JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment of acquittal dated 21.9.2017, recorded by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No. 4 Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal Case No. 128-2 of 15/14, whereby respondent accused (hereinafter ‘accused’) came to be acquitted of the notice of accusation put to him for having committed offences punishable under Section 279 IPC, appellant-State has approached this Court by way of instant appeal, seeking therein conviction of accused for having committed aforesaid offence, after setting aside the judgment of acquittal. 2. Necessary facts as emerge from the record for the proper adjudication of the case are that the complainant namely Suraj Kumar (PW-1) vide his statement i.e. exhibit PW-14/A recorded under Section 154 CrPC, alleged that on 8.2.2014, at about 2 pm, near Government Degree College, Sanjauli, IGMC road, accused was driving Maruti Car bearing registration No. PB-02G-0829 in a rash and negligent manner, as a result of which he lost control over the vehicle and ultimately dashed his vehicle with HRTC taxi bearing registration No. HP-02A-0736, causing damage to the same. Complainant further alleged that at that relevant time, accused was driving the vehicle under the influence of liquor and he did not have a valid and effective driving licence to drive the same. On the basis of aforesaid report, a formal FIR dated 23.5.2017, exhibit PW-11/A came to be registered against the accused under Section 279 IPC, in Police Station Sadar, Shimla. After completion of investigation, police presented Challan in the competent Court of law i.e. Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No. 4, Shimla, who being satisfied that prima facie case exists against the accused, put notice of accusation to him for having committed offences punishable under Section 279 IPC and Sections 181 and 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Subsequently, learned trial Court, on the basis of evidence collected on record by the prosecution held the accused not guilty of having committed aforesaid offences and acquitted him. In the aforesaid background, appellant-State has approached this Court, by way of instant appeal, praying therein for conviction of accused, after setting aside judgment of conviction recorded by the Court below. 3. Mr. In the aforesaid background, appellant-State has approached this Court, by way of instant appeal, praying therein for conviction of accused, after setting aside judgment of conviction recorded by the Court below. 3. Mr. Dinesh Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General, while referring to the judgment of acquittal recorded by the learned Court below, vehemently argued that the impugned judgment is not sustainable in the eye of law as the same is not based upon proper appreciation of the evidence and as such same deserves to be quashed and set aside. Learned Additional Advocate General further contended that close scrutiny of evidence adduced on record by the prosecution would go to show that the prosecution successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt that on the date of alleged accident, vehicle in question was being driven by the accused under the influence of liquor and he dashed his vehicle against HRTC taxi, thus causing damage to the same. While making this Court to peruse statements of the prosecution witnesses adduced on record, learned Additional Advocate General made a serious attempt to persuade this Court that the prosecution successfully proved on record that vehicle in question was being driven rashly and negligently by the accused so as to endanger human life and as such, there was no occasion for the learned Court below to acquit him of charges framed against him under Section 279 IPC. While inviting attention of this Court to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab versus Saurabh Bakshi, 2015 (5) SCC 182 , Mr. Dinesh Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General contended that the person driving under the influence of alcohol does not deserve any leniency, rather he needs to be dealt with severely and as such, judgment of acquittal recorded by the learned Court below being contrary to the evidence adduced on record, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. I have heard the learned Additional Advocate General and gone through the record carefully. 5. Before adverting to the factual matrix of the case as well as arguments advanced by the learned Additional Advocate General, it may be noticed that this Court, while granting leave to appeal had specifically called for the record for perusal. After having carefully gone through the record, this Court is not persuaded to agree with the aforesaid contentions put forth by the learned Additional Advocate General on behalf of the appellant-State. After having carefully gone through the record, this Court is not persuaded to agree with the aforesaid contentions put forth by the learned Additional Advocate General on behalf of the appellant-State. Since during proceedings of the case this Court had an occasion to go through the statements of material prosecution witnesses, this Court does not hesitate to conclude that prosecution has miserably failed to prove on record that at the relevant time, vehicle in question was being driven rashly and negligently by the accused. None of the prosecution witnesses has stated anything specific with regard to rashness, negligence and high speed of the vehicle at the time of alleged accident. 6. True it is, that accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC has not denied the factum of accident but that fact merely can not be a ground to hold him guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 279 IPC, especially when no cogent and convincing evidence has been led on record by the prosecution to prove rash and negligent driving on the part of accused. In the case at hand, though the prosecution, with a view to prove its case, examined as many as fourteen prosecution witnesses but entire case of the prosecution hinges upon the testimony of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-5, who at the time of alleged accident were occupants of taxi, which was allegedly hit by accused. 7. PW-1 Suraj Kumar, complainant and PW-2 Dharam Singh were traveling in the HRTC taxi at the relevant time but interestingly none of these witnesses has stated that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving on the part of accused. 8. PW-1 Suraj Kumar stated that he was traveling in HRTC taxi on 8.2.2014 and was going to IGMC Shimla. He further stated that when taxi reached near Government Degree College Sanjauli, another vehicle came from opposite side and dashed against the taxi, but he feigned ignorance with regard to fault, if any, of the accused. He stated that he could not state that due to whose fault the accident occurred. Though this witness was declared hostile but was cross-examined by prosecution. In his cross-examination conducted by the learned Public Prosecutor, he categorically stated that since he had got down right before reaching Government Degree College Sanjauli, he can not say what led to the accident. He stated that he could not state that due to whose fault the accident occurred. Though this witness was declared hostile but was cross-examined by prosecution. In his cross-examination conducted by the learned Public Prosecutor, he categorically stated that since he had got down right before reaching Government Degree College Sanjauli, he can not say what led to the accident. Aforesaid deposition having been made by this witness in his cross-examination creates doubt with regard to his presence on the spot at the time of alleged accident as such, no reliance, if any, can be placed upon the same. Apart from above, learned Public Prosecutor was not able to extract anything from this witness contrary to what he stated in his examination-in-chief and as such his testimony remains un-shattered. 9. Similarly, another independent witness Dharam Singh (PW-2) failed to recall exact date of accident. He testified that he was traveling in the HRTC taxi, which met with an accident. He also stated that he could not say that due to whose fault accident occurred. He was declared hostile but prosecution was not able to extract anything in his cross-examination contrary to what he stated in his examination-in-chief. In his cross-examination, this witness admitted the factum of having not witnessed the accident. 10. Aforesaid witnesses i.e. PW-1 and PW-2 were the only independent witnesses associated by prosecution to prove the case with regard to accident caused allegedly by the accused, but, as has been discussed hereinabove, none of these witnesses was able to point out exact cause of accident, rather their presence on the spot itself is doubtful. 11. PW-5 Gurmeet i.e. driver of the taxi though stated that accident took place since accused was driving the vehicle in high speed but he nowhere stated specifically that at the relevant time, vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently by the accused. In his cross-examination, he categorically denied that accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the accused. 12. Conjoint reading of statements of aforesaid material prosecution witnesses leaves no doubt in the mind of this Court that prosecution failed to prove rash and negligent driving on the part of accused and as such, learned Court below rightly acquitted the accused under Section 279 IPC. 13. 12. Conjoint reading of statements of aforesaid material prosecution witnesses leaves no doubt in the mind of this Court that prosecution failed to prove rash and negligent driving on the part of accused and as such, learned Court below rightly acquitted the accused under Section 279 IPC. 13. True it is that aforesaid witness stated that the offending vehicle was in high speed but that is not sufficient to conclude rash and negligent driving, if any, on the part of accused. High speed itself is not a criteria to conclude rashness and negligence, rather it is/was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that offending vehicle was being driven in such rash and negligent manner so as to endanger human life or likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. 14. Needless to say, for the purpose of criminal law, a high degree of evidence is required before felony is established. Merely because accident took place, it can not be presumed that there was negligence on the part of driver. Act of driving must be grossly rash and negligent to such an extent that reasonable inference can be drawn about the same likely to endanger human life or cause hurt or injury to another person. 15. By now, it is well settled that specific evidence is required to be adduced on record by prosecution to prove rash and negligent driving, if any, on the part of the accused. Mere allegations are not sufficient to hold accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 279 IPC. 16. At this stage, reliance is placed on judgment rendered by our own High Court in case titled Akshay Kumar v. State of HP, Latest HP LJ 2009 HP 72, relevant para of which reads as under:- “8. Mere allegations are not sufficient to hold accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 279 IPC. 16. At this stage, reliance is placed on judgment rendered by our own High Court in case titled Akshay Kumar v. State of HP, Latest HP LJ 2009 HP 72, relevant para of which reads as under:- “8. In fact, an injury shall be deemed to be negligently caused whomsoever it is willfully caused, but results from want of reasonable caution, in the undertaking and doing of any act either without such skill, knowledge or ability as is suitable to consequences of such act, or when it results from the not exercising reasonable manner of using them or from the doing of any act without using reasonable caution for the prevention of mischief, of from the omitting to do any act which is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so and that it may cause injury, but without an intention to cause injury or knowledge that it will be probably caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Rash and negligent act may be described as criminal rashness negligence. It must be more than mere carelessness or error of judgment.” The courts below did not appreciate the above facts that there was debris on the side of the road on the curve due to the slip, while negotiating the curve, as stated above, some witnesses have admitted that the danga gave way to the bus which caused the accident and the rash and negligent driving by the petitioner is also denied, therefore, it find that the findings of quilt arrived at against the petitioner by both the courts below were not based upon legal and proper appreciation of evidence. In the circumstances aforesaid, the petitioner cannot be said to have criminal rashness or negligence, thus he is entitled for the benefit of doubt as two views were deducible from the evidence on record.” 17. Reliance is placed upon judgment of this Court in Gurcharan Singh versus State of Himachal Pradesh reported in 1990 (2) ACJ 598, relevant paragraphs of which are reproduced here-in-below:- “14. Adverting to the facts of this case, it is in evidence that the truck in question was loaded with fertilizer weighing 90 quintals. Reliance is placed upon judgment of this Court in Gurcharan Singh versus State of Himachal Pradesh reported in 1990 (2) ACJ 598, relevant paragraphs of which are reproduced here-in-below:- “14. Adverting to the facts of this case, it is in evidence that the truck in question was loaded with fertilizer weighing 90 quintals. Obviously, it cannot be said that the speed of the vehicle was very fast. Secondly, it is a State Highway and not a National Highway. Therefore, the speed on this account as well cannot be considered to be high. “15. Coming to the statements of witnesses on this aspect, it has been stated that the truck was moving in high speed but it has not been said as to what that speed actually was. To say that a vehicle was moving in a high speed is neither a proper and legal evidence on high speed nor in any way indicates thereby the rashness on the part of the driver. The prosecution should have been exact on this aspect as speed of the vehicle is an essential point to be seen and proved in a case under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. Further, there are no skid marks which eliminate the evidence of high speed of the vehicle. In addition to this, it has been stated by the witnesses that the vehicle stopped at a distance of 50 feet from the place of accident. This appears to be exaggerated. However, it is not a long distance looking to the two points; viz, the first impact of the accident and the last tyres of the vehicle and the total length of the body of the truck in question. If seen from these angles, the distance stated by the witnesses cannot be considered to be very long and thus an indication of high speed. The version of the petitioner that he blew the horn near about the place of curve which frightened the child, cannot be considered to be without substance. This can otherwise be reasonably inferred that the petitioner would have blown the horn on seeing the child on the road as it is in evidence that the child had come on the pucca portion of the road while there is no evidence as to whether the witnesses, more particularly, Ghanshyam, PW7, Chander Kanta, PW8, mother, and a few other witnesses were there at that particular time. Rather the depositions of these witnesses indicate that they were coming from some village lane which was joining the main road in question. Children of this age, usually crafty by temperament, move faster than the parents and are in advance of them while walking. This appears to have happened in the present case. Minute examination of the circumstances of this case and the evidence brought on the record, discloses that the deceased had reached the pucca portion of the road much before the arrival of his parents and the witnesses. That is why in their deposition they have said that the child had been run over by the truck. On the other hand, the petitioner has stated that horn by him and started crossing the road which could not be seen by him and the result was the accident and the death of the child. In case some pedestrians suddenly cross a road, the driver of the vehicle cannot save the pedestrian, however slow he may be driving the vehicle. In such a situation he cannot be held negligent; rather it appears that the parents of the child were negligent in not taking proper care of the child and allowed him to come alone to the road while they were somewhere behind and they could have rushed to pull back the child before the approaching vehicle came in contact with him as it is in their depositions that the truck driver was at a distance coming at a high speed and in case the child wanted to cross the road, it could do so within the time it reached at the place of the accident. How the accident has actually taken place, has not been clearly and comprehensively stated by any of the witnesses. They appear to have been prejudiced by the act of the driver. Their versions are, therefore, coloured by the ultimate act of the petitioner and the fact that the child had been finished.” 18. This Court is also fully conscious of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab versus Saurabh Bakshi 2015 (5) SCC 182 , wherein it has been held that no leniency should be shown to reckless drivers. The Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as follows:- “25. Before parting with the case we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. The Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as follows:- “25. Before parting with the case we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving where the other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty and the civilized persons drive in constant fear but still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such obtaining circumstances, we are bound to observe that the law-makers should scrutinize, re-look and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC, so with immense anguish.” 19. There can not be any disagreement with the concern expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment with regard to carelessness/recklessness of the drivers especially under the influence of alcohol. But in the instant case, as has been discussed above, prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that ill fated vehicle was being driven by accused rashly and negligently, rather, version put forth by prosecution appears to be untrustworthy in view of material contradictions in the statements of the alleged eye witnesses, and as such, this Court sees no application of aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court in the instant case. 20. Though only the testimony of aforesaid witnesses is crucial to determine correctness of the story put forth by the prosecution but even otherwise if statements of all other prosecution witnesses are read in conjunction, same certainly compels this Court to draw conclusion that there are material inconsistencies in their statements, which are certainly fatal to the prosecution case. In the case at hand, case of prosecution is that vehicle bearing registration No. HP-02A-0736 was an HRTC taxi but it is apparent from the record and testimony of registered owner, PW-4 and subsequent purchaser, PW-3 that the said car was a private car being run as a taxi. 21. Similarly, PW-14 ASI Rajpal Investigating Officer, has taken a stand contrary to that of other witnesses, wherein he has categorically denied that taxi was an HRTC taxi. 22. 21. Similarly, PW-14 ASI Rajpal Investigating Officer, has taken a stand contrary to that of other witnesses, wherein he has categorically denied that taxi was an HRTC taxi. 22. Having carefully perused the evidence available on record, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that no reliance can be placed upon the version put forth by these witnesses since there are material inconsistencies and contradictions in their statements. 23. By now it is well settled that in a criminal trial evidence of eyewitness requires careful assessment and needs to be evaluated for its creditability. Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that since fundamental aspect of criminal jurisprudence rests upon well established principle that “no man is guilty until proved so”, utmost caution is required to be exercised in dealing with the situation where there are multiple testimonies and equally large number of witnesses testifying before the Court. Most importantly, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that there must be a string that should join the evidence of all the witnesses thereby satisfying the test of consistency in evidence amongst all the witnesses. In nutshell, it can be said that evidence in criminal cases needs to be evaluated on touchstone of consistency. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in C. Magesh and others versus State of Karnataka (2010) 5 Supreme Court Cases 645, wherein it has been held as under:- “45. It may be mentioned herein that in criminal jurisprudence, evidence has to be evaluated on the touchstone of consistency. Needless to emphasis, consistency is the keyword for upholding the conviction of an accused. In this regard it is to be noted that this Court in the case titled Surja Singh v. State of U.P. (2008)16 SCC 686 : 2008(11) SCR 286 has held:- (SCC p.704, para 14) “14. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witness is held to be creditworthy; ..the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.” In a criminal trial, evidence of the eye witness requires a careful assessment and must be evaluated for its creditability. Since the fundamental aspect of criminal jurisprudence rests upon the stated principle that “no man is guilty until proven so,” hence utmost caution is required to be exercised in dealing with situation where there are multiple testimonies and equally large number of witnesses testifying before the Court. There must be a string that should join the evidence of all the witnesses and thereby satisfying the test of consistence in evidence amongst all the witnesses.” 24. Since another allegation with regard to consumption of alcohol by accused at the time of alleged accident stands duly proved in accordance with law, this Court sees no reason to interfere in the finding recorded by learned Court below qua the issue, as such, same is upheld. 25. Similarly, this Court finds that accused was not having a valid and effective driving licence to drive the vehicle at that time and accordingly he came to be convicted under Section 181 of Motor Vehicles Act, which finding also appears to be recorded on the basis of evidence available on record, and as such, same is also upheld. 26. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made herein above, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the judgment recorded by the learned Court below, whereby accused has been acquitted under Section 279 IPC and same is upheld. In result, appeal is dismissed.