JUDGMENT : This original petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, filed at the instance of the plaintiffs, raises two important questions. First one is regarding the applicability of Section 28 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 (in short, “the Court Fees Act”) in respect of a suit filed by the principal deities in a temple, a public religious trust. Second question is, what will be the legal effect on the plaintiffs succeeding in a challenge, against an order passed by the trial court directing them, in an uncontested suit reserved for judgment, to correct the jurisdiction value and pay court fee under a specified provision of the Court Fees Act, where the suit itself was rejected under Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, “the Code”) during the pendency of the challenge? The reliefs sought for in Ext.P1 plaint are as follows: “(i) A judgment and decree may be passed declaring that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the scheduled properties. (ii) Consequent upon the grant of relief (i) as above, direct the 1st defendant to put the 2nd defendant or the plaintiffs on behalf of the 2nd defendant in possession failing which the plaintiffs may be directed to take delivery of the scheduled property on behalf of the 2nd defendant, if necessary after passing a preliminary decree directing the identification of the property to be delivered as above and deferring the same to the final decree stage and (iii) Allow the plaintiffs to realise the cost of the proceedings.” 2. Petitioners are deities in temples, who are represented by next friends. 3. Alappuzha Ananthanarayanapuram Thuravoor Thirumala Devaswom is a Hindu religious trust. It is a public trust. The trust is represented by its president, 2nd defendant in the suit. Trust is managing the temples figuring in the suit, one situated at Alappuzha and the other at Thuravoor. 4. 2nd defendant (2nd respondent) is governed by a scheme, framed in O.S.No.8 of 1958 by the District Court, Alappuzha. Under the scheme, the interested persons of the trust are known as “mahajanam”. They are the beneficiaries of the temples, belonging to Gouda Saraswatha Brahmin Community, a religious denomination among Hindus. 5. Plaintiffs in Ext.P1 suit, the principal deities, are represented by next friends, who are beneficiaries of the temples and hence interested in the trust. Under the scheme, the interested persons of the trust are known as “mahajanam”. They are the beneficiaries of the temples, belonging to Gouda Saraswatha Brahmin Community, a religious denomination among Hindus. 5. Plaintiffs in Ext.P1 suit, the principal deities, are represented by next friends, who are beneficiaries of the temples and hence interested in the trust. It is averred that the interests of the next friends are not adverse to the plaintiff deities or the 2nd defendant trust. 6. The suit pertains to a dispute relating to Thirumala Devaswom Medical College (in short, “TD Medical College”). It is pleaded in Ext.P1 plaint that the Government of Kerala in the early 1960's decided to establish a medical college in private sector. Government of Kerala persuaded the 2nd defendant, a financially sound institution at that time and having large extent of agricultural lands, to take up the said responsibility. Under the orders of the 1st respondent State, the trust established a medical college and named it as T.D.Medical College. 7. Consequent upon starting the medical college, the scheme of 2nd respondent was appropriately amended by obtaining approval from the District Court, Alappuzha in the above suit by order dated 18.09.1967. Under Chapter 7 of the scheme, a separate entity styled as “TD Medical College Trust” was constituted. According to the petitioners, it is clear from Chapter 7 that TD Medical College Trust is another extended arm of the Hindu Public Religious Trust compendiously described as Alappuzha Ananthanarayanapuram Thuravoor Thirumala Devaswom. 8. As time passed, the 2nd respondent found it difficult to run the Medical College on account of financial constraints. Eventually, under an agreement dated 17.10.1967, executed between the Government of Kerala and the TD Medical College Trust, the Government took over administration of the Medical College. Ext.P3 is the above said agreement. 9. Petitioners would contend that it is the sacred and fundamental duty of the Government to impart education. When a private agency like the 2nd respondent failed in its earnest attempt to help the State in the matter of fulfilling their fundamental duties, the Government, at best, could have cancelled the sanction granted to the TD Medical College and rehabilitated the students elsewhere. Instead, they chose to enter into Ext.P3 agreement with the 2nd respondent. According to the petitioners, the agreement is unilateral and heavily loaded in favour of the Government. Instead, they chose to enter into Ext.P3 agreement with the 2nd respondent. According to the petitioners, the agreement is unilateral and heavily loaded in favour of the Government. It is further contended that the penal clauses in Ext.P3 will not bind the petitioners, as they are beyond the competence of the 2nd respondent. Ext.P3 is neither an agreement to sell the property nor a transfer of property of any kind. It has the effect of not only taking over management of the Medical College, but also the effect of taking possession of the property belonged to the 2nd respondent trust. For the reasons stated in Ext.P1 plaint, the petitioners/plaintiffs would contend that they are entitled to follow the trust properties and get it recovered from the 1st respondent State. Therefore, Ext.P1 plaint was instituted for the aforementioned reliefs. 10. Ext.P2 is copy of the order impugned herein. It was passed by the Munsiff, Alappuzha in O.S.No.1059 of 2014, after narrating the facts and noticing that the 1st respondent (1st defendant) State, though entered appearance, did not file a written statement. 11. On 13.07.2016, the trial court recorded the proceedings to the effect that the defendants did not file a written statement and Exts.A1 to A4 series were marked. On that day, the case was reserved for judgment to 16.07.2016. On that day, the matter was re-opened suo motu and posted for further hearing to 25.07.2016. Again, the matter was adjourned to 27.07.2016. Then again, it was posted for judgment to 06.08.2016 and thereafter to 12.08.2016. On that day, it was again adjourned to 24.09.2016. On 24.09.2016, the matter was re-opened and posted for correcting valuation shown in the plaint within 15 days and posted to 17.10.2016. On 17.10.2016, the present original petition was filed before this Court. It is seen from the records that on 24.10.2016, the Government Pleader took notice for the 1st respondent State and notice to the 2nd respondent was issued by speed post. An order of stay of further proceedings in O.S.No.1059 of 2014 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Alappuzha was passed by this Court on 24.10.2016. It is an undeniable fact that the plaint was rejected for non-payment of court fee on 17.10.2016 (that is prior to the date on which an order of stay was granted). 12. An order of stay of further proceedings in O.S.No.1059 of 2014 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Alappuzha was passed by this Court on 24.10.2016. It is an undeniable fact that the plaint was rejected for non-payment of court fee on 17.10.2016 (that is prior to the date on which an order of stay was granted). 12. Heard Sri.K.V.Sadananda Prabhu, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri.K.V.Sohan, learned State Attorney appearing for the 1st respondent State. Sri.Lakshmi Narayan, learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent is also heard. 13. Assertions in Ext.P1 plaint would clearly show that the properties belonged to the two deities, who instituted Ext.P1 suit through next friends. There is no material before this Court to hold that the next friends have any adverse interest against the plaintiffs. Further, the assertion in Ext.P1 plaint that the properties scheduled therein are managed by the 2nd respondent trust as per the terms in the scheme decree passed by the District Court, Alappuzha in O.S.No.8 of 1958 remains unchallenged, for the reason that the 1st respondent State did not file a written statement in Ext.P1 suit. Yet another assertion in Ext.P1 suit that the properties scheduled therein are the properties of a public religious trust is also not denied. For the sole reason that no written statement had been filed by the 1st defendant (1st respondent) State, none of the factual contentions raised in Ext.P1 plaint could be denied at the behest of the 1st respondent State. 14. Sri.Sadananda Prabhu relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bishwanath v. Radha Ballabhji ( AIR 1967 SC 1044 ) contended that the suit, instituted by the next friends on behalf of the deities, is perfectly maintainable in law. It is also to be noticed that the next friends, who claimed to be worshipers of the temple and beneficiaries of the trust, were compelled to institute the suit on account of the inaction by the 2nd respondent. A similar question was considered by the Supreme Court and held thus: “8. The second question turns upon the right of a worshipper to represent an idol when the Shebait or manager of the temple is acting adversely to its interest. A similar question was considered by the Supreme Court and held thus: “8. The second question turns upon the right of a worshipper to represent an idol when the Shebait or manager of the temple is acting adversely to its interest. Gaanapathi Iyer in his valuable treatise on "Hindu and Mahomedan Endowments", 2nd Edn., at p. 226, had this to say in regard to the legal status of an idol in Hindu law : "The ascription of a legal personality to the deity supposed to be residing in the image meets with all practical purposes. The deity can be said to possess property only in an ideal sense and the theory is therefore, not complete unless that legal personality is linked to a natural person." It would be futile to discuss at this stage relationship between the idol and its Shebait or Manager qua the management of its property, as the Privy Council in Jagadindra Nath v. Hemanta Kumari Debi, (1904) 31 Ind App 203 at pp. 209, 210 (PC), has settled the legal position and stated thus : "There is no doubt that an idol may be regarded as a juridical person capable as such of holding property, though it is only in an ideal sense that property is so held." Dealing with the position of the Shebait of such an idol, the Privy Council proceeded to state : "....... it still remains that the possession and management of the dedicated property belong to the Shebait. And this carries with it the right to bring whatever suits are necessary for the protection of the property. Every such right of suit is vested in the Shebait, not in the idol." This was a case where the Shebait filed a suit for eviction from the dedicated property within three years after attaining majority and the Board held that, as he had the right to bring the suit for the protection of the dedicated property, S. 7 of the Limitation Act, 1877, would apply to him. The present question, namely, if a Shebait acts adversely to the interests of the idol whether the idol represented by a worshipper can maintain a suit for eviction, did not arise for consideration in that case. That question falls to be decided on different considerations. 9. The present question, namely, if a Shebait acts adversely to the interests of the idol whether the idol represented by a worshipper can maintain a suit for eviction, did not arise for consideration in that case. That question falls to be decided on different considerations. 9. Three legal concepts are well settled : (1) An idol of a Hindu temple is a juridical person; (2) when there is a Shebait, ordinarily no person other than Shebait can represent the idol; and (3) worshippers of an idol are its beneficiaries, though only in a spiritual sense. It has also been held that persons who go in only for the purpose of devotion have according to Hindu law and religion, a greater and deeper interest in temples than mere servants who serve there for some pecuniary advantage: see Kalyana Venkataramana Ayyangar v. Kasturi Ranga Ayyangar, ILR 40 Mad 212 at p. 225: (AIR 1917 Mad 112 at p. 118). In the present case, the plaintiff is not only a mere worshipper but is found to have been assisting the 2nd defendant in the management of the temple. 10. The question is, can such a person represent the idol when the Shebait acts adversely to its interest and fails to take action to safeguard its interest. On principle we do not see any justification for denying such a right to the worshipper. An idol is in the position of a minor and when the person representing it leaves it in a lurch, a person interested in the worship of the idol can certainly be clothed with an ad hoc power of representation to protect its interest. It is a pragmatic, yet a legal solution to a difficult situation. Should it be held that a Shebait, who transferred the property, can only bring a suit for recovery, in most of the cases it will be an indirect approval of the dereliction of the Shebait's duty, for more often than not he will not admit his default and take steps to recover the property, apart from other technical pleas that may be open to the transfer in a suit. Should it be held that a worshipper can file only a suit for the removal of a Shebait and for the appointment of another in order to enable him to take steps to recover the property, such a procedure will be rather a prolonged and a complicated one and the interest of the idol may irreparably suffer. That is why decisions have permitted a worshipper in such circumstances to represent the idol and to recover the property for the idol. It has been held in a number of decisions that worshippers may file a suit praying for possession of a property on behalf of an endowment; see Radhabai v. Chimnaji, (1878) ILR 3 Bom 27, Zafaryab Ali v. Bakhtawar Singh, (1883) ILR 5 All 497 Chidambaranatha Thambirarn v. P. S. Nallasiva Mudaliar, 6 Mad LW 666 : (AIR 1918 Mad 464), Dasondhay v. Muhammad Abu Nasar, (1911) ILR 33 All 660 at p. 664: (AIR 1917 Mad 112) (FB), Radha Krishnaji v. Rameshwar Prasad Singh, AIR 1934 Pat 584, Manmohan Haldar v. Dibbendu Prosad Roy, AIR 1949 Cal 199.” (underline supplied) It is therefore clear that legal competence of the next friends to institute the suit on behalf of the deities is unchallengeable. 15. As mentioned above, the allegations in the plaint would clearly show that the 2nd respondent trust is a public religious trust and the properties managed by the trust are vested with the petitioners (deities). Certainly, by nature the properties are trust properties. On a plain reading of Section 28 of the Court Fees Act, it can be seen that the said Section is a provision applicable to a suit of this nature. It will also be clear that Section 30 of the Court Fees Act, relating to a suit for possession not otherwise provided for, cannot be applied to Ext.P1 suit. It is obvious for the reason that Section 30 of the Court Fees Act is a residuary provision and it becomes applicable only on finding that no other provision could be applied to a given case. It is obvious for the reason that Section 30 of the Court Fees Act is a residuary provision and it becomes applicable only on finding that no other provision could be applied to a given case. Section 28 of the Court Fees Act is extracted hereunder for clarity: “Suits relating to trust property.-In a suit for possession or joint possession of trust property or for a declaratory decree, whether with or without consequential relief in respect of it, between trustees or rival claimants to the office of trustee or between a trustee and a person who has ceased to be trustee, fee shall be computed on one-fifth of the market value of the property subject to a maximum fee of rupees two hundred or where the property has no market value, on rupees one thousand: Provided that, where the property does not have a market value, value for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of courts shall be such amount as the plaintiff shall state in the plaint. Explanation.-For the purpose of the section, property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or other religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be trust property and the manager of any such property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.” The above Section applies to a suit for possession of trust property or for a declaratory decree, whether with or without any consequential relief in respect of it, between the trustees and a person who has ceased to be a trustee. According to the plaint averments, the 2nd respondent trust entrusted the TD Medical College and its properties for running and managing the institution. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that actual possession of the properties had not been handed over to the State and the properties belonging to a public religious trust were entrusted only for management of the college. It is also the contention that the State, by virtue of Ext.P3, could only assume the role of a trustee under the 2nd respondent. All the above contentions are raised so as to indicate that Section 28 of the Court Fees Act is the relevant provision of law applicable to this case. In the absence of any rebuttal of the contentions in Ext.P1 plaint, I am of the clear view that the 1st respondent State cannot be heard to oppose the factual averments in the plaint. In the absence of any rebuttal of the contentions in Ext.P1 plaint, I am of the clear view that the 1st respondent State cannot be heard to oppose the factual averments in the plaint. 16. It is well settled that valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction and court fees shall be determined on the basis of the plaint averments. This principle has been reiterated by a Full Bench of this Court in Victoria v. Yesuraj Kumar ( 2017 (4) KLT 936 ). 17. Sri.Sohan, relying on P.P.S.Pillai v. Catholic Syrian Bank (2000 KHC 691), contended that even though under Section 12(5) of the Court Fees Act it is required that all questions as to value for the purpose of determining jurisdiction of the courts shall be heard and decided before evidence is recorded, a Division Bench of this Court in the above decision has held that the embargo in Section 12(5) of the Court Fees Act does not enable a plaintiff, who has undervalued his suit, to contend that once the undervaluation has escaped notice of the court initially, the court cannot thereafter find that the suit is undervalued. The principle stated in the above decision does not apply to this case, for the important reason that Section 12(5) of the Court Fees Act would come into play only in a case where the defendant had filed a written statement. In this case, admittedly the 1st respondent State had not filed any written statement. Therefore the above decision has no application to this case and can be easily distinguished. 18. Foregone discussion will make the position clear that going by the plaint averments, the provision of law in the matter of court fee payable in Ext.P1 suit is to be computed under Section 28 of the Court Fees Act. I, therefore, find that the trial Judge was in serious error in re-opening the case reserved for judgment on so many occasions and ultimately rejecting the suit for non-payment of court fee. 19. Another legal issue required to be explained in this case is the effect of rejection of the suit subsequent to the institution of this original petition. On facts, Sri.Sadananda Prabhu contended that after allowing the plaintiffs to adduce evidence and marking documents on their side, initially the case was posted for judgment to 16.07.2016. On that day the matter was re-opened for further hearing and posted to 25.07.2016. On facts, Sri.Sadananda Prabhu contended that after allowing the plaintiffs to adduce evidence and marking documents on their side, initially the case was posted for judgment to 16.07.2016. On that day the matter was re-opened for further hearing and posted to 25.07.2016. Again it was adjourned to 27.07.2016. After hearing it was closed again and reserved for judgment to 06.08.2016. The case was again adjourned for judgment to 12.08.2016 and 24.09.2016. On that day, the court directed the plaintiffs to correct the valuation within 15 days and the case was adjourned to 17.10.2016. 15 days would have expired on 12.10.2016. It is the contention of the petitioners that a couple of days before that day happened to be holidays and therefore an application was filed on 13.10.2016 for extending time for correcting the valuation and payment of court fee. It is the further submission of Sri.Sadananda Prabhu that instead of posting the interlocutory application to 17.10.2016, the date on which the case was posted, the application was taken up on 14.10.2016 without notice to the petitioners and two days time had been granted for rectifying the so called mistake. That application was called on 17.10.2016 and it was dismissed. Simultaneously the suit was rejected on that date. According to the learned counsel, the procedure adopted by the trial Judge was improper and illegal and the suit was rejected without affording an opportunity to the petitioners to explain their position. Hence, the action of the trial Judge was against the principles of natural justice. Further, the original petition challenging Ext.P2 order was filed before this Court on 17.10.2016, the date on which the plaint was rejected. 20. Sri.Sadananda Prabhu contended that if this Court finds that valuation shown and court fee paid in Ext.P1 suit are proper, and if this Court sets aside Ext.P2 order, then the rejection of Ext.P1 suit by the lower court will be of no legal consequence, as it can only be qualified as a dependent order. 21. To buttress this contention, learned advocate relied on certain decisions. The decision in G.Sundaram Chettiar v. P.A.Valli Ammal (AIR 1935 Madras 43) is pressed into service to advance his arguments. 21. To buttress this contention, learned advocate relied on certain decisions. The decision in G.Sundaram Chettiar v. P.A.Valli Ammal (AIR 1935 Madras 43) is pressed into service to advance his arguments. Relying on an earlier judgment of the Madras High Court, a Division Bench in the above case held that an appeal against a preliminary order in execution can be filed even after the date of final order, which merely carried out and is consequential to the preliminary order, though no appeal has been filed against the final order and with the reversal of the earlier order, the later order which depends for its validity upon the earlier one, ipso facto ceased to have any force. Kanakayya v. Lakshmayya (AIR 1951 Madras 218) is another decision on the point. 22. Learned counsel referred to the decision in Chappila v. Chemmaran ( 1960 KLT 1361 ), Radhakrishnaru v. Madhavan Pillai (1961 KLT 3) and Mathew Kuruvilla v. Rajagopala Iyer (1966 KLT 916) also. However, a Full Bench of this Court in Haji Hassan Rowther v. Bulgheese Beevi ( 1971 KLT 613 ) overruled the decision in Mathew Kuruvilla's case and considered the decisions in Chappila's case and Radhakrishnaru's case. Without assigning any specific reason, the Full Bench held that the view taken in Mathew Kuruvilla's case was not correct. In Mathew Kuruvilla's case it was held that when an order dismissing a petition to condone delay in filing an appeal is interfered with in revision, order of the Judge dismissing the appeal, based on the rejection of the petition to excuse delay, will be absolutely void and still have no effect in law. This principle was overturned by the Full Bench without stating any reason. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner, heavily relying on G.Ramegowda v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore ( AIR 1988 SC 897 ), contended that the concept called “dependant orders” have been recognized by the Supreme Court in the above case. Supreme Court was handling three appeals under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Claimants in certain land acquisition appeals before the High Court approached the Supreme Court with a complaint that the High Court erroneously condoned huge delay in preferring the appeals by the State by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court, after considering the factual issues, ultimately dismissed the appeals. Claimants in certain land acquisition appeals before the High Court approached the Supreme Court with a complaint that the High Court erroneously condoned huge delay in preferring the appeals by the State by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court, after considering the factual issues, ultimately dismissed the appeals. In the course of arguments, it was brought to the notice of the Supreme Court that when the Supreme Court was in seizin of the appeals against the order condoning delay, the High Court had disposed of the main appeals on merits. It was held that disposal of the main matters on merits would not bar the consideration by the Supreme Court of the correctness of the order passed by the High Court. In paragraph 5, the following observations are made: “We might, perhaps, deal with the latter submission of Shri Veerappa first. The fact that the main appeals are themselves, in the meanwhile, disposed of finally on the merits by the High Court would not by itself detract from and bar the consideration of the correctness of the order condoning the delays. This is an instance of what are called 'dependant-orders' and if the order excusing the delays is itself set aside in these appeals, the further exercise, made in the meanwhile, by the High Court finally disposing of the appeals would be rendered nugatory. The submission of Shri Veerappa is, therefore, insubstantial.” 24. The term “dependant orders” therefore can be expressed with certitude as orders whose operation will depend on the outcome of a challenge against an earlier order. In a given case, when an order passed by an inferior court is challenged before a superior court and on setting aside the order, if it results in substance undoing the consequences that followed the non-compliance of the impugned order, then the order following the impugned one is said to be a dependant order. It does not make any difference even if the suit or proceedings has been finally decided pending the challenge against the earlier order, if the reversal of it has a direct bearing on the merit of disposal of the suit or proceeding. 25. In the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the definite view that the principles in G.Ramegowda's case should apply to this case. 25. In the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the definite view that the principles in G.Ramegowda's case should apply to this case. The ratio in Haji Hassan Rowther's case decided by the Full Bench shall not detain me from applying the principle regarding the dependant orders laid down by the apex Court in G.Ramegowda's case. 26. Court below seriously erred in appreciating the unrebutted contentions in Ext.P1 plaint and failed to find that Section 28 of the Court Fees Act is the provision of law applicable to such cases. It is the submission on the side of the petitioners that the court below hastily rejected the plaint, despite intimating it about the challenge against Ext.P2 order. Such an action on the part of the trial court is unapprovable on any count. In the result, the original petition is allowed. Ext.P2 order is set aside. The liability of petitioners/plaintiffs to pay court fee in Ext.P1 plaint shall be determined in accordance with the provisions under Section 28 of the Court Fees Act. Order rejecting Ext.P1 plaint passed by the court below, being an order dependant on the outcome of this original petition, is hereby set aside and I direct the court below to restore the suit to its original number and proceed with the same in accordance with law.