JUDGMENT & ORDER : Heard Ms. P. Dhar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. M. Debbarma, learned Addl. G.A. appearing for the respondents No.1,2 & 6, Mr. D.C. Nath, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.3 and Mr. J. Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No.4 & 5. 2. The petitioner was working as the Health Management Information Systems, HMIS in short, Assistant [Nodal M & E Officer) under the District Health & Family Welfare Society, Gomati District on contract basis for a period of 11 months in the fixed pay but she was not granted renewal for which, otherwise she was supposed to be considered in terms of the condition of the contract as provided in the memorandum dated 13.11.2013 [Anenxure-1 to the writ petition]. 3. Briefly stated, the petitioner’s case is that the similarly situated contractual employees got renewal by way of extension of their tenure but the petitioner’s case was not considered and she was released by the memorandum dated 05.01.2015 [Annexure-4 to the writ petition] from the service of HMIS Assistant, [Nodal M&E Officer] SDH/DH/SH under National Health Mission w.e.f. 14.01.2014. Subsequently, by the corrigendum dated 07.01.2015 the date of effect was corrected to 14.01.2015. The petitioner has submitted that the foundation for not granting the renewal of her service by way of extending the tenure was on the basis of certain materials which have stigmatized the petitioner in respect of her integrity and those materials were taken into consideration for denying the renewal of the petitioner by way of extension of tenure. For example, the petitioner has submitted that one allegation against her is that she had forged the signature of the Chief Medical Officer, CMO in short, for purpose of obtaining the personal loan from Tripura Gramin Bank, Udaipur Branch. For this purpose, the petitioner has referred to a communication made by the CMO, Executive Secretary of DHFWS to the Officer-in-Charge, R.K. Pur police station stating that the petitioner had manipulated his signature for obtaining the loan amounting to Rs.3,00,000/-. Accordingly, he had urged for taking appropriate action for culpable act. After completion of the investigation, the chargesheet was filed against the petitioner and the charge was farmed under Sections 468/471 of the IPC by the Judicial Magistrate, Court No.2, First Class, Udaipur, Gomati Tripura in PRC(WP) No.62 of 2016. Accordingly, he had urged for taking appropriate action for culpable act. After completion of the investigation, the chargesheet was filed against the petitioner and the charge was farmed under Sections 468/471 of the IPC by the Judicial Magistrate, Court No.2, First Class, Udaipur, Gomati Tripura in PRC(WP) No.62 of 2016. The said order framing the charge was challenged by the petitioner in the court of the Sessions Judge, Gomati Judicial District, Tripura in the Criminal Revision Petitioner No.01(01) of 2017 which was later on transferred to the court of the Addl. Sessions Judge, Gomati Judicial District, Udaipur. By the order dated 07.04.2017, the Addl. Sessions Judge has clearly opined that there is no material to frame the charge and accordingly, the petitioner was discharged from the criminal liability. That order has not been challenged by the State and it has reached to its finality. The petitioner has urged this court to lift the veil as according to her the entire action is mala fide for taking the materials which have stigmatized the petitioner’s integrity and for considering those behind her back. The denial of the right to have defence against such imputation which is otherwise the person, holding a civil post, is entitled under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India has vitiated the decision of non-renewal. 4. In response to this writ petition, the employer who engaged the petitioner in the said post by filing an elaborate reply has stated that the petitioner was also unauthorizedly absent for quite some time without any sanction of leave, but her leave was not sanctioned till the release of the petitioner from the said post. In Para-17 of the said reply, the respondent No.3 has categorically stated as under: 16. That in reply to the averments and/or contentions made in Paragraph Nos.13 & 14 of the writ petition I state that releasing of Smt. Priyanka Datta from the said service was not made on the basis of any deliberation, arbitration and any unfair treatment meted out towards her from this end. It was basis on the manipulation of signature of the CMO which is illegal and without sanction. 5. Ms. It was basis on the manipulation of signature of the CMO which is illegal and without sanction. 5. Ms. P. Dhar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has emphatically submitted that the averments as made in Para-16 of the reply filed by the respondent No.3 clearly shows that only the allegation of forging the signature of the CMO as the Drawing and Disbursing Officer was taken into consideration for taking a decision on renewal. This imputation is the foundation, and the admitted foundation, for not considering the petitioner from further renewal when the other persons were allowed. 6. Mr. Nath, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.3 has in response to the said allegation, as referred in Para-16 of the reply, submitted that there is element of unsuitability, reflected in her absence in the work without any notice or without any sanction of leave. That apart, in terms of the condition, one month’s advance salary has been paid to the petitioner. 7. Mr. J. Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No.4 & 5 has produced the relevant records including the leave register to support the contention of Mr. Nath, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.3 that there was serious allegation from the CMO that his signature was manipulated by the petitioner and the CMO had asked for initiating the disciplinary action against the petitioner. From the records, Mr. Majumder, learned counsel has referred a letter dated 27.12.2018 which was written by the CMO urging the Mission Director to discontinue the services of the petitioner. The petitioner was working under the control of the CMO and as such, the Mission Director took that letter very seriously, as evidence of her unsuitability in the service. That apart, Mr. Majumder, learned counsel has produced the leave register to show that the petitioner was absent. Even if the leave, as entitled to her, as whole is granted to her, her absence will not be covered. But there was no sanction of leave at any point of time for the said absence. 8. Mr. M. Debbarma, learned Addl. G.A. appearing for the State-respondents has supported the contention of Mr. Nath, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.3 and Mr. But there was no sanction of leave at any point of time for the said absence. 8. Mr. M. Debbarma, learned Addl. G.A. appearing for the State-respondents has supported the contention of Mr. Nath, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.3 and Mr. J. Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No.4 & 5 and submitted that the petitioner was supposed to work for 11 months and the petitioner has been released only on completion of 11 months. As such, the petitioner does not have any right to continue in the said post in terms of the conditions of the service. Therefore, this court may not exercise its extra ordinary jurisdiction by intervening with the action of the respondents, particularly the memorandum dated 05.01.2015, Annexure-4 to the writ petition. 9. In response to the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, Ms. Dhar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has shown the so called manipulated signature on the certificate of the DDO. She has strenuously argued that the space for the signature of the DDO is apparently vacant and as such, the allegation of manipulation cannot sustain. She has brought to the notice of this court that even the criminal court has accepted that contention and discharged the petitioner from the criminal liability. Ms. Dhar, learned counsel has referred and relied on a decision of the apex court in Chandra Prakash Shahi vs. State of U.P. & Others, reported in (2000) 5 SCC 152 , where the apex court while dealing with the distinction between the foundation and motive for an action of termination or the release, has observed as under: “Motive” is the moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, “motive” is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? If it was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the action would be upheld in law. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? If it was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the action would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary inquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct which were found to be true in the preliminary inquiry. The apex court in Chandra Prakash Shahi (supra) has further observed as under: “19. While the judicial pronouncements stood at that stage, the entire case-law was reviewed by this Court in State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi : (1976) 4 SCC 52 in which it was contended that the legal and constitutional position with regard to an order of termination was not settled as there were conflicting decisions of this Court on that question. This contention was not accepted and on a review of the entire case-law, including the Seven-Judge Bench decision in Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab: (1974) 2 SCC 831 it was laid down that the Court has consistently held that the “motive”, in passing an order of termination or reversion, operating in the minds of the Government was not a relevant factor for determining whether the order was passed by way of punishment. What was determinative of the true nature of the order was not its exterior form but the “foundation” on which it was based. If misconduct or negligence was the foundation of the order of termination, or for that matter, reversion, the order would be punitive in nature. The Court also referred to the decision in Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey: (1976) 3 SCC 334 in which it was observed as under: “7. We think that the principles involved in applying Article 311(2) having been sufficiently explained in Samsher Singh case1 it should no longer be possible to urge that Sughar Singh case17 could give rise to some misapprehension of the law. Indeed, we do not think that the principles of law declared and applied so often have really changed. We think that the principles involved in applying Article 311(2) having been sufficiently explained in Samsher Singh case1 it should no longer be possible to urge that Sughar Singh case17 could give rise to some misapprehension of the law. Indeed, we do not think that the principles of law declared and applied so often have really changed. But, the application of the same law to the different circumstances and facts of various cases which have come up to this Court could create the impression sometimes that there is some conflict between different decisions of this Court. Even where there appears to be some conflict, it would, we think, vanish when the ratio decidendi of each case is correctly understood. It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. After appreciating the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, this court is of the considered opinion that it is not an order of termination but it is an order of release on expiry of the contract, but what the petitioner has submitted and which has not been denied by the respondents is that the similarly situated persons who were also engaged by the same type of contract, has been renewed on assessment of their performance for further tenure. But in the case of the petitioner, on assumption that the petitioner has forged the signature of the DDO (CMO) as stated in Para-16 of the reply filed by the respondent No.3, her contract was not renewed for the further tenure. Even though there are other grounds of unsuitability as assigned by the respondents No.3, 4, 5 & 6. But that was the foundation of the said action. In view of this, this court is of the view that the petitioner was supposed to get an opportunity to defend herself against the said allegation of serious misconduct and which was made the foundation for not renewing her contract at par with the other persons who were also working under the same nature of engagement. In view of this, this court is of the view that the petitioner was supposed to get an opportunity to defend herself against the said allegation of serious misconduct and which was made the foundation for not renewing her contract at par with the other persons who were also working under the same nature of engagement. The right of the petitioner to continue is not in-defeasible. It is subject to suitability. Even the renewal is not a right. If the employer finds that she is suitable to continue in the same engagement, they are at their discretion to renew the contract for a further tenure under the same terms and conditions or under new conditions. But what happened in this case is that some other similarly situated persons were considered for renewal of their contractual engagement, but the petitioner was not considered and she was released on the said foundation as stated above. Thus, this court is of the considered view that the said release order contained in the memorandum dated 05.01.2014 [Annexure-4 to the writ petition], is liable to be interfered with and accordingly, the same is set aside. The respondent No.3 shall give the reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to project her defence or to have her say by cataloging the allegations which were considered as the foundation during non-renewal and after due inquiry on following the principles of natural justice, the respondent No.3 shall take an appropriate decision. On the basis of the outcome, the respondent No.3 shall reconsider whether the petitioner’s contract shall be renewed or not. It is made abundantly clear that if after the inquiry, the petitioner is exonerated from the imputation which was considered as the foundation for non-renewal, then the petitioner’s case shall be considered positively by the respondents. It is also made clear that the other elements as pointed out, such as the absence from the job can also be considered at the time of such renewal. 11. Having observed thus, this petition stands allowed to the extent as indicated above. Before parting with the records, it is made clear that the petitioner will not get any back wage because she does not have any subsisting right or indefeasible right to get such wage. 11. Having observed thus, this petition stands allowed to the extent as indicated above. Before parting with the records, it is made clear that the petitioner will not get any back wage because she does not have any subsisting right or indefeasible right to get such wage. If the petitioner is exonerated from the alleged misconduct which has formed the foundation, she has right to be fairly considered for renewal of the contract in the same post in which she was discharging her duties. There shall be no order as to costs. A copy of this judgment and order be furnished to Mr. Nath, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.3 The records as produced by Mr. Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No.4 & 5 be returned.