution, that they were intended to signify conferment of an individual discretion with the Governor. In our view, the use of the word “Governor” would only mean the Governor when acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers. 37. The learned Single Judge, in our view, erred in not adverting to the principles, which have been laid down in the decisions of the Apex Court in Samsher Singh’s case (supra), as also in State of Gujarat vs. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retd.) (supra), which we have adverted to. 38. Constituting an area within the meaning of Article 243-Q would, ultimately, relate to the executive power of the State. Though it is brought about by an amendment to the Constitution and, in that sense, it is a constitutional provision, by no stretch of imagination, can we hold that it is not part of the Governmental function, namely, the constitution of areas for which local self-Government would be constituted for which various ground level factors are to be considered. Though it is brought about by an amendment to the Constitution and, in that sense, it is a constitutional provision, by no stretch of imagination, can we hold that it is not part of the Governmental function, namely, the constitution of areas for which local self-Government would be constituted for which various ground level factors are to be considered. We see nothing in the Article or in the Sections in question to suggest that either the constituent body, which amended the Constitution, or the Legislature even intended departure from the principle of parliamentary democracy founded on the principles that the Governor is only a formal head to discharge his functions in accordance with the advice of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, we would unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the reasoning and the finding of the learned Single Judge that the Notifications in question are bad for the reason that the Governor has not applied his mind and he has not exercised his personal discretion, is not correct. 39. An incidental question has to be considered. It has been found by the learned Single Judge and it is not in dispute also that the file relating to this matter was never placed before the Governor. A question, therefore, arises whether it was necessary to place the file before the Governor. In this context, we must also dwell a little bit more on how the Government works under the Constitution. As we have noted, India has adopted parliamentary democracy on the basis of the Westminster’s model. Ministerial advice forms the basis for the actions of the Governor, as we have already noted. It is for the easy transaction of the Governmental business that Article 166 provides for formation of Rules of Business. All the States have made their Rules of Business. In this State, the Rules of Business, which had been framed in the State of Uttar Pradesh, are still being followed in terms of the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000. Rule 8, read with Appendix II of the Rules, deals with the matters, which are to be placed before the Chief Minister or the Governor. The matter at hand, namely, declaration of an area as a municipality, is, according to the Government, not a matter, which is required to be placed before the Governor. Mr. Rule 8, read with Appendix II of the Rules, deals with the matters, which are to be placed before the Chief Minister or the Governor. The matter at hand, namely, declaration of an area as a municipality, is, according to the Government, not a matter, which is required to be placed before the Governor. Mr. V.B.S. Negi, learned Senior Counsel, would, thereupon, seize upon this circumstance to contend that it will unerringly point to the availability of personal discretion with the Governor. 40. Let us now examine Article 166 in this regard. It reads as follows: “166. Conduct of business of the Government of a State:- (1) All executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. (2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor, and the validity of an order on instruction which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor. (3) The Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion.” 41. All executive action is to be taken in the name of the Governor, he being the head of the State. We have also noticed from the discussion of the Apex Court in Samsher Singh’s case (supra) the reason why the Governor cannot personally be sued in regard to Article 361. The reason behind the principle in Article 361 has been explained to be that the Governor’s actions are, actually, not his actions. The actions of the Governor are, actually, actions of the State. It is true that Article 166(3) contemplates that the Rules of Business are to be framed in respect of matters except the matters, which fall within the discretionary powers of the Governor. The actions of the Governor are, actually, actions of the State. It is true that Article 166(3) contemplates that the Rules of Business are to be framed in respect of matters except the matters, which fall within the discretionary powers of the Governor. The argument of the respondents/writ petitioners appears to be that, since, under Rule 8 of the Rules of Business, read with Appendix II, the matter of this nature, namely, declaration of an area under Section 3 of the 1916 Act or under the 1959 Act, is not to be placed before the Governor, it shows that this is a matter, which falls outside the four walls of the Rules of Business and, therefore, there is discretion with the Governor alone. We would think that this argument of the writ petitioners proceeds on a wrong appreciation of the Rule of Business in question and the case of the State. 42. The Rules of Business are framed under Article 166(3). They provide for easy transaction of the Governmental business. This is for the reason that the exact power to be wielded by each Minister is clearly articulated and the work is divided according to the same. It is done on the basis of the subject, which is handled by the particular Minister. In the Rules of Business, ordinarily, certain matters must be considered by the Chief Minister. Certain matters must be considered by the entire Cabinet. Other matters can be dealt with by the Minister concerned. Usually, once the work is allocated to a Minister, he is free to issue standing orders from time to time to meet the contingencies and, on the basis of the standing orders, matters are thereafter decided as to who exactly can exercise the power. We have also noticed the statement of the law in Samsher Singh’s case (supra) that, when a Minister or an officer carries out work, it is not a case of delegation of power. In fact, Article 166(3) does not contemplate delegation of power. The work done by a civil servant, for example, within the province of his authority is treated as the work done by the Minister and, finally, therefore, as the work done by the Governor. All executive actions, as we have noticed, are to be done in the name of the Governor. The orders have to be authenticated in the manner as provided under Article 166(2). 43. All executive actions, as we have noticed, are to be done in the name of the Governor. The orders have to be authenticated in the manner as provided under Article 166(2). 43. A question, which has arisen, is as to the effect of deviation from the standards, which are proclaimed in Article 166(1) and Article 166(2). We may only advert to a recent judgment of the Apex Court as to the effect of such deviation and that is the judgment in MRF Limited vs. Manohar Parrikar and Others, (2010) 11 SCC 374 . Therein, the court proceeded to hold, inter-alia, as follows: “The Business Rules framed under the Provisions of Article 166 (3) of the Constitution are mandatory and must be strictly adhered. Any decision by the Government in breach of these Rules will be a nullity in the eyes of law. The Rules of business framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution are for convenient transaction of the business of the Government and for allocation of the business among the Ministers. Article 166(2) of the Constitution requires the decision of the State Government to be authenticated as per the Rules framed thereunder. Any decision taken by the State Government therefore, reflects the collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers and their participation in such decision making process. The Chief Minister as the Head of the Council of Ministers is answerable not only to the Legislature but also to the Governor of the State. The Governor of the State as the Head of the State acts with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister. The Rules framed under Article 166 (3) of the Constitution are in aid to fulfill the Constitutional Mandate embodied in Chapter II of Part VI of the Constitution. Therefore, the decision of the State Government must meet the requirement of these Rules also. The decisions of the State Government have to be in conformity with the mandate of Article 154 an 166 of the Constitution as also the Rules framed thereunder as otherwise such decision would not have the form of a Government decision and will be a nullity. The decisions of the State Government have to be in conformity with the mandate of Article 154 an 166 of the Constitution as also the Rules framed thereunder as otherwise such decision would not have the form of a Government decision and will be a nullity. Therefore, if the Council of Ministers or Chief Minister has not been a party to a decision taken by an Individual Minister, that decision cannot be the decision of the State Government and it would be non-est and void ab initio.” 44. It is, no doubt, true that failure to comply with the Rules of Business can have fatal consequences in relation to the works, which are to be discharged as per Appendix II, as has been laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment. We may also, in this context, refer to a judgment of the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan and Another vs. Sripal Jain, AIR 1963 SC 1323 . The respondent in the said case was compulsorily retired. Rule 31(vii)(a) of the Rajasthan Rules of Business provided that the cases of compulsory retirement must be placed before the Governor. The contention taken by the appellant State before the Apex Court was that, on a conspectus of the provisions in question, it is only those cases of compulsory retirement by way of punishment, which were required to be placed before the Governor, and, in this case, compulsory retirement was done on the respondent/employee completing 25 years of service. The Apex Court proceeded to hold in favour of the State and took the view that, on a conspectus of the provisions, the matter did not merit engaging the attention of the Governor as it was not a case of compulsory retirement by way of penalty. The order of compulsory retirement was found to be legal. We have noticed this judgment only for the purpose of noting that a case must, indeed, be decided on the basis of the exact Rules of Business in question and its impact on the contention raised. The order of compulsory retirement was found to be legal. We have noticed this judgment only for the purpose of noting that a case must, indeed, be decided on the basis of the exact Rules of Business in question and its impact on the contention raised. In this case, the mere fact that the issue at hand was perceived as not one, which should engage the attention of the Governor, in that, it was not required to be placed before the Governor, does not, in any way, detract from the principle, which we have laid down earlier, namely, that this is not a matter, which requires personal attention of the Governor or the exercise of his personal discretion. There are many matters, which, even as the learned Single Judge has held, may not engage the attention of the Governor. More importantly, as to which matter must engage the attention of the Governor, is a matter to be determined on the basis of the Rules of Business. The effect of Rule 8, read with Appendix II, is only that the issue at hand is one, which, under the Rules of Business, is not required to be placed before the Governor. That does not, however, mean that the argument of Mr. V.B.S. Negi, learned Senior Counsel, that it should be treated as meaning that the Governor has an absolute discretion in the matter, is to be accepted. It is quite clear that, in terms of the Rules of Business, if there is no other vice attached to the decision taken in this matter by the Secretary concerned, the mere fact that it was not even placed before the Governor, as it is put by the learned Single Judge, will be of no avail to the writ petitioners. 45. We may also notice the statement contained in paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition. It reads as follows: “8. That in reply to the contents of paras 15 and 16 of the writ petition, it is stated that Article 166 (1) of the Constitution of India clearly provides that all executive action of the State shall be in the name of the Governor. It reads as follows: “8. That in reply to the contents of paras 15 and 16 of the writ petition, it is stated that Article 166 (1) of the Constitution of India clearly provides that all executive action of the State shall be in the name of the Governor. Further Article 166 (2) provides that all orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor. It is humbly submitted that the Hon’ble Governor of the State of Uttarakhand exercising his powers under Article 166 (2) of the Constitution of India, has framed Rules, 2001, wherein in Rule-3 it has been laid down that all orders issued or executed by the State Government, shall be treated as issued or executed on behalf of the Governor. Copy of the Rules, 2001 is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No. C.A. 5 to this affidavit. It is submitted that the Rule-4 of the said Rules further provides that all orders issued by the State Government shall be signed by the Principal Secretary, Secretary, Additional Secretary, Joint Secretary, Dy. Secretary or Under Secretary or such other offices who have been authorized by the Governor to sign the same and such order or orders shall be treated as authenticated by the Governor. It is necessary to submit that Governor, exercising the powers under Article 166(2) and 166(3) of the Constitution for the convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State, has framed U.P. Rules of Business, 1975 (as adopted and applicable in the State of Uttarakhand). As per Rule-8 of the said Rules, the matters as detailed in the Schedule-2 of the said Rules to be produced before the Chief Minister and Governor of the State. Since the matter with regard to enhancement of the transitional areas and constitution of local bodies does not fall within the list of matters detailed in the Schedule-2 of the said Rules, hence the objections were decided and notification was issued by the Secretary and accordingly the matter at hand was not submitted before the Governor for approval. Copy of Rules of Business is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No. C.A. 6 to this affidavit. Copy of Rules of Business is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No. C.A. 6 to this affidavit. Further there is also no provision in the Uttar Pradesh Secretariat Instructions, 1982 (issued in pursuance to the provision of Rule 12 of U.P. Rules of Business, 1975) for submission and taking approval from the Governor with regard to enhancement of transitional areas and constitution of the local bodies. Copy of Uttar Pradesh Secretariat Instructions, 1982 is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No. C.A. 7 to this affidavit. It is submitted that enhancement of transitional area of Nagar Palika Parishad, Kotdwar and its upgradation to Nagar Nigam was done after taking approval from the Hon’ble Cabinet of the State. The State Government has issued the final notification after due consideration of the report an recommendation of the committee constituted by the respondent no. 3 and the entire exercise has been done on behalf of the Governor as per U.P. Rules of Business, 1975. Contrary contentions are denied.” 46. It is also necessary to notice that there is no rejoinder affidavit filed to the counter affidavit. Hence, as a matter of fact, the contentions of the State would be treated to have stood uncontroverted. 47. The fact that the word “Governor” is used in clause (2) of Article 243-Q or the word “Governor” is used in Sections 3 & 4 of the 1916 Act and under Section 3 of the 1959 Act will also, in this context, not advance the case of the writ petitioners. As we have already noted, going by the principles laid down by the Apex Court, there is nothing to import a personal discretion with the Governor. The Rules of Business also do not contemplate placing this matter before the Governor. Once the impression that the employment of the word “Governor” in Article 243-Q and in the Sections of the 1916 Act and of the 1959 Act, does not carry the meaning, which the writ petitioners intend to impress upon us, is removed, then we would think that the ground is cleared for us to hold that the fact that the matter is not even brought to the Governor’s notice also is a matter of no moment. The question as to whether it is a matter, which should be brought to the notice of the Governor, as we have held, is a matter to be governed by the Rules of Business. That is all that emerges from the pleading of the State that it is not a matter, which should engage the attention of the Governor. The Governor means, as we have already noticed, the Government. 48. We may also notice, going by the pleadings, that, in the instructions, which have been issued in pursuance to the provision of U.P. Rules of Business, 1975, there is no such provision regarding enhancement of transitional areas and constitution of local bodies having to be brought before the Governor. In this regard, the Government has produced a copy of the Instructions as Annexure No. CA7 along with the counter affidavit. It is also to be noted that it has been pleaded that the enhancement of the transitional area of the Nagar Palika and upgradation, which is involved in this case, was done after taking approval of the Cabinet and the State Government is said to have issued the final Notification. There is no case pleaded or argued by the respondents / writ petitioners before us, in the alternative, that the person, who has issued the Notifications, which are impugned, has no authority under the Rules of Business. Therefore, we need not be detained by any such aspect. Further, the fact of matter being placed before the Cabinet stands uncontroverted by the appellants. Effect of Section 327 of the 1916 Act, read with the Seventh Schedule: 49. We have already adverted to the discussion under Section 327 of the 1916 Act. Section 327, apparently, contains provision for delegating powers; but, the power under Sections 3(1) & 3(2) of the 1916 Act cannot be delegated. This is clear from Section 327. In our view, the provision of Section 327, read with the Seventh Schedule, would militate against the reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge. All that Section 327 provides is the power to delegate to the Prescribed Authority various powers, with the exception of those which are indicated in the Seventh Schedule. Undoubtedly, they include the power under Sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the 1916 Act. It is significant to notice that the heading of the Seventh Schedule is “powers of the State Government that may not be delegated”. Undoubtedly, they include the power under Sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the 1916 Act. It is significant to notice that the heading of the Seventh Schedule is “powers of the State Government that may not be delegated”. This would go to show that what was understood by the Legislature was that, what was seemingly shown as the discretionary power of the Governor was, actually, the power of the Government, as any other view would be incompatible with the power being with the Government. The power to actually issue the Notification contemplated under Sections 3(1) & 3(2) cannot be delegated. We have already taken the view that such power is one, which is vested with the Government and not with the Governor, in essence. Though it is stated that the Governor has to exercise the power under Article 243-Q and Section 3, we have already reasoned and held that it is only in the constitutional sense. Read with the Rules of Business, it is for the authority, who is competent under the Rules of Business, to do it. We are not confronted with a case relating to the absence of power with the officer, who has issued the Notifications. We are of the view that the Notifications cannot be challenged on the said basis. 50. In fact, at first blush, though, in Section 3 of the 1916 Act, when consequent upon the 74 Amendment to the Constitution, a substitution took place and the present version is to be found and the word “Governor” is used, in Section 327, the words continue to be the “State Government.” This is why we have already adverted to the judgment of the Constitution Bench, which has laid down that Governor is a shorthand expression to denote the Government, except, of course, in cases, which we have already discussed. 51. We must, however, also refer to certain judgments, which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the writ petitioners. As far as the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Anil Trivedi and Another vs. State of M.P. and Others, 2015 (2) MPLJ 154 , is concerned, the case involved a Notification issued under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. As far as the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Anil Trivedi and Another vs. State of M.P. and Others, 2015 (2) MPLJ 154 , is concerned, the case involved a Notification issued under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. Therein, no doubt, the Division Bench has adverted to an earlier Division Bench and has taken the view that the use of the word “Governor” means the Governor has personal discretion and the power must be exercised by the Governor himself. In fact, though an attempt was made before the Division Bench to persuade it on the strength of the judgments of the Apex Court, it took the view that the question had already been answered by an earlier Division Bench. We are, with respect, unable to subscribe to the view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court and we are of the view that it does not lay down the law correctly. 52. As far as the judgment of the Jharkhand High Court in the case of Jawaharlal Sharma vs. State of Jharkhand and Others, AIR 2006 Jhar 135 is concerned, we are of the view that we need not be detained by consideration of the judgment by the Jharkhand High Court. It is not quite clear whether the Jharkhand High Court has held that the Governor has an individual discretion. At any rate, we would reiterate that, in our view, the correct position in law is what we have laid down. We have no reason to be persuaded to take a different view. 53. A reference has been made by the writ petitioners also to the decision of the Apex Court in Champa Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, Civil Appeal No. 4554 of 2018. In fact, the learned Single Judge has also relied upon the same. It is necessary, therefore, to refer to what transpired in the said case. A Notification dated 06.10.2008 for upgradation of Gram Panchayat as Nagar Palika was issued under the Rajasthan Municipalities Ordinance. There was a litigation; the Notification was withdrawn; fresh Notification was issued; and, finally, the High Court came to dismiss the writ petition. It is this, which came to be considered by the Apex Court. The Apex Court referred to the ingredients of Article 243-Q, namely, transitional area, smaller urban area and the larger urban area. There was a litigation; the Notification was withdrawn; fresh Notification was issued; and, finally, the High Court came to dismiss the writ petition. It is this, which came to be considered by the Apex Court. The Apex Court referred to the ingredients of Article 243-Q, namely, transitional area, smaller urban area and the larger urban area. The court proceeded to hold, inter-alia, as follows: “It, therefore, appears from the scheme of Article 243Q(2) that the Governor is not free to notify ‘AREAS’ in his absolute discretion but is required to fix the parameters necessary to determine whether a particular AREA is a transitional area or a smaller urban area or a larger urban area with due regard to the factors mentioned above. It is implicit that such parameters must be uniform for the entire State. It is only after the determination of the parameters, various municipal bodies contemplated under Article 243Q(1) could be constituted.” A query was put by the court as to whether any Notification has been issued under clause (2) of Article 243-Q. The court, thereafter, proceeded to hold as follows: “In response to a specific query whether any notification contemplated under Article 243(Q)(2) had been issued by the State of Rajasthan, Mr. Guru Krishnakumar learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Rajasthan, produced two notifications dated 4.7.1995 and 30.4.2012. On a plain reading of both the notifications, it appears that these notifications had been issued in exercise of the statutory powers conferred on the State Government by two different enactments known as “The Rajasthan Municipality Act, 1959 (since repealed) and the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009. Apart from the declaration regarding the source of power for the issuance of these notifications to be authority conferred by the various provisions of the above mentioned two enactments, it appears from the tenor and scheme of the notifications that these notifications purport to classify municipalities only on the basis of population. The various other parameters to which regard is required to be had under Article 243Q(2) were not taken into consideration for the purpose of classification made under the above mentioned two notifications. Therefore, in our opinion, these two notifications cannot be treated as notifications contemplated under Article 243(Q)(2). The various other parameters to which regard is required to be had under Article 243Q(2) were not taken into consideration for the purpose of classification made under the above mentioned two notifications. Therefore, in our opinion, these two notifications cannot be treated as notifications contemplated under Article 243(Q)(2). In the absence of any notification which meets the requirements of Article 243Q(2), the entire exercise undertaken by the State of Rajasthan in upgrading the Napasar village Gram Panchayat to be a Nagarpalika – [that is equivalent to Nagar Panchayat as mentioned in Article 243Q(1)(a)] is unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with the requirements of the Constitution under Article 243Q of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the initial notification dated 6.10.2008 itself is unsustainable. Unfortunately, this aspect has not been noticed by the High Court obviously because it was not brought to the notice of the High Court. The fact that a litigant before the court does not point out the relevant principles and provisions of law does not prevent the court from examining the issues involved in the lis, more particularly, when the process which is the subject matter of litigation before the court is inconsistent with the mandate of the Constitution. It is a settled principle of law that courts are bound to take note of the constitution and the laws.” The court, therefore, proceeded to hold that the initial Notification, itself, was unconstitutional. The issues, which are raised in these cases, in our view, are different from the issues, which actually fell for consideration before the Apex Court. Also, in the impugned final Notifications before us, they are stated to be issued under Section 3 of the Act, read with Article 243-Q. 54. It is, no doubt, true that, when a Notification is issued constituting an area as transitional area, smaller urban area and larger urban area, various ingredients in Article 243-Q (2) must be borne in mind. It is not as if there are no consequences. It has a great capacity for both, good and bad. For instance, under MNREGA, the benefits under the Act are guaranteed for those in the rural area. Upon it falling within an urban area, the benefits under the said Act may be taken away. A person may, without any discernible benefit or advantage, lose whatever benefit he is getting under the said Act on the area being declared as an urban area. Upon it falling within an urban area, the benefits under the said Act may be taken away. A person may, without any discernible benefit or advantage, lose whatever benefit he is getting under the said Act on the area being declared as an urban area. Similarly, there may be persons, who may have complaints that, upon it being labeled as an urban area, he may be called upon to pay higher taxes. Therefore, undoubtedly, as all powers, the power to notify under Article 243-Q (2) must be done with the greatest care and application of mind to the various factors, which are indicated therein. No extraneous matter or irrelevant matter should govern the exercise of power under Article 243-Q (2), read with Section 3 of the 1916 Act. 55. Having said so, we would, again, revert back to consider the further arguments raised by the parties. 56. Mr. Yogesh Pacholia, learned counsel for the writ petitioners in one of the cases, would point out that there is no Notification issued under Article 243-Q (2). According to him, the order of action is, firstly, there must be a Notification under Article 243-Q and it is, thereafter, that power must be exercised under Section 3 of the 1916 Act. It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain and to hold as to what is to be done in terms of Article 243-Q, read with Sections 3 & 4 of the 1916 Act. Article 243-Q (2) is the result of an amendment in 1974 to provide for greater decentralization of power and to strengthen the local bodies. It falls under Part IXA of the Constitution and comes under the heading “The Municipalities”. The word “Municipality” is defined under clause (e) of Article 243P as an institution of self-government constituted under Article 243-Q. Thereafter, Article 243-Q provides that there shall be constituted in every State a Nagar Panchayat (by whatever name called) for a transitional area. It further provides another form of municipality, namely, a Municipal Council, which is to be constituted for a smaller urban area. Finally, there is to be a Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area. This is to be done in accordance with the provisions of the said Part. It is, thereafter, in clause (2) that the constituent body has provided as to what is to be a transitional area, a smaller urban area or a larger urban area. Finally, there is to be a Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area. This is to be done in accordance with the provisions of the said Part. It is, thereafter, in clause (2) that the constituent body has provided as to what is to be a transitional area, a smaller urban area or a larger urban area. The Governor, which we have explained is not the Governor as a person distinct from the Government with the Council of Ministers at the helm of affairs advising him, is to have regard to the population of the area, the density of the population, the revenue generated for local administration, the percentage of employment in nonagricultural activities and economic importance. It may also have regard to any other factor, which the Government may think fit. On the basis of the same, a Notification is issued, by which, transitional area, smaller urban area or larger urban area is to be specified. 57. We must, now, turn to Section 3 of the 1916 Act. Section 3 has a heading “declaration etc. of transitional area and smaller urban area”. Section 3(1) provides for any area, which is specified by the Governor in a Notification under clause (2) of Article 243-Q with such limits as are specified therein, to be a transitional area or a smaller urban area. It is to be noticed that the 1916 Act deals with only transitional area and smaller urban area and the larger urban area, for which a Municipal Corporation is to be constituted as per Article 243-Q, is governed by another enactment, namely, the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1959. Subsection (2) of Section 3 of the 1916 Act, no doubt, provides that the Government may, by a subsequent Notification under Article 243-Q, include or exclude any area from a transitional area or a smaller urban area referred to under Section 3(1) of the 1916 Act. In these cases, both, Section 3(1) of the 1916 Act and Section 3(2) of the 1959 Act are involved. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the 1916 Act provides that the Notification under sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) can be issued only after previous publication under Section 4, inter-alia. In these cases, both, Section 3(1) of the 1916 Act and Section 3(2) of the 1959 Act are involved. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the 1916 Act provides that the Notification under sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) can be issued only after previous publication under Section 4, inter-alia. Therefore, a conjoint reading of Article 243-Q and Section 3 of the 1916 Act would only mean that the competent authority, as per the Rules of Business, and not the Governor as such, is to specify the areas, be it a transitional area or a smaller urban area. This is to be done by a Notification. In these cases, the Notifications in question can themselves be treated as the Notifications. In fact, the learned Advocate General, before the learned Single Judge, maintained that communication dated 26.09.2012 is seen as issued under Article 243-Q. It appears to be a letter addressed by a Government Secretary declaring certain parameters, which are to be borne in mind when declaration is to be made within the meaning of Article 243-Q (2). In fact, in the Notifications, which have been challenged, it is specifically stated that they are issued in accordance with the powers under Section 3, read with Article 243-Q (2). It is also to be noticed that order dated 26.09.2012 has not been put to challenge by any of the writ petitioners. The said order or letter, as it may be considered, appears to lay down certain parameters for exercising the power. It is also to be noticed that order dated 26.09.2012 has not been put to challenge by any of the writ petitioners. The said order or letter, as it may be considered, appears to lay down certain parameters for exercising the power. It reads as follows: ^^la[;k 886@4¼1½2012&1¼,u½ 2012 izs"kd] MkŒ mekdkUr iaokj] lfpo] mRrjk[k.M 'kkluA lsok esa] 1- vk;qDr] x<+oky ,oa dqek;w¡ e.MyA 2- leLr ftykf/kdkjh] mRrjk[k.MA 3- funs'kdA 4- 'kgjh fodkl foHkkx] mRrjk[k.M&nsgjknwuA 'kgjh fodkl vuqHkkx&1 nsgjknwu% fnukad 26 flrEcj] 2012 fo"k; 'kgjh LFkkuh; fudk;ksa ds vkxkeh lkekU; fuokZpu ds n`f"Vxr lhek foLrkj dk izLrko miyC/k djk;s tkus ds laca/k esaA egksn;] vkxkeh 'kgjh LFkkuh; fudk;ksa ds n`f"Vxr jkT; dh fudk;ksa ;Fkk uxj iapk;r] uxjikfydk ifj"kn ,oa uxj fuxe dk lhek foLrkj fd;k tkuk izLrkfor gSA vr% bl laca/k esa eq>s ;g dgus dk funsZ'k gqvk gS fd ftykf/kdkfj;ksa }kjk fuEu rF;ksa ds vk/kkj ij ijh{k.kksijkar fudk;ks ds lhek foLRkkj dk izLrko 'kklu dks miyC/k djk;k tk;sxk%& 1- lfEefyr fd;s tkus okys {ks= dh 75 izfr'kr ;k mlls vf/kd tula[;k d`f"k ls fHkUu O;olk; esa yxh gksA 2- lfEefyr fd;s tkus okys {ks= dh tula[;k ;k ?kuRo de ls de eSnkuh {ks=ksa gsrq 250 O;fDr izfr fdyksehVj gks ,oa ioZrh; {ks= gsrq de ls de 150 O;fDr izfr fdyksehVj gksA 3- lfEefyr fd;s tkus okyk {ks= LFkkuh; iz'kklu gsrq jktLo mRiUu djus dh fLFkfr esa gksA 4- lfEefyr fd;s tkus okys {ks= dk vkfFkZd egRo gksA 5- lfEefyr fd;s tkus okys {ks= esa 'kgjh xq.k fo|eku gksA 2- ftykf/kdkfj;ksa }kjk lhek foLrkj gsrq izf"kr fd;s tkus okys izLrko esa lfEefyr fd;s tkus okys {ks=ksa ds laca/k esa fuEufyf[kr lwpuk,a vfuok;Z :Ik ls miyC/k djk;h tkuh vko';d gksaxh%& 1- lfEefyr fd;s tkus okys {ks= dh orZeku tula[;kA 2- lfEefyr fd;s tkus okys {ks= dk xzkeokj {ks=QyA 3- lfEefyr fd;s tkus okys xzke dh xr rhu o"kZ dh Lo;a dh vk;&O; dk fooj.kA 4- lfEefyr fd;s tkus okys {ks= dk dqy fdrus izfr'kr Hkw&Hkkx d`f"k {ks= gSA 5- lfEefyr fd;s tkus okys {ks=ksa dk uD'kk utjh miyC/k djk;k tk;s ftlesa lhekadu yky jax ls fd;k tk; ,oa lhek js[kk ls vanj dh vksj xkVk la[;kvksa dks Hkh vafdr fd;k tk;A 6- lfEefyr fd;s tkus okys {ks= dk fn'kkokj fooj.k Hkh miyc/k djk;k tk;A 7- ftl uxj iapk;r] uxjikfydk ifj"kn ,oa uxj fuxe ftldk lhek foLrkj fd;k tkuk izLrkfor gks mlds orZeku lhekadu dks iznf'kZr djus okyk uD'kk utjh ftlesa lhekdau ds vanj dh vksj xkVk la[;ksa dk fooj.k fn'kkokj fooj.k lfgr vafdr gks miyC/k djk;k tk;A 8- u;s {ks= lfEefyr fd;s tkus ds Ik'pkr~ vfLrRo esa vkus okys uxj iapk;r] uxjikfydk ifj"kn vFkok uxj fuxe ds lhekadu gsrq u;s izLrkfor {ks=ksa dks lfEefyr djrs gq, mldk uD'kk utjh miyC/k djk;k tk;] lhekadu ds vanj dh vksj xkVk la[;kvksa dk Li"V fn'kkokj fooj.k vafdr fd;k tk;A 3- d`i;k mijksDr vk/kkj ij lacaf/kr tuin ds ftykf/kdkjh }kjk okafNr lwpukvksa lfgr fudk; ds lhek foLrkj dk izLrko rRdky 'kklu dks izf"kr fd;k tk;sxkA Hkonh;] ¼MkWŒ mekdkUr iaokj½ lfpoA Lka[;k 886@4¼1½2012&1¼,u½ 2012 rn~fnukafdr~A izfrfyfi la;qDr lfpo] jkT; fuokZpu vk;ksx] mRrjk[k.M dks lwpukFkZ izsf"krA vkKk ls] ¼lqHkk"k pUnz½ mi&lfpoA** 58. In fact, the provision of Section 3(1) and Section 3(2) of the 1916 Act, we may notice, refers to the Notification under clause (2) of Article 243-Q. Similarly, Sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the 1959 Act refer to Article 243-Q. Both, under Section 3 of the 1916 Act and under Section 3 of the 1959 Act, as also under Article 243-Q of the Constitution, the Governor is not to exercise any personal discretion. No doubt, this exercise can be carried out only after going through the procedure provided under Section 4 in respect of the 1916 Act, which brings us to the last few questions, which arise in these cases. 59. In these cases, it is necessary to refer to the developments, which took place, which we have already noted in the beginning of the judgment, namely, that this is a sequel to an earlier round of litigation, namely, Writ Petition (M/S) No. 3094 of 2017 & connected cases. We have already extracted the judgment passed in the earlier round. It is, apparently, thereafter that a hearing was afforded to the writ petitioners. The hearing was not afforded by the authority under the Rules of Business and not by the person, who has passed the Notifications. About this, there is no dispute. In fact, the learned Single Judge, we have noticed, has noted the argument of the writ petitioners that the hearing was afforded by the District Magistrate and even delegated further to a Committee and that this may vitiate the order. What Section 4 of the 1916 Act contemplates is issuance of a preliminary notification, which is to be affixed in the office of the District Magistrate and also to be published in newspapers in the district concerned and a draft in Hindi is also to be made available. Persons are to be informed that they would be free to file their objections. It is provided that the Governor is to consider any objection in writing, which it receives from any person within the period stipulated. The net result is as follows: Before a notification is issued under Section 3, a draft publication is to be made. Any person is free to file a written objection or suggestion. It is to be filed within the time period, which is provided. It is further declared that the Governor, as understood by us, is to consider the objection or suggestion. Any person is free to file a written objection or suggestion. It is to be filed within the time period, which is provided. It is further declared that the Governor, as understood by us, is to consider the objection or suggestion. As far as the 1959 Act is concerned, there is no provision similar to Section 4 of the 1916 Act. 60. In these cases, we have noticed the direction, which was given by the learned Single Judge in the earlier round of litigation. The hearing was done, it appears, at the level of the District Magistrate/Committee, etc. This has been adversely commented upon by the learned counsel for the writ petitioners. The Governor has no power to delegate, the Governor must do the hearing himself, the Governor must consider the matter and the objections himself, runs the argument. In fact, the pleadings also appear to be on the said lines. There is no specific pleading that the matter has been carried out in violation of the Rules of Business. This assumes significance for the reason that we have already held that there is no personal discretion with the Governor in the matter. Under the Rules of Business, it is not even necessary to place the matter before the Governor. This is the inevitable result of the operation of the Rules of Business. This does not render it unconstitutional or illegal. 61. The only question, which would remain, is whether the Rules of Business are followed. This is a matter, which must be specifically pleaded. It is not specifically pleaded that, in arriving at a decision, the competent authority has not acted in terms of the Rules of Business. It is true that the word used in sub-section (2) of Section 4 is the “Governor”. Having regard to the interpretation we have placed on the word “Governor” we have no difficulty in holding that the word “Governor” does not mean the Governor by himself. In fact, in keeping the Governor out of the picture in terms of the Rules of Business, it would not be illegal. 62. A question arises, no doubt, as to whether the hearing has been done by the person, who actually took the decision in the matter. In fact, in keeping the Governor out of the picture in terms of the Rules of Business, it would not be illegal. 62. A question arises, no doubt, as to whether the hearing has been done by the person, who actually took the decision in the matter. We may only refer to a judgment of the Apex Court in Gullapalli Nageswar Rao and Others vs. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Another, AIR 1959 SC 308 . Therein, the matter arose under the Motor Vehicles Act. Chapter IVA provided for nationalization of bus transport. Under the scheme, Section 68 contemplated an opportunity to file objections. Therein, the court referred to the fact that Rules of Business were there, which governed the situation. As per the Rules, the Minister in-charge of the particular department would dispose of the cases and he could also, by standing orders, give direction as he thought fit for the disposal of cases in the department. In terms of the same, the Chief Minister, who was in-charge of the Transport Department, made an order directing the Secretary to hear the objections filed against the scheme. Petitioner therein filed objections before the Secretary, who gave a personal hearing and, thereafter, the matter was placed before the Chief Minister, who made order approving the scheme. It is here that the court, inter-alia, held as follows: “28. At this state, the argument hinted at but not seriously pressed, may be noticed. The Rules the Governor is authorised to make, the argument proceeds, are only to regulate the acts of the Governor or his subordinates in discharge of the executive power of the State Government, and therefore will not govern the quasi-judicial functions entrusted to it. There is a fallacy in this argument. The concept of a quasi-judicial act implies that the act is not wholly judicial; it describes only a duty cast on the executive body or authority to conform to norms of judicial procedure in performing some acts in exercise of its executive power. The procedural rules made by the Governor for the convenient transaction of business of the State Government apply also to quasi-judicial acts, provided those ’Rules conform to the principles of judicial procedure. 30. With this background we shall proceed to consider the validity of the three alleged deviations of the State Government from the fundamental judicial procedure. The procedural rules made by the Governor for the convenient transaction of business of the State Government apply also to quasi-judicial acts, provided those ’Rules conform to the principles of judicial procedure. 30. With this background we shall proceed to consider the validity of the three alleged deviations of the State Government from the fundamental judicial procedure. In the present case, the officer who received the objections of the parties and heard them personally or through their representatives, was the Secretary of the Transport Department. Under the ’Madras Government Business Rules and Secretariat Instructions’ made by the Governor under Art. 166 of the Constitution, the Secretary of a department is its head. One of the parties to the dispute before the State Government was the Transport Department functioning as a statutory authority under the Act. The head of that department received the objections, heard the parties, recorded the entire proceedings and presumably discussed the matter with the Chief Minister before the latter approved the scheme. Though the formal orders were made by the Chief Minister, in effect and substance, the enquiry was conducted and personal hearing was given by one of the parties to the dispute itself. It is one of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure that the person or persons who are entrusted with the duty of hearing a case judicially should be those who have no personal bias in the matter............ The aforesaid decisions accept the fundamental principle of natural justice that in the case of quasi-judicial proceedings, the authority empowered to decide the dispute between opposing parties must be one without bias towards one side or other in the dispute.” 63. In this context, we may also bear in mind what has been laid down in paragraph 35 of the Samsher Singh’s case (supra). 64. We must, first of all, consider whether, in law, a hearing as such is required to be given to the parties under Section 4 of the 1916 Act. In these cases, a perusal of the judgment in the earlier round of litigation by the learned Single Judge would show that the learned Single Judge had referred to a judgment of this Court passed in Special Appeal No. 103 of 2011 and, more importantly, he relied on the concession, which was given by the Advocate General, that a hearing would be afforded. Since the judgment in Special Appeal No. 103 of 2011 is rendered by a Division Bench, it becomes our duty that we advert to it as to whether it provides for any right to hearing. This we say as another Division Bench, in which the judgment was rendered by one of us, namely, in Narendra Singh Rana vs. State of Uttarakhand and Others, 2016 (2) UD 275, has taken the view that no oral hearing as such is required. This was done after considering the decision of the Apex Court also in Baldev Singh and Others vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others, (1987) 2 SCC 510 . In fact, the decision in Baldev Singh’s case (supra) was rendered under the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act, which provided for constitution of a notified area. Therein, we distinguished the said judgment by holding as follows: “26. We would think that the said decision was rendered in the context of Section 256 therein and it is also a case where there was no attempt for complying with natural justice in any manner. There is no provision like Section 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, which provides for preliminary notification, calling for objections and it being considered as it is contemplated in the Act in question in these cases. The Hon’ble Apex Court, therefore, took the view that people should be given an opportunity of being heard in view of the serious consequences like loss of office in Gram Panchayat etc.” 65. We may, in fact, notice further that, even in the said case, the Apex Court had only clarified that hearing contemplated is not required to be oral and can be by inviting objections and disposing them of in a fair manner. We have noted that Section 4, indeed, provides for filing of objections or suggestions, though in writing, and for disposing them before the notification is actually issued. That apart, in Special Appeal No. 103 of 2011, the question which actually arose was under Article 243U of the Constitution. Article 243-U contemplates a notification by which a larger urban area is specified. In regard to the same, the complaint of the writ petitioners, who were apparently elected and who were holding office in smaller urban areas, was that their term was being cut short. Article 243-U contemplates a notification by which a larger urban area is specified. In regard to the same, the complaint of the writ petitioners, who were apparently elected and who were holding office in smaller urban areas, was that their term was being cut short. In particular, we notice that the case turned on the provision contained in Section 8AA of the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1959. Section 8AA provided, inter-alia, authority to dissolve the municipal council from such day as may be specified. Therein, the Division Bench proceeded to consider the said Section and, inter-alia, held as follows: “7. A look at the said Section would make it amply clear that after a Municipal Council is converted into a Municipal Corporation, the Municipal Council or the persons composing the Municipal Council, chosen by direct election, do not immediately cease to exist in law. In the event State Government is of the opinion that it is expedient to dissolve such Municipal Council, it may do so. Therefore, the law governing the field clearly says that upon a Municipal Council being upgraded to a Municipal Corporation, Municipal Council would not automatically stand dissolved. The law gives power to the State Government to dissolve such a Municipal Council. Therefore, power to dissolve a Municipal Council, as granted by Section 8-AA of the said Adhiniyam, is power referred in Article 243-U (1) by the words, “unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force.” In the event dissolution is effected in exercise of such power, as it appears to us, Proviso to sub-Article (1) of Article 243-U applies and it becomes obligatory to give a reasonable opportunity of being heard before such power is exercised. 8. In the event an action is fait accompli, then giving of an opportunity of hearing becomes a mere formality. If an action is such that the law regards the same as final and cannot be altered, the action becomes fait accompli, resulting in opportunity of hearing against such action a mere formality. In the instant case, under Section 8-AA of the said Adhiniyam, Government is required to express an opinion that it is expedient to dissolve the Municipal Council, which has been upgraded. The question is whether such an opinion is fait accompli, that giving of hearing before expression of such opinion becomes a mere formality. In the instant case, under Section 8-AA of the said Adhiniyam, Government is required to express an opinion that it is expedient to dissolve the Municipal Council, which has been upgraded. The question is whether such an opinion is fait accompli, that giving of hearing before expression of such opinion becomes a mere formality. Therefore, the one and the only question is whether the opinion of the Government, as may be expressed in terms of Section 8-AA of the said Adhiniyam, is or is not fait accompli? In the event it is fait accompli, then giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing would become academic and mere formality.” 66. More importantly, the court held as follows: “10. We are also of the view that Article 243-Q, which authorizes upgradation of a Municipal Council to a Municipal Corporation, does not contemplate giving of an opportunity of hearing before a decision to do so is taken and, accordingly, when steps are taken to make such upgradation, no hearing is required to be given, but when, as a consequence of such upgradation, a Municipal Council is to be dissolved, unless the law, for the time being in force, provides that such upgradation automatically dissolves the Municipal Council, which has been upgraded to a Municipal Corporation, the said Municipal Council is entitled to an opportunity of hearing and the same is sine qua non for effecting dissolution of such a Municipal Council and that appears to be the mandate of Article 243-U of the Constitution.” 67. Therefore, the learned Single Judge may not have been justified in referring to the judgment passed in Special Appeal No. 103 of 2011, as far as the question of affording an opportunity of hearing before the power is exercised under Article 243-Q is concerned. We would think that there is no requirement in law to afford an oral hearing, as what Section 4(2) contemplates is only opportunity to give objections or suggestions in writing within a particular period and the same are to be considered. It is true, no doubt, however, that, on the concession of the Advocate General, the matter was remitted back. The concession of the Advocate General, no doubt, binds the State. But, we cannot, at the same time, take the view that, in law, there is any requirement of oral hearing. It is true, no doubt, however, that, on the concession of the Advocate General, the matter was remitted back. The concession of the Advocate General, no doubt, binds the State. But, we cannot, at the same time, take the view that, in law, there is any requirement of oral hearing. It is important that this issue is clarified and reiterated in accordance with the view that we have already taken in Narendra Singh Rana’s case (supra). It is to be noticed that this cannot be treated as a matter, where an oral hearing as such will advance the quality of the proceedings. Whatever is to be said can possibly be said in, what is stated, in writing. There is no requirement for an oral hearing. It may be necessary in a case, where a question of somebody’s right is involved, as, for example, a disciplinary proceeding or other proceedings, where rights are involved. In fact, the learned Advocate General drew our attention to the judgment of the Apex Court in Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. vs. The Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur, (1980) 2 SCC 295 , wherein, no doubt, the court was considering a case, where there was no analogous provision to Section 4 of the 1916 Act; but, it is relevant to notice what the court laid down in paragraph 5 of the said judgment, which reads as follows: “5. The solution to the question raised before us principally depends upon the nature of the function that is performed by the State Government under section 3 of the Act. If that function is judicial or quasi-judicial involving adjudication of the rights of any person resulting in civil consequences, it no doubt becomes necessary to follow the maxim audi alteram partem (hear the other side) before taking a decision. It is also true that in order to establish that a duty to act judicially applies to the performance of a particular function, it is no longer necessary to show that the function is analytically of a judicial character or involves the determination of a lis inter partes; though a presumption that natural justice must be observed will arise more readily where there is an express duty to decide only after conducting a hearing or inquiry or where the decision is one entailing the determination of disputed questions of law and fact. Prima facie, moreover, a duty to act judicially will arise in the exercise of a power to deprive a person of his livelihood or of his legal status where the status is not merely terminable at pleasure, or to deprive a person of liberty or property rights or another legitimate interest or expectation, or to impose a penalty on him; though the conferment of a wide discretionary power exercisable in the public interest may be indicative of the absence of an obligation to act judicially. Where a discretionary power to encroach upon individual rights is exercised, the factors pointing to whether it must be exercised judicially include the nature of the interests to be affected, the circumstances in which the power falls to be exercised and the nature of the sanctions, if any, involved. Exceptionally, a duty to act judicially may arise in the course of exercising a function not culminating in a binding decision, if the wording of the grant of powers or the context indicates that a fair hearing ought to be extended to persons likely to be prejudicially affected by an investigation or recommendation. (Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vo1. I, Fourth Edition, Para 65 at p. 77).” 68. We have noticed the law, which has been laid down in Gullapalli Nageswar Rao vs. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (supra). If we were to apply the said principle here, it may possibly be that this would also be a case, where, under the Rules of Business, a decision is taken by the Secretary and it was on the basis of the recommendations, which were made by the District Magistrate or the Committee, to whom powers were allegedly delegated. It is true that, on the basis of the judgment in the earlier round of litigation, hearing was afforded, though we are of the view that, in law, no such hearing is required. We have also noticed absence of pleadings to the effect, with reference to the Rules of Business, that the actions, which were taken, were illegal. It is to be noticed at this stage that, under Section 327 of the 1916 Act, what is tabooed is the delegation of the power under Section 3(1) and Section 3(2). In fact, the power is to be delegated to the Prescribed Authority; but, in this case, the actual power under Section 3(1) and Section 3(2) has not been delegated. It is to be noticed at this stage that, under Section 327 of the 1916 Act, what is tabooed is the delegation of the power under Section 3(1) and Section 3(2). In fact, the power is to be delegated to the Prescribed Authority; but, in this case, the actual power under Section 3(1) and Section 3(2) has not been delegated. At best or at worst, it is a case, where the Secretary authorised somebody working under him to afford a hearing and the said authority has made certain recommendations. If we proceed on the basis that actual hearing in law was not really necessary, then there may not be a scope for applying the principle enunciated in Gullapalli Nageswar Rao vs. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (supra). 69. It is to be noticed that, under the Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016, Section 6 reads as follows: “6. Effect of change in population or inclusion of the area of Panchayat in any level of Nagar Panchayat - If the whole of the area, of a Gram Panchayat is included in a Nagar Panchayat, the Gram Panchayat shall cease and its assets and liabilities shall be disposed of in the manner prescribed. If a part of such area is so included, its jurisdiction shall be reduced by that part.” 70. Therefore, this also would show that the question of affording a hearing, in such cases, would not arise. 71. No doubt, a contention is raised on behalf of the appellants that the proceeding in this case is not a quasi judicial proceeding. It is, according to the learned Advocate General, only a legislative exercise when the notification is issued. There is no specific pleading, in fact, that the Committees or the persons before whom the hearing was done were not competent authorities under the Rules of Business. In such circumstances, though we are troubled by this aspect, we do not think that we should be detained by this any further. We may notice, in fact, that the judgment in the earlier round of litigation was based on the concession given by the learned Advocate General that a hearing will be given to the writ petitioners and every affected person. 72. We may notice, in fact, that the judgment in the earlier round of litigation was based on the concession given by the learned Advocate General that a hearing will be given to the writ petitioners and every affected person. 72. As far as the question as to whether discretion is to be traced out from Article 163(1) or Article 163(2) is concerned, this has already been answered by the Apex Court that the power is one, which is to be traced under Article 163(1). 73. It is to be noticed, therefore, on considering Article 243-Q, what is contemplated is the specifying of the area under clause (2) of Article 243Q, which is, as we have already noticed, not to be done personally by the Governor exercising his personal discretion. For the areas in question, Article 243-Q (1) contemplates notification of the forms of local Government, be they Nagar Panchayat for a transitional area, Municipal Council for a smaller urban area or a Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area. As far as the areas are concerned, they are to be specified under Article 243-Q (2). 74. The upshot of the above discussion is that the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained. The Appeals are, accordingly, allowed; the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge will stand set aside; and the writ petitions will stand dismissed. No order as to costs.