Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 291 (RAJ)

Dilip Maheshwari v. State of Rajasthan

2018-01-22

SANDEEP MEHTA

body2018
JUDGMENT Sandeep Mehta, J —By way of this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioner Dilip Maheshwari has approached this Court seeking quashing of entire proceedings of the criminal case No.282/2006 pending against him in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jodhpur Metropolitan for the offence under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 2. Brief facts relevant and essential for disposal of the petition are noted hereinbelow: The petitioner is a vendor of food articles. He runs his business in the name and style of M/s. Rameshwar Enterprises. The Food Inspector collected samples of 'Avin' Brand ghee cartons of 1 Ltr. each from the petitioner's shop on 23.06.2003 after paying the requisite cost. One carton of ghee was forwarded in a sealed condition to the Public Analyst on 28.06.2003 from where a report dated 28.07.2003 was received with an opinion that the sample of ghee did not meet the standards as per the Appendix of the P.F.A. Act and was also misbranded. The Food Inspector sought permission to prosecute the petitioner which was granted by the competent authority on 26.06.2006. The complaint came to be filed on 20.07.2006. The trial court recorded pre-charge evidence and framed charge against the petitioner for the offences under Sections 7(1) read with Section 17, 7(ii) read with Section 16 of the P.F.A. Act and Rule 50 of The Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules and Section 7(iii) read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The petitioner has now approached this Court by way of this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the entire proceedings of the complaint on the ground that the notice under Section 13(2) of the PF Act was served upon him after three years of collection of the sample of ghee and by that time, the best before date printed on the carton of ghee, prescribing the outer limit for consumption as being six months from the month of packaging had lapsed and owing to this delay, the petitioner's statutory right of getting the second sample of ghee examined through the FSL has been frustrated. 3. Shri Bhansali, learned counsel representing the petitioner, relied upon this Court's decision in the case of Leela Devi & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan, 2012 4 CJ (Cri.) Raj . 3. Shri Bhansali, learned counsel representing the petitioner, relied upon this Court's decision in the case of Leela Devi & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan, 2012 4 CJ (Cri.) Raj . and urged that it is an admitted case emerging from record that the complaint was filed after more than 3 years of sample of packaged ghee being collected from the petitioner's business premises. It was clearly printed on the carton of ghee that the same was to be consumed within a period of six months from packing month i.e. April, 2003. Thus Shri Bhansali urged that the entire proceedings of the complaint are liable to be quashed because the statutory right available to the accused under Section 13(2) of the P.F.A. Act to get the second sample examined from the C.F.L. has been frustrated by the delay in lodging of the complaint by which time, the best before date had expired. 4. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed the arguments advanced by Shri Bhansali. However, he too was not in a position to dispute the fact that owing to the delay occasioned in filing of the complaint, the right available to the accused under Section 13(2) of the P.F.A. Act was frustrated to the extent of adulteration/ non-meeting of the standards because the "best before date" had expired by then and thus, having the second sample examined from CFL thereafter would be an exercise in futility. Nevertheless, he urged that so far as the aspect of misbranding is concerned, apparently the said opinion of the Public Analyst has no relevance with the period for which the ghee was fit for consumption and if desired, the petitioner can always get the second sample sent to the Central Forensic Laboratory for challenging the report of the Public Analyst on this aspect. He thus urges that no interference is called for in the instant matter because Leela Devi's judgment has no application to the facts of the case at hand. 5. I have heard and considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the impugned order as well as the record. He thus urges that no interference is called for in the instant matter because Leela Devi's judgment has no application to the facts of the case at hand. 5. I have heard and considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the impugned order as well as the record. Evidently, so far as the aspect of adulteration of the packaged ghee sample collected from the petitioner's shop is concerned, the statutory right available to the accused under Section 13(2) of the PFA Act of challenging the Public Analyst's report has been totally frustrated because of the delay in filing the complaint. A warning was clearly printed on the packaged carton of ghee that the food article was to be consumed within a period of six months from the month of packing i.e. April, 2003. Thus, the outer limit for which the quality of ghee was assured by the manufacturer came to an end by October, 2013. Dairy products like ghee definitely tend to deteriorate efflux of with time and i.e. why mentioning of the best before date is prescribed by law on such packaged food articles. As the complaint was filed well after the "use best before date", printed on the ghee carton the statutory right available to the accused under Section 13(2) of the PFA Act for challenging the LHA's report by having the second sample of the Food Article analysed through the CFL was totally frustrated to the extent of adulteration/ nonmeeting of standards. This issue is squarely covered in petitioner's favour by Leela Devi's judgment. However, so far as the aspect of misbranding is concerned, the Public Analyst's report clearly mentions that the carton of ghee collected from the petitioner did not bear the mark of vegetarian/ non-vegetarian. To that extent, the charge of mis-branding framed by the trial court against the petitioner cannot be termed to be illegal on any ground whatsoever. Manifestly, owing to the delay, the right of the petitioner to challenge the public analyst's report would be prejudiced only to the extent of the opinion regarding adulteration/non meeting of the standards. To that extent, the charge of mis-branding framed by the trial court against the petitioner cannot be termed to be illegal on any ground whatsoever. Manifestly, owing to the delay, the right of the petitioner to challenge the public analyst's report would be prejudiced only to the extent of the opinion regarding adulteration/non meeting of the standards. No prejudice would be caused by the said delay if at all the petitioner desires to challenge the said report on the aspect of mis-branding because the omission/ violation is noticeable by the naked eye and does not require any scientific analysis which can be adversely effected by delay. 6. Thus, while accepting the instant misc. petition in part, the proceedings of the impugned complaint and the charge framed against the petitioner by the trial court for the offence under Rule 50 of the PF Rules read with Section 7(iii) /16 of the PF Act is sustained. However, the charge framed against the petitioner for the offences under Sections 7(i) read with Section 17 and Section 7(ii) read with Section 16 is quashed. 7. The misc. petition is partly allowed in the above terms.