JUDGMENT : Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. The writ petition is heard finally with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. 2. By this writ petition, the petitioners being the Management and School wherein respondent No.1 was working, have challenged order dated 24/03/2017 passed by the School Tribunal, whereby delay of 4 years and 9 months in filing appeal by respondent No.1 before the Tribunal, has been condoned. 3. Respondent No.1 was working as a clerk in petitioner No.2 School. According to the petitioners, it was found that respondent No.1 had illegally kept amounts deposited towards fees with himself rather than depositing them in the account of the petitioners, due to which a criminal complaint was lodged against him leading to registration of first information report and he being prosecuted for offence punishable under sections 409 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. For the said misconduct, he was proceeded against by institution of an enquiry in terms of the provisions of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Act, 1977 and the Rules framed there under. In pursuance of the said enquiry conducted against respondent No.1, he was found guilty of the charges levelled against him and by order dated 03/11/2011 the service of respondent No.1 was terminated. Despite the order of termination of service being communicated to respondent No.1, he did not take any steps to challenge the same. The limitation for challenging such order of termination by filing appeal under section 9 of the said Act, is 30 days. 4. In the meanwhile, the criminal prosecution of respondent No.1 continued and on 01/09/2015 the Trial Court passed its judgment and order acquitting respondent No.1 on the ground that the investigation itself was flawed and the prosecution had failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. 5. After about one year of the order i.e. on 26/08/2015, respondent No.1 submitted a representation to petitioner No.2 seeking reinstatement in service on the ground that he had been acquitted by the Trial Court in the criminal prosecution launched against him. Thereafter, on 31/08/2016 respondent No.1 filed appeal under section 9 of the said Act before the School Tribunal along with an application for condonation of delay of 4 years and 9 months. Thereafter, on 31/08/2016 respondent No.1 filed appeal under section 9 of the said Act before the School Tribunal along with an application for condonation of delay of 4 years and 9 months. In the application for condonation of delay, the reasons given by respondent No.1 can be found in paras 3 and 4 of the application, which read as follows :- “3. The appellant is poor person and there is no earning member in Appellants family. The Respondent management suspended the Appellant on dated 22/2/2011 and from 22/2/2011 the Respondent management has not given salary to Appellant. Therefore his financial condition was very weak. At the same time criminal case was also pending against Appellant before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandrapur. Therefore, Appellant requested the Respondent No.1 and 2 to take back him in service as he has not committed any offence. At that time Respondent management has given assurance that they will taken him back in service if the Hon'ble Chief Judicial Magistrate has pass order of acquittal. Therefore believing on the version of Respondent Management the Appellant has not challenged the order of termination dated 3/11/2011 within a period of limitation. 4. The Hon'ble Chief Judicial Magistrate has released the Appellant in Cri.Case No. 241/2011 U/s. 409 and 420 of I.P.C. on dated 1/9/2015. After acquittal order the counsel in criminal case given advice to Appellant to wait uptill appeal period is over. Therefore on believing the version of counsel in Criminal matter Appellant is not approached quickly after passing order of acquittal. Then the Appellant has given letter to Respondent no.2 on dated 26/8/2016 and submitted the order of acquittal and requested to reinstate him in service. The Respondent no.2 has accepted the letter of joining but did not join him therefore Appellant remains to option except to challenge the order of termination dated 3/11/2011. Therefore delay of about four years nine month occurred. Which is not deliberate. The appellant has filed separate application to condoned the delay.” 6. The petitioners opposed the prayer for condonation of delay by filing reply before the Tribunal. 7. By the impugned order, the Tribunal has condoned delay of 4 years and 9 months and the reasoning of the Tribunal is found in para 5 of the impugned order. It reads as follows:- “5. The petitioners opposed the prayer for condonation of delay by filing reply before the Tribunal. 7. By the impugned order, the Tribunal has condoned delay of 4 years and 9 months and the reasoning of the Tribunal is found in para 5 of the impugned order. It reads as follows:- “5. On going through the submission of both side and case record, it seems that the appellant stated the fact on oath that the respondent management has given assurance that they will take back him in service if Court has passed the order of acquittal. After acquittal the appellant has sent the letter on 28/08/2016 and requested to the management to reinstate in service. But, the management refused to reinstate in service and therefore, delay has been caused. It further seems that the service of the appellant has been terminated by conducting the enquiry under Rules 36 and 37 of the M.E.P.S. Act. Therefore, in order to decide the real controversy in the application in the interest of justice, it is necessary to condone the delay. The case-law cited supra is not helpful to the respondent case. In the result, I proceed to pass the following order.” 8. Mr. Rohit Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, submits that the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is not sustainable because respondent No.1 miserably failed to explain the huge delay of 4 years and 9 months in approaching the Tribunal. It was submitted that the only reason mentioned in the application for condonation of delay filed on behalf of respondent No.1 was that the management had allegedly given an assurance to the said respondent that he would be taken back in service if an order of acquittal was passed in his favour in the criminal proceedings. It was submitted that the said statement was absolutely vague and that it could not be a ground for condonation of delay of 4 years and 9 months. It was submitted that nothing prevented respondent No.1 from filing of appeal before the Tribunal within the period of limitation because the order of termination of service dated 03/11/2011 was communicated to respondent No.1 and he was very much aware of the same. It was submitted that nothing prevented respondent No.1 from filing of appeal before the Tribunal within the period of limitation because the order of termination of service dated 03/11/2011 was communicated to respondent No.1 and he was very much aware of the same. It was further submitted that even after the Trial Court acquitted respondent No.1 on 01/09/2015, no immediate steps were taken by respondent No.1 and that it was only after about one year that representation dated 26/08/2016 was submitted by the said respondent, for which no cogent explanation was given in the application for condonation of delay. The learned counsel placed reliance on judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mathuradas Mohta College of Science, Nagpur v. R.T. Borkar and others, reported in 1997 (2) Mh.L.J. 168 and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes and others v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (dead) Through LRs., reported (2012) 5 SCC 370 . 9. Per contra, Ms Kirti Satpute, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1, submitted that the Tribunal had taken a correct view in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It was submitted that respondent No.1 had proceeded on an assurance given by the petitioners-Management about reinstatement in service if an order of acquittal was passed by the Court in the criminal proceedings against respondent No.1. It was submitted that after the order of acquittal was passed by the Trial Court, respondent No.1 relied upon advice given by the counsel due to which delay had occurred. It was submitted that respondent No.1 had nothing to gain by approaching the Tribunal after a delay of 4 years and 9 months and that in the facts of the present case, no fault could be found with the order of the Tribunal. The learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Ashok s/o. Sudam Patel (Patil) v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in 2013 (3) AllMR 134 and Smt. Anita d/o. Chunnulal Patil v. Upale Rayat Shikshan Sanstha & Ors., reported in 2014 (5) AllMR 682 . 10. Heard counsel for the parties. The facts of the present case show that the service of respondent No.1 was terminated by order dated 03/11/2011, upon culmination of enquiry on specific charges levelled against respondent No.1. 10. Heard counsel for the parties. The facts of the present case show that the service of respondent No.1 was terminated by order dated 03/11/2011, upon culmination of enquiry on specific charges levelled against respondent No.1. The said respondent was aware of the charges levelled against him and he was also aware about the proceedings of the enquiry committee which found him guilty of the charges and recommended termination of service. It is also not the case of respondent No.1 that the order of termination of service dated 03/11/2011 was either not communicated to him or that the communication of the said order was delayed in any manner. Therefore, the period of limitation of 30 days for filing appeal before the Tribunal in the present case started from 03/11/2011 and respondent No.1 was expected to file appeal within the limitation of period of 30 days from 03/11/2011. 11. The application for condonation of delay, relevant portion of which has been quoted above, shows that the reason given by respondent No.1 was only an alleged assurance given by petitioner No.1Management about taking respondent No.1 back in service if an order of acquittal was passed in the criminal proceedings. Other than this vague sentence, there are no specific pleadings put forward by respondent No.1. The order of acquittal was passed by the Trial Court in the present case on 01/09/2015. Even if the said alleged assurance given by the Management is to be taken into consideration, respondent No.1 was expected to approach the petitioners immediately or to file appeal before the Tribunal to make a grievance about the order of termination of service. Respondent No.1 did not do so and after passage of time of about one year, respondent No.1 preferred a representation dated 26/08/2016 before petitioner No.2 and then on 31/08/2016 filed appeal before the Tribunal under section 9 of the said Act. The only explanation sought to be given in the application for condonation of delay as regards time period elapsed after 01/09/2015 was that the counsel, who was representing respondent No.1 in the criminal proceedings had advised that respondent No.1 should wait till the appeal period is over. The only explanation sought to be given in the application for condonation of delay as regards time period elapsed after 01/09/2015 was that the counsel, who was representing respondent No.1 in the criminal proceedings had advised that respondent No.1 should wait till the appeal period is over. Even if the said ground is taken into consideration, there is no cogent explanation on the part of respondent No.1 to have filed the appeal before the Tribunal on 31/08/2016 i.e. after about one year from 01/09/2015 when the order of acquittal was passed in his favour. 12. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the Tribunal has not taken into consideration any of these facts that were on record and it only referred to the claim of respondent No.1 that the petitioner-Management had allegedly given an assurance that respondent No.1 would be taken back in service if an order of acquittal was passed in his favour. The Tribunal has recorded that since the statement was made on oath, it was a ground for condonation of delay of 4 years and 9 months. Thereafter, the Tribunal has merely recorded that respondent No.1 had approached the petitioners on 28/08/2016 for reinstatement and that the appeal was filed immediately thereafter. The Tribunal has failed to take into consideration the requirement of law that cogent reasons are required to be given for condonation of delay and that the delay cannot be condoned as a matter of right. 13. In the present case, there is no dispute that the delay is of 4 years and 9 months. The reasons given in the application for condonation of delay fall short of being termed as cogent and reasonable to explain such a huge delay in approaching the Tribunal. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has pointed out that Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mathuradas Mohta College of Science, Nagpur v. R.T. Borkar and others (supra) had refused to condone the delay of even 6 months in an appeal filed by an employee before the School Tribunal as there was absence of sufficient cause demonstrated by the employee. Although the facts of each case would differ but, the principle that can be culled out from the said judgment is that the requirement of filing appeal before the Tribunal within the period of 30 days is a statutory requirement and that a person approaching the Tribunal after the said period of limitation of 30 days has to show sufficient cause that prevented such person from preferring the appeal within the aforesaid prescribed limitation. In order to examine whether sufficient cause has been demonstrated, the pleadings placed on record assume significance and in the present case the pleadings in the application for condonation of delay and the reasons for delay put forth by respondent No.1 are not sufficient to justify the impugned order passed by the Tribunal condoning the delay of 4 years and 9 months. 14. As regards the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1, in the judgment of this Court in the case of Ashok s/o. Sudam Patel (Patil) v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., (supra), delay has been condoned in the facts of that particular case. In the said judgment, reliance is placed on judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katji and others, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 . In the facts and circumstances of the present case reliance placed on the said judgment is also misplaced. The learned counsel for respondent No.1 has emphasized that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by filing an appeal, which is delayed and that there can be no presumption that the delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence. It is submitted that the said principle ought to be applied in the present case and that if the said principle is applied, no fault can be found with the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. Reliance is also placed by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 on the judgment of this Court in the case of Smt.Anita d/o. Chunnulal Patil v. Upale Rayat Shikshan Sanstha & Ors. (supra) wherein delay of 217 days was condoned. 15. There is no doubt that a liberal approach is advised in considering applications for condonation of delay and that substantial delay in some cases has been condoned by the Courts. (supra) wherein delay of 217 days was condoned. 15. There is no doubt that a liberal approach is advised in considering applications for condonation of delay and that substantial delay in some cases has been condoned by the Courts. But, in all such cases, the reasons put forth by the person applying for condonation of delay have been found to be cogent and reasonable, constituting sufficient cause for condonation of delay. In the present case, the explanation sought to be given in paras 3 and 4 of the application for condonation of delay is absolutely vague. There is no explanation given as to what prevented respondent No.1 from approaching the Tribunal within the period of limitation after the order of termination of service was passed on 03/11/2011. It is also not explained as to what prevented respondent No.1 from taking immediate steps to approach the Tribunal after the order of acquittal dated 01/09/2015 was passed by the Trial Court, if the aforesaid assurance given by the petitioner-Management was true and the version of respondent No.1 was to be believed. The entire application for condonation of delay filed on behalf of respondent No.1 is absolutely silent on the reasons that prevented respondent No.1 from approaching the Tribunal within the period of limitation or within a reasonable period from the order of termination dated 03/11/2011, passed by the petitioners. In this situation, it is difficult to accept the explanation sought to be given by respondent No.1 and it becomes clear that the Tribunal committed an error in condoning the delay without adverting to these aspects of the present case. 16. In the light of the above, it is found that the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is unsustainable. Accordingly, the present writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 24/03/2017 passed by the Tribunal is quashed and set aside and the application for condonation of delay filed before the Tribunal is dismissed. 17. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. No order as to cost.