JUDGMENT : K.M. Joseph, J. Appellants are the respondents in the writ petition. The writ petitioner sought to quash the Notification dated 24.04.2018 issued in regard to inclusion of village Jagjeetpur Devpur Mustakhampur in Nagar Nigam Haridwar in its entirety and a direction was sought for commanding the respondents to drop the entire exercise in pursuance of the said notification. 2. The writ petition was heard along with a batch of other writ petitions. This Notification dated 24.04.2018, which the writ petitioner, is challenging was issued under Section 3(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) read with Article 243Q of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge took the view that the Notification in question, apart from the other Notifications, is bad in law for the reason that the Notification has not been issued by the Governor exercising its personal discretion. He was of the view that this is the case where the Governor should have exercised its personal discretion. He has also taken out that on the complaints of the writ petitioners oral hearing was directed, the hearing which was directed to be given was done by somebody to whom the power was delegated. The Secretary, who issued the Notification, in fact, did not hold the lien. Further reference is also made to Section 327 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, apparently, in regard to the Notification issued under Section 3 of the said Act of 1916, which was also called in question and Schedule VII to the Act, to buttress the reasoning the learned Single Judge found action bad as the Governor has not exercised its discretion individually. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been filed. 3. We heard Mr. S.S. Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General on behalf of the State of Uttarakhand/appellants and Mr. Vivek Shukla, learned counsel on behalf of respondent no. 1/writ petitioner. 4. This Court has already allowed the appeals filed by the State of Uttarakhand in other cases and set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge. As far as this case is concerned, as noted, this is a case under Section 3(2) of the Act of 1959. The writ petitioner is an individual, who also claims to be the Gram Pradhan of Village Jagjeetpur. Mr. Vivek Shukla, learned counsel for respondent no. As far as this case is concerned, as noted, this is a case under Section 3(2) of the Act of 1959. The writ petitioner is an individual, who also claims to be the Gram Pradhan of Village Jagjeetpur. Mr. Vivek Shukla, learned counsel for respondent no. 1/writ petitioner would, in fact, submit that this is a case where a powerful Minister found that he is becoming unpopular and he or any of his candidate will not be able to win an election and he wanted this area to be included for political reason to ensure that his candidate should win the election and for achieving the same this exercise was done. He would, in fact, complain that there is no counter affidavit filed in the writ petition as such averments made there in the writ petition should unrebutted. He further points out that the village in question is self-sufficient village, and it is going to be grabbed for motivated political reasons. He further endeavours to point out, with aid of a document, namely, Annexure 4 report of the Nagar Nigam, which shows that the larger urban area into which this village is going to be subsumed does not have the funds and all this has been ignored while issuing the impugned notification while including village Jagjeetpur. He would further point out the effect of including an area into a larger urban area with reference to Section 3(2) of the Act of 1959. Section 3 of the Act of 1959 reads as under : “[3. Declaration of larger urban area. – (1) Any area specified by the Governor in a notification under clause (2) of Article 243-Q of the Constitution with such limits as are specified therein to be a larger urban area, shall be known as a City, by such name as may specify. (2) Where, by a subsequent notification under clause (2) of Article 243-Q of the Constitution the Governor includes an area in a city, such area shall thereby become subject to all notifications, rules, regulations, bye-laws, orders and directions issued or made under this or any other enactment and in force in the city at the time immediately preceding the inclusion of such area and all taxes, fees and charges imposed under this Act, shall be and continue to be levied and collected in the aforesaid area.].” 5. He would draw our attention towards the judgment in the case of Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd., Gorakhpur Vs. Nagar Mahapalika, Gorakhpur, reported in 1996 (8) SCC 432 for the proposition that once the Panchayat is included into larger urban area, the effect would be that all the taxes would apply and the residents of the area will be called upon to pay the higher taxes which would burden them with additional municipal taxes and charges to be levied as a consequence of the enforcement of the notification. In fact, the writ petitioner by quoting an example has a case that the water charges are also low and that will also witness an increase. He would point out that 40 percent of the people in the area are Scheduled Caste; there are also many members belonging to the OBC category. He points out that there are several Ashrams, which are located in this area. He would further point out that when it becomes a part of the larger urban area, the culture of the area would be disturbed. He points out that if the villagers do not wish to have the area included in the larger urban area, why should it be forced upon them. 6. In this case, we must notice that on a perusal of the judgment impugned in appeal, would show that though various contentions were seen taken, finally the learned Single Judge has noted as follows : “23. On the surface, it looks like an open and shut case for the State, considering the earlier decisions of this Court. But the petitioners do have a point! The point is whether under clause (2) of Article 243Q of the Constitution of India read with Sections 3 & 4 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, the power to decide as to what would constitute a “transitional” or a “smaller” or “larger” urban area is to be exercised by the Governor in its discretionary powers, or by the Government under its Rules of Business? The question is extremely important and goes to the root of the matter. It is also an admitted position that this question was never raised before this Court, either in the earlier round of litigation, or before the Division Bench of this Court in the PIL. The question is extremely important and goes to the root of the matter. It is also an admitted position that this question was never raised before this Court, either in the earlier round of litigation, or before the Division Bench of this Court in the PIL. In fact, even earlier to this, i.e. in the year 2011 when similar matters had come up before this Court where the validity of the inclusion of rural area into urban area was questioned, the present question was not raised. This Court therefore never had the occasion to examine this issue. 24. Now since it has been raised, this Court must examine this question and give its findings. In a recent decision of the Apex Court also relating to Article 243Q of the Constitution of India, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed – “It is a settled principle of law that courts are bound to take note of the constitution and the laws” [Champa Lal v. State of Rajasthan and Ors (Civil Appeal No. 4554 of 2018)]. 25. At the same time, this Court will not look into any other aspect, as they have already been dealt with and a finding has been reached so far as these grounds are concerned, to which a reference has been made above. The only aspect, which this Court has been called upon to examine is whether notifications under Article 243Q (2) read with Sections 3 & 4 of the U.P. Municipalities Act are notifications to be issued by the Governor, under his discretionary powers, or by the Government.” 7. Therefore, apparently, the only aspect, which appears to have been canvassed and pressed before the learned Single Judge by the writ petitioners, was the aspect relating to the validity of a notification and its effect if it is not issued by the Governor in the exercise of its discretionary power. In the circumstances, we do not think we should permit the writ petitioner to urge at appellate stage and that too for the first time the grounds which he has urged before us, and not argued and invited any finding on the issues before the learned Single Judge. 8. In the circumstances, we do not think we should permit the writ petitioner to urge at appellate stage and that too for the first time the grounds which he has urged before us, and not argued and invited any finding on the issues before the learned Single Judge. 8. That apart as far as the case of political malafide is concerned in connection with the “powerful Minister”, the writ petitioner has not made the Minister a party eo nomine nor are there sufficient allegations, which would justify any such conclusion. As far as the question relating to the culture is concerned, there are different value judgments operating in this field. It may be true that people living in a village would wish to preserve that culture, but on the other hand, the need for development of the area is also not a matter, which is to be ignored at the cost of culture. Culture and development can always go parallel together. One old system should not be persisted to continue for ages without there being changes to meet the need of modern era. We have already held that it is not necessary for the Governor to exercise any personal discretion in this matter as the use of the word ‘Governor’ is only as a short time expression of the word Government. We may profitably refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Samsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another reported in 1974 (2) SCC 831 , which is a judgment rendered by the Bench of 7 learned judges, which has culled out the areas where the Governor has discretion expressly. We may also refer to the judgment of a Constitution Bench reported in 2013 (3) SCC 1 in the case of State of Gujarat and Another Vs. Justice R.A. Mehta and others, wherein also the true position of Governor has been culled out. Apart from areas where there is express power with the Governor, as found in Samsher Singh’s case (Supra), we are aware that there could be situations where the Governor must exercise its power in its individual discretion. Justice R.A. Mehta and others, wherein also the true position of Governor has been culled out. Apart from areas where there is express power with the Governor, as found in Samsher Singh’s case (Supra), we are aware that there could be situations where the Governor must exercise its power in its individual discretion. Cases where question arise to as to who is to be invited to form the Government as the Chief Minister, cases of dissolution of the houses, cases of the dismissal of the Ministry are all cases where constitutionally the Governor could act in exercise of personal discretion. Equally, there are cases where the Governor would be called upon to exercise his own discretion. As for instance under particular statutes where he acts ex-officio under a statute. Governor when he acts as a Chancellor is a statutory authority and he would be called upon to exercise its jurisdiction in the light of its own judgment. Cases are also where Governor acts as for instance under Article 192 of the Constitution of India in respect of disqualification allegedly incurred by a member of legislative assembly would have to be exercised not on the basis of aid and advice of the Council of Ministers but on the basis of the recommendation of the competent authority. We are of the view that even under Section 3 of the Act of 1959, the position of the Governor is the same as the position of the Governor under Section 3 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. The wording is pari materia. We only notice, in fact that under Act there does not appear to be a provision similar to Section 4 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. But in this case that is not the question which we have been called upon to answer. We may notice that the learned Single Judge of this Court had in the earlier round of litigation had essentially based on the concession of the learned Advocate General vouchsafed the right of hearing. We may notice in fact that even the writ petitioner has not individually given any objection. The writ petitioner has only produced the objections filed by several others. 9. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the appeal filed by the State is to be allowed. We may notice in fact that even the writ petitioner has not individually given any objection. The writ petitioner has only produced the objections filed by several others. 9. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the appeal filed by the State is to be allowed. The earlier judgment rendered by us in the batch of earlier appeals would also constitute to be reasoning and part of this judgment. Accordingly, the appeal will stand allowed and the judgment of the learned Single Judge will stand set aside; the writ petition will stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.