ORDER 1. With the consent of learned counsel for parties, the matter is finally heard. 2. This appeal under section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khandpeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, is directed against the order dated 30.11.2017 passed in Writ Petition No. 2358/2014; whereby, the claim of the appellant for appointment on compassionate ground has been negatived. 3. Father of the appellant employed as Security Guard with the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, as it was prior to its bifurcation as the Madhya Pradesh Poorva Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Company, died on 2.11.2001. The appellant was minor. On attaining majority, he applied for compassionate appointment in the year 2004 which was turned down by order communicated on 14.9.2004. Later, vide order No. 01-07/ N% /45, Jabalpur dated 1.9.2000, the Board has imposed ban on compassionate appointment. That by order dated 3.10.2013, the respondent-company framed policy for compassionate appointment, 2013 brought in vogue w.e.f. 10.4.2012. The appellant vide application dated 15.7.2013 again applied for the appointment on compassionate ground. The same was turned down holding that as per Circular No. 13070-13071, dated 24.12.2014, the claim of the wards of only such employees who died during course of employment and arising out of employment, were to be considered for appointment. Since the death of appellant's father was not during course and arising of employment, his claim was turned down by communication dated 3.2.2016. 4. Since the death of appellant's father was not during course and arising of employment, his claim was turned down by communication dated 3.2.2016. 4. Learned Single Judge taking into consideration the policy in vogue, declined to cause any indulgence; on the following findings: “Relevant clauses of policy governing the appointment of employees died in harness as clauses 1.1, 2.1, 3.2.1 and 3.8 read as under: ^^1-1 e/;izns'k e/; {ks= fo|qr forj.k daiuh ds ,sls dkfeZd tks fd ¼1½ e/; izns'k jkT; fo|qr eaMy ds ,sls dkfeZd tks jkT; 'kklu dh vf/klwpuk fnukad 10-4-2012 ds }kjk e/; {ks= daiuh dks vafre :i ls varfjr ,oa vkesfyr gq, gS ,oa daiuh esa gh dk;Zjr gS ;k ¼2½ e/; {ks= daiuh }kjk fu;qDr daiuh ds dkfeZdks dh daiuh lsokdky esa fnoaxr dkfeZd ¼3½ ,sls dkfeZd ftudh e`R;q fnukad 15-11-2000 ds i'pkr fdarq 10-11-2012 ds iwoZ e-iz-jk-fo-e-a@diauh dk dk;Z djrs le;] vkdfLed nq?kZVuk] fo|qr nq?kZVuk] geykojksa }kjk gR;k vFkok dk;Z djrs le; okgu nq?kZVuk ds dkj.k gqbZ gks] ds vkfJrksa dks dafMdk 02 ,oa 03 esa of.kZr ik=rk dh 'krksZ ds vuqlkj vuqdaik fuq;fDr nh tk ldrh gSA dk;Z ds nkSjku nq?kZVuk eqR;q ds izdj.kksa dks vuqdaik fu;qfDr gsrq lkekU; e`R;q ds izdj.kksa ds Åij izkFkfedrk nh tk;sxh rFkk nq?kZVuk e`R;q ds vkosnuksa ij fopkj fd;s tkus ds mijkar gh vU; izdj.kksa ij fopkj fd;k tk,xkA nq?kZVuk e`R;q esa e-iz-jkT; fo|qr e.My@daiuh esa dk;Z djrs le; vkdfLed nq?kZVuk] fo|qr nq?kZVuk] geykojksa }kjk gR;k vFkok dk;Z ds nkSjku okgu nq?kZVuk ds izdj.k 'kkfey fd, tk,xsA 2-1 df.Mdk 1-1 esa of.kZr ifjfLFkfr vuqlkj fnoaxr ,sls dkfeZd dh iRuh vFkok iw.kZr% vkfJr ifr dks] vFkok 1- daiuh lsod dh e`R;q fnukad ls 07 o"kZ rd in miyC/k gksus ij gh mlds vkfJr dks vuqdaik fu;qfDr dh ik=rk gksxhA 3-8 dafMdk 1-1 esa n'kkZ, vuqlkj fnukad 10-4-2012 ds iwoZ ,oa fnukad 15-11-2000 ds i'pkr~ ds nq?kZVuk e`R;q ds izdj.kksa dks NksM+dj] 'ks"k iwoZ ds vLohd`r] fujkd`r ,oa yafcr izdj.kksa ij fopkj ugha fd;k tk,xk** Perusal of these clauses in conjunction give impression that precedence has been given to those cases in which employees have died in harness during the course of the employment like sudden accident/electricity shock etc. Clause 3.8 stipulates that cases of normal death between 15.11.2000 to 10.4.2012 would not be considered. Case of petitioner squarely falls between this period because his father died in 2001. Therefore, authority has rightly rejected the application. Clause 3.8 stipulates that cases of normal death between 15.11.2000 to 10.4.2012 would not be considered. Case of petitioner squarely falls between this period because his father died in 2001. Therefore, authority has rightly rejected the application. One of the important aspect which is worth consideration is that petitioner is 32 years of age as reflected in the petition and death of his father was of year 2001, therefore, financial distress which would have caused at the relevant point of time, now no longer exist with equal ferocity. Therefore, on this count also, case of petitioner does not evoke credence and confidence to interfere. Compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as a matter of right because it dehors regular mode of appointment. Once policy of employment is such that when petitioner could not establish through pleadings that some other identically placed persons were given the benefit of compassionate appointment, parents of whose have died in harness in normal course of death, then no case is made out for interference.” 5. Trite it is that the appointment on compassionate ground is not a right but a privilege and a mode to salvage the family of an employee who die in harness from instant financial penury. Thus where the family have survived for year and gracefully, no right accrues for appointment on compassionate ground. In Steel Authority of India Limited v. Madhusudan Das and others: (2008) 15 SCC 560 , it has been held: “15. This Court in a large number of decisions has held that the appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It must be provided for in the rules. The criteria laid down therefor, viz., that the death of the sole bread earner of the family, must be established. It is meant to provide for a minimum relief. When such contentions are raised, the constitutional philosophy of equality behind making such a scheme be taken into consideration. Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India mandate that all eligible candidates should be considered for appointment in the posts which have fallen vacant. Appointment on compassionate ground offered to a dependent of a deceased employee is an exception to the said rule. It is a concession, not a right.” In I.G.(Karmik) and others v. Prahlad Mani Tripathi: [ (2007) 6 SCC 162 ], it is observed : “6. Appointment on compassionate ground offered to a dependent of a deceased employee is an exception to the said rule. It is a concession, not a right.” In I.G.(Karmik) and others v. Prahlad Mani Tripathi: [ (2007) 6 SCC 162 ], it is observed : “6. An employee of a State enjoys a status. Recruitment of employees of the State is governed by the rules framed under a statute or the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. In the matter of appointment, the State is obligated to give effect to the constitutional scheme of equality as adumbrated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. All appointments, therefore, must conform to the said constitutional scheme. This Court, however, while laying emphasis on the said proposition carved out an exception in favour of the children or other relatives of the officer who dies or who becomes incapacitated while rendering services in the police department . 7. Public employment is considered to be a wealth. It in terms of the constitutional scheme cannot be given on descent. When such an exception has been carved out by this Court, the same must be strictly complied with. Appointment on compassionate ground is given only for meeting the immediate hardship which is faced by the family by reason of the death of the bread earner. When an appointment is made on compassionate ground, it should be kept confined only to the purpose it seeks to achieve, the idea being not to provide for endless compassion.” In State of Chattisgarh and others v. Dhirjo Kumar Sengar: [ (2009) 13 SCC 600 ], it has been held : “12. This Court times without number has held that appointment on compassionate ground should not be granted as a matter of course. It should be granted only when dependents of the deceased employee who expired all of a sudden while being in service and by reasons thereof his dependents have been living in penury.” In State of Gujarat and others v. Arvind Kumar T.Tiwari and another: [ (2012) 9 SCC 545 ], it has been held: “8. It is a settled legal proposition that compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is not simply another method of recruitment. It is a settled legal proposition that compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is not simply another method of recruitment. A claim to be appointed on such a ground, has to be considered in accordance with the rules, regulations or administrative instructions governing the subject, taking into consideration the financial condition of the family of the deceased. Such a category of employment itself, is an exception to the constitutional provisions contained in Articles14 and 16, which provide that there can be no discrimination in public employment. The object of compassionate employment is to enable the family of the deceased to overcome the sudden financial crisis it finds itself facing, and not to confer any status upon it.” 6. In view of above pronouncement of law and the fact that the family had tide over years since 2005, no case is made out for direction to respondents to consider the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground. 7. Consequently, Appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.