ORDER : D.N. Patel, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by original respondent no.1 of the Writ Petition being W.P. (S) No. 538 of 2013. The Writ Petition was preferred by respondent no.1 challenging the order of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority dated 24 th December, 2012, whereby, punishment of withholding six increments with cumulative effect, and no promotion to respondent no.1 (original petitioner) in future was passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The Writ Petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 18 th July, 2013 and, hence, original respondent no.1 has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Factual Matrix: Respondent no.1 is an original petitioner. He was serving as Junior Engineer with this appellant. Because of negligence on the part of respondent no.1, as alleged by this appellant, a charge sheet was issued on 20 th September, 2011. For holding enquiry, Enquiry Officer was appointed. After taking into consideration oral as well as documentary evidences on record, the Enquiry Officer gave his report on 2nd November, 2012 and it has been concluded by the Enquiry Officer that the charges levelled against the delinquent-respondent no.1 (original petitioner) have not been proved. Without giving any second show-cause notice, which is required if the Disciplinary Authority is differing with the Enquiry Officer's report, the Disciplinary Authority passed an order on 24 th December, 2012 and the punishment of withholding six increments with cumulative effect, and no promotion to be given to the delinquent, in future was inflicted upon respondent no.1. This punishment order was challenged by respondent no.1 (original petitioner) by way of a Writ Petition being W.P. (S) No. 538 of 2013, which was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 18 th July, 2013 and, hence, original respondent no.1 has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. Reasons: 3. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that for the alleged misconduct committed by respondent no.1 (original petitioner), charge sheet was issued on 20 th September, 2011. The Enquiry Officer was appointed. On the basis of oral as well as documentary evidences on record, the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the charges levelled against respondent no.1 (original petitioner) were not proved. The Enquiry Officer was appointed. On the basis of oral as well as documentary evidences on record, the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the charges levelled against respondent no.1 (original petitioner) were not proved. The charge sheet is at Annexure-3 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal and the Enquiry Officer's report is at Annexure-1 to the memo of the supplementary affidavit filed by this appellant in this Letters Patent Appeal. 4. It appears that the Disciplinary Authority was not agreeing with the Enquiry Officer's report. 5. Without giving any second show-cause notice and without giving any reasons why the Disciplinary Authority is differing with the report of the Enquiry Officer, directly punishment order was passed by the Disciplinary Authority, dated 24 th December, 2012 of withholding six increments with cumulative effect, and no promotion is to be given to the delinquent, in future. This is not permissible in the eye of law. This runs counter to several decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 6. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 , in paragraphs 18 and 19, which read as under: “18. Under Regulation 6, the enquiry proceedings can be conducted either by an enquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority itself. When the enquiry is conducted by the enquiry officer, his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with the decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the enquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an enquiry, an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the enquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the enquiry officer, they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the enquiry officer’s report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the enquiry officer, they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the enquiry officer’s report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation, the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the disciplinary authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of enquiry as explained in Karunakar case. 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.” (emphasis supplied) 7. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lav Nigam v. Chairman & MD, ITI Ltd., reported in (2006) 9 SCC 440 , in paragraphs 10 and 13, which read as under: “10. The conclusion of the High Court was contrary to the consistent view taken by this Court that in case the disciplinary authority differs with the view taken by the inquiry officer, he is bound to give a notice setting out his tentative conclusions to the appellant. It is only after hearing the appellant that the disciplinary authority would at all arrive at a final finding of guilt. Thereafter, the employee would again have to be served with a notice relating to the punishment proposed. 13. It is only after hearing the appellant that the disciplinary authority would at all arrive at a final finding of guilt. Thereafter, the employee would again have to be served with a notice relating to the punishment proposed. 13. We have already quoted the extracts from the show-cause notice issued by the disciplinary authority. It is clear that no notice at all was given before the disciplinary authority recorded its final conclusions differing with the finding of fact of the inquiry officer. The notice to show cause was merely a show-cause against the proposed punishment. In view of the long line of authorities, the decision of the High Court cannot be sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the decision of the High Court is set aside.” (emphasis supplied) 8. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CSHA University v. B.D. Goyal, reported in (2010) 15 SCC 776, in paragraph 7, which reads as under: “7. It is no doubt true that the punishing authority or any higher authority could have disagreed with the finding of the enquiring officer, but in such a case the authority concerned is duty-bound to record reasons in writing and not on ipse dixit can alter the finding of an enquiring officer. The order of the Vice-Chancellor, which was produced before us does not satisfy the requirements of law in the matter of differing with the findings of an enquiring officer. In that view of the matter, we do not find any infirmity with the impugned judgment so as to be interfered with by this Court. This appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.” (emphasis supplied) 9. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Malhotra v. Punjab National Bank, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 251 , in paragraphs 13 and 14, which read as under: “13. In ECIL, only the first issue was involved and in the facts of this case, only second issue was involved. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Malhotra v. Punjab National Bank, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 251 , in paragraphs 13 and 14, which read as under: “13. In ECIL, only the first issue was involved and in the facts of this case, only second issue was involved. The second issue was examined and decided by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Kunj Behari Misra wherein the judgment of ECIL has not only been referred to, but extensively quoted, and it has clearly been stipulated that wherein the second issue is involved, the order of punishment would stand vitiated in case the reasons so recorded by the disciplinary authority for disagreement with the enquiry officer had not been supplied to the delinquent and his explanation had not been sought. While deciding the said case, the Court relied upon the earlier judgment of this Court in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna. 14. Kunj Behari Misra itself was the case where the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer on 12-12-1983 and passed the order on 15-12-1983 imposing the punishment, and immediately thereafter, the delinquent officers therein stood superannuated on 31-12-1983. In Kunj Behari Misra this Court held as under: (SCC p. 97, para 19) “19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.” (emphasis supplied) 10. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.” (emphasis supplied) 10. In view of the aforesaid decisions, if the Disciplinary Authority is not agreeing with the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer about the proof of the charges, then second show-cause notice is a must by giving specific reasons, to the delinquent, of disagreement with the reasoning of the Enquiry Officer, by the Disciplinary Authority. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the Writ Petition being W.P.(S) No. 538 of 2013 preferred by respondent no.1 (original petitioner) vide judgment and order dated 18th July, 2013. 11. Much has been argued out by the learned counsel for the appellant by placing reliance upon Rule 55-A of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 and it is submitted that for imposing minor punishment, there was no need for the Disciplinary Authority to give second show-cause notice and there is no requirement of holding enquiry. This contention is of no help to the appellant mainly for the following reasons: (a) Confused minded State authority has taken decision after holding enquiry and after getting report from the Enquiry Officer that now enquiry is not required. (b) In the facts of the present case, already enquiry has been initiated by the State. (c) Enquiry Officer has given report on 2 nd November, 2012 (Annexure-A to the supplementary affidavit filed by this appellant in this Letters Patent Appeal). Looking to the Enquiry Officer's report, it appears that the charges levelled against the delinquent-respondent no.1 (original petitioner) are not proved. The delinquent is exonerated from all the charges. (d) Once the enquiry is already conducted and once the Enquiry Officer has already given report that the charges levelled against the delinquent are not proved, meaning thereby to misconduct is not proved and, hence, now the State cannot take a decision that the enquiry was not required after the State has failed to prove the charges. 12. (d) Once the enquiry is already conducted and once the Enquiry Officer has already given report that the charges levelled against the delinquent are not proved, meaning thereby to misconduct is not proved and, hence, now the State cannot take a decision that the enquiry was not required after the State has failed to prove the charges. 12. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, reported in 1991 Supp (1) SCC 504, in paragraphs 4 and 5, which read as under: “4. Withholding of increments of pay simpliciter undoubtedly is a minor penalty within the meaning of Rule 5(iv). But sub-rule (v) postulates reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a specified period with further directions as to whether or not the government employee shall earn increments of pay during the period of such reductions and whether on the expiry of such period the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay. It is an independent head of penalty and it could be imposed as punishment in an appropriate case. It is one of the major penalties. The impugned order of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect whether would fall within the meaning of Rule 5(v)? If it so falls Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules require conducting of regular enquiry. The contention of Shri Nayar, learned counsel for the State is that withholding two increments with cumulative effect is only a minor penalty as it does not amount to reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay. We find it extremely difficult to countenance the contention. Withholding of increments of pay simpliciter without any hedge over it certainly comes within the meaning of Rule 5(iv) of the Rules. But when penalty was imposed withholding two increments i.e. for two years with cumulative effect, it would indisputably mean that the two increments earned by the employee was cut off as a measure of penalty for ever in his upward march of earning higher scale of pay. In other words the clock is put back to a lower stage in the time scale of pay and on expiry of two years the clock starts working from that stage afresh. In other words the clock is put back to a lower stage in the time scale of pay and on expiry of two years the clock starts working from that stage afresh. The insidious effect of the impugned order, by necessary implication, is that the appellant employee is reduced in his time scale by two places and it is in perpetuity during the rest of the tenure of his service with a direction that two years’ increments would not be counted in his time scale of pay as a measure of penalty. The words are the skin to the language which if peeled off its true colour or its resultant effects would become apparent. When we broach the problem from this perspective the effect is as envisaged under Rule 5(v) of the Rules. It is undoubted that the Division Bench in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, P.C. Jain, A.C.J. speaking for the Division Bench, while considering similar question, in paragraph 8 held that the stoppage of increments with cumulative effect, by no stretch of imagination falls within clause (v) of Rule 5 or in Rule 4.12 of Punjab Civil Services Rules. It was further held that under clause (v) of Rule 5 there has to be a reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay by the competent authority as a measure of penalty and the period for which such a reduction is to be effective has to be stated and on restoration it has further to be specified whether the reduction shall operate to postpone the future increments of his pay. In such cases withholding of the increments without cumulative effect does not at all arise. In case where the increments are withheld with or without cumulative effect the government employee is never reduced to a lower stage of time scale of pay. Accordingly it was held that clause (iv) of Rule 5 is applicable to the facts of that case. With respect we are unable to agree with the High Court. If the literal interpretation is adopted the learned Judges may be right to arrive at that conclusion. But if the effect is kept at the back of the mind, it would always be so, the result will be the conclusion as we have arrived at. With respect we are unable to agree with the High Court. If the literal interpretation is adopted the learned Judges may be right to arrive at that conclusion. But if the effect is kept at the back of the mind, it would always be so, the result will be the conclusion as we have arrived at. If the reasoning of the High Court is given acceptance, it would empower the disciplinary authority to impose, under the garb of stoppage of increments, (sic stoppage) of earning future increments in the time scale of pay even permanently without expressly stating so. This preposterous consequence cannot be permitted to be permeated. Rule 5(iv) does not empower the disciplinary authority to impose penalty of withholding increments of pay with cumulative effect except after holding inquiry and following the prescribed procedure. Then the order would be without jurisdiction or authority of law, and it would be per se void. Considering from this angle we have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order would come within the meaning of Rule 5(v) of the Rules; it is a major penalty and imposition of the impugned penalty without enquiry is per se illegal. 5. The further contention of Shri Nayar that the procedure under Rule 8 was followed by issuance of the show cause notice and consideration of the explanation given by the appellant would meet the test of Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules is devoid of any substance. Conducting an enquiry, de hors the rules is no enquiry in the eye of law. It cannot be countenanced that the pretence of an enquiry without reasonable opportunity of adducing evidence both by the department as well as by the appellant in rebuttal, examination and cross-examination of the witnesses, if examined, to be an enquiry within the meaning of Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules. Those rules admittedly envisage, on denial of the charge by the delinquent officer, to conduct an enquiry giving reasonable opportunity to the presenting officer as well as the delinquent officer to lead evidence in support of the charge and in rebuttal thereof, giving adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the department and to examine witnesses if intended on his behalf and to place his version; consideration thereof by the enquiry officer, if the disciplinary authority himself is not the enquiry officer. A report of the enquiry in that behalf to be placed before the disciplinary authority who then is to consider it in the manner prescribed and to pass an appropriate order as for the procedure in vogue under the Rules. The gamut of this procedure was not gone through. Therefore, the issuance of the notice and consideration of the explanation is not a procedure in accordance with Rules 8 and 9. Obviously, the disciplinary authority felt that the enquiry into minor penalty is not necessary and adhering to the principles of natural justice issued the show cause notice and on receipt of the reply from the delinquent officer passed the impugned order imposing penalty thinking it to be a minor penalty. If it is considered, as stated earlier, that it would be only a minor penalty, the procedure followed certainly meets the test of the principles of natural justice and it would be a sufficient compliance with the procedure. In view of the finding that the impugned order is a major penalty certainly then a regular enquiry has got to be conducted and so the impugned order is clearly illegal. The trial court rightly granted the decree. The judgment and the decree of the High Court is vitiated by manifest illegality. At this distance of time it is not expedient to direct an enquiry under Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgment and decree of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored but in the circumstances without costs.” (emphasis supplied) 13. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. S.C. Parashar, reported in (2006) 3 SCC 167 , in paragraph 12, which reads as under: “12. The penalty imposed upon the respondent is an amalgam of minor penalty and major penalty. The respondent has been inflicted with three penalties: (1) reduction to the minimum of the timescale of pay for a period of three years with cumulative effect; (2) loss of seniority; and (3) recovery of 25% of the loss incurred by the Government to the tune of Rs 74,341.89p. i.e. Rs 18,585.47p. on account of damage to the Gypsy in 18 (eighteen) equal monthly instalments. i.e. Rs 18,585.47p. on account of damage to the Gypsy in 18 (eighteen) equal monthly instalments. Whereas reduction of timescale of pay with cumulative effect is a major penalty within the meaning of clause (v) of Rule 11 of the CCS Rules, loss of seniority and recovery of amount would come within the purview of minor penalty, as envisaged by clauses (iii) and (iii)(a) thereof. The disciplinary authority, therefore, in our opinion acted illegally and without jurisdiction in imposing both minor and major penalties by the same order. Such a course of action could not have been taken in law.” (emphasis supplied) 14. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Jaswant Singh Kanwar, reported in (2014) 13 SCC 622 , in paragraphs 14 and 15, which read as under: “14. The disciplinary authority by its order has imposed stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect as a major penalty for the offences alleged against the petitioner. The principle of stoppage of increment is laid down in Kulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, where penalty was imposed withholding two increments i.e. for two years with cumulative effect, it would indisputably mean that the two increments earned by the employee were cut off as a measure of penalty for ever in his upward march of earning higher scale of pay. In other words the clock is put back to a lower stage in the timescale of pay and on expiry of two years the clock starts working from that stage afresh. The insidious effect of the impugned order by necessary implication is that the appellant employee is reduced in his timescale by two places and it is in perpetuity during the rest of the tenure of his service with a direction that two years’ increments would not be counted in his timescale of pay as a measure of penalty. The stoppage of increment is only a major penalty which keeps the petitioner away from the benefits that would have accrued to him during the suspension period. It is not a new penalty imposed for the same offence in respect of the same subject-matter. 15. In our view, the High Court has failed to note the very purpose of the stoppage of increment imposed as a major penalty by the disciplinary authority. It is not a new penalty imposed for the same offence in respect of the same subject-matter. 15. In our view, the High Court has failed to note the very purpose of the stoppage of increment imposed as a major penalty by the disciplinary authority. The grant of increment after the order of suspension by the authority with the concurrent finding of the period not spent on duty and more so when the order of termination is not declared illegal or void ab initio would not only defeat the very purpose of levying penalties but would also jeopardise public interest and administration of justice.” (emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decisions, withholding of 6 increments and no promotion in future is not a minor punishment at all. 15. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge while allowing W.P. (S) No. 538 of 2013, vide judgment and order dated 18th July, 2013. We see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned Single Judge. Hence, there is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal, the same is, hereby, dismissed. 16. Nonetheless, liberty is reserved with the appellant to give show-cause notice to the delinquent if the State so thinks fit, specifically giving reasons why the Disciplinary Authority is not agree with the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer and thereafter only the Disciplinary Authority can proceed further. 17. This Letters Patent Appeal is, therefore, dismissed.