JUDGMENT : Lok Pal Singh, J. Common substantial questions of law are arising in all these appeals from the same judgment and decree passed in separate suits between the same parties. Therefore, afore-mentioned second appeals are being decided by one common judgment. 2. All these Appeals have been preferred against the impugned judgment and decree dated 02.06.2006. The second appeals were admitted on the following substantial questions of law formulated in appeals :- 1. Whether agreement for sale dated 09.07.1991 cannot be said to be a just document in view of restrictions imposed by Section 11 of Contract Act? 2. Whether the constructing party was competent to enter into an agreement in view of Section 11 of the Contract Act? 3. All these Second Appeals were heard and decided by the then Learned Judge of this Court. At the time of dictating the order the Learned Judge has observed in its judgment and order dated 19.05.2014 that “only question required decision in these Second Appeals was”, whether Court could proceed on the basis that the original agreement in the suits has executed a conveyance by putting his thumb impression when no witness identified his thumb impression amongst other thumb impression appearing on the conveyance tendered in evidence? 4. Aforementioned Second Appeals were decided on the substantial question so posed above. However, the judgment of the Learned Judge was not reflecting on the substantial questions of law framed by the Court at the time of admitting the appeal. 5. Feeling aggrieved by judgment and order dated 19.05.2014, the plaintiff/ respondent filed the review applications which were dismissed by the Learned Judge by order dated 16.06.2016 on the pretext that by means of review application the respondents wish to reargue the case. 6. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff/ respondent preferred SLP No. 21775-21782 of 2014 Parvash Ali Vs. Sugra and Anr. All the four appeals were allowed by the Hon’ble Apex Court vide judgment and order dated 01.09.2014 and matter was remanded back to this Court. At the time of remanding the matter to this Court the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the High Court may, if necessary, reformulate the questions or frame additional substantial questions of law which according to the learned counsel for the respondents arise in the matter. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. At the time of remanding the matter to this Court the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the High Court may, if necessary, reformulate the questions or frame additional substantial questions of law which according to the learned counsel for the respondents arise in the matter. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. In view of this Court, the substantial questions of law which were framed by the Learned Judge of this court at the time of admission of the appeals pertains to the Section 11 of the Contract Act. But there is no pleadings of the defendant/ appellant that at the time of execution of the alleged agreement to sale or sale deed, the defendant was minor. It appears to this Court that without considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the substantial questions of law were framed by the Second Appellate Court. Learned counsel for the parties have fairly submitted that these substantial questions of law are not involved in the present Second Appeals. Definition of substantial question of law has not been given under Section 100 of CPC. However, elaborating the words “substantial question of law” in the case of Santosh Hazari Vs. Purshotam Tewari (2001) 3 SCC 179 the definition of substantial question of law is that a substantial question which goes to the root of the case. Relevant para of the judgment are extracted hereunder :- “15. … The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. The task of an appellate Court affirming the findings of the trial Court is an easier one. The appellate Court agreeing with the view of the trial Court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (See Girijanandini Devi & Ors. Vs. The appellate Court agreeing with the view of the trial Court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (See Girijanandini Devi & Ors. Vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 ). We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate Court for shirking the duty cast on it. While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate Court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial Court must weigh with the appellate Court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same presiding Judge who authors the judgment. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate Court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial Court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate Court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact (See Madhusudan Das Vs. Smt. Narayani Bai). The rule is - and it is nothing more than a rule of practice - that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judges notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. (See Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu Vs. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh & Ors.). Secondly, while reversing a finding of fact the appellate Court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial Court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. (See Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu Vs. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh & Ors.). Secondly, while reversing a finding of fact the appellate Court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial Court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the Court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate Court had discharged the duty expected of it. We need only remind the first appellate Courts of the additional obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present Section 100 substituted in the Code. The first appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final Court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate Court is also a final Court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate Court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one. 16. Reverting back to the facts of the case at hand, prima facie we find the first appellate Court did not discharge the duty cast on it as a Court of first appeal. The High Court having noticed failure on the part of the appellant in not discharging the statutory obligation cast on him by sub-section (3) of Section 100 of the Code, on account of the substantial question of law involved in the appeal having not been stated, much less precisely, in the memorandum of second appeal, ordinarily an opportunity to frame such question should have been afforded to the appellant unless the deficiency was brought to the notice of the appellant previously by the High Court Registry or the court and yet the appellant had persisted in his default. That was not done. That was not done. In our opinion, the following substantial question of law does arise as involved in the case and worth being heard by the High Court :- Whether on the pleadings and the material brought on record by the defendant, the first appellate Court was right in holding that the case of adverse possession was made out by the defendant and the suit filed by the plaintiff was liable to be dismissed as barred by time under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, more so when such finding was arrived at in reversal of the findings of the trial Court?” 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court placed reliance on the ratio of the judgment supra and has reiterated the definition of substantial question of law in the case of Manjunath Rao Vs. U. Chandrashekhar (2017) 15 SSC 309. Relevant para of the judgment are extracted hereunder :- “7. It is well settled in law that the reason is the life of law. It is that filament that injects soul to the judgment. Absence of analysis not only evinces non-application of mind but mummifies the core spirit of the judgment. A Judge has to constantly remind himself that absence of reason in the process of adjudication makes the ultimate decision pregnable. While dealing with the first appeal preferred under Section 96 CPC, the Court in State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh (dead) through his LRs, (2000) 5 SCC 652 took note of the exception to the judgment passed by the first appellate court by observing that there was no due or proper application of mind or any critical analysis or objective consideration of the matter, despite the same being the first appellate court. 8. A three-Judge Bench in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , while discussing about power of the first appellate court, has opined that it is the final court of facts and, therefore, pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. It is necessary to note that the Court had also held thus : “… The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. It is necessary to note that the Court had also held thus : “… The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. The task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial court is an easier one. The appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (See Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 ). We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. …” [Emphasis supplied] The aforesaid passage has to be appositely understood. While reversing the finding and conclusions of the trial Court, the duty of the first appellate court is different than while affirming a judgment. Be it stated, the Court has also held that it is a final court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate court even on questions of law unless such question of law is a substantial one. In the said case, the Court, after referring to the decision in Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1951 SC 120 , has further opined that : “… while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it. We need only remind the first appellate courts of the additional obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present Section 100 substituted in the Code. …” The purpose of referring to the said decision is to highlight the responsibility cast on the first appellate court or a court hearing the first appeal. 9. In Madhukar and others v. Sangram and others, (2001) 4 SCC 756 , the Court noticed that the High Court has framed two questions and thereafter had set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and allowed the first appeal. Discussing about the duty of the first appellate court, the Court had referred to the decision in Santosh Hazari (supra) and reiterated the principles stated therein. 10. In H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith (dead) by LRs, (2005) 10 SCC 243 , the two-Judge Bench ruled : “The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding regarding title. The order of the High Court is cryptic and the same is without assigning any reason.” The said principle has been reiterated in State Bank of India and another v. Emmsons International Limited and another, (2011) 12 SCC 174 . The order of the High Court is cryptic and the same is without assigning any reason.” The said principle has been reiterated in State Bank of India and another v. Emmsons International Limited and another, (2011) 12 SCC 174 . Thus, in the first appeal the parties have right to be heard both on the questions of facts as well as on law and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all the aspects and decide the case by ascribing reasons. 12. On a perusal of the said Rule, it is quite clear that the judgment of the appellate court has to state the reasons for the decision. It is necessary to make it clear that the approach of the first appellate court while affirming the judgment of the trial Court and reversing the same is founded on different parameters as per the judgments of this Court. In Girijanandini Devi (supra), the Court ruled that while agreeing with the view of the trial court on the evidence, it is not necessary to restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given in the trial court judgment which is under appeal should ordinarily suffice. The same has been accepted by another three-Judge Bench in Santosh Hazari (supra). However, while stating the law, the Court has opined that expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage to be adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. We are disposed to think, the expression of the said opinion has to be understood in proper perspective. By no stretch of imagination it can be stated that the first appellate court can quote passages from the trial court judgment and thereafter pen few lines and express the view that there is no reason to differ with the trial Court judgment. That is not the statement of law expressed by the Court. The statement of law made in Santosh Hazari (supra) has to be borne in mind. 13. In this regard, a three-Judge Bench decision in Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao and another, AIR 1974 SC 2048 is worthy of noticing, although the context was different. That is not the statement of law expressed by the Court. The statement of law made in Santosh Hazari (supra) has to be borne in mind. 13. In this regard, a three-Judge Bench decision in Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao and another, AIR 1974 SC 2048 is worthy of noticing, although the context was different. In the said case, the question arose with regard to power of the Division Bench hearing a Letters Patent appeal from the judgment of the single Judge in a first appeal. The Court held that the Letters Patent appeal lies both on questions of fact and law. The purpose of referring to the said decision is only to show that when the Letters Patent appeal did lie, it was not restricted to the questions of law. The appellant could raise issues pertaining to facts and appreciation of evidence. This is indicative of the fact that the first appellate court has a defined role and its judgment should show application of mind and reflect the reasons on the basis of which it agrees with the trial Court. There has to be an “expression of opinion” in the proper sense of the said phrase. It cannot be said that mere concurrence meets the requirement of law. Needless to say, it is one thing to state that the appeal is without any substance and it is another thing to elucidate, analyse and arrive at the conclusion that the appeal is devoid of merit. 14. In the case at hand, as we have noted earlier, the learned Judge has really not ascribed any reason. There has been no analysis of facts or law. There is no discussion with regard to the points urged. While agreeing with the general approval of reasons to support the conclusions of the judgment in appeal, the High Court has to keep in view the language employed in Order XLI Rule 31 CPC and the view expressed in Santosh Hazari (supra). Analysis and reason are to be manifest. When that is not done, needless to say, the judgment of the High Court becomes indefensible.” 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court has defined, what is substantial question of law. Analysis and reason are to be manifest. When that is not done, needless to say, the judgment of the High Court becomes indefensible.” 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court has defined, what is substantial question of law. From the perusal of the substantial questions of law and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, in view of this Court none of the substantial questions of law which were framed at the time of appeal are substantial questions of law, as defined by Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgments supra. 10. The substantial questions of law framed earlier are not substantial questions of laws. Hence, with the consent of the parties, the substantial questions of law framed at the time of appeal are being deleted. 11. From the perusal of the record, in view of this Court, the following substantial questions of law arise in the Second Appeals which are being formulated in the presence of the learned counsel for the parties as under :- 1. Whether the Courts below has recorded the findings on the question of existence of thumb impression of late Abdul Gani (defendant no.1) on the disputed Sale Deed dated 09.07.1991, without there being any evidence on record? 2. Whether the First Appellate Court erred in law without recording its findings on any of the questions of law formulated or giving its finding on issues framed by the trial Court? 12. Learned counsel for the parties agreed that, in fact, these are the real substantial questions of law framed by this Court which are based on the pleadings and evidence and the issues involved in the cases. The aforesaid substantial questions of law have been framed in presence of the parties. Learned counsel for the parties are aware of the aforesaid substantial questions of law and they have submitted that this matter is old one and they are ready with the arguments. Therefore, their arguments be heard today itself. 13. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length on the formulated substantial questions of law framed above. 14. It is contention of Mr. M.S. Tyagi, learned counsel for the appellant that Abdul Gani denied his thumb impression on the disputed sale deed. Mr. Tyagi further submits that none of the witnesses was produced by the plaintiff to prove the factum that the sale deed does contain the thumb impression of late Abdul Gani. Mr. 14. It is contention of Mr. M.S. Tyagi, learned counsel for the appellant that Abdul Gani denied his thumb impression on the disputed sale deed. Mr. Tyagi further submits that none of the witnesses was produced by the plaintiff to prove the factum that the sale deed does contain the thumb impression of late Abdul Gani. Mr. Tyagi invited the attention of this Court in regard to the averments of paragraph no.10 of the written statement and submitted that Abdul Gani specifically stated that he did not executed the Sale Deed dated 09.07.1991. 15. Per contra Mr. Siddhartha Singh submits that on behalf of the plaintiff, the plaintiff was examined as PW-1. He put the execution of the Sale Deed and the fact that Abdul Gani who put signature in his presence. He further submitted that statement made by the plaintiff Parvez, in regard to the factum of thumb impression of Abdul Gani shown in cross-examination. He further submits that the marginal witness Ibrahim in whose presence Abdul Gani put his signature on the Sale Deed also proved the fact that Abdul Gani put his thumb impression in his presence. Another witness PW-3 Abash also proved the same fact and also proved the thumb impression of Abdul Gani on Registered Agreement to Sale. 16. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the material available on record, since, both the Courts below have not recorded their findings as to whether thumb impression of late Gani is available on the disputed Sale Deed or not? Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the learned Trial Court has not afforded an opportunity of hearing to the defendant to prove the factum, that the disputed Sale Deed does not bear thumb impression of late Abdul Gani as the same can be proved by way of expert evidence. Mr. Tyagi further submits that the expert opinion is required to prove the factum as to whether the disputed Sale Deed bears the thumb impression of the Abdul Gani. He further submits that to determine this issue the matter be remanded to the learned trial Court. 17. Mr. Tyagi further submits that the expert opinion is required to prove the factum as to whether the disputed Sale Deed bears the thumb impression of the Abdul Gani. He further submits that to determine this issue the matter be remanded to the learned trial Court. 17. Considering the rival submission of the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that the Court cannot itself examine the genuineness of thumb impression on the Sale Deed, however, it can be ascertained by two modes—firstly, by the presenting oral evidence of the person, in whose presence the thumb impression was put on the Sale Deed, secondly, by way of expert opinion comparing with the admitted thumb impression. Since, no evidence has been adduced by the parties, thus, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly and it is directed that both the parties shall prove the existence and non-existence of the thumb impression of Abdul Gani on the disputed documents. 18. Second substantial question of law is whether the First Appellate Court erred in law without recording its findings on any of the questions of law formulated or giving its finding on issues framed by the trial Court? Perusal of the impugned judgment and degree passed by the First Appellate Court though has recorded the reasons in its judgment but the First Appellate Court while allowing appeal neither addressed its findings on the issues nor formulated any point of determination/ question of law to decide the controversy involved in the suit. Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC prescribes the mode of disposal of First Appeal. The First Appellate Court is the last Court of facts and law. Thus, it is expected from the First Appellate Court to render its decision in conformity with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. The reliance is placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2011) 4 SCC 240 in H. Siddiqui V. A. Ramalingam. The provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 are extracted hereunder: “21. The said provisions provide guidelines for the appellate court as to how the court has to proceed and decide the case. The provisions should be read in such a way as to require that the various particulars mentioned therein should be taken into consideration. The provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 are extracted hereunder: “21. The said provisions provide guidelines for the appellate court as to how the court has to proceed and decide the case. The provisions should be read in such a way as to require that the various particulars mentioned therein should be taken into consideration. Thus, it must be evident from the judgment of the appellate court that the court has properly appreciated the facts/evidence, applied its mind and decided the case considering the material on record. It would amount to substantial compliance of the said provisions if the appellate court’s judgment is based on the independent assessment of the relevant evidence on all important aspect of the matter and the findings of the appellate court are well founded and quite convincing. It is mandatory for the appellate court to independently assess the evidence of the parties and consider the relevant points which arise for adjudication and the bearing of the evidence on those points. Being the final court of fact, the first appellate court must not record mere general expression of concurrence with the trial court judgment rather it must give reasons for its decision on each point independently to that of the trial court. Thus, the entire evidence must be considered and discussed in detail. Such exercise should be done after formulating the points for consideration in terms of the said provisions and the court must proceed in adherence to the requirements of the said statutory provisions. 22. In B.V. Nagesh & Anr. v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy (2010) 13 SSC 530, while dealing with the issue, this Court held as under : “4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case therein is open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. Sitting as a court of appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. 23. More so, none of the courts below had taken into consideration Clause 11 of the agreement dated 30.6.1979 which reads as under : “11. In the event of any default on the part of the vendors in completing the sale the earnest money paid herewith shall be refunded to the purchasers together with a like amount of Rs.5000/- (Rupees five thousand only) as liquidated damages for breach of contract.” Thus, in case of non-execution of the sale deed, the appellant could get the earnest money with damages. 24. So far as the issues of inadequate consideration and rise in price are concerned, both the parties have argued the same at length and placed reliance on a large number of judgments of this Court, including : Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani, (1993) 1 SSC 519 : AIR 1993 SC 1742 ; Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corporation (P) Ltd., (2002) 8 SCC 146 ; P. D’Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu, (2004) 6 SCC 649 ; Jai Narain Parasrampuria v. Pushpa Devi Saraf, (2006) 7 SCC 756 ; Pratap Lakshman Muchandi v. Shamlal Uddavadas Wadhwa, (2008) 12 SCC 67 and Laxman Tatyaba Kankate v. Taramati Harishchandra Dhatrak, (2010) 7 SCC 717 . 25. In view of the above, as we are of the considered opinion that the courts below have not proceeded to adjudicate upon the case strictly in accordance with law, we are not inclined to enter into the issue of inadequate consideration and rise in price. However, the judgment impugned cannot be sustained in the eyes of law” 19. The reliance is also placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2018) 3 SCC 340 in G. Saraswathi V. Rathinammal and Others. The provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 are extracted hereunder : “9. However, the judgment impugned cannot be sustained in the eyes of law” 19. The reliance is also placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2018) 3 SCC 340 in G. Saraswathi V. Rathinammal and Others. The provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 are extracted hereunder : “9. Indeed, in the absence of any application of judicial mind to the factual and legal controversy involved in the appeal and further without even mentioning the factual narration of the case set up by the parties, the findings of the two Courts as to how they dealt with the issues arising in the case in their respective jurisdiction and without there being any discussion, appreciation, reasoning and categorical findings on the issues and why the findings of two Courts below deserve to be upheld or reversed, while dealing with the arguments of the parties in the light of legal principles applicable to the case, it is difficult for this Court to sustain such order of the Division Bench. In our opinion, the disposal of the LPA by the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be said to be in conformity with the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908(hereinafter referred to as “the Code”). 10. Time and again, this Court has emphasized on the Courts the need to pass reasoned order in every case which must contain the narration of the bare facts of the case of the parties to the lis, the issues arising in the case, the submissions urged by the parties, the legal principles applicable to the issues involved and the reasons in support of the findings on all the issues in support of its conclusion. It is really unfortunate that the Division Bench failed to keep in mind this principle while disposing of the appeal and passed a cryptic and unreasoned order. Such order undoubtedly caused prejudice to the parties because it deprived them to know the reasons as to why one party has won and the other has lost. We can never countenance the manner in which such order was passed by the High Court which has compelled us to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the appeal afresh on merits. 11. We can never countenance the manner in which such order was passed by the High Court which has compelled us to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the appeal afresh on merits. 11. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the Division Bench of the High Court for deciding the appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law keeping in view our observations made supra. 12. We, however, make it clear that we have refrained from making any observation on merits of the controversy having formed an opinion to remand the case to the High Court for the reasons mentioned above. The High Court would, therefore, decide the appeal, uninfluenced by any of our observations, strictly in accordance with law. Since the appeal is quite old, we request the High Court to ensure expeditious disposal of the appeal.” 20. It is the settled proposition of law that the First Appellate Court being the last Court of facts and law should take care of the case and decide the First Appeal in conformity with the provisions contained in Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. In case the First Appellate Court did not discharge its legal obligations in deciding the First Appeal in conformity with the provisions contained under Order 41 Rule 31 CPC, the judgment and degree of the First Appellate Court cannot be said to be a proper and prefect judgment. The Hon’ble Apex Court also deprecated the way of deciding the First Appeal without considering the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. Since, the First Appellate Court failed to decide the First Appeal in accordance with the provisions contained in Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and the judgment of First Appellate Court is not in conformity with the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment supra. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 21. Since, the First Appellate Court failed to decide the First Appeal in accordance with the provisions contained in Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and the judgment of First Appellate Court is not in conformity with the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment supra. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 21. Since, both the substantial questions of law have been answered in favour of the defendants/ appellant as this Court is not in a position to decide the Second Appeal finally on merit in absence of the evidence and the suit requires the additional evidence to prove or disprove the existence of thumb impression of Abdul Gani both the judgments and degree passed by the learned Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are set aside. The matter is being remanded to the learned Trial Court to decide the suit expeditiously after giving full opportunity of hearing to the parties. 22. Learned counsel appearing for the parties have informed this Court that pursuant to the judgment and decree dated 19.09.2006 passed by the First Appellate Court. The Sale Deed executed in favour of the plaintiff/ respondent had already been registered in the office of Sub-Registrar Hardiwar. It is further contended that the plaintiff/ respondent herein is in possession of the property in dispute and mutation has already been carried out in favour of the plaintiff/ respondent. 23. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, it is directed that the Sale Deed registered in favour of the plaintiff/ respondent and mutation and possession of the plaintiff/ respondent will remain intact till the decision of the suit. 24. The matter pertains to the suit filed way back in the year 1995 and it is expected from the Trial Court to decide all the suit expeditiously by giving full opportunity of leading evidence to the parties. It is further expected from the learned Trial Court to avoid unnecessary adjournments. 25. In view of the above observations, all the appeals are disposed of accordingly. 26. There will be no order as to costs.