S. 768 K. N. Pudur Primary Agricultural Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. v. G. Balakrishnan
2018-01-30
M.VENUGOPAL, S.VAIDYANATHAN
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : M. Venugopal, S. Vaidyanathan, JJ. The Writ Appeal S.R. has been listed "for maintainability", as the Registry has raised query that the appellant is not a party in W.P.No.17367 of 2017 and there is a delay of 60 days in filing the appeal. 2. Challenging the order of the learned single Judge in W.P.No.17367 of 2017, dated 10.10.2017, directing the Police to register the FIR if any cognizable offence is made out, the Society has come forward with the present Writ Appeal and sought leave of the Court and as the issue with regard to the maintainability was raised, the matter is posted before us. 3. Detailed arguments were advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant-Society stating that the Society has not been made as a party-respondent in the Writ Petition and that as there is an adverse order against the Society while allowing such Writ Petition, the Writ Appeal is maintainable and that the Registry ought to have numbered the Writ Appeal. According to the learned counsel, the appellant-Society has got a fundamental right to question the impugned order of the learned single Judge, more particularly when the rights of the Society had been affected. 4. As the Registry raised the question of maintainability, the matter is placed before us after recording the endorsement made by the learned counsel for the appellant on return of papers, endorsing that, "the appellant-Society is not made a party to the writ petition; the order passed by the learned single Judge in W.P.No.17367 of 2017, dated 10.10.2017 is affecting the right of the society; hence, the appellant Society seeking leave of the Court for filing Writ Appeal against the said order; therefore, question of condonation of delay in filing writ appeal does not arise. Direct the Registry may be placed the matter before the Hon'ble Bench for maintainability." 5. Heard both sides and perused the materials available on record. 6. De-hors the aspect of delay in filing the appeal and seeking leave to file the appeal, it is no doubt true that for registering an FIR, not only a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be filed, but also this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is empowered to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction.
6. De-hors the aspect of delay in filing the appeal and seeking leave to file the appeal, it is no doubt true that for registering an FIR, not only a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be filed, but also this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is empowered to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction. When such power has been exercised under Article 226, whether the Writ Appeal (intra-Court appeal) is maintainable before this Court under Clause 15 of the Letters Parent. Under the Constitution of India, there is no provision for intra-Court appeal to be filed against the order of the single Judge passed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in that regard. Article 226 only deals with the power of the High Court to issue certain writs. Writ Petition could be heard either by a single Judge or by a Division Bench consisting of two or more Judges. 7. The intra-Court appeal is provided under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court. For better appreciation, it is useful to quote Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, as follows : "Clause 15.
Writ Petition could be heard either by a single Judge or by a Division Bench consisting of two or more Judges. 7. The intra-Court appeal is provided under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court. For better appreciation, it is useful to quote Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, as follows : "Clause 15. Appeal from the Courts of Original Jurisdiction to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction: And We do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Madras from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Sec.107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Sec.108 of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything herein before provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Sec.108 of the Government of India Act made (on or after the 1st day of February, 1929), in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal, but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our Heirs of Successors in Our or Their Privy Council as hereinafter provided." 8.
From the above extracted Clause 15, it is clear that the appeal shall lie to the High Court of Judicature at Madras from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court, subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed. From the above extract of Clause 15, it is also clear that intra Court appeal is not provided if a single Judge has exercised criminal jurisdiction sitting and hearing the matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. Recently, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, in the decision reported in 2017 (5) SCC 533 (Ram Kishan Fauji Vs. State of Haryana), categorically held that it is manifest that no intra-Court appeal lies against the order of the single Judge in exercise of the criminal jurisdiction. When there are proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising from an order made by the Court in exercise of the power conferred under the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), it would be a criminal proceedings within the meaning of the Letters Patent. On a plain reading of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, it is clear that no appeal lies against the order passed by the learned single Judge in exercise of criminal jurisdiction. Further, the Court in a writ appeal pursuant to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, exercises appellate jurisdiction and not a jurisdiction as conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. When a power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is invoked at the instance of a litigant with regard to any criminal matter, it is deemed to have been exercised by the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Hence, no intra-Court appeal is permissible.
When a power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is invoked at the instance of a litigant with regard to any criminal matter, it is deemed to have been exercised by the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Hence, no intra-Court appeal is permissible. The Bench hearing the matters pertaining to Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, whereas the Bench hearing the matters exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is empowered to deal with the issues that may fall under Section 482 Cr.P.C. As the jurisdiction exercised in this case is one under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only appeal will lie to the Supreme Court and not before the Division Bench of the Court. 10. In the case on hand, the contention that there is suppression of facts by the writ petitioner, cannot be gone into at this stage and it is for the appellant to put forth the same before the learned single Judge and seek necessary clarification if the appellant is otherwise entitled to make and if law permits such application before the learned single Judge. 11. With regard to the contention of the appellant that the appellant-Society that they have not been made as a party to the writ proceedings before the single Judge, we are of the view that in criminal matters, more particularly in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., there is no need for the accused to be made as a party and heard, when a direction is sought for registering a complaint. 12. Hence, we are of the view that if the appellant-Society is aggrieved by the impugned order of the learned single Judge, it is always open for the appellant-Society to approach the Apex Court and not by filing the Writ Appeal before the Division Bench of this Court. 13.
12. Hence, we are of the view that if the appellant-Society is aggrieved by the impugned order of the learned single Judge, it is always open for the appellant-Society to approach the Apex Court and not by filing the Writ Appeal before the Division Bench of this Court. 13. In view of the above observations and discussion so made, de-hors the query raised by the Registry with regard to the delay in filing the appeal and the appellant-Society not being impleaded as a party to the writ proceedings and that in any event, there is a delay in preferring the writ appeal, and that the leave to file appeal is also sought for, we are of the view that the Writ Appeal is not maintainable against the order passed under Criminal Jurisdiction by the learned single Judge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the Registry is directed to return the original papers, if any, to the learned counsel for the appellant, after substituting the same by way of photocopy, so as to enable the Registry to keep the same for record purpose, within 15 days from the date when the order copy is made ready.