JUDGMENT : The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the letter as contained in memo no. 835/Conf. Deoghar dated 28.11.2018 issued under the signature of the respondent no. 6–the Sub-Divisional Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate, Deoghar, whereby the petitioner has been asked to vacate the premises of Hotel Madhumala International within 15 days of receipt of the said letter. Further prayer has been made for issuance of direction upon the respondent-Central Bank of India to initiate immediate remedial measures to reduce the interest rates being charged towards the petitioner’s loan account right from inception of the debtor-creditor relationship, if the interest rate so charged is found to be arbitrary, excessive and violative of public policy. 2. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that the petitioner had availed loans from the respondent-Central Bank of India for an amount of Rs.600 lakhs and the rate of interest was fixed @ 17.5% which was sanctioned on 09.09.2011. While availing the loan facility, Madhumala Construction Private Limited being the guarantor mortgaged Hotel Madhumala International to the respondent-Bank. The petitioner immediately thereafter lodged its objection towards the exorbitant rate of interest vide letter dated 10.09.2011 and during the consideration of the said letter, the petitioner was further given a term loan of Rs. 200 lakhs vide sanction letter dated 03.01.2013 and the rate of interest was @ 15% per annum. The petitioner, however, failed to make re-payment of the loan in terms with the repayment schedule and its account became NPA and ultimately the Bank resorted to Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “SARFAESAI Act, 2002”). Now, a letter has been issued by the respondent no. 6 for vacating the mortgaged property within 15 days. The petitioner approached the Deputy Collector, Deoghar and Sub-Divisional Officer, Deoghar by making representation dated 04.12.2018 highlighting the relevant aspects of the matter with a request not to take any coercive action in terms of the said letter, however, the same remained unresponded. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the primary reason for the loan accounts getting NPA is charging of excessive interest by the Bank. The petitioner had requested the Bank for reducing the interest rate only to 16.6% which is the rate being charged presently. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the primary reason for the loan accounts getting NPA is charging of excessive interest by the Bank. The petitioner had requested the Bank for reducing the interest rate only to 16.6% which is the rate being charged presently. The petitioner is not a wilful defaulter and it has been making regular payments towards its loan accounts even after declaration of its account as NPA by the Bank and currently it is paying Rs. 18 lakhs per month to the Bank as would be evident from the loan account statement. It is further submitted that the respondents have not complied the mandate of Section 14 of the SARFAESAI Act, 2002. Moreover, non-service of the notice upon the guarantor and mortgagor of the property sought to be vacated namely, the Madhumala Construction Private Limited is clearly in violation of the principles of natural justice. The respondent-Bank may be directed to disclose its Board approved policy regarding charging of excessive interest rates as mandated by the Master Direction-Reserve Bank of India (Interest Rate on Advances) Directions, 2016 issued by the Reserve Bank of India which is binding on the Bank in view of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. It is also submitted that the respondent-Bank may be directed to initiate immediate remedial measures to reduce the interest rate being charged on the petitioner’s loan accounts right from inception of the debtor-creditor relationship, if the interest rate so charged is found to be arbitrary, excessive and violative of public policy. It is further submitted that under first and second proviso to Section 14(ix) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the District Magistrate has to pass suitable orders for the purpose of taking possession of the secured assets within a period of thirty days from the date of application and if no order is passed by the District Magistrate within the said period of thirty days for the reasons beyond his control, he may after recording reasons in writing for the same, pass the order within a maximum period of sixty days in aggregate. However, the impugned letter dated 28.11.2018 passed by the respondent no. However, the impugned letter dated 28.11.2018 passed by the respondent no. 6 suggests that the application was made by the secured creditor (the respondent-Bank) on 14.09.2017 and the said impugned order was passed on 20.11.2018 i.e., more than a year and as such, the said order is dehors the provision of law and is liable to be set-aside. Out of the total loan amount of Rs. 8 crores taken on two different occasions, the petitioner has already repaid Rs. 6.51 crores to the respondent-Bank. Moreover, the petitioner is still paying Rs. 18 lakhs per month against the outstanding loan amount and as such, no purpose would be served in taking possession of a running hotel. 4. On the contrary, Mr. P.A.S. Pati, the learned counsel for the respondent-Bank, submits that the respondent-Bank has also preferred O.A. No. 151/2017 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi for recovery of the outstanding amount of loan as parallel recourse is permitted to the secured creditor. The petitioner has appeared in the said case and has already filed the written statement agitating the issue regarding the rate of interest charged against its term loan accounts. It is further submitted that the order passed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 can also be challenged before the DRT and as such, the present writ petition is not maintainable. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and looking to the contents of the present writ petition, it appears that the petitioner has put challenge to the letter issued by the respondent no. 6, whereby the petitioner has been directed to vacate the mortgaged property. 6. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has given much emphasis on the argument that the impugned notice has been issued beyond the period prescribed under the second and third proviso to Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. To appreciate the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, I have gone through the provisions of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, which empowers the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate to assist the secured creditor in taking possession of secured asset. To appreciate the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, I have gone through the provisions of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, which empowers the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate to assist the secured creditor in taking possession of secured asset. Under second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, it has been provided that the District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, shall pass suitable order within a period of thirty days from the date of application. The third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 provides that in case, when no order is passed within the said period of thirty days then after recording reasons in writing for the same, the order may be passed within such further period but not exceeding sixty days in aggregate. 7. It prima facie appears that the impugned letter has been issued by the respondent no. 6 under the provisions of Section 14 (1-A) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 as a consequential notice to an order passed under Section 14 by the District Commissioner, Deoghar. The petitioner has not averred in the writ petition as to when the Deputy Commissioner, Deoghar has passed the order on the application of the secured creditor dated 14.09.2017 and, therefore, the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order dated 28.11.2018 has been passed dehors the provisions of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 remains unsubstantiated. Thus, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, it does not seem appropriate to go into the details at this stage as to whether the impugned letter has been issued after expiry of the period of limitation. 8. Moreover, the petitioner has put challenge to the steps taken in consequence of a proceeding under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an order passed under Section 14 is also appealable in nature. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors.” reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 , has held as under: “42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors.” reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 , has held as under: “42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression “any person” used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.” 10. Further, in the case of “Standard Chartered Bank Vs. Vs. Noble Kumar & Ors.” reported in (2013) 9 SCC 620 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “27. The “appeal” under Section 17 is available to the borrower against any measure taken under Section 13(4). Taking possession of the secured asset is only one of the measures that can be taken by the secured creditor. Depending upon the nature of the secured asset and the terms and conditions of the security agreement, measures other than taking the possession of the secured asset are possible under Section 13(4). Alienating the asset either by lease or sale, etc. and appointing a person to manage the secured asset are some of those possible measures. On the other hand, Section 14 authorises the Magistrate only to take possession of the property and forward the asset along with the connected documents to the borrower (sic the secured creditor). Therefore, the borrower is always entitled to prefer an “appeal” under Section 17 after the possession of the secured asset is handed over to the secured creditor. Section 13(4)(a) declares that the secured creditor may take possession of the secured assets. It does not specify whether such a possession is to be obtained directly by the secured creditor or by resorting to the procedure under Section 14. Section 13(4)(a) declares that the secured creditor may take possession of the secured assets. It does not specify whether such a possession is to be obtained directly by the secured creditor or by resorting to the procedure under Section 14. We are of the opinion that by whatever manner the secured creditor obtains possession either through the process contemplated under Section 14 or without resorting to such a process obtaining of the possession of a secured asset is always a measure against which a remedy under Section 17 is available.” 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “United Bank of India” (supra) and “Standard Chartered Bank” (supra) has held that the proceeding under Section 14 is consequential action of Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. Thus, the efficacious and effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person under Sections 17 & 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 12. So far as invoking of writ jurisdiction in the matters of realization of loan by the financial institutions are concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court in a recent judgment rendered in the case of “Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore & Anr. Vs. Mathew K.C.” reported in (2018) 3 SCC 85 , while considering the earlier judicial pronouncements made in this regard, has held thus: “16. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex-parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tandon (supra), has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order:- “46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool Corpn. v.Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.” 17. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference.“ 13. Considering the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 as well as the aforesaid judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Apex Court, I am not inclined to entertain the present writ petition at this stage and the same is accordingly dismissed as not maintainable. The petitioner is, however, at liberty to take recourse before the appropriate forum as provided under the law, if so advised. I.A. No. 11249 of 2018 also stands dismissed.