Research › Search › Judgment

Bombay High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 2843 (BOM)

Sarovar Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Dy. Commissioner Of Wealth Tax

2018-12-03

AKIL KURESHI, M.S.SANKLECHA

body2018
JUDGMENT Akil Kureshi, J. - With the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties, these Appeals are being finally dispose of at this stage. 2. The issues being common, we may record facts from Wealth Tax Appeal No. 418 of 2016, which are as under: 3. The Appellant Assessee is a Private Limited Company, engaged in the business of building and operating hotels. For the Assessment Year 200708, following questions are presented for our consideration: "(a) Whether on the facts and in the circumstance of the case and in law, the Tribunal was right in holding that lands were includable in net wealth as ''urban land'' under section 2(ea) (v) of the Act even though permission for construction was not made available to the Appellant during the relevant year? (b) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal misdirected itself in holding that the lands held by the Appellant were includeable in net wealth, as ''urban land'' under section 2(ea)(v) of the Act, even though a period of two years had not lapsed from the date of acquisition of the said lands? (c) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal fell in error of law in holding that the land along with building constructed on it, was includible in net wealth, as ''urban land'' under section 2(ea)(v) of the Act?" 4. These questions arise in relation to two plots of land namelyland bearing Survey No. 159 of village Kalipatthur, Kancheepuram District, Near Old Mahabalipuram Road, Chennai (which has been referred to as "Mahabalipuram plot"), admeasuring 3500 sq.mtrs. This land was acquired by the Assessee on 21st April, 2006. The second property is land, admeasuring 2.33 acres along with a building admeasuring 5600 sq.ft. situated at Sri. Perumbudur, Chennai (which has been referred to as "Sri Perumbudur property"). This land was acquired by the Assessee on 8th December, 2006. 5. The Wealth Tax Department was of the opinion that both these properties form part of the Assessee''s net wealth. At the hands of the Assessee, the issue reached the Tribunal. 6. situated at Sri. Perumbudur, Chennai (which has been referred to as "Sri Perumbudur property"). This land was acquired by the Assessee on 8th December, 2006. 5. The Wealth Tax Department was of the opinion that both these properties form part of the Assessee''s net wealth. At the hands of the Assessee, the issue reached the Tribunal. 6. On behalf of the Assessee, before the Tribunal, following three main grounds were raised : (i) That on these lands, no construction can be carried out without the permission of the concerned authority and, therefore, these lands would not form part of the Assessee''s net wealth; (ii) In any case, in relation to Assessment Years 200708 and 200809 (reletable to Wealth Tax Appeal Nos. 418 of 2016 and 415 of 2016), the lands were held for a period of less then two years and that, therefore, these lands cannot be considered to be urban land; (iii) That in relation to Sri Perumbudur land, there was a building constructed on the land and, therefore, also same would not fall within the definition of ''urban land'', as considered in Section 2(ea) (v) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 (for short "the Act"). 7. The Tribunal by the impugned Judgment, rejected the Assessee''s Appeal, principally holding that, in relation to land on which construction is permissible, after obtaining sanction from the Competent Authority, exclusion clause contained in the definition would not apply. Perusal of the Judgment of the Tribunal, however, would show that the other grounds raised by the Assessee, were not dealt with. We are informed that the Assessee had approached the Tribunal, seeking rectification on this ground, which came to be dismissed by the Tribunal. 8. In relation to ground (i), Counsel for the Assessee, urged that the Tribunal has committed serious error in interpreting relevant statutory provisions. He contended that undisputedly in the present case, no construction could have been carried out on the lands in question without the permission of the Competent Authority. No such permission was granted at the relevant time. The Tribunal was, therefore, not correct in accepting the Revenue'' contention that the lands in question were urban land, includible in the Assessee''s net wealth. 9. No such permission was granted at the relevant time. The Tribunal was, therefore, not correct in accepting the Revenue'' contention that the lands in question were urban land, includible in the Assessee''s net wealth. 9. With respect of grounds No.(ii) and (iii), Counsel for the Assessee submitted that the Tribunal committed a serious error in not deciding these issues, though specifically raised in the Appeals as well as in rectification proceedings. 10. On the other hand, learned Counsel Shri Chhotaray, for the Revenue opposed the appeal, contending that the view of the Tribunal, is perfectly justified. The requirement of sanction or permission on a plot of land before construction can be carried out, cannot be equated with any prohibition against construction. 11. In relation to ground (i), which concerns question (a) presented before us, we may refer to the applicable statutory provisions. Section 2 of the Act contains definition of various terms. Clause (ea) of Section 2 contains the definition of term ''assets'', in relation to the Assessment Year, commencing on the first day of April, 1993 or any subsequent Assessment Year. Clause (v) thereof, refers to ''urban land''. The term ''urban land'' is explained in clause (b) of Explanation-I below, the said definition, which reads as under:" (b)''urban land'' means land situate (i) in any area which is comprised within the jurisdiction of a municipality (whether known as a municipality, municipal corporation, notified area committee, town area committee, town committee, or by any other name) or a cantonment board and which has a population of not less than ten thousand according to the last preceding census of which the relevant figures have been published before the valuation date; or (ii) in any area within such distance, not being more than eight kilometers from the local limits of any municipality or cantonment board referred to in sub-clause (i), as the Central Government may, having regard to the extent of, and scope for, urbanisation of that area and other relevant considerations, specify in this behalf by notification in the Official Gazette. But does not include land on which construction of a building is not permissible under any law for the time being in force in the area in which such land is situated or the land occupied by any building which has been constructed with the approval of the appropriate authority or any unused land held by the assessee for industrial purposes for a period of two years from the date of its acquisition by him [or any land held by the assessee as stock in trade for a period of [ten] years from the date of its acquisition by him.]" For the purpose of this ground, it is undisputed that the land in question would otherwise fall within the clause (i) or (ii) of the said Explanation Clause (b). 12. The contention of the Assessee, however, is that, the exclusion clause contained in the said provision would apply since the construction on the land in question, was not permitted without sanction being granted by the Competent Authority. Before the Tribunal, Assessee had argued that as per the Tamil Nadu Town Planning Act, without such permission from the local authority, no construction could have been carried out and, therefore, the exclusion clause would apply. 13. This definition excludes from the term ''urban land'' on which construction of a building is not permissible under any law for the time being in force. This expression the construction of building not permissible under any law in force, cannot be equated with regulatory requirement of any statutory provision which mandates obtaining of permission from the Competent Authority before any construction can be carried out. Construction being not permissible is not the same thing as the construction though permissible, must be after obtaining sanction of the prescribed authority. The Tribunal, therefore, was perfectly correct in coming to the conclusion that this exclusion clause would not aid the assessee. In any urban area or for that matter in any area, permission for construction is always regulated through statutory provisions. Unless the prescribed authority such as Municipality or local authority, approves building plan and grants permission for construction, no construction can be put up on any land. Such a regulatory mechanism may also have categorical restrictions or divisions, such as, in certain areas, only limited type of development may be permitted. Unless the prescribed authority such as Municipality or local authority, approves building plan and grants permission for construction, no construction can be put up on any land. Such a regulatory mechanism may also have categorical restrictions or divisions, such as, in certain areas, only limited type of development may be permitted. These, controls or regulatory mechanism cannot be equated with construction of a building not being permissible on the land in question. The Tribunal was correct in recording that Assessee had not brought any such prohibition in law to the notice of the Tribunal. It is well accepted principal that restriction and prohibition are two different concepts. Building regulations may amount to restriction of development of land but not prohibition of putting up construction thereon. Assessee is not right in contending that until such permission is granted, it remains a land on which construction is prohibited by law. 14. The contention of the Counsel for the Assessee that no permission having been granted, same may be equated with the construction not being permissible, is not a correct interpretation of the relevant provisions. If we accept the contention, as was raised before us, it would amount to adding a requirement in the exclusion clause, which the legislature has not prescribed. In our opinion, therefore, there is a clear distinction between a case where the construction of a building is not permissible under any law for the time in force and where construction though permissible, must be preceded by permission, approval or sanction from the prescribed authority. Counsel for the Assessee had argued that the Wealth Tax is to be computed on the basis of net wealth of an Assessee on the prescribed date on which construction of a building was not permissible on the land in question. In our opinion, this argument begs the question. As held by us, requirement of permission for construction would not make construction on the land impermissible. This being the position, as on which date such requirement is being tested would be of no consequence. In our opinion, therefore, question (a) raised by Assessee, does not give rise to any substantial question of law, 15. With respect of questions (b) and (c), however, we are of the opinion that Tribunal should consider these questions and pass a fresh order. This is so since though raised, the Tribunal has not considered these issues. In our opinion, therefore, question (a) raised by Assessee, does not give rise to any substantial question of law, 15. With respect of questions (b) and (c), however, we are of the opinion that Tribunal should consider these questions and pass a fresh order. This is so since though raised, the Tribunal has not considered these issues. As noted, question No.(b) arises in Appeal No. 418 and 415 of 2016, the Assessee would be allowed to argue question (b) in relation to those appeals. Question (c) arises in all the Appeals but with respect of Sri Perumbudur land only. 16. In the circumstances, for the purposes of enabling the Assessee to appear before the Tribunal only press question No.(b) and (c) in relation to the respective Wealth Tax Appeals, the impugned common judgment of the Tribunal is set aside. Appeals are restored to the Tribunal for fresh consideration and disposed of in accordance with law. 17. Accordingly, all the Appeals are disposed of.