JUDGMENT : AKIL KURESHI, J. 1. This appeal is filed by the original respondent Gujarat Slum Clearance Board (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Board' for short). 2. Brief facts are as under. 3. The respondent herein original petitioner who was employed in the Board as Deputy Executive Engineer in the year 1979. In due course, he was promoted to the post of Executive Engineer in the year 1987. While he was discharging such duties at Surat where he was posted, according to the Board, he had made certain advance payments for materials for construction which payments were not according to the rules and made with ulterior motive. A charge-sheet dated 21.12.1994 came to be issued against the petitioner alleging that in various construction works executed during the petitioner's tenure as Executive Engineer, he had made excess advance payments to the contractors which was in breach of the rules and regulations of the Board and was done with ulterior motive of benefiting the contractors. The petitioner had thus, breached rule 3 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Conduct) Rules. To establish this allegation, the charge-sheet relied on the advance payments made by the petitioner to the contractor, the value of the consumed goods as per the record of the Board and the resultant shortfall in the stock. 4. The petitioner filed a detailed defense statement to the said charge-sheet and denied all the allegations. He referred to each tender peacemeal and contended that there was no shortfall of the stock. In addition to challenging the very foundation of the charge-sheet, his main contention was that the duty to verify the stock before the advance payments were made, was that of the Deputy Executive Engineer. As an Executive Engineer, he was not expected to verify such details personally. He had merely accepted the reports of his subordinates and had not committed any misconduct. 5. A detail inquiry was conducted. The Investigating Officer submitted his report dated 09.11.2011 exonerating the petitioner from the charge. Though the charge-sheet contained only one charge, the Inquiry Officer split the charge into three separate elements and held that none of the elements was proved. He recommended dropping of the inquiry against the petitioner. 6. For over five years after the Inquiry Officer submitted his report, the Board took no action on such report either accepting or rejecting the same. He recommended dropping of the inquiry against the petitioner. 6. For over five years after the Inquiry Officer submitted his report, the Board took no action on such report either accepting or rejecting the same. In the meantime, the petitioner applied to the Board for VRS as per the scheme on 17.07.2000. On the ground that the departmental inquiry against the petitioner was pending and not yet over, such request for VRS was not accepted. Instead, the Board issued a show-cause notice dated 21.11.2000 proposing to disagree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. This notice of disagreement also contained reasons why the Disciplinary Authority did not wish to accept the findings of the Inquiry Officer. The petitioner was given opportunity to meet with such reasons. Besides other grounds in such show cause notice, the Disciplinary Authority referred to two letters dated 19.02.1988 and 29.11.1988 issued by the Secretary to the Board, which were placed before the Inquiry Officer by the presenting authority along with the written brief, which according to the Disciplinary Authority, the Inquiry Officer had ignored. In the same show-cause notice, the reference was also made to a panchnama, according to which, the excess stock of material which should have been on the ground as per the payments made by the petitioner was not found. 7. The petitioner filed a detailed reply to the said show cause notice of disagreement on 01.12.2000 and contended that the Inquiry Officer's report should be accepted. The Disciplinary Authority, however, passed an order dated 29.06.2001 and held that the charge against the petitioner was proved. He imposed the punishment of reverting the petitioner to the lower post of Deputy Executive Engineer. Subsequently, the petitioner's request for VRS was accepted. He was made to retire on the lower post of Deputy Executive Engineer, which obviously resulted into substantial financial loss to the petitioner. The petitioner therefore filed the said above mentioned Special Civil Application and challenged the actions of the Board. 8. The learned Single Judge allowed the petition by the impugned judgment. Following factors weighed with the learned Single Judge in the process. The petitioner therefore filed the said above mentioned Special Civil Application and challenged the actions of the Board. 8. The learned Single Judge allowed the petition by the impugned judgment. Following factors weighed with the learned Single Judge in the process. A. According to the learned Judge, unless the findings of the Inquiry Officer are perverse or such that no man of ordinary prudence, the same cannot be set aside and the same yardstick should be applied also by the Disciplinary Authority while re-appreciating the findings of the Inquiry Officer. B. The Disciplinary Authority relied on documents which were not earlier produced. It was noted that two letters dated 19.02.1988 and 29.11.1988 do not form part of the charge-sheet and were merely presented by the Assessing Officer along with his brief. With respect to the Panchnama of the stock available, it was found that no such document was produced during the inquiry at all. The learned Judge was of the opinion that though the disciplinary rules of the Board permitted production of additional documents which do not form part of the charge-sheet, the same cannot be done to fill the lacuna. C. Ordinarily, when there was breach of natural justice in conduct of the inquiry, the Court would remand the proceedings for fresh inquiry from the stage where such defect was detected. However, in the present case, such approach was not warranted. D. The delinquent was correct in contending that it was a duty of the Deputy Executive Engineer to certify the stock and consequently the payments to be made to the contractor. The delinquent had merely acted on such reports. 9. We have heard learned advocates for the parties. Few facts which emerge from the record are that for the alleged misconduct committed by the petitioner in the year 1988, a charge-sheet was issued on 21.12.1994. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 09.11.1995 exonerating the petitioner from the charge. For more than five years after that, the Disciplinary Authority took no action on such report. It was only when the petitioner applied for VRS, the Disciplinary Authority activated the inquiry and issued a notice of disagreement on 21.11.2000. In such notice, reliance was placed on two documents which were merely presented by the presenting officer along with a written brief. Thus, clearly the petitioner had no real opportunity of meeting with these documents under contents thereof. In such notice, reliance was placed on two documents which were merely presented by the presenting officer along with a written brief. Thus, clearly the petitioner had no real opportunity of meeting with these documents under contents thereof. Reliance was also placed on a panchnama to contend that the stock of the construction materials was less than what it should have been. This panchnama was never produced in the inquiry and found place for the first time in the disagreement notice. Ultimately, when the Disciplinary Authority held that the charge was proved, he imposed the punishment of reversion to the lower post. 10. For reasons to be recorded hereinafter, we do not propose to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge, however, for reasons somewhat different than those recorded in the judgment. 11. Firstly, there was a clear breach of natural justice on more occasions than one during the course of conduct of the inquiry. The documents never supplied were relied upon by the Disciplinary Authority at the fag end of the inquiry, after the Inquiry Officer submitted his report exonerating the delinquent from the charge. Secondly, there has been a gross delay in proceeding against the delinquent at all stages. For the alleged misconduct which was committed in the year 1988, the charge-sheet was issued nearly six years later in December, 1994. Once the Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 09.11.1995, the Disciplinary Authority did not take any action on such report. Though the report was in favour of the delinquent, it was, of course, open for the Disciplinary Authority to disagree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer after following established procedure. However, he could not have sat tight over such report for indefinite period of time. This would be more relevant since in the meantime, the Board had framed a VRS scheme and the petitioner had applied for VRS under such scheme. It was only when the petitioner desired a golden handshake with the Board, the Board thought of proceeding further with the pending inquiry which till then was completely shelved and forgotten. 12. This would be more relevant since in the meantime, the Board had framed a VRS scheme and the petitioner had applied for VRS under such scheme. It was only when the petitioner desired a golden handshake with the Board, the Board thought of proceeding further with the pending inquiry which till then was completely shelved and forgotten. 12. The combined effect of these two factors would be that the learned Single Judge was perfectly correct in holding that there had been a breach of important procedure and elements of natural justice in conduct of the inquiry and further, this was not a fit case where the matter should be placed back before the Disciplinary Authority for fresh conclusion. The additional reason for the last conclusion is that the Disciplinary Authority even after holding that the charge was proved, thought of imposing the punishment of reversion to the lower post and not of dismissal from the service. The charge itself was extremely serious. It alleged overpayment at the hands of the petitioner in excess of Rs.5 lakhs to the contractor with malafide intention to benefit the contractor illegally. If the Disciplinary Authority thought that the charge was truly and fully proved, imposition of a penalty other than the extreme penalty of dismissal, removal, or compulsory retirement defies logic. 13. Before concluding, we may clarify one or two aspects emerging from the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Firstly, we have not gone into the factual matrix of the charge which the learned Single Judge has. We have therefore not examined the parameters, upon which, or the limitations subject to which the findings of the Disciplinary Authority would be open to interference by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 14. Secondly and more importantly, we should not be seen to have confirmed the observations of the learned Single Judge that the Disciplinary Authority is bound by the inhabitation of not interfering with the findings of the Inquiry Officer unless the same are perverse. Such limitations are recognized by the Courts while scrutinizing the findings arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority after conducting a domestic inquiry. Such restrictions cannot be read into the powers of the Disciplinary Authority while examining the report of the Inquiry Officer. Such limitations are recognized by the Courts while scrutinizing the findings arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority after conducting a domestic inquiry. Such restrictions cannot be read into the powers of the Disciplinary Authority while examining the report of the Inquiry Officer. An Inquiry Officer is appointed by the Disciplinary Authority to act as a fact finding commission to conduct an inquiry and to submit his findings in form of an inquiry report. This is done ordinarily since a Disciplinary Authority may not have sufficient time to devote for conduct of a departmental inquiry. It is well established through series of judgments of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court that the Inquiry Officer's report is not binding on the Disciplinary Authority and it is free to take a view different from that expressed by the Inquiry Officer, of course, after following the principles of natural justice. 15. In case of State of Assam & Another v. Bimal Kumar Pandit reported in AIR 1963 SC 1612 , a question arose before the Supreme Court in the context of the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution before its amendment requiring issuance of second show cause notice to the delinquent government officer. In this context, the Court observed that at the stage of departmental inquiry, the public officer concerned would be entitled to test the evidence adduced against him and to lead his own evidence. When the inquiry is over and the Inquiry Officer submits his report, the dismissing authority has to consider the report and decide whether it agrees with the conclusion of the report or not. If the findings in the report are against the public officer and the dismissing authority agrees with the said finding, a stage is reached for giving another opportunity to the public officer to show why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. 16. In case of Union of India v. H.C. Goel reported in AIR 1964 SC 364 , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the report of the Inquiry Officer is not binding on the Government. 16. In case of Union of India v. H.C. Goel reported in AIR 1964 SC 364 , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the report of the Inquiry Officer is not binding on the Government. It was further observed that the decisions of the Court did not suggest that the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer concludes a matter and the Government which appoints the Inquiry Officer and directs the inquiry is bound by the said finding and must act on the basis that the said findings are final and cannot be reopened. 17. It is not necessary to refer to long list of judgments on this issue. Suffice it to record that these judgments do not lay down any limitations or restriction on the power of the Disciplinary Authority to disagree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. 18. In case of S.P. Malhotra v. Punjab National Bank and others reported in (2013) 7 SCC 251 and in case of Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and another reported in AIR 1999 SC 3734 , the Supreme Court held that before the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, he must give an opportunity to the delinquent by issuing a show cause notice giving his tentative reasons for such disagreement. 19. Subject to above observations, Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. Under order dated 12.07.2017 while granting interim relief to the appellant Board, the Board was directed to deposit differential amount of VRS benefits payable to the delinquent before this Court. We are informed that the same has been done. Interim relief is vacated. The registry shall release the amount in question in favour of the respondent employee along with accrued interest, if any. If there is any shortfall, it will be open for the respondent to recover the same from the Board. 20. Letters Patent Appeal along with Civil Application is disposed of accordingly.