JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This criminal jail appeal is directed against the judgment dated 11-6-2013 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Khowai, convicting the appellant under Section 498-A/312 IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years with fine for the offence under Section 498-A IPC and to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years with fine for his conviction under Section 312 IPC. Both the sentences are to run concurrently. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal, as alleged by the prosecution, are that as per the ejahar dated 20-4-2007, the victim, namely, Smt. Laxmi Debnath, daughter of Smt. Lilu Debnath (the informant, who was examined as PW-4), was given in marriage to the appellant (Shri Sujit Debnath) on 11- 10-2006; the marriage was solemnized according to Hindu rites and rituals. At the time of their marriage, PW-4 party gave Rs.15,000/- in cash along with golden ornaments and other household furniture as per the demand of the bridegroom. But due to financial constraints, the parents of the victim could not fulfill his demand of one colour TV and so they assured them to fulfill the demand within 2 and half months which they could not fulfill due to financial hardships whereupon the appellant started physical and mental tortures upon the victim; by this time, the victim was already pregnant. On one occasion, the appellant had called the parents of the victim with false information that their daughter was seriously ill. However, on their arrival, they found the victim in healthy condition. On their query, the appellant told that he had intentionally gave false information as they failed to give the Colour TV and stated that he would not accept her daughter any more if TV was not presented to him. He further demanded a sum of Rs. 10,000/- for the delay in not presenting the TV in time. He even dragged the victim by pulling her hair to compel them to present the colour TV. On giving reassurance, the parents of the victim returned home. Though the appellant initially hesitated, he ultimately allowed the parents of the victim to take her to their house for treatment. It was after her taking to their home, they came to know from the victim that the appellant had tried to forcibly abort the baby in the womb of the victim by administering local medicines. Though the appellant initially hesitated, he ultimately allowed the parents of the victim to take her to their house for treatment. It was after her taking to their home, they came to know from the victim that the appellant had tried to forcibly abort the baby in the womb of the victim by administering local medicines. Thereafter, the informant returned the victim to the appellant after giving her treatment. However, on 17-3-2007, the informant received information that her daughter was seriously ill and was admitted to Khowai Hospital. On their arrival at the Khowai Hospital, the informant and others came to know that the victim died on 16-3-2007. Apparently, on the written information given by Dr. Debashish Nath at Khowai Hospital, U.D. Case No. 07/2007 was registered at Khowai PS and the police thereafter prepared the inquest report over the dead body of the deceased and arranged the post mortem examination by observing formalities to ascertain the actual cause of her death. 3. After 34 days of the death of the deceased, PW-4 on 20-4-2007 lodged a written ejahar with the Khowai Police Station against the appellant and based on such information, Khowai Police Station Case No.25/07 was registered U/s 498-A/304-B IPC against the appellant. After completing the investigation, the IO of the case submitted the charge sheet against the appellant U/s 498-A/304-B IPC. After hearing the prosecution and the appellant, the learned Additional Sessions Judge framed the charges against the appellant U/s 498-A/304-B, to which the appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. In the course of trial, the prosecution examined 11 witnesses and exhibited certain documents to bring home the charges against the appellant. After examining the appellant U/s 313 Cr.P.C, passed the impugned judgment convicting him U/s 498- A/312 IPC and sentencing him in the manner indicated earlier. Aggrieved thereby, this appeal is now preferred by the appellant. 4. Assailing the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence, Mr. Ratan Datta, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the trial court has failed to appreciate the statement of PW-1, who stated that after the death of the victim, the family of the deceased demanded return of the articles which the deceased had brought to her matrimonial home, but they refused to do so and that such refusal was sole reason for lodging the complaint 34 days after her death. He contends that there is no proper explanation of the inordinate delay in lodging the complaint thereby raising serious doubt on the case of the prosecution. The learned counsel further submits that the trial court has also failed to appreciate the significance of the statement of PW-2 that though during the pregnancy of the deceased, she was taken to her parental house due to strained relation between the appellant and her due to the torture inflicted upon her by the appellant, yet, she was allowed to return to her matrimonial home after seven days and that had the deceased been actually subjected to physical and mental torture by the appellant as alleged by the informant, she would not have been sent back to the appellant only to suffer further such torture. It is also argued by the learned counsel that there is absolutely no shred of evidence to show that the deceased had been subjected to tortures of any kind, which would have surfaced during her medical check-up. It is also interesting to note, contends the learned counsel for the appellant, that though the mother and father of the deceased (PW-4 and PW-5 respectively) were there at the hospital when the inquest was conducted by the police and put his signature on the inquest report as a witness, yet neither he nor PW-4 bothered to lodge any FIR over her death at that time and PW-4 proceeded to lodge the FIR only after the lapse of 34 days. According to the learned counsel, the conduct of the parents of the deceased was quite strange which rather proves that the complaint so lodged was an afterthought and that the case was foisted upon the appellant to arm twist him to return the streedhan she brought at the time of her marriage. The learned counsel draws my attention to the inquest report (Exbt.2 and 5) and the statement of the IO of the case (PW-8) wherein it was stated that no mark of injury could be seen on the body of the deceased and contends that such evidence establish that there was no foul play in the death of the deceased. The learned counsel draws my attention to the inquest report (Exbt.2 and 5) and the statement of the IO of the case (PW-8) wherein it was stated that no mark of injury could be seen on the body of the deceased and contends that such evidence establish that there was no foul play in the death of the deceased. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that though the Medical Officer (PW-11) conducting the post mortem examination of the deceased had indicated that if there was kick in the belly of the deceased, and abortion took place thereafter, that would be a sign of forced abortion in the cervix, but he never stated that there was sign of forced abortion of the deceased in the cervix. The learned counsel thus submits that there are many unexplained circumstances in the case of the prosecution which cast serious doubt in the case of the prosecution; he is, therefore, entitled to be acquitted forthwith. To fortify his various submissions, the appellant relies on Inderpal v. State of MP, (2001) 10 SCC 736 , Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State, (1984) 4 SCC 116 , Matisan Bhumij and Ors. V. State of Bihar, 2010 CriLJ 1197, Md. Abdul Hannan Maishan v. State of Tripura, 2017 CriLJ 1796 and Arunava Bhowmik v. State of Assam, (2005) 1 GLT 45. On the other hand, Mr. Subrata Sarkar, the learned Public Prosecutor, supports the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence and submits that the same was passed by the trial court after carefully scrutinizing the evidence on record. He, therefore, submits that the findings of the trial court are perfectly based on evidence; the interference of this court is, therefore, not called for in the impugned judgment. 5. At this stage, it may be noted that the first charge against the appellant is that after his marriage with the deceased on 11-10-2006, he subjected the deceased to cruelty both physical and mental torture. The second charge against him is that on 16-3-2007, the appellant caused the death of his wife at his house by intentionally administering some local medicine for the purpose of her abortion at the matured stage of pregnancy by continuous torture upon her by demanding dowry. 6. This takes us directly to the evidence of the mother and father of the deceased, who were examined as PW-4 and PW-5 respectively. 6. This takes us directly to the evidence of the mother and father of the deceased, who were examined as PW-4 and PW-5 respectively. PW-4 deposed that the deceased was given in marriage to the appellant as Hindu rites and ceremony on 24th Asvina (five years before the date of her giving evidence) and that in that marriage, as per the demand of the appellant, a sum of Rs. 15,000/- in cash, wooden furniture, two items of golden ornaments weighing about 8 annas were given from their side, but they failed to deliver the colour TV; they then assured him that they would fulfil his demand of colour TV within two and half months. She further deposed that the colour TV could not be given to the appellant. After three months of their marriage, the deceased complained to her that her husband tortured her physically demanding colour TV. One day through one Sunil tailor, information was given to them to visit the matrimonial home of the deceased as she was ill. She further deposed that when she along with her husband (PW-5) rushed there in the night, they found the deceased in good condition and that on their query, the appellant told them that he was intentionally giving false information as his demand of colour TV had not been fulfilled; he also demanded Rs. 10,000/- more. When they expressed their inability to do so, the appellant dragged her to them by pulling her hair and placed a paper asking them to take her back by signing on that paper and it was only when they convinced him that after chaitra, they would deliver the colour TV and returned home the next day. After seven/eight days, she along with her sister-in-law Kalpana had gone to the matrimonial home of the deceased to bring her to their house during her pregnancy period, the appellant reluctantly allowed them to take her but asked them to return her after seven days. They accordingly brought her to their house. According to PW- 4, after taking her to their house, they arranged her medical examination and found that she was having some complications, but they took her back to her matrimonial house along with prescriptions and medicines to the appellant. They accordingly brought her to their house. According to PW- 4, after taking her to their house, they arranged her medical examination and found that she was having some complications, but they took her back to her matrimonial house along with prescriptions and medicines to the appellant. She went on to depose that after about one and half month later, a telephone was received by Kalpana Debnath (PW-2) from the appellant informing her that the deceased was admitted in the Khowai Hospital and asked them to go there to see her and that with that information, she and her husband rushed to the hospital at about 10:30 AM and on reaching there, they found the relatives of the appellant but did not find him. On their query, they came to learn that the deceased had already expired, and they saw her dead body at the hospital morgue. She also deposed that from the relatives of the appellant, she came to know that her daughter was taken to the hospital dead and that she doubted (suspected?) that her husband might have killed her daughter. The police prepared the inquest report over her dead body in which her husband (PW-5) also signed. She further testified that she lodged a written ejahar before the OC, Khowai PS after 10/12 days of the incident and the ejahar was drafted at Khowai Court premises, but she could not recollect the name of the scribe. She mentioned in the ejahar that the delay in lodging the ejahar occurred due to the illness of her husband. She also deposed that her daughter expired when she was three months pregnant at the time of her death and that as she was subjected to cruelty by the appellant in connection with his demand for colour TV and cash amount, she doubted (suspected?) that she might have been killed by the appellant. 7. In her cross-examination, she admitted that her statements in Court regarding the receipt of phone of the appellant through Kalpana Debnath or of her having visited the deceased at her matrimonial home and of finding her in good health or of the appellant telling her that he had intentionally gave false information as they did not fulfil her demand of colour TV and of the appellant forcibly pulling the hair of the deceased or of his further demand of Rs. 15,000/- or of placing a paper asking them to sign therein to take back the deceased, were absent in her statements made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Therefore, such statements made for the first time in court after some five years later are rather improvements, cannot be seriously taken or help the case of the prosecution. She also admitted in her cross that she did not lodge any complaint to the police when the police was preparing inquest over the dead body of her daughter. 8. Coming now to the deposition of PW-5, who is the father of the deceased, he testified that the deceased was given in marriage to the appellant on the 24th Aswina (five years before he made the deposition in Court) according to Hindu rites and ceremony and that on the demand of the appellant, a sum of Rs. 15,000/-, wooden furniture, two items of gold ornaments were given from their side, but they failed to fulfil his demand of colour TV, which they promised to do so within one and half money but in vain. Her daughter occasionally visited them at their house and they also visited her in her matrimonial home, but after two and half months of their marriage, the deceased complained to him that her husband tortured her physically for colour TV. He also deposed that after three months of her marriage, one day, through Sunil tailor, they were informed by the appellant to come to their house as the deceased was sick, but on their arrival, they found her in good condition. On their query, he told them that he intentionally gave false information as his demand of colour TV was not yet fulfilled and wanted a further sum of Rs. 10,000/-, to which they expressed their inability. This prompted the appellant to drag the deceased to them by pulling her hair and asked them to sign on a paper to take her back. Thereafter, they convinced him that both the TV and Rs. 10,000/- would be delivered to him and they then left the house on the following day. He further testified that after seven/eight days, PW-4 and his sister (Kalpana Debnath) went to the deceased to bring her during her pregnancy period, and the appellant after much reluctance allowed them to take her out on the condition they should return her after seven days. He further testified that after seven/eight days, PW-4 and his sister (Kalpana Debnath) went to the deceased to bring her during her pregnancy period, and the appellant after much reluctance allowed them to take her out on the condition they should return her after seven days. They then took the deceased with them and they arranged medical examination and found that she had some complications, but they took her back to her matrimonial home after seven days along with prescriptions and medicines. He further deposed that after about one month, when they received information through her sister (Kalpana) that she was admitted to Khowai Hospital, he and PW-4 rushed to Khowai hospital at about 10.30 AM where they found the relatives of the appellant but not the appellant. On their query, they came to learn that his daughter had already died. They also found her dead body at the hospital morgue. He deposed that he also found some spot marks on her throat and that he doubted (suspected?) that her husband might have killed his daughter. The police prepared the inquest report to which he reluctantly put his signature after repeated requests made by the police. According to him, he was shocked by the death of his daughter and became ill and had to confine himself at home and could not lodge the complaint for about a month and his wife ultimately lodged the ejahar. 9. The question is whether the statements of PW-4 and PW-5 are corroborated in material particulars by the other prosecution witnesses? To prove their case, the prosecution examined PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-4 and PW-5, PW-6, PW-7, PW-8 and PW-11 (Medical Officer). PW-1 claimed that he had participated in the marriage ceremony of the appellant and the deceased. He further deposed that he was present in the negotiation between the parties over the marriage proposal of the appellant and the deceased and that it was decided before the marriage that Rs. 15,000/- in cash, wooden furniture, some golden ornaments and a colour TV would be presented to the appellant side as demanded by them and that at the time of the marriage, all the aforesaid articles except the colour TV were delivered; three months’ time was sought by the parents of the deceased for delivery of the colour TV, which could not also be fulfilled. As for the remaining statement of PW-1 about the additional demand of Rs. 10,000/- and the non-delivery of colour TV or about the alleged murder of the deceased by her in-laws, the facts so narrated by him are not based on his personal knowledge, but were heard by him from the parents of the deceased and the same are, therefore, in the nature of hearsay evidence and are not admissible in law. 10. Hearsay evidence is excluded on the ground that it is always desirable, in the interest of justice, to get the person, whose statement is relied upon, into the Court for his examination in the regular way, in order that many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness can be brought to light and exposed, if they exist, by the test of cross-examination. His presence in the negotiation for the proposed marriage between the appellant and the deceased was never corroborated by any witness. In his cross-examination, he admitted that his statement that he told the police that about 3 months later, one day, the parents of the deceased informed him and others that one day, they were called to the matrimonial home of the deceased and there the matrimonial relatives of the deceased demanded Rs. 10,000/- more as they delayed in fulfilling the demand of colour TV, is not there in his statement recorded U/s 161 Cr.P.C. This reveals that such statement is a first time statement made to the Court about 5 years after the incident. Therefore, the statement of PW-1 can hardly help the prosecution for the conviction of the appellant. PW-1 also did not make any statement about the appellant subjecting the deceased to cruelty. 11. PW-2 is the sister of the father of the deceased. Her deposition with respect to the demand made by the appellant side for Rs. 15,000/-, wooden furniture, gold ornaments and colour TV is virtually similar to the statement of PW-1. She also deposed that one day in the evening at about 7 PM, her brother (PW-5) and his wife (PW-4) received telephonic information from the appellant that the condition of the deceased was not good due to fever and that they accordingly rushed to her matrimonial home but on reaching there, they found in good health. She then repeated the same statement made by PW-4 and PW-5 concerning the demand of the money and colour TV. She then repeated the same statement made by PW-4 and PW-5 concerning the demand of the money and colour TV. She then repeated what PW-4 said about what happened after about two months and how the deceased was brought to their house. She then deposed that when the deceased was brought to their house, she complained that her husband used to torture her physically for demand of dowry of Rs. 10,000/- and colour TV. Thereafter, according to her, they received the information about her death. She testified that when she saw her dead body at the hospital, she noticed black marks by the side of her mouth and swelling in front of her mouth and she as such suspected that she might be killed by her husband. In her cross-examination, she admitted that she did not tell the police that the deceased complained to her that the appellant used to torture her to demand colour TV and Rs. 10,000/-. However, she subsequently volunteered to state that she was never asked that question by the police. She also admitted that the police never recorded her statement in tune with her statement before the Court. In our opinion, this witness appears to be not a trustworthy witness inasmuch as she did not tell the police at the earliest point of time at the hospital that the appellant used to torture her. PW-2, PW-4 and PW-5 are undoubtedly related witnesses and their evidence shall have to be closely scrutinized. Her evidence that she noticed black marks by the side of her mouth and swelling in front of her mouth is not supported by the evidence of PW-4 and PW-5. The law is now well-settled that though there is no inflexible rule that the evidence of related witnesses cannot be relied upon in every case, yet Court should be cautious in evaluating the worth of the testimony of related witness who is inimical from before to the accused. The law is explained by the Apex Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 , at page 149: “48. Before discussing the evidence of the witnesses we might mention a few preliminary remarks against the background of which the oral statements are to be considered. The law is explained by the Apex Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 , at page 149: “48. Before discussing the evidence of the witnesses we might mention a few preliminary remarks against the background of which the oral statements are to be considered. All persons, to whom the oral statements are said to have been made by Manju when she visited Beed for the last time, are close relatives and friends of the deceased. In view of the close relationship and affection any person in the position of the witness would naturally have a tendency to exaggerate or add facts which may not have been stated to them at all. Not that this is done consciously but even unconsciously the love and affection for the deceased would create a psychological hatred against the supposed murderer and, therefore, the Court has to examine such evidence with very great care and caution. Even if the witnesses were speaking a part of the truth or perhaps the whole of it, they would be guided by a spirit of revenge or nemesis against the accused person and in this process certain facts which may not or could not have been stated may be imagined to have been stated unconsciously by the witnesses in order to see that the offender is punished. This is human psychology and no one can help it.” 12. The prosecution, however, declined to examine PW-3 as he was not a cited witness. Thus, what has clearly emerged out of the aforesaid evidence is that no satisfactory evidence could be produced by the prosecution to prove that the deceased was ever subjected to cruelty by the appellant. Not a single witness from the locality was produced by the prosecution to show that the deceased was tortured by the appellant at any time. The fact that the appellant could not have possibly tortured the deceased during her lifetime can also be seen from the statement of the Medical Officer conducting the post mortem examination and the police officer preparing the inquest report. The Medical Officer (Dr. Debasish Nath) is examined as PW-11, who deposed that he conducted the PO examination on 17-3-2007 at about 3 PM; the patient was brought dead on 16-3-2007 at about 2305 hours. The Medical Officer (Dr. Debasish Nath) is examined as PW-11, who deposed that he conducted the PO examination on 17-3-2007 at about 3 PM; the patient was brought dead on 16-3-2007 at about 2305 hours. He deposed that in the event of bringing a dead person to the hospital, they generally gave information to the PS where after the police prepared the inquest report, issued the dead body challan and they then conducted the post mortem examination. He testified that there was apparently no injury on the body of the deceased, but there was an indication of missed foetus, i.e. foetal sac present, that there was no foetus and that based on his report, he could safely say that there was sign of septicaemia or forced abortion. He went on to depose that if there was any kick on the belly and thereafter abortion took place, in that case, there would be sign of forced abortion in the cervix and that during post mortem examination, after opening the entire body, he did not collect viscera for examination as he did not find any inflammation or sign of poisoning. It also his deposition that generally when they did not find any exact cause of death, they used the term “CRF” and that there might be cardiac attack or other respiratory diseases such as Asthma, etc. which ultimately affected cardiac arrest. Thus, the evidence of PW-11 has ruled out the possibility of the appellant torturing the deceased or of administering some local medicine for the purpose of causing miscarriage to the deceased. That apart, from the evidence of PW-11, it is further confirmed that there was no injury on her body when he conducted the post mortem examination on her body. It must, however, be noted that it has been the case of the prosecution that the deceased died of administering some local medicine for the purpose of aborting her pregnancy and not due to kicking her on her belly. 13. It must, however, be noted that it has been the case of the prosecution that the deceased died of administering some local medicine for the purpose of aborting her pregnancy and not due to kicking her on her belly. 13. Coming now to the evidence of the police officer, who conducted the inquest and who was examined as PW-9 (Shri Nepal Chandra Dhar), he deposed that on 16-3-2007, he was posted as ASI at the Subhash Park Outpost of Khowai PS; that on that day, he proceeded to Khowai Hospital outdoor in connection with Khowai PS UD Case No.7 of 2007 and on being identified by the husband of the deceased (the appellant), he prepared the inquest over the dead body of the deceased who was found on a table of the hospital and on examination of her body, he did not find any mark of violence and that on his query, it was revealed from the statements of witnesses present that for the last few days, the deceased was suffering from illness and when her fever was not relieved with the help of local people, her husband brought her to the hospital. He identified the inquest report prepared by him as Exbt-5 and that from amongst the witnesses present, he obtained the signatures of Ramesh Debnath (PW-5), Sujit Debnath, Prasanna Debnath and Nibash Debnath where after he along with Constable Dhirendra Sarkar placed the body of the deceased for post mortem examination. He further testified that he could not say whether PW- 5 was the father of the deceased and that the witnesses present at the time of preparing inquest did not make any complaint against anybody who could cause the death of the deceased. In so far as the statement of Shri Kishore Debbarma, SDPO, Khowai, who was examined as PW-10 is concerned, they are in the nature of opinion or hearsay evidence and not based on his personal knowledge when he said that the deceased was not in favour of abortion or that since her parents failed to meet the demand of colour TV, the appellant forcibly aborted her pregnancy against her will and caused her death. Therefore, the prosecution cannot derive any benefit from such statements, nay, his evidence to that effect stands excluded from consideration. 14. Therefore, the prosecution cannot derive any benefit from such statements, nay, his evidence to that effect stands excluded from consideration. 14. Thus, a combined reading of PW-9, PW-10 and PW-11 will show that there is no evidence of injury caused to the deceased nor is there any evidence of miscarriage caused to the deceased resulting from poisoning; the story of the prosecution as deposed to by PW-2, PW-4 and PW-5 to that effect is demonstrably inconsistent with the statements of PW-2, PW-4 and PW-5. It is also interesting to note that though both PW-4 and PW-5 were there at the Khowai Hospital when the inquest report was prepared by PW-9 and when PW-5 himself signed on such inquest report as one of the witnesses, none of them even uttered a single word of suspicion about the responsibility of the appellant for the death of the deceased. In fact, the written ejahar was lodged against him by PW-4 after 34 days of the incident. An attempt was, however, made by her to explain the inordinate delay in lodging the written ejahar by stating that it was occasioned by the illness of her husband (PW-5). Now, there is absolutely no corroborative evidence, medical or otherwise, to substantiate her self serving statement to the effect that her husband was sick which prevented them from lodging the written ejahar for some 34 days. Moreover, what prevented her and PW- 2 or, for that matter, PW-5 himself from lodging the FIR right there at the Khowai Hospital when he signed in the inquest report prepared by PW-9 as the witness at the Khowai Hospital on 16-3-2007 had they really suspected foul play over her death? Delay in setting law into motion by lodging of complaint and registration of FIR is normally viewed by courts with suspicion because there is possibility of concoction and embellishment of the occurrence. So, it becomes necessary for the prosecution to satisfactorily explain the delay. The object of insisting upon a prompt lodging of FIR is to obtain early information not only regarding assailants but also the role played by accused, nature of incident and names of witnesses. So, it becomes necessary for the prosecution to satisfactorily explain the delay. The object of insisting upon a prompt lodging of FIR is to obtain early information not only regarding assailants but also the role played by accused, nature of incident and names of witnesses. In the instant case, the absence of injury mark on the body of the deceased coupled with the unsatisfactory explanation of the inordinate delay in lodging the FIR, particularly, when the police were already there by the time both PW-4 and PW-5 had reached the hospital and when PW-5 himself signed on the inquest report prepared by PW-9. These two riddles certainly strengthen the theory floated by the defence that the written ejahar is an after-thought and based on false and concocted story and came to be lodged only when the appellant and his family refused to return the cash amount and other articles brought by the deceased at the time of their marriage. 15. That apart, it is also quite strange that when it was the case of the prosecution that the deceased was subjected to cruelty, both mental and physical, by the appellant, yet how could her parents still allow her to return to her matrimonial home after seven days of her stay with them, more so, when the demand of colour TV and Rs. 10,000/- by him was yet to be fulfilled by them? It is difficult to believe that PW-4 and PW-5, knowing fully well, as projected by them, that the deceased had in the past been subjected to cruelty by the appellant, would send her back to her matrimonial home; surely they should know that it would be a road to perdition for her to return to the appellant in such circumstance. There are thus many unexplained mysteries in the case of the prosecution. On the basis of the evidence brought on record by the prosecution, I find it difficult to sustain the conviction of the appellant. It is well-settled that in our criminal jurisprudence, suspicion, howsoever grave they may be, cannot take the place of proof. 16. The result of the foregoing discussion is that this appeal must succeed. The impugned judgment of convictions and sentences are hereby set aside. The appellant is, therefore, acquitted of the charges. As he is already on bail, he need not surrender to his bail-bonds. Transmit the LC record.