JUDGMENT : This appeal preferred under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code (“Code” for short) is heard on the following substantial questions of law : (1) Whether the Civil Court could have decided the question as to whether the order passed by the Consolidation Officer under Section 31 of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act was illegal in view of the provisions contained under Section 32 of the said Act ? (2) Whether the learned Lower Appellate Court erred in assuming jurisdiction to discuss the validity of the sale-deed which was declared as illegal and, therefore, null and void by the Competent Authority under the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 and further confirmed in the Revision under section 35 of the said Act by the Revisional Authority under the same Act ? (3) Whether the civil Court could assume jurisdiction to overrule the order passed by the Competent Court under the provisions of Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 and confirmed by the Revisional Authority when such jurisdiction was expressly barred under the said Act ? (4) Whether in view of the order Exhibit 95 passed by the Competent Court under the provisions of Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 and confirmed by the Revisional Authority which declared the sale-deed dated 25-11-1992 as illegal, whether the Lower Appellate Court could decree the suit of the respondent 1 on the basis of such sale-deed ? 2. The appellant is defendant 1 in Regular Civil Suit 46/1999 which is instituted by deceased Vishnudas Ramdas Rathod for cancellation of order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, recovery of possession and damages and in the alternate for refund of sale consideration of the suit property. The suit property is agriculture field bearing Survey 22/1, admeasuring 4.17 Hectares of village Pimpalshenda. 3. Defendant 2 was the original owner of the suit field, who entered into an agreement dated 21-1-1992 with the plaintiff for sale of the said field. Pursuant to the agreement, defendant 2 executed sale-deed dated 25-5-1992 in favour of the plaintiff. It is the case of the plaintiff that he was placed in possession of the suit field on 21-1-1992. 4. Pursuant to the agreement, defendant 2 executed sale-deed dated 25-5-1992 in favour of the plaintiff. It is the case of the plaintiff that he was placed in possession of the suit field on 21-1-1992. 4. The plaintiff further averred that the sale-deed was executed when consolidation proceedings under the Maharashtra Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 (“Act” for short) were ongoing, and, therefore, defendant 2 executed a further agreement dated 26-5-1992 assuring that appropriate document inter alia sale-deed shall be executed, if necessary, at a later stage. This was done, presumably as the parties were aware of the statutory bar to alienation during the pendency of the consolidation proceedings. 5. The further case of the plaintiff is that defendant 1 entered into an agreement dated 22-3-1992 with the owner defendant 2 and claimed possession thereof which led to proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and in the said proceedings the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mangrulpir handed over the possession to defendant 1. 6. Defendant 1 resisted the claim of the plaintiff by written statement Exhibit 39 denying each and every material averment in the suit plaint. Defendant 1 claimed that possession of the suit field was delivered to him by defendant 2 on 22-3-1992 pursuant to agreement of even date. Defendant 1 further pleaded that the sale-deed dated 22-5-1992 executed in favour of plaintiff is void and is challenged under the provisions of the Act. The defendant 1 admitted that he is in possession of the suit field pursuant to the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mangrulpir in the proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 7. Defendant 2 resisted the suit claim contending that blank papers and stamps are misused by the plaintiff. In a sense, defendant 2 out-rightly denied having executed sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff. 8. The trial Court decreed the suit in part. The claim for declaration, possession and damages came to be rejected. Defendant 2 was directed to pay the plaintiff Rs.60,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 29-12-1997 till actual realisation. 9. It is irrefutable that during the pendency of the suit, the authority under the Act passed an order dated 29-12-1997 holding that the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff is null and void. Defendant 2 was directed to pay the plaintiff Rs.60,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 29-12-1997 till actual realisation. 9. It is irrefutable that during the pendency of the suit, the authority under the Act passed an order dated 29-12-1997 holding that the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff is null and void. It is further not in dispute that the plaintiff preferred a revision challenging the said order, which is also rejected. Perusal of the record reveals that notwithstanding that the order dated 29-12-1997 was brought on record and proved in evidence (Exhibit 95), the plaintiff did not amend the suit plaint nor did he take any step to incorporate a challenge to the said order in the civil suit. The trial Court held that in view of the declaration under the Act that the sale-deed executed in favour of plaintiff during the pendency of the consolidation proceedings is void, the plaintiff failed to prove his ownership qua the suit field. 10. The judgment and decree dated 29-3-2001 passed by the trial Court in Regular Civil Suit 46/1999 was challenged in Regular Civil Appeal 117/2001 by the plaintiff Vishnudas Ramdas Rathod and in Regular Civil Appeal 140/2001 by the original defendant 2 Suryakant Vithoba Pusande. By common judgment dated 30-4-2005, the learned IIIrd Ad hoc Additional District Judge, Washim allowed Regular Civil Appeal 117/2001 and decreed the suit claim in entirety and dismissed Regular Civil Appeal 140/2001. 11. It would be useful to briefly refer to the reasons which persuaded the first appellate Court to reverse the judgment and decree of the trial Court. In paragraph 22 of the judgment, the appellate Court accepts the submission that provisions of Sections 27 and 31 of the Act do not come into play. The appellate Court observes that there is no evidence to suggest that the sale in favour of the plaintiff has resulted in subdivision of consolidated holdings which is the precondition for the applicability of Section 31 of the Act. Perusal of the judgment of the appellate Court would reveal that only provisions of the Act which are considered are Sections 31 and 31A. The appellate Court did not consider the effect and implication of the provisions of Sections 9, 27 and 36A of the Act. 12. Perusal of the judgment of the appellate Court would reveal that only provisions of the Act which are considered are Sections 31 and 31A. The appellate Court did not consider the effect and implication of the provisions of Sections 9, 27 and 36A of the Act. 12. Shri Nitin Vyawahare, learned Counsel for appellant would submit that the order declaring the sale-deed void is in exercise of power under Section 9 read with Section 27(2) of the Act and the learned appellate Court erred in assuming that the authority under the Act invoked Section 31. Shri Vyawahare would submit that Section 31 which speaks of restrictions on alienation and subdivision of consolidated holdings would come into play only after the completion of the consolidation proceedings. Shri Vyawahare would submit that since admittedly the consolidation proceedings were ongoing when the sale-deed dated 25-5-1992 was executed in favour of the plaintiff, the authority rightly invoked the provisions of Sections 9 and 27(2) of the Act. In the light of the said submission, I have examined the order of the authority dated 29-12-1997 which declares the sale-deed void (Exhibit 95). The order is predicated on a finding that the sale-deed is executed during the pendency of the consolidation proceedings and is, therefore, void in view of the provisions of Section 9(1) read with Section 27 of the Act. 13. Shri Vyawahare, learned Counsel is justified in submitting that the first appellate Court wrongly assumed that the order dated 29-12-1997 invoked the provisions of Section 31. The first appellate Court clearly erred in so assuming and then holding that since the transfer did not result in subdivision or fragmentation, the provisions of Section 31 of the Act are not contravened. The statutory scheme is that during the pendency of the consolidation scheme, alienation of any property covered by the notice issued under Section 15A(1) of the Act, is in contravention of the provisions of Section 27 of the Act and, therefore, void irrespective of whether by such transfer the land is subdivided or fragmented. Section 9 of the Act reads thus : “9. Penalty for transfer or partition contrary to provisions of Act. (1) The transfer or partition of any land contrary to the provisions of this Act shall be void. Section 9 of the Act reads thus : “9. Penalty for transfer or partition contrary to provisions of Act. (1) The transfer or partition of any land contrary to the provisions of this Act shall be void. (2) The owner of any land so transferred or partitioned shall be liable to pay such fine not exceeding Rs.250 as the Collector may, subject to the general Orders of the State Government, direct. [Such fine shall be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue.] (3) Any person unauthorisedly occupying, or wrongfully in possession of, any land, the transfer or partition of which, either by the act of parties or by the operation of law, is void under the provisions of this Act, may be summarily evicted by the Collector.] “Provided that, save as otherwise provided in section 31, the Collector may, upon an application made in this regard, regularise a transfer or partition of a land contrary to the provisions of this Act made on or after 15th day of November 1965 and before the date of commencement of Maharashtra Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 2017, if such land is allocated to residential, commercial, industrial, public or semipublic or any nonagricultural use, in the prevailing draft or final Regional Plan: or is intended to be used for any bona fide nonagricultural user, subject to payment of regulairsation premium at such per centum not exceeding 25 per cent of the market value of such land as per the Annual Statement of Rates, as the Government may notify, from time to time, in the Official Gazette: Provided further that, save as otherwise provided in section 31, if a transaction of transfer or partition of land contrary to the provisions of this Act is regularised on the ground that the land would be used for any bona fide nonagricultural use, then failure to start such bona fide nonagricultural use within 5 years from the date of regularisation shall result in forfeiture of such land by the Collector. Such land thereafter shall be first offered to the holder or occupant of a neighbouring contiguous survey number or recognised subdivision of a survey number on payment of 50 per cent of the market value of such land as per the prevailing Annual Statement of Rates and three-fourth of the amount so collected shall be paid to the defaulting person from whom such land was forfeited to the Government and the remaining one-fourth of the amount so collected shall be credited into the Government account. Where occupant of such neighbouring contiguous survey number or recognised subdivision refuses to purchase the fragment, the fragment shall be auctioned by the State Government and the proceeds thereof shall be divided between the defaulting person and the Government in the ratio of 3:1. Explanation.- For the purpose of this subsection, the term “Annual Statement of Rates” shall mean the Annual Statement of Rates published under the provisions of the Bombay Stamp (Determination of True Market Value of Property) Rules, 1995 or any other Rules for the time being in force in this regard, prevalent in respect of the year in which the order of regularisation is issued by the Collector or the year in which such premium is paid, whichever is later.” Section 27 of the Act reads thus : “27. Stay of certain proceedings; ban on transfer of land during continuance of consolidation proceedings. Stay of certain proceedings; ban on transfer of land during continuance of consolidation proceedings. When a Consolidation Officer proceeds to prepare a scheme under section 15, during the continuance of the consolidation proceedings- (a) no proceedings,- (i) under section 153 or 155 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879; (ia) under section 120 or section 124 of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act, 1337 Fasli; (ib) under section 135 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954; (ii) for execution of any award made or deemed to be made under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960; (iii) for execution of any award made under the Bombay Agricultural Debtor's Relief Act, 1947 or under the Hyderabad Agricultural Debtor's Relief Act, 1956; (iiia) for the recovery of a sum due under an agreement registered under the Central Provinces and Berar Debt Conciliation Act, 1933; (iv) for execution of any decree passed by a Civil Court; [(v) for partitioning or subdividing in any manner, in respect of any land [for which a notice under section 15A has been given] shall be commenced, and all such proceedings if commenced shall be stayed; [(b) no person shall transfer any land in respect of which a notice under section 15A has been given, except with the previous permission in writing of the Consolidation Officer. Such permission may be given in such circumstances and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed.]” It would also be necessary to note the provisions of Section 36A of the Act, which read thus :- “36A. Bar of jurisdiction. (1) No Civil Court or Mamlatdars Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the State Government or any officer or authority. (2) No order of the State Government or any such officer or authority made under this Act shall be questioned in any Civil, Criminal or Mamlatdars Court” 14. The jurisdiction of the civil Court to settle, decide or deal with (emphasis supplied) which is by or under the Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the State Government or any officer or authority is expressly barred. The jurisdiction of the civil Court to settle, decide or deal with (emphasis supplied) which is by or under the Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the State Government or any officer or authority is expressly barred. The question whether the sale-deed executed during the pendency of the consolidation proceeding was in contravention of Section 27 of the Act and, therefore, void in view of the provisions of Section 9 of the Act, is clearly a question which is required to be dealt with and decided by the authority under the Act, and which the authority has decided. It is undisputed that the plaintiff challenged the adjudication in revision and failed. In view of the express bar engrafted in Section 36A of the Act, it was not open for the first appellate Court to consider the order Exhibit 95 on merits much less to hold the said order to be erroneous. Be it noted, that the order Exhibit 95 was not in challenge in the civil suit and indeed even if the order were to be challenged in the civil suit, the provisions of Section 36A of the Act would preclude the civil Court from dealing with the validity of the order. 15. Shri Vyawahare, learned Counsel for the appellant has invited my attention to the decision of this Court in Yashwant Ramchandra Dhumal deceased by L.Rs. v. Shri Shankar Maruti Dhumal and another reported in 2001(2) Mh.L.J. 576 and in particular to the following observations. “9. A reading of the scheme of the Act shows that the Act is a complete code in itself for the appellants under the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947. It provides for the determination of local and standard areas and treatment of fragmentation, the procedure for consolidation, the effect of consolidation proceedings and of consolidation of hoardings and the powers and procedure of consolidation. The Act also confers a revisional power on the State Government and Section 36A thereof, reproduced supra bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. It provides for the determination of local and standard areas and treatment of fragmentation, the procedure for consolidation, the effect of consolidation proceedings and of consolidation of hoardings and the powers and procedure of consolidation. The Act also confers a revisional power on the State Government and Section 36A thereof, reproduced supra bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. Section 368 provides : "If any suit instituted in any Civil Court or Mamlatdar's Court involves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any authority competent to settle, decide or deal with such issues under this Act, the Civil Court or Mamlatdar's Court shall stay the suit and refer such issues to such competent authority for determination." Now, the only question which requires examination in the present case is whether under the Act, where an owner is entitled to be in possession of the holding, to which he is entitled under the scheme, a suit for possession of such holding would be tenable in a civil Court? 10. From the facts of the present case, the suit filed by the appellants is for possession of Survey No. 199/48 which is in the possession of the respondent No. 1. It is clear that in view of the fact that this holding forms part of Gat No. 1429 and has been allotted to the respondent No. 2, who would naturally be entitled to be in possession of the said land. The appellant No. 1, who is an allottee of 50% of Gat No. 1428 would therefore not be entitled to possession of the suit land. In any case, it is clear that the appellants and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are all allottees of land governed by the consolidation scheme, though, they ought be in possession of, under the scheme. In fact, because the respondent No. 1 has not handed over possession of the land which respectively belonged to the appellants. In the respondent No. 2, the respondent No. 2, in turn, has not handed over possession of his land for formation of Block No. 1428 as a result of which the appellants and the respondent No. 1, who are half owners of Block No. 1428 are not in possession of their rooms. In the respondent No. 2, the respondent No. 2, in turn, has not handed over possession of his land for formation of Block No. 1428 as a result of which the appellants and the respondent No. 1, who are half owners of Block No. 1428 are not in possession of their rooms. I am of opinion, that the power to put the owners, in possession of the holding, to which they are entitled under the scheme is a power which is exclusively conferred on the consolidation officer under Section 21 of Subsection (3) of the Act, which reads as follows : "24(3) The Consolidation Officer shall, from the commencement of the agricultural year next following the date of publication of the notification in the Official Gazette, under Subsection (1) and in the prescribed manner, put the owners in possession of the holding to which they are entitled under the scheme and for doing so may, in the prescribed manner, evict any person from any land which he is not entitled to occupy under the scheme : Provided that, if two-thirds or more of the owners affected by the scheme agree to enter into possession of the holdings to which they are entitled under the scheme, the Consolidation Officer may put them in possession of such holdings from such earlier date as may be decided upon by such owners." It is clear from the section that the Consolidation Officer puts the owners in possession from the commencing of the agricultural year next following the date of publication of the notification in the Official Gazette, it is not disputed before me that it is being under Subsection (1) published long ago having regard to the facts of the case. I am therefore of view that since the appellants and the respondents are both allottees under the Consolidation Scheme, the question as to who should be in possession of any portion of land which is covered by the Consolidation Scheme is a question, that can only be decided by the Consolidation Officer under Section 31(3) of the Act. 11. It is settled law that the question of jurisdiction of a Civil Court must not be readily inferred unless it is expressly excluded or must be taken to be so excluded by necessary implication. 11. It is settled law that the question of jurisdiction of a Civil Court must not be readily inferred unless it is expressly excluded or must be taken to be so excluded by necessary implication. Having regard to the scheme of the present Act, the relevant provisions of which have been reproduced above, I am of view that the Jurisdiction of Civil Courts is barred by Section 36A of the Act where the question is one relating to putting a owner in possession of the holding to which he is entitled under the scheme.” Shri Vyawahare, learned Counsel would then rely on the following observations of this Court in Narayan S. Bite and Ors. v. Mahadeo Shripati Pise and Ors. reported in 2001(3) BCR 262 : “5. Since each of the abovesaid issue, mentioned in the application, can be exclusively tried and decided by the Competent Authority under the Act, it is not possible to sustain the conclusion reached by the Court below that suit could proceed before the Civil Court. In my view each of the issue mentioned in the application below Exh.28 is relevant for full and complete adjudication of the matter. It is well settled that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to settle, decide and/or deal with any question which can or under the Act required to be decided by the Authority or the Slate Government. There is express bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court in this behalf as provided for in Section 36A of the said Act. It would be apposite to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Shevantabai Maruti Kalhatkar v. Ramu Rakhamaji Kalhatkar and Anr, 1999 (1) Bom.C.R. 764 : 1983(3) Mh.L.J. 834, relied upon by the Petitioners to contend that when any issue would arise for consideration in the suit which can be decided, settled or dealt with by the Competent Authority under the Act, it is not open for the Civil Court to adjudicate the same because of the express bar under Section 36A of the Act.” 16. Shri S.A. Marathe, learned Counsel for respondent 1(1) to 1(5) would rely on Putalabai Lakhu Pawar and others v. Shiva Dhondi Pawar and others reported in AIR 1981 Bom. Shri S.A. Marathe, learned Counsel for respondent 1(1) to 1(5) would rely on Putalabai Lakhu Pawar and others v. Shiva Dhondi Pawar and others reported in AIR 1981 Bom. 9 , to buttress the submission that bar of Section 31(1) is attracted only if the land is allotted under the Act and notice is issued under Section 6(2) of the Act. Shri S.A. Marathe, learned Counsel would then refer to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Mallappa Guruppa Chaugule v. Padmanna Omanna Sajane and others reported in AIR 1982 Bom. 211 and in particular to the following observations in paragraph 11 : “11. Now, S. 15A of the Act which deals with the procedure for preparation of a scheme and principles to be followed in its preparation reads as follows : “(1) The Consolidation Officer shall, after giving due notice to the land owners concerned and the village committee, visit each of the concerned villages, and shall, in consultation with the village committee, proceed to prepare a scheme for the consolidation of holdings which shall include such statements, records and maps as may be prescribed. (2) In preparing the scheme, the consolidation Officer shall have regard to the procedure which the State Government may from time to time prescribe in regard to the number of blocks in which the village lands are to be grouped, the manner of allotting new plots to each owner, the recommendations of the village committee and such other matters as may be prescribed.” A bare reading of the provisions of S.15A will show that the Consolidation Officer must visit each of the concerned villages and he has to proceed to prepare a scheme in consultation with the village committee for the consolidation of holdings. S.15A further requires that the Consolidation Officer must give due notice to the land owners concerned and the village committee. S.15A is no doubt a procedural provision, but it casts an obligation on the Consolidation Officer statutorily to give sufficient notice to the land owners before he visits the village. The visit to the village is intended for the Consolidation Officer to personally collect the necessary data. It is implicit in the provisions of S.15A that before any scheme is made, the villagers have to be heard. The visit to the village is intended for the Consolidation Officer to personally collect the necessary data. It is implicit in the provisions of S.15A that before any scheme is made, the villagers have to be heard. A villager is entitled to put his point of view before the Consolidation Officer as to how his field or land should be dealt with and whether it should be included in the one Gat or the other and further whether any land which is intended to be allotted to him compares favourably with the land which is owned by him and which may as a result of a scheme of consolidation be allotted to some other person. The very basis of the scheme, therefore, is to be prepared by the Consolidation Officer after recording the views of the land owner concerned. It is clear from the provisions of S. 15A that the legislature contemplated that a land belonging to a land owner will not be affected by the scheme unless he is personally given notice of the enquiry. This provision is obviously made with a view to safeguard the interest of the land owner so as to enable him to put before the Consolidation Officer all the necessary information in relation to his land and to know his point of view in respect of land which is likely to be allotted to him. It is difficult to imagine how a scheme concerning land belonging to the land owner to whom no notice has been given can really be said to be scheme properly made in compliance with the statutory provisions of S. 15A at least in so far as it affects him. The per-conditions, therefore, for preparing a draft scheme is individual notice to the land owner and if such notice has not been given, the scheme so far as he is concerned cannot be said to have been made in compliance with the provisions of law. There is noting on the record to show that any such personal notice was given to respondent No.1.” 17. Putalabai Lakhu Pawar and others v. Shiva Dhondi Pawar and others is of no relevance since I have already held that the first appellate Court wrongly assumed that the order Exhibit 95 invoked Section 31 of the Act. There is noting on the record to show that any such personal notice was given to respondent No.1.” 17. Putalabai Lakhu Pawar and others v. Shiva Dhondi Pawar and others is of no relevance since I have already held that the first appellate Court wrongly assumed that the order Exhibit 95 invoked Section 31 of the Act. The observations in Mallappa Guruppa Chaugule v. Padmanna Omanna Sajane and others do not take the case of the plaintiff any further since it is irrefutable that the plaintiff was aware of the pendency of the consolidation proceedings and that the sale-deed which was executed in his favour by the defendant 2 Suryakant Vithoba Pusande is hit by the provisions of the Act and, therefore, entered into a subsequent agreement purporting to bind the seller to execute such other document including sale-deed at a later stage to perfect the title. 18. The finding recorded by the trial Court that in view of the provisions of the Act and the declaration that the sale-deed executed in favour of the plaintiff is null and void, which declaration could not have been tested by the civil Court, the plaintiff has not proved ownership over the suit field is in consonance with the statutory scheme. The first appellate Court seriously erred in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 19. It must be held that the validity of the order Exhibit 95 declaring the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff void could not have been subjected to scrutiny by the first appellate Court in view of the provisions of Section 36A of the Act. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 20. The appeal is allowed. However, Shri Nitin Vyawahare, learned Counsel for the appellant fairly states that since his client-original defendant 1 is in possession of the property, the decree of the trial Court directing refund of amount of Rs.60,000/- with interest shall be satisfied by defendant 1. 21. The judgment and decree dated 30-4-2005 in Regular Civil Appeal 117/2001 is set aside and the judgment and decree dated 29-3-2001 in Regular Civil Suit 46/1999 is restored.