JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Petitioner husband has filed this appeal against the judgment and decree dated 8th August, 2007 & 20th September, 2008 respectively passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Hazaribagh as the Matrimonial Suit preferred under section 13(1)(1a) and 13(1)(1b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for dissolution of marriage with the respondent was dismissed. 3. The case of the parties as borne out from the pleadings before the learned court and the evidences on record are being summarized here under. The relationship of marriage dates back to its solemnization on 6th March, 1980 till date. It encapsulates various events in the course of their matrimonial relationship. They entered into the marital knot on 6th March, 1980 when the appellant-husband was 26 years of age and respondent-wife was of 18 years. A son was also borne out of the wedlock. They were residing at Hazaribagh at that point of time. The husband was pursuing an engineering course and later on, joined the Coal India Limited in April, 1982 and got posted at Ranchi. It is an undisputed case of the parties that since 1982 they were living separately as the respondent-wife started pursuing her higher studies at Patna. She completed her graduation from Magadh Mahila College, Patna and thereafter completed her B.Ed as well. The respondent had given birth to a male child on 26.11.1982 in a nursing home at Darbhanga, where aunt of the respondent was a doctor. The petitioner was posted between 1989 to 1995 at Daltonganj under the Coal India Limited. The petitioner alleged desertion and cruelty on the part of the respondent in staying away from the matrimonial home since 1982 without any reasonable cause, the respondent, on her part, justified it on the grounds that she was advised by the petitioner and his parents to shift to Patna for higher studies and the petitioner used to visit his in-laws residence at Patna where the marriage was consummated to his full satisfaction. According to the respondent, she continued to visit the petitioner-husband during holidays along with her son while he was posted at Daltonganj. It was also brought on record that the cousin brother of the respondent was married to the sister of the petitioner Binita Seth. She has attributed strenuous relationship due to the ill treatment accorded to her by the petitioner and his parents. It was also brought on record that the cousin brother of the respondent was married to the sister of the petitioner Binita Seth. She has attributed strenuous relationship due to the ill treatment accorded to her by the petitioner and his parents. Finding no alternative, after completion of her post graduation and also B. Ed. course, she took up an employment as Assistant Teacher in Bankipur Girls School, Patna in the year 1990 and started maintaining her along with her son from the salary received from the school. She alleged that as long as the petitioner was posted at Ranchi and living with other employees of CCL, he never tried to bring the respondent by making separate arrangement. He also persuaded the respondent to get a job since her father was a politician and MLA. It was only after shifting to Daltonganj, he took up a separate house. According to the respondent, she continued to maintain her marital relationship with the petitioner that too, on her own expenses. She never deserted the petitioner nor caused any mental torture, cruelty. Therefore, the suit was fit to be dismissed in limine. 4. The respondent, in her written statement, had also taken a plea that since the marriage was solemnized at Madhubani and other acts were done there, the cause of action for institution of the suit did not lay at Hazaribagh. She had, however, not made any further plea that the cause of action could have lied at Daltonganj where she has claimed to have resided with the petitioner of and on during holidays. She alleged that on one occasion i.e. on 03.06.1995 when she rushed to Daltonganj on coming to know of presence of a woman in petitioner's house, the petitioner did not allow her entry on the plea that he had obtained a decree of divorce. She was aggrieved with the conduct of the petitioner and lodged an FIR at Patna under the provisions of sections 323/341/379/109/406/494/498A read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. She was aggrieved with the conduct of the petitioner and lodged an FIR at Patna under the provisions of sections 323/341/379/109/406/494/498A read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. She also inquired about the ex-parte decree rendered by the court of 2nd Additional District Judge at Hazaribagh and preferred an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code for the restoration of the present suit which was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 3 of 1995.The ex-parte decree was set aside and challenge thereto before this Court in Civil Revision No. 348 of 2000 was dismissed by order dated 27.07.2001. Special Leave (C) No. 2216 of 2001, preferred by the petitioner-husband before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India was also dismissed by order dated 05.04.2002. Thereafter the respondent filed her written statement to contest the suit and parties led evidences before the learned family court. 5. The learned family court framed the following issues:- (i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce against the defendant on the ground mentioned in the plaint? (ii) Whether the defendant knowingly and motively deserted the plaintiff and caused cruelty with him? It also framed 3rd issue i.e. (iii) Whether the petitioner and respondent last resided as husband and wife at Hazaribagh or at Daltonganj? 6. Petitioner examined six witnesses, namely P.W. 1 Brajnandan Prasad P.W. 2 Prabhu Mahto P.w.3 Ravi Bhushan Seth, himself P.W.4 Dinesh Prasad Mandal P.W.5 Dipendra Pandey and P.W.6 Dineshwar Prasad. The following documents were also admitted in evidence on behalf of petitioner: Ext. 1: c.c. of M. Case No. 11/02, court of Principal Judge, Patna. Ext. 2 to 2/3: C.C.L, original order No. PM (A) GE/Disc Case/R.B.S./95/19358 dt. 19.8.1995. P.M. (A) OE Dis. Case No. RBS/95/24833 dt. 11.10.1995 No. OE/CCL/MM Trans/21311-31 dt. 19.6.1997. P.M (A) OE/Disc Case No. RBSeth/95/17107311 dt. 18.9.2002 (Show-cause). Ext. 3: Letter written by Meena Kumari dt. 14.8.2002 to Chairman-cum-Managing Director CCL Darbhanga House, Ranchi Ext. 4: c.c. of letter dt. 8.6.1982 written by Ravi to Meena. Ext. 5: c.c. of evidence of Meena Kumari in Misc. Case No. 3/95. Ext. 6 to 6/3: Telephone bill dt. 11.5.2006, 1.6.1995, 11.1.2006 and 1.6.1995. Ext. 7 c.c. of order dated 28.11.1995 passed by Hon'ble High Court, Patna Ranchi Bench, Ranchi C.W.J.C. No. 3389 of 1995 (R) Ext. 8 to 8/1: Original letter dt. 8.6.1982 written by Ravi to Meena. Ext. 5: c.c. of evidence of Meena Kumari in Misc. Case No. 3/95. Ext. 6 to 6/3: Telephone bill dt. 11.5.2006, 1.6.1995, 11.1.2006 and 1.6.1995. Ext. 7 c.c. of order dated 28.11.1995 passed by Hon'ble High Court, Patna Ranchi Bench, Ranchi C.W.J.C. No. 3389 of 1995 (R) Ext. 8 to 8/1: Original letter dt. 23.2.1996 issued by the Director (Admn.) cum Deputy Secretary, letter No. 185 dt. 23.2.1996 and letter No. 237 dt. 18.3.1996 Ext. 9: Service Certificate Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd. letter No. 1292 dt. 22.3.1982 Ext. 10: Appointment letter of C.C.L. India vide letter No. 50297 dt. 8.3.1982. Ext. 11: c.c. of F.I.R. Sadar Kadamkuwan P.S. Case No. 311 of 1995 Ext. 12 to 12/2: letter dt. 28.6.94, 3.8.94 & 14.5.1995 Ext. 13 & 13/1: original birth certificate of Somaiya Shreshth Shradha Ext. 14 to 14/1: Acknowledgement dt. 9.7.1993 Ext. 15 to 15/1: Postal receipt dt. 5.7.1993 and 8.3.1993. Ext. 16: c.c. of marriage Registration Certificate of R.B. Seth & Sangeeta. Ext. 17: c.c. of order dated 22.7.1995 passed by C.J.M., Patna Ext. 18 to 18/2: C.C. of evidence of Kaushik Kumar in G. Case No. 2379/95 dt. 18.6.97 to 11.7.1997, c.c. of deposition of S.D. Sarkar dt. 11.11.1997 in G.R. No. 2379/95 and deposition of Meena Kumari Seth dt. 3.3.1998 in G.R. 2379/95. Ext. 19: letter written by 'Bhabhi' of the respondent. 7. Respondent adduced four witnesses in her support as under: R.W.1 Meena Seth herself. R.w.2 Rajeev Kumar R.W.3 Raj Kumar Mahaseth and R.W.4 Krishnadeo Singh The following documents have been admitted into evidence on behalf of the respondent: Ext. I and I/1: Photograph Ext. A to A/12: Letter dated 13.3.1980, 27.8.1980, 29.11.1980, 16.5.1981, 26.5.1981, 4.8.1981, 31.8.1981, 18.9.1981, 17.11.1981, 12.10.1981, 18.1.1982, 31.1.1982 and 18.2.1982. Ext. B & B/1: Greeting Cards. Ext. C: Hostel Pass. Ext. D: Character Certificate Ext. E: Birth Certificate Ext. F: Marksheet of M.Sc. Ext. F/1: Marksheet of B.Sc. Ext. G: Appointment letter. Ext. H: Photocopy of Extension Order. Ext. I: c.c. of order in Misc. Case No. 03/95 Ext. I/1: c.c. of order of Civil Revision No. 348/2000 (r) Ext. I/2: Photocopy of order of S.C. In Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 22162/2001 Ext. I/3: certified copy of FIR and Charge-sheet. Ext. I/4: certified copy of order dated 8.4.1995 in G.R. Case No. 2379/95 Trial No. 905/96 Ext. J: Termination letter. Ext. Case No. 03/95 Ext. I/1: c.c. of order of Civil Revision No. 348/2000 (r) Ext. I/2: Photocopy of order of S.C. In Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 22162/2001 Ext. I/3: certified copy of FIR and Charge-sheet. Ext. I/4: certified copy of order dated 8.4.1995 in G.R. Case No. 2379/95 Trial No. 905/96 Ext. J: Termination letter. Ext. K: STD Call for the month of 1st June to 30th June, 1995. Ext. L: News Paper. Ext. M: Letter dated 19.2.1982 and Greeting Card written and signed by Vidya Bhushan Seth Ext. N. Letter dated 7.8.1980 written by Usha Seth. Identification for 'Y': letter dated 19.2.1982. Identification for 'Y/1': letter dated 7.8.1980. 8. Learned family court decided both the issue Nos. 1 and 2 against the petitioner-husband, it also ruled against the petitioner on the point of jurisdiction. The suit was accordingly dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 08.08.2007. 9. One more fact which needs to be noticed here is in relation to the acquittal of the husband-appellant by the court of learned 1st Class Judicial Magistrate, Patna by judgment dated 10.04.2011 in G.R. No. 2379 of 1995 arising out of KKN P.S. Case No. 311 of 1995. The learned court acquitted the appellant of the charges under sections 323/341 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code. It further held that the prosecution had failed to produce any evidence to establish the charge under section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. So far the allegation in relation to charge under section 498A is concerned, it was held that the prosecution had failed to produce any evidence of unlawful demand of dowry. Moreover, consistent evidence had been produced that the husband always used to come to meet his wife and child. This itself denied the possibility of cruelty. The charge under section 494 of the IPC were also not proved as the prosecution had failed to produce any evidence that the second marriage had been solemnized within one month of the ex-parte decree of divorce granted by the court. The court also found from the evidence on record that the second marriage was solemnized in the year 1995. The prosecution had, therefore, failed to prove the ingredients under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code beyond all reasonable doubt. The court also found from the evidence on record that the second marriage was solemnized in the year 1995. The prosecution had, therefore, failed to prove the ingredients under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code beyond all reasonable doubt. Based on these findings, the appellant was acquitted of all these charges in the year 2011 after passing of the impugned judgment dated 8th August, 2007. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant has also pointed out that after passing of the ex-parte decree of dissolution of marriage on 21.3.1994. The appellant solemnized marriage with another lady on 10.05.1995 i.e. much beyond the period of limitation for filing application for restoration of the matrimonial suit or for preferring the appeal against it. He has relied upon the provision of section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act to support the submission that it was lawful for the appellant to marry again. It is further stated that two daughters have been borne out of the second marriage of the petitioner thereafter and he resides with them. Learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the findings of the learned family court on all the counts. He submits that the evidence on record does establish both ingredients of desertion on the part of the respondent-wife i.e. the factum of separation and the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). On the part of the appellant also there is complete absence of consent giving reasonable cause to the respondent to leave the matrimonial home since 1982. As a matter of fact, the respondent has been living separately without any provocation or reasonable cause provided by the husband on the pretext of higher studies and the job having been undertaken at Patna. The appellant had enough reason to institute the matrimonial suit at Hazaribagh as continued desertion in such fashion amounted to cruelty. He has made reference to the evidence of one S.D. Sarkar, witness for prosecution in G.R. Case No. 2379 of 1995 also adduced on behalf of respondent in the matrimonial case that this appellant was his tenant since 1992 at Daltonganj and that the respondent-wife had not visited him since 1992. The said evidence is marked as Ext. -18/1. He has made reference to the evidence of one S.D. Sarkar, witness for prosecution in G.R. Case No. 2379 of 1995 also adduced on behalf of respondent in the matrimonial case that this appellant was his tenant since 1992 at Daltonganj and that the respondent-wife had not visited him since 1992. The said evidence is marked as Ext. -18/1. Even by the evidence of other two witnesses relied upon by the learned family court R.W. 2 and 3, the brief sojourn of the respondent-wife at Daltonganj would not create a cause of action for maintaining the Matrimonial suit at Daltonganj as the parties had last resided together at Hazaribagh after their marriage. He submits that refusal to live without a reasonable cause on the part of the respondent in the matrimonial home for so long is in itself an act of mental cruelty. Since the parties had lived separately for more than about 35 years by now, there is no chance of re-union. The refusal on the part of the wife to sever the matrimonial tie which had irretrievably broken down is itself an act of mental cruelty. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a judgment rendered by this court in the case of Vijay Kumar Verma v. Madhuri Verma @ Puspa Verma reported in [2007(3)JCR 4(Jhr)]. He submits that the facts of the case revealed that the parties had been living separately for more than 21 years which was sufficient to hold that their marriage had irretrievably broken down. As a matter of fact in the said case also after passing of the ex-parte decree of divorce the husband had re-married in the year 1998 which was well within the knowledge of the first wife and the children were also borne out of the second marriage. The present case stands on better footing as the second marriage was solemnized on 10.5.95 before the application for restoration of matrimonial suit was filed on 23.06.1995. He has also relied upon a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta reported in (2002) 5 SCC 706 on the plea of mental cruelty. He submits that making of false complaint to the police in itself is sufficient to cause mental torture, depression, frustration, anguish and are enough to hold acts of mental cruelty perpetrated by the other spouse. He submits that making of false complaint to the police in itself is sufficient to cause mental torture, depression, frustration, anguish and are enough to hold acts of mental cruelty perpetrated by the other spouse. The appellant had also been placed under suspension in the service because of the unwarranted allegation made by the respondent. The appellant has already superannuated from the service few years back. The marriage has irretrievably broken down, therefore it would be in the interest of both the parties that the marriage be dissolved. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife submits that the entire materials on record taken together conclusively shows that the respondent had all along wanted to live in her matrimonial home. Initially after her marriage, it was the petitioner and his family members, who were better educated, who insisted upon her to undertake higher education at Patna. That was the reason for her stay at Patna in her parents' house where she pursued graduation, post graduation and B.Ed course successfully. In fact, it was also on the instigation of the petitioner she undertook a job in a government school to earn in a handsome manner. However, she made repeated efforts to re-kindle and maintain matrimonial relationship with the petitioner by frequently undertaking visits during holidays and vacation between 1992 to 1995 at his place of posting at Daltonganj. The respondent showed her complete intent to keep the marriage alive. However, she was taken aback on the news of the second marriage of the petitioner and also ex-parte decree for the dissolution of the marriage having been obtained behind her back. It was only thereafter that she pursued litigation upto the Apex Court and got the matrimonial suit restored after setting aside of the ex-parte decree. The challenge thereto on behalf of the petitioner upto the Apex Court also failed. The respondent had also sufficient cause of action to institute a criminal case for the offences U/s 323/341/379/109/406/494/498A read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. She also instituted a Maintenance case under Section 125 of the Indian Penal Code at Patna. She has all through shown her intention till date to continue with the matrimonial relationship. Even during the course of mediation undertaken pursuant to the orders of this Court dated 3.4.2017, she expressed her desire to stay with her husband. She also instituted a Maintenance case under Section 125 of the Indian Penal Code at Patna. She has all through shown her intention till date to continue with the matrimonial relationship. Even during the course of mediation undertaken pursuant to the orders of this Court dated 3.4.2017, she expressed her desire to stay with her husband. However, the petitioner is at fault in refusing to keep her in the matrimonial home, more so for the reason that he has surreptitiously contracted second marriage after obtaining ex-parte decree for dissolution of marriage in the year 1994, without proper notice to her. In such circumstances, the learned family court was fully justified in dismissing the matrimonial suit. The petitioner had failed to establish willful desertion or cruelty against the respondent-wife to obtain a decree of dissolution of marriage. Petitioner should not be allowed to benefit out of his own wrong. In such circumstances the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 13. We have considered the submissions of the counsel for the parties, the material, pleadings and evidences on record and also the judgments cited on their behalf. From the materials, pleadings and evidences on record, we, on the one hand, find justification on the part of the respondent-wife to pursue higher education may be at the instance of the petitioner and reason to live at Patna with her parents. We also find from the evidence on record that the petitioner used to visit at his in-laws house, even as per the case of the respondent where their marriage was consummated to the full satisfaction of the petitioner. We also find that after completion of her education, the respondent undertook a job at Patna, but, apart from her occasional visits to the husband, while he was posted at Daltonganj along with her child between 1992 to 1994-95 which is also disputed by the appellant on the basis of evidence of one S.D. Sarkar, there was no other overt act on the part of the respondent to permanently inhabit the matrimonial home. In fact, she lived along with her parents at Patna throughout that period. The continued period of separation in that way from 1982 onwards till the matrimonial suit was instituted in the year 1993 could be taken as an indication on the part of one of the spouses not to live together. In fact, she lived along with her parents at Patna throughout that period. The continued period of separation in that way from 1982 onwards till the matrimonial suit was instituted in the year 1993 could be taken as an indication on the part of one of the spouses not to live together. The marital life should be reviewed as a whole and if such continued separation over a long period of time is reckoned, it may provide a cause of action to one of the spouses to seek dissolution of the marriage itself. The matrimonial suit instituted by the petitioner in the year 1993 was decreed ex-parte. The petitioner incurred second marriage much beyond time prescribed for seeking restoration of the suit or preferring an appeal by the aggrieved party. We may usefully refer to the provisions of Section 15 of Hindu Marriage Act which reads as under: "15. Divorced persons when may marry again-When a marriage has been dissolved by a decree of divorce and either there is no right of appeal against the decree or, if there is such a right of appeal, the time for appealing has expired without an appeal having been presented, or an appeal has been presented but has been dismissed, it shall be lawful for either party to the marriage to marry again" 14. In the facts and circumstances as noted above, the second marriage of the petitioner was solemnized much after the time prescribed for preferring appeal. In fact the miscellaneous case for restoration of the suit and setting aside of the ex-parte decree was filed after the solemnization of the second marriage of the petitioner i.e. on 10.06.1995. The second marriage of the petitioner, technically speaking, cannot be said to be unlawful. The appellant has also got two daughters out of the second marriage. On the other hand, the criminal prosecution launched by the respondent against him for the offences of bigamy, under section 494 of the IPC, cruelty in marriage under section 498A and other offences under sections 323/341/406 etc has failed and the appellant has been acquitted by the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna by the judgment dated 10.04.2011 during the pendency of this appeal. It can, therefore, be safely concluded that the accusations made against the petitioner by the respondent-wife were false and could not be proved to the hilt. It can, therefore, be safely concluded that the accusations made against the petitioner by the respondent-wife were false and could not be proved to the hilt. False accusations in itself has been treated as a ground of mental cruelty by the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Parveen Mehta (supra). The apex Court has, while dealing with the provisions of section 13 (1)(i-a), held at para 19 of the report that the definition is comprehensive enough to include cases of physical as also mental cruelty. Cruelty for the purpose of section 13(1)(i-a) is to be taken as a behaviour by one spouse towards the other, which causes reasonable apprehension in the mind of the latter that it is not safe for him or her to continue the matrimonial relationship with the other. Mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling with one of the spouses due to the behaviour or behavioural pattern by the other and inference can be drawn from the attending facts and circumstances taken cumulatively. The Apex Court in the case reported in 2013(5)SCC 226 has discussed the grounds for the mental cruelty at para 10 to 16 of the report, while relying upon the precedents on the point i.e. Samar Ghose V. Jaya Ghose, (2007)4 SCC 511 and other cases. We may refer to para 11 of the report which sets out illustrative cases where inference of "mental cruelty" can be drawn. This list is obviously not exhaustive because each case presents its own peculiar factual matrix and existence or otherwise of mental cruelty to be judged by applying mind to individual facts of the case. The Apex Court also observed at para 29 of the report that the inference drawn by the High Court was wrong that since the husband and wife did not stay together there is no question of the parties causing cruelty to each other. Staying together under the same roof is not a precondition for mental cruelty. The Apex Court had also found that the parties had been living separately for more than 10 years. This separation has created an unbridgeable distance between the two. As per the opinion rendered in the case of Samar Ghose (Supra) relied therein also, the Apex Court found that if the wife refuses to sever the tie, it may lead to mental cruelty. This separation has created an unbridgeable distance between the two. As per the opinion rendered in the case of Samar Ghose (Supra) relied therein also, the Apex Court found that if the wife refuses to sever the tie, it may lead to mental cruelty. A question also arose whether the marriage has irretrievably broken down? It was observed that though irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, but, where marriage is beyond repair on account of bitterness created by the acts of the husband or the wife or of both, the courts have always taken irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a very weighty circumstance amongst others necessitating severance of marital tie. A marriage which is dead for all purposes cannot be revived by the court's verdict, if the parties are not willing. This is because marriage involves human sentiments and emotions and if they are dried up there is hardly any chance of their springing back to life on account of artificial reunion created by the court's decree. The Apex Court at para 34 of the report held that in the ultimate analysis, because of mental cruelty perpetrated by the wife to the appellant/husband, dissolution of marriage will relieve both sides of pain and anguish. Even if the court refused decree of divorce to the appellant/husband there were hardly any chance of the respondent wife leading a happy life with the appellant husband because a lot of bitterness has been created by the conduct of the respondent wife. 15. Before parting, the Apex Court also touched upon an issue in the interest of victims of the matrimonial disputes. It held that by recording a finding against the respondent wife that she had caused mental cruelty to the appellant husband, the court may not be understood, however, to have said that the fault lies only with the respondent wife. In matrimonial disputes there is hardly any case where one spouse is at fault. But, then, before the dispute assumes alarming proportions, someone must make efforts to make parties see reason. If the bitterness escalated and the marriage becomes beyond repair, then it is in the larger interest of the parties to sever the relationship. 16. In matrimonial disputes there is hardly any case where one spouse is at fault. But, then, before the dispute assumes alarming proportions, someone must make efforts to make parties see reason. If the bitterness escalated and the marriage becomes beyond repair, then it is in the larger interest of the parties to sever the relationship. 16. After having profitably referred to the illuminating opinion of the Apex Court on the subject, we find that in the factual matrix of the present case spread over a period of 35 years, since the parties started living separately, we cannot, but, express our view that their relationship has reached to such stage where re-conciliation is a remote possibility. The petitioner had contracted a second marriage which cannot be termed illegal in view of the provisions of section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. He has got two daughters, borne out of the marriage. The criminal prosecution launched against him by the respondent wife for bigamy having failed, his marriage for the second time can, therefore, also not be declared to be illegal, except for the purposes of maintaining an illusionary relationship with the petitioner though there are no sentiments or emotions left to be ignited between the parties. The matrimonial bond, therefore, appears to be beyond repair. By referring to the illustrative cases of mental cruelty as laid down in the case of Samar Ghose (supra), we can well say that the marriage has become a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever the tie, the law in such cases, does not always serve the sanctity of the marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feeling and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty. It is pertinent to note that in Samar Ghose v. Jaya Ghose case (supra) they had lived separately for more than sixteen and a half years which fact led to the conclusion that the matrimonial bond had been ruptured beyond repair because of the mental cruelty caused by the wife. In the factual matrix of the present case where the parties have been living separately for a period over 35 years by now a similar view can be taken. In the factual matrix of the present case where the parties have been living separately for a period over 35 years by now a similar view can be taken. We are, therefore, of the considered view that it is fit and proper to dissolve the marriage between the parties, subject to payment of permanent alimony on the part of the appellant husband. 17. We do not wish to dilate on the third issue relating to the jurisdiction of the learned court, in the factual background of the case, more so, on account of lack of any pleadings on the part of the respondent wife in relation to the maintainability of the cause of action at Daltonganj. The respondent seems to have developed a case on the basis of evidence adduced beyond pleadings on that point. 18. As per the enquiry made from the learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant has superannuated from the job of Central Coal Field Limited from the post of Engineer after having served the Organization since his appointment in the year 1982 itself, spanning a career of 30-32 years. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the interest of justice would be served, if a permanent alimony of Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rs. Twenty Lac only) is granted as it would be commensurate to the requirement and the status of the respondent wife. The appellant must have enough worth having retired as an Engineer under the CCL, an instrumentality of the State. The marriage between the parties stands dissolved. The appellant shall pay a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/-(Twenty Lac only) as permanent alimony to the respondent wife within a period of three months. The impugned judgment and decree dated 08.08.2007 and 20.09.2008 respectively passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Hazaribagh in Matrimonial Suit No. 26 of 1993 is set aside. 19. The appeal stands allowed. Decree accordingly.