JUDGMENT Hon’ble Jayant Banerji, J.—This Special Appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 8 January 2018 passed in Writ Petition No. 16090 of 1986 by means of which the challenge to the order of termination dated 14 August 1986 by the petitioners was rejected and the writ petition was dismissed. 2. The facts as narrated in the writ petition are that in the year 1984 certain vacancies arose in the Office of the Deputy Transport Commissioner, Bareilly Zone and names were called from the Employment Exchange. Several persons applied for the posts. Call letters were issued to the petitioners and after being duly selected by the Department Selection Committee, the petitioners were appointed as ‘Junior Clerks’ and appointment letters were issued. The petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 were appointed on 30 November 1984 and the petitioner No. 3 was appointed on 19 December 1984. On 14 August 1986, the Deputy Transport Commissioner-respondent No. 3 terminated the services of all the three petitioners. This order of termination was challenged by the petitioners in the writ petition on the ground of arbitrariness, lack of opportunity and non-application of mind. It was alleged in the petition that fresh adhoc appointments were going to be made on the posts of the petitioners. It was also alleged that the persons junior to the petitioners were continuing in service. In supplementary-affidavit, the petitioners enclosed an advertisement published in ‘Hindi Daily’ dated 22 September 1986 advertising the posts against which the services of the petitioners were terminated. 3. In the counter-affidavit to the writ petition filed on behalf of the respondents, it was stated that in order to fill up the existing vacancy of the Junior Clerks,names of candidates were requisitioned from the Employment Exchange, Bareilly and on receipt of applications, after appearing for a type test, the applicants were called for personal interviews on 22 November 1984. A three member Committee was constituted for conducting the personal interview of the candidates. However, before the interview could be held, one of the members of the Committee raised an objection that the vacancies were required to be notified. The applicants who had applied directly had also been included in the list of candidates to be interviewed. It was, therefore, decided that in order to cope up with the work for time being, an adhoc arrangement could be made but the vacancies had to be notified. The applicants who had applied directly had also been included in the list of candidates to be interviewed. It was, therefore, decided that in order to cope up with the work for time being, an adhoc arrangement could be made but the vacancies had to be notified. 4. In this view of the matter, since, in the meantime, one more vacancy had occurred, three candidates were selected and appointed on adhoc basis with the condition that the appointments were purely temporary and liable to be terminated at any time without any prior notice. One of the candidates so appointed declined to take up the appointment on adhoc basis and as such another selected candidate was appointed in his place on 19 December 1984 with the same conditions. 5. The petitioners are the three adhoc appointees. It is further stated that the services of the petitioners were terminated by means of the order dated 14 August 1986, the termination order being served on them on the same day and they were relieved from service. It has also been stated that the vacancies were advertised in a Hindi daily newspaper on 22 September 1986 and the applications received in response to the advertisement were pending in the office for consideration. The services of the petitioners which were on adhoc basis were terminated in order to make regular appointments under the Rules. With regard to the allegation that junior clerks appointed subsequently to the petitioners were continuing in service, the contention is denied and it is stated that no such persons named in the writ petition were ever appointed in the Office and neither were there any other candidates in service who had been appointed on adhoc basis. 6. With regard to the allegation that junior clerks appointed subsequently to the petitioners were continuing in service, the contention is denied and it is stated that no such persons named in the writ petition were ever appointed in the Office and neither were there any other candidates in service who had been appointed on adhoc basis. 6. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that (1) they were entitled to be considered for regularization under the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Adhoc Appointments (On Posts Outside the Purview of the U.P. Public Service Commission) Rules, 1979 (Rules of 1979), (2) the appellants had applied for regular appointment and were interviewed by a regularly constituted committee and they could not be removed from service without giving notice to them, (3) similarly placed persons whose appointment had been terminated in a similar fashion had filed writ petitions before this Court which were allowed by means of the judgement reported in Sanjeev Kumar and another v. State of U.P. and another, 1999(1) AWC 853 and the special appeal filed against that judgement was also dismissed and hence the petitioners are also entitled to have similar relief. (This ground, however, was not taken by the petitioners in the writ petition) 7. In support of his contention learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance also on judgements in U.P. State Electricity Board v. Pooran Chandra Pandey and others, (2007) 11 SCC 92 and another case in State of Jharkhand and others v. Kamal Prasad and others, (2014) 7 SCC 223 . 8. Learned Standing Counsel on the other hand has strongly opposed the contentions made on behalf of the appellants and has relied upon the averments made in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents. It has been further stated that the Constitution Bench judgement of the Supreme Court rendered in the case in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 , would squarely apply to the facts of the present case. It is further stated that the petitioners are not entitled for regularization under the the provisions of the Rules of 1979 and the petitioners have been continuing in service merely on the basis of the interim order passed by this Court in the writ petition. It is further stated that the petitioners are not entitled for regularization under the the provisions of the Rules of 1979 and the petitioners have been continuing in service merely on the basis of the interim order passed by this Court in the writ petition. It has been further contended that despite the writ petition having been dismissed on 8 January 2008, the petitioners concealed this fact from the respondents and continued in service fraudulently till the year 2013. 9. As far as the first contention made on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellants is concerned that they were entitled for regularization under the provisions of Rules of 1979, it is to be seen that the Rules were amended by means of the Third Amendment Rules in the year 2001. The provision for regularization of adhoc appointments under the Rules of 1979 are as under: “4. Regularization of ad hoc Appointments.—(1) Any person who- (i) who directly appointed on ad hoc basis on or before June 30, 1998 and is continuing in service as such on the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Regularization of ad hoc Appointments (On Posts Outside the Purview of the Public Service Commmission) (Third Amendment) Rules, 2001; (ii) possessed requisite qualifications prescribed for regular appointments as the time of such ad hoc Appointment; and (iii) has completed or, as the case may be, after has has completed three years service shall be considered for regular appointment in permanent or temporary vacancy, as may be available, on the basis of his record and suitability before any regular appointment is made in such vacancy in accordance with the relevant rules or orders.” 10. Thus, the three essential requirements for regularization of adhoc appointments were that firstly, the person ought to have been directly appointed on adhoc basis on or before 30 June 1998 and was continuing in service as such on the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Adhoc Appointments (On Posts Outside the Purview of the U.P. Public Service Commission) Third Amendment (Rules), 2001 (Third Amendment Rules, 2001), secondly, possessed the requisite qualification for the appointment at the time of such adhoc appointment and, thirdly, should have completed or as the case may be after he has completed three years service shall be considered for regular appointment in permanent or temporary basis as may be available on the basis of his record and suitability before any regular appointment is made in such vacancy in accordance with the relevant rules or orders. 11. The appointment letters of the petitioners/appellants dated 30 November 1984, 19 December 1984 reflect that the appointments were purely on adhoc basis which was absolutely temporary in nature and their services could be terminated at any time without any prior notice. Thereafter, their services were terminated with effect from 14 August 1986. Thus, it is evident that the petitioners have not completed three years service as was required under the Rules of 1979. The petitioners continued in service, thereafter, merely on the basis of the order dated 24 September 1986 passed by this High Court in the writ petition. Therefore, the factum of their continuance in service post 14 August 1986 is only relatable to and under the interim order passed by this Court for which they can derive no benefit. 12. The second contention of the appellants is that they had applied for regular appointment and were interviewed by regularly constituted Committee and they cannot be removed from service without giving notice. As is apparent from the counter-affidavit filed by the State Government, it has been categorically stated that the appellants and other candidates were called for personal interview on 22 November 1984. However, before the interview could be held, one of the members of the Committee constituted for conducting personal interviews of the candidates raised an objection that the vacancies were required to be notified. The applicant had applied directly had also been included in the list of candidates to be interviewed. However, before the interview could be held, one of the members of the Committee constituted for conducting personal interviews of the candidates raised an objection that the vacancies were required to be notified. The applicant had applied directly had also been included in the list of candidates to be interviewed. It was, therefore, decided that in order to cope up with the work for the time being, an adhoc arrangement could be made and also, that the vacancies had to be notified. In view of this decision taken by the Committee, the appellants were interviewed and the appellants were appointed on adhoc basis with the condition that their services can be terminated at any time without any prior notice. It is also evident from the record that an advertisement was subsequently published in a Hindi Daily newspaper calling for applications for the posts against which the petitioners were earlier appointed on adhoc basis. It has nowhere been stated that the petitioners applied for the posts in pursuance of the advertisement published in the Hindi daily newspaper. Reliance placed by the petitioners in Sanjeev Kumar is of no benefit to the petitioners as would be discussed here under. In this view of the matter, the second contention of the petitioners has also to be rejected. 13. The third contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that similarly placed persons whose services had been terminated in similar fashion had filed writ petitions in which a favourable decision had been made. They have relied upon the judgement of a learned Judge of this Court passed in the case of Sanjeev Kumar by which judgement the petitioners therein (excluding one Sakeel Ahmad) were directed to be reinstated in service with full back wages and other allowances and the impugned orders of termination were quashed. A perusal of the judgement reveals that although the procedure laid down for regular appointment was said to have been complied but the status of the appointees was stated in the appointment letter as temporary. The appointments in question were made on the basis of recommendation made by a duly constituted Selection Committee against substantive vacancies notified to the general public and the Kshetriya Seva Yojan Adhikari. In the appointment letters issued to those petitioners, the appointment were stated to be temporary and liable to be terminated at any time without notice. The appointments in question were made on the basis of recommendation made by a duly constituted Selection Committee against substantive vacancies notified to the general public and the Kshetriya Seva Yojan Adhikari. In the appointment letters issued to those petitioners, the appointment were stated to be temporary and liable to be terminated at any time without notice. The Court then embarked on the issue regarding the real nature of the appointments. The services of the petitioners therein were terminated as ‘no longer required’. The observation of the Court is as follows: “The Court is of the view that for a fair decision of the question whether appointments which were ostensibly made qua the permanent vacancies after giving prior intimation of the vacancies to higher authorities and after advertising the vacancies and calling the names of candidates from the Employment Exchange were vitiated because of the non-compliance of any substantial provisions embodied in the service Rule or for the reason that appointments were not relatable to any vacancy or for any other valid reasons, an opportunity ought to have been proferred to the appointees to show-cause as to why the appointments be not rescinded or service be not terminated for the reasons aforestated. The orders terminating the services of the petitioners are, in the opinion of the Court, vitiated owing to non-compliance with the rules of natural justice.” 14. Thus, the admitted facts of the case of Sanjeev Kumar were that the vacancies in question were advertised and names of candidates were called from Employment Exchange and the order terminating the services of those petitioners stated that their services were no longer required. 15. As stated above, the categorical stand of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed in reply to the writ petition filed by appellants is that since the vacancies were not advertised, for that reason regular appointments were not made particularly in view of the objection raised by a member of the Selection Committee. It was then decided that till the vacancies are duly notified to meet the exigencies at that point of time, adhoc appointments could be made and appointment letters were accordingly issued. The order terminating the services of the petitioners refers to the letters of appointment of the petitioners appointing them on adhoc basis. Their services were terminated in the afternoon of 14 August 1986. The order terminating the services of the petitioners refers to the letters of appointment of the petitioners appointing them on adhoc basis. Their services were terminated in the afternoon of 14 August 1986. Thus, the petitioners at the very outset were put under notice that their services were on an adhoc basis and could be terminated at any time without any prior notice. As also referred hereinabove, an advertisement was subsequently issued in a Hindi daily newspaper inviting applications from candidates for the posts and the petitioners, instead of applying for service, proceeded to file the writ petition in which interim orders were obtained. 16. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the nature of appointment of the petitioners in the present case is markedly different from that of the petitioners in the case of Sanjeev Kumar. Therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to any benefit of the decision of this Court passed in the case of Sanjeev Kumar. 17. In this regard, we may refer to the judgement of the Supreme Court passed in the case of Umadevi. It was held in that judgement that it is ordinarily not proper for the Courts whether acting under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Article 32 of the Constitution, to direct absorption in permanent employment of those who have been engaged without following a due process of selection as envisaged by the constitutional scheme. Paragraph 43 of the aforesaid judgment is as under: “43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, which we have described as ‘litigious employment’ in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The Courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates.” 18. On the issue of legitimate expectation, the Court observed as follows: “47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post.” The Supreme Court further went of to clarify as follows: “53. ......... We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopend based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.” 19. Thus, the Supreme Court in the case of Umadevi has clearly held that if the initial appointment was not made by following due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant Rules, merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. 20. However, as noted above, the facts of the case of the appellants would not bring their service to a position entitling them to benefit of the Rules of 1979 as amended by the Third Amendment Rules of 2001. 21. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellants on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pooran Chandra Pandey is unsustainable. In Pooran Chandra Pandey, the Supreme Court proceeded to distinguish the judgment delivered by the five judges of the Constitution Bench in the case of Umadevi (3) and proceeded to hold that the writ petitioners had put in 22 years of service and it was not reasonable if their claim for regularisation is denied even after such a long period of service. 22. A three judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and others, (2008) 10 SCC 1 , clarified that that the comments and observations made by the two-Judge Bench in Pooran Chandra Pandey should be read as obiter and the same should neither be treated as binding by the High Courts, Tribunals and other Judicial Foras nor they should be relied upon or made basis for bypassing the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Umadevi. The following paragraphs of the judgment of the Supreme Court need to be referred and they are as under: “77. We have carefully analyzed the judgment of the two-Judges Bench (in Pooran Chandra Pandey case) and are of the considered view that the above reproduced observations were not called for. The only issue which fell for consideration by two-Judges Bench was whether the daily-wage employees of the society, the establishment of which was taken over by the Electricity Board alongwith the employees, were entitled to be regularized in terms of the policy decision taken by the Board and whether the High Court committed an error by invoking Article 14 of the Constitution for granting relief to the writ petitioners. The question whether the Electricity Board could frame such a policy was neither raised nor considered by the High Court and this Court. The question whether the Electricity Board could frame such a policy was neither raised nor considered by the High Court and this Court. The High Court simply adverted to the facts of the case and held that once the daily wage employees of the society became employees of the Electricity Board, they could not be discriminated in the matter of implementation of the policy of regularization. Therefore, the two-Judges Bench had no occasion to make any adverse comment on the binding character of the Constitution Bench judgment in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi. ....... ....... 92.In the light of what has been stated above, we deem it proper to clarify that the comments and observations made by the two-Judges Bench in U.P. State Electricity Board v. Pooran Chandra Pandey should be read as obiter and the same should neither be treated as binding by the High Courts, Tribunals and other judicial foras nor they should be relied upon or made basis for bypassing the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench.” 23. Reliance of the learned counsel for the appellant on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand is also misplaced. In that case there was a clear finding that the employees had been in service for more than 22 years from the date of first appointment as junior engineers and 23 years years from the appointment in the posts of Assistant Engineers on adhoc basis and they had been in service independently of any interim order passed by the Court. It was observed by the Supreme Court in paragraph 41 of the judgement in State of Jharkhand that “In view of the categorical finding of fact on the relevant contentious issue that the respondent employees have continued in their service for more than 10 years continuously therefore, the legal principle laid down by this Court in Umadevi (3) case at para 53 squarely applied to the present cases.” 24. The records of the present case clearly indicate that the appellants had served as adhoc employees on their posts for a period of less than two years and continued thereafter only on the strength of the interim order passed by this Court. As such they can claim no benefit of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Jharkhand v. Kamal Prasad and others. 25. As such they can claim no benefit of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Jharkhand v. Kamal Prasad and others. 25. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the appellants have failed to make out any case for setting aside the order passed by the learned Judge in the writ petition. This appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.