JUDGMENT & ORDER : This is an appeal under Section 100 of the CPC from the judgment dated 27.07.2015 delivered in Title Appeal No. 43 of 2013 by the District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala. 2. By the said judgment dated 27.07.2015, the judgment dated 05.04.2013 delivered in Title Suit 129 of 2005 by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Court No.2, Agartala, West Tripura (hereinafter referred to as the trial court) has been affirmed and consequently, the first appeal has been dismissed. By the said judgment dated 05.04.2013, the suit instituted by the appellant has been dismissed. 3. At the time of admitting this appeal, the following substantial question of law was framed by the order dated 04.02.2016 : “Whether the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and affirmed by the appellate Court suffer from perversity for non appreciation/mis-appreciation of the pleadings and evidence on record ?” The appellant was strangely given liberty to raise any other substantial question of law at the time of hearing. But Mr. Mahajan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant did not press any other substantial question of law for purpose of challenging the impugned judgment dated 27.07.2015. 4. The relevant fact is required to be introduced at the outset to appreciate the challenge. The appellant instituted the suit for cancellation of the sale deed No.1-5563 dated 25.05.2007 executed by the defendant No.1 (Exbt.A). The plaintiff is the widow of the original defendant No.1 namely Ramjoy Saha, now deceased. In their wedlock, a female child was borne to them. For some irreconcilable disputes between the plaintiff and the original defendant No.1, the marital relation got seriously jeopardised. In the plaint, it has been alleged that the original defendant No.1 had developed illicit relation with another lady and started a reckless life. The plaintiff on 08.04.2007 found them in a compromising position. The original defendant No.1 in the wake of that incident left the house. The mother in law of the plaintiff came forward to restitute their marital life. In a conciliation meeting, it was decided that the shop premises measuring 0.002 acre will be handed over to the plaintiff and accordingly, one agreement dated 15.04.2017 was entered into, by the original defendant No.1. The mother in law of the plaintiff came forward to restitute their marital life. In a conciliation meeting, it was decided that the shop premises measuring 0.002 acre will be handed over to the plaintiff and accordingly, one agreement dated 15.04.2017 was entered into, by the original defendant No.1. Having got the information from the reliable source on 24.04.2007 that the original defendant No.1 was going to transfer the suit land, the plaintiff rushed to the registry office along with her mother in law and filed the objection against the sale of the suit land. The apprehension came true when the sale deed was presented in the office of the District Sub-registrar on receiving the consideration money of Rs.60,000/- on 25.05.2007, but the District Sub-registrar on the face of the said objection had kept the registration pending and fixed a date for hearing on the objection. At the intervention of the local club, a meeting was convened on 25.06.2007. In the said meeting, it was settled, according to the plaintiff, that the suit premises will be with the appellant and the original respondent No.1 will not transfer the suit land to the defendant No.2 in future. The defendant No.2 will not purchase the suit land. The earnest money of Rs.20,000/- along with expenditure for preparation of the sale deed of Rs.15,000/- had to be paid back to the defendant No.2. Accordingly, those terms was reduced in writing in the form of agreement. But the defendant No.2 on 12.09.2007 came to the suit land and demanded the vacant possession of the suit land showing the sale deed dated 25.05.2007. But the plaintiff resisted him and denied to put him in the possession. 5. On apprehension of dispossession, the plaintiff filed the suit and urged for cancellation of the said sale deed by declaring that the disputed instrument is illegal and void ab-initio. The plaintiff has also urged for perpetual injunction from disturbing and interfering with the possession of the land described in the plaint as ‘the scheduled property’. Both the defendants filed the written statements separately and stated that the allegations made in the pleadings are all false. At the instance of the plaintiff, he was arrested and harassed. The original defendant No.1 had asserted that he took loan from various sources and thus he had no other alternative but to sell off the scheduled property. Both the defendants filed the written statements separately and stated that the allegations made in the pleadings are all false. At the instance of the plaintiff, he was arrested and harassed. The original defendant No.1 had asserted that he took loan from various sources and thus he had no other alternative but to sell off the scheduled property. In para-16 of the written statement, the original defendant No.1 has asserted as under : “16. That on 25.05.2007 the answering Defdt. sold out the suit land to the Defdt. No.2 vide Sale Deed No.1-5563 and delivered possession. The Defdt. No.2 also got possession over the suit land and fixed the signed board in the suit land. On 01.09.2007 the answering Defdt. called by Women P.S. and when the answering Defdt. appeared before the Women P.S. he was arrested by the police against a false case instituted by the Plaintiff by the help of the father of the Plaintiff. After returning from the jail the answering Defdt. found that the Plaintiff forcefully entered into the suit land and took possession over the suit land by breaking the locks used by the Defdt. No.2. The Defdt. No.1 also came to know that the Defdt. No.2 had filed a complaint before the P.S. for the same.” 6. The defendant No.2, Sri. Amitabha Chowdhury in his written statement has stated that he got the possession from the original defendant No.1 when the sale deed was presented for registration on 25.05.2007, even though the sale deed was registered on 03.08.2007. But the plaintiff dispossessed the defendant No.2 on 27.08.2007. He has strongly denied that the sale deed bearing No.1-5563 is void ab-initio. That apart, the defendant No.1 has categorically admitted that he got the full consideration money and executed the sale deed in favour of the defendant No.2 in presence of the witnesses. The trial court had framed the following issues amongst other issues for determining the suit : “(iii) Whether the registered sale deed vide No.1-5563 dated 20.05.2007 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 is illegal and void ab-initio? (iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree of cancellation of the disputed sale deed?” 7. The plaintiff adduced two witnesses and five documentary evidence and the defendants have produced three witnesses and executed three documentary evidence. (iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree of cancellation of the disputed sale deed?” 7. The plaintiff adduced two witnesses and five documentary evidence and the defendants have produced three witnesses and executed three documentary evidence. The trial court on appreciation of the evidence has returned the finding inter alia as under : “Exbt.A is a registered sale deed bearing No.1-5563 dated 25.05.2007. The said sale deed entered between defendant No.1 (since deceased) & 2 in respect of the suit land. Exbt.2 is also a sale deed bearing No.1-4448 entered between the father of defendant No.1 (since deceased) namely Narayan Ch. Saha and defendant No.1 (since deceased) and Exbt. C is a Khatin No.412 in the name of defendant No.1 (since deceased) for the suit premises. 7.5. From the above documents I find that defendant No.1 (since deceased) purchased the suit land from his father by a registered sale deed and mutated h is name in a Khatian bearing No.412 and thereafter he sold the said land by a registered sale deed bearing No.1-5563 to defendant No.2. Accordingly, there is no dispute in respect of the title of the defendant No.1 (since deceased) regarding the suit land. Now, plaintiff alleged that there was an agreement deed vide Exbt.1 dated 15.04.2007 in which it was alleged that the defendant No.1 for the maintenance of plaintiff and her daughter, the suit land has been given to plaintiff. Now, the burden of proof lies upon plaintiff to prove the Exbt.1. This is a un-registered agreement deed and no witness of the said deed was examined by the plaintiff to prove the said agreement deed. Above all, in cross examination PW-1 admitted that she purchased the stamp paper of the above stated agreement deed dated 15.04.2007 and that stamp paper was purchased on day before the said agreement though on perusal of the stamp I find that it was purchased near about one year ago.” 8. The trial court has returned the finding that the agreements (Exbts.3 and 4) did not deal with the title but of the ‘perpetual’ possession by the plaintiff. It thus becomes a document mandatorily registrable. The plaintiff alone has vouched the agreement and its execution did not get support from any other person. The trial court has returned the finding that the agreements (Exbts.3 and 4) did not deal with the title but of the ‘perpetual’ possession by the plaintiff. It thus becomes a document mandatorily registrable. The plaintiff alone has vouched the agreement and its execution did not get support from any other person. On the face of the claim of the original defendant No.1, no such agreement was ever executed by him [this assertion has been made by way of amendment in the written statement], it has been clearly observed by the trial court that since the original defendant No.1 had competence to execute the questioned sale deed, it cannot be cancelled under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act reads as under : 31. When cancellation may be ordered – (1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable ; and the Court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled. (2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, the Court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.” 9. The said judgment was challenged by the plaintiff by filing the first appeal being T.A.43 of 2013 in the Court of the District Judge. By the impugned judgment dated 27.07.2015, the first appellate court returned the finding as noted below and dismissed the appeal : “........Thereafter, the Sale Deed the recital of which was prepared on 25.05.2007 and presented to the Sub Registrar the same day but kept pending because of the dispute was registered on 03.08.2007. Pleaded case of the defendant no.2 is that thereafter, removing all objections and obstructions, he paid the consideration money to defendant No.1 according to the market value and the suit land was sold to him regarding which, deed was submitted before the Sub Registrar on 25.05.2007. Pleaded case of the defendant no.2 is that thereafter, removing all objections and obstructions, he paid the consideration money to defendant No.1 according to the market value and the suit land was sold to him regarding which, deed was submitted before the Sub Registrar on 25.05.2007. It is also his pleaded case that it was agreed by the parties that the objection application filed by the plaintiff and another before the Sub-Registrar shall be withdrawn personally by them and that thereafter, the deed was registered on 03.08.2007. Accordingly, he adduced his evidence and that of Dws. 2 and 3 which could not be shaken in the cross examination. 14. Now, the points on which the learned Court below laid stress need to be discussed. Learned Court below at para 7.5 held that it was the burden of plaintiff to prove the agreement marked Exbt.1. In the opinion of this Appellate Court, the burden was discharged exhibiting it when no objection was raised by defendant No.2. So, examination of the witnesses was not called for. However, one of the witnesses was her mother in law who was substituted as defendant but did not contest the suit and thus did not oppose the case of the plaintiff. In the cross examination, it was suggested that the agreement was forged which since not proved, carries no meaning. Again, when the agreement is proved, the date of purchase of the stamp paper is irrelevant. The deciding factor of the case comes next. Learned Court below has held that though defendant no.2 admitted his signature in the documents marked Exhibits 3 and 4, these not being registered, in view of the provisions of Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act shall apply to Exbt.3. Section 17(1)(c) of the Act applies when the instrument acknowledges the receipt of payment of any consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any such right, title or interest. So, the clause will apply to Exbt.4 because, through this document the money was refunded. Thus, both Exhibits 3 and 4 not being registered and Exbt.A being registered, the latter will prevail in view of the provisions of Sections 49 and 50 of the Registration Act as has been held by the learned Court below.” 10. Mr. So, the clause will apply to Exbt.4 because, through this document the money was refunded. Thus, both Exhibits 3 and 4 not being registered and Exbt.A being registered, the latter will prevail in view of the provisions of Sections 49 and 50 of the Registration Act as has been held by the learned Court below.” 10. Mr. S. Mahajan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the sale deed was registered by practising fraud and misrepresentation on 03.08.2007 and such the purported sale deed was without any consideration and is a sham transaction. Mr. Mahajan, learned counsel has further submitted that the agreement to sale does not ‘create extinguish or limit any right or charge on property’, as such it will not come within the purview of Section 17(c) of the Registration Act. The admission by the respondent No.2 regarding the execution of the agreement dated 26.05.2007 (Exbt.4) has estopped the respondent No.2 to make any further agreement has been alleged but it is evident from the records that on the basis of the presentation made on 25.05.2007 the sale deed was registered on 03.08.2007. From the said agreement to sale dated 11.05.2007 (Exbt.3) it surfaces that the land value was determined at Rs.5,00,000/- and out of that amount a sum of Rs.20,000/- was given as the earnest money. That the said land has been registered showing the value at Rs.60,000/-. Thus the sale deed dated 25.05.2007 is without valid and reasonable consideration and by misrepresentation and fraud. That apart, by the agreement dated 15.04.2007, the original defendant No.1 transferred the right to use the suit land in favour of the plaintiff appellant to maintain her livelihood and for her and their daughters’ livelihood. Mr. Mahajan, learned counsel has therefore submitted that the scheduled or the questioned document being the sale deed dated 25.05.2007 is liable to be cancelled on the ground that the original respondent No.1 was obligated by the agreement dated 15.04.2007 [Exbt.1 series], not registered, which provides that the original defendant No.1 would never be entitled to sale, mortgage or transfer the said dokan viti under any circumstances to anyone. Mr. Mahajan, learned counsel for the appellant has fairly submitted that agreement was not registered, as that was a family arrangement. 11. Mr. Mr. Mahajan, learned counsel for the appellant has fairly submitted that agreement was not registered, as that was a family arrangement. 11. Mr. Mahajan, learned counsel has referred a decision of the apex court in Ram Saran Lall versus Domini Kuer reported in AIR 1961 SC 1747 , but this court is of the considered view that the proposition of law in respect of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 47 of the Registration Act does not have any specific relevance in the context. However in Ram Saran Lall (supra) it has been observed that Section 47 of the Registration Act does not, provide that when a sale would be deemed to be complete. It only permits a document when registered to operate from a certain date which may be earlier than the date when it was registered. The object of this section is to decide which of two or more registered instrument in respect of the same property is to have effect. 12. Mr. Mahajan, learned counsel has on the aspect of registration relied on a decision of the apex court in Kale and Other versus Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others reported in (1976) 3 SCC 119 where the apex court having referred to Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908 has observed as follows : “.........In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 17, Third Edition, at pp. 215-216, the following apt observations regarding the essentials of the family settlement and the principles governing the existence of the same are made: A family arrangement is an agreement between members of the same family, intended to be generally and reasonably for the benefit of the family either by compromising doubtful or disputed rights or by preserving the family property or the peace and security of the family by avoiding litigation or by saving its honour. The agreement may be implied from a long course of dealing, but it is more usual to embody or to effectuate the agreement in a deed to which the term "family arrangement" is applied. Family arrangements are governed by principles which are not applicable to dealings between strangers. The agreement may be implied from a long course of dealing, but it is more usual to embody or to effectuate the agreement in a deed to which the term "family arrangement" is applied. Family arrangements are governed by principles which are not applicable to dealings between strangers. The Court, when deciding the rights of parties under family arrangements or claims to upset such arrangements, considers what in the broadest view of the matter is most for the interest of families, and has regard to considerations which, in dealing with transactions between persons not members of the same family, would not be taken into account. Matters which would be fatal to the validity of similar transactions between strangers are not objections to the binding effect of family arrangements. 10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretized form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions: (1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family; (2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence; (3) The family arrangements may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary; (4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the Court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immoveable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) (sic) (Section 17(1)(b)?) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable; (5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld, and the Courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same; (6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement. 11. The principles indicated above have been clearly enunciated and adroitly adumbrated in a long course of decisions of this Court as also those of the Privy Council and other High Courts, which we shall discuss presently. 12. In Lala Khunni Lal v. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain : LR 38 IA 87, 102 : ILR 33 ALL 356 : 8 ALJ 552 the statement of law regarding the essentials of a valid settlement was fully approved of by their Lordships of the Privy Council. In this connection. the High Court made the following observations which were adopted by the Privy Council: The learned judges say as follows: The true character of the transaction appears to us to have been a settlement between the several members of the family of their disputes, each one relinquishing all claim in respect of all property in dispute other than that falling to his share, and recognizing the right of the others as they had previously asserted it to the portion allotted to them respectively. It was in this light, rather than as conferring a new distinct title on each other, that the parties themselves seem to have regarded the arrangement, and we think that it is the duty of the Courts to uphold and give full effect to such an arrangement. Their Lordships have no hesitation in adopting that view. This decision was fully endorsed by a later decision of the Privy Council in Mt. Hiran Bibi v. Mt. Sohan Bibi : AIR 1914 PC 44 :27 MLJ 149:18 MWN 929 13. Their Lordships have no hesitation in adopting that view. This decision was fully endorsed by a later decision of the Privy Council in Mt. Hiran Bibi v. Mt. Sohan Bibi : AIR 1914 PC 44 :27 MLJ 149:18 MWN 929 13. In Sahu Madho Das v. Pandit Mukand Ram : (1955) 2 SCR 22 , 42-43: AIR 1955 SC 481 , this Court appears to have amplified the doctrine of validity of the family arrangement to the farthest possible extent, where Bose, J. speaking for the Court, observed as follows: It is well settled that a compromise or family arrangement is based on the assumption that there is an antecedent title of some sort in the parties and the agreement acknowledges and defines what that title is, each party relinquishing all claims to property other than that falling to his share and recognising the right of the others, as they had previously asserted it, to the portions allotted to them respectively. That explains why no conveyance is required in these cases to pass the title from the one in whom it resides to the person receiving it under the family arrangement. It is assumed that the title claimed by the person receiving the property under the arrangement had always resided in him or her so far as the property falling to his or her share is concerned and therefore no conveyance is necessary. But, in our opinion, the principle can be carried further and so strongly do the Courts lean in favour of family arrangements that bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid in anticipation, future disputes which might ruin them all, and we have no hesitation in taking the next step (fraud apart) and upholding an arrangement under which one set of members abandons all claim to all title and interest in all the properties in dispute and acknowledges that the sole and absolute title to all the properties resides in only one of their number (provided he or she had claimed the whole and made such an assertion of title) and are content to take such properties as are assigned to their shares as gifts pure and simple from him or her, or as a conveyance for consideration when consideration is present. 14. 14. In Ram Charan Das v. Girjanandini Devi: [1965]3 SCR 841 : AIR 1966 SC 323 this Court observed as follows : Courts give effect to a family settlement upon the broad and general ground that its object is to settle existing or future disputes regarding property amongst members of a family. The word 'family' in the context is not to be understood in a narrow sense of being a group of persons who are recognised in law as having a right of succession or having a claim to a share in the property in dispute.... The consideration for such a settlement, if one may put it that way, is the expectation that such a settlement will result in establishing or ensuring amity and goodwill amongst persons bearing relationship with one another. That consideration having been passed by each of the disputants the settlement consisting of recognition of the right asserted by each other cannot be permitted to be impeached thereafter. 15. In Tek Bahadur Bhujil v. Debi Singh Bhujil : AIR 1966 SC 292 , 295 : (1966)2 SCJ 290 it was pointed out by this Court that a family arrangement could be arrived at even orally and registration would be required only if it was reduced into writing. It was also held that a document which was no more than a memorandum of what had been agreed to did not require registration. This Court had observed thus, Family arrangement as such can be arrived at orally. Its terms may be recorded in writing as a memorandum of what had been agreed upon between the parties. The memorandum need not be prepared for the purpose of being used as a document on which future title of the parties be founded. It is usually prepared as a record of what had been agreed upon so that there be no hazy notions about it in future. It is only when the parties reduce the family arrangement in writing with the purpose of using that writing as proof of what they had arranged and, where the arrangement is brought about by the document as such, that the document would require registration as it is then that it would be a document of title declaring for future what rights in what properties the parties possess. 16. 16. Similarly in Maturi Pullaiah v. Maturi Narasimham : AIR 1966 SC 1836 : (1967) 1 SCJ 848 it was held that even if there was no conflict of legal claims but the settlement was a bona fide one it could be sustained by the Court. Similarly it was also held that even the disputes based upon ignorance of the parties as to their rights were sufficient to sustain the family arrangement. In this connection this Court observed as follows: It will be seen from the said passage that a family arrangement resolves family disputes, and that even disputes based upon ignorance of parties as to their rights may afford a sufficient ground to sustain it. x x x Briefly stated, though conflict of legal claims in praesenti or in future is generally a condition for the validity of a family arrangement, it is not necessarily so. Even bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims will suffice Members of a joint Hindu family may, to maintain peace or to bring about harmony in the family, enter into such a family arrangement. If such an arrangement is entered into bona fide and the terms thereof are fair in the circumstances of a particular case, Courts will more readily give assent to such an arrangement than to avoid it.” [Emphasis added] 13. While arguing on the right of the plaintiff based on the purported ‘family arrangement’ as reduced in the writing Mr. Mahajan, learned counsel has also relied a decision of the apex court in Raghubar Singh and Others versus Gulab Singh and Others reported in (1998) 6 SCC 314 . The passages as referred by Mr. Mahajan, learned counsel are reproduced below : “20. Fazal Ali, J in his exhaustive judgment, dealing with the question of the pre-existing right of a Hindu widow laid down: (SCC pp. 113-14, para 20) "20. Thus on a careful consideration and detailed analysis of the authorities mentioned above and the Shastric Hindu Law on the subject, the following propositions emerge with respect to the incidents and characteristics of a Hindu woman's right to maintenance: (1) that a Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned, and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow; (2) though the widow's right to maintenance is not a right to property but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in property, i.e. it is a jus ad rem not jus in rem and it can be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court; (3) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment and is of such importance that even if the joint property is sold and the purchaser has notice of the widow's right to maintenance, the purchaser is legally bound to provide for her maintenance; (4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing right which existed in the Hindu law long before the passing of the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946, and is, therefore, a pre-existing right; (5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a sort of co-owner in the property of her husband, though her co-ownership is of a subordinate nature; and (6) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she is entitled to retain the possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person who succeeds to the property or purchases the same is in a position to make due arrangements for her maintenance." (emphasis ours) ****************** 23. Thus, we find that there is enough authority for the proposition that the right to maintenance of a Hindu female is a pre-existing right, which existed in the Hindu Law long before the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946 came into force and is not a creation of those statutes, which only recognised that position. Thus, we find that there is enough authority for the proposition that the right to maintenance of a Hindu female is a pre-existing right, which existed in the Hindu Law long before the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946 came into force and is not a creation of those statutes, which only recognised that position. In the words of Fazal Ali, J. in Tulasamma's case : (SCC p. 135, para 62) "(1) The Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing rights.” 14. Finally Mr. Mahajan, learned counsel has brought to the notice of the court a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Beni Prasad and Others versus Smt. Ujji and Others reported in AIR 1978 All 421 where the Allahabad high court has observed that if the executant of the sale deed was holding the property in her own right it could certainly bind the members of the Hindu joint family to which she belongs. On the other hand if the property was only held in her name to secure for her a right or maintenance, and she was in fact not the owner of the property as alleged in the plaint then in that case, the sale deed was certainly one which purported to wrongly fully deprived the plaintiffs of their right to the property and they are certainly entitled to have it cancelled in order to safeguard their rights. 15. 15. Mr. T.K. Deb, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has categorically submitted that the plaintiff does not hold any status to seek cancellation of the registered sale deed inasmuch as the plaintiff does not have any right over the property as demised in the disputed registered instrument to demonstrate her apprehension may cause serious injury to her. There is no dispute that the original defendant No.1 was the owner of the land before the transfer as caused by the registered instrument. So far the issue of consideration value of the land is concerned those are full in the jurisdiction of the revenue. It does not affect the legal right and mere collateral to the context of a person. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has admitted that no suit has been filed by the defendant No.2-respondent against the plaintiff. As the defendant No.2 has admitted that he has been ousted from the possession, the option of taking legal action for recovery of possession still remains with the defendant No.2, unless it is shown that such suit as contemplated is barred by limitation. It is not contentions here. 16. Having appreciated the rival contentions as well as the evidence, this court is of the view that the family arrangement as reduced in writing (Exbt.1 series) cannot be admitted in the evidence for the bar created by Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. Section 49 provides that effect of non registration of documents which required to be registered is that it cannot be considered for any purpose. No document required by Section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered, shall affect immovable property comprised therein or confer any right to adopt or be received as the evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power unless it has been registered. An unregistered document affecting immovable property to be registered may be received as contract in a suit for specific performance or as evidence of part performance or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be affected by the registered instrument. Therefore, by way of the purported family arrangement, the document has been created in writing (Exbt.1 series) was required to be registered. Therefore, by way of the purported family arrangement, the document has been created in writing (Exbt.1 series) was required to be registered. From a bare reading, it surfaces that creation of perpetual right of the plaintiff on the scheduled property has been so created by the said deed of agreement dated 15.04.2007. The answer is available in Kale (supra) where it has been categorically culled out that the registration would be necessary only if the terms of family arrangement are reduced into writing, creating the rights thereby. Whether a family arrangement is always mandatorily registrable in all the circumstances it has been observed by the apex court that a compromise or family arrangement if based on the assumption that there is an antecedent title of some sort in the parties and the agreement acknowledges and defines what the title is, each party relinquishing all claims to property other than that falling to his share and recognising the right of the others as they had previously asserted it, is not registrable. This is not the case in hand. By the said agreement dated 11.5.2007 some rights have been created in favour of the plaintiff but that right is not on the basis of an antecedent title, therefore the said agreement even if assumed to be executed by the original defendant No.1 that will not satisfy the conditions required for cancellation of a registered instrument as provided under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act and as such, the suit must fail. 17. The decision of the Allahabad high court in Beni Prasad (supra) is counterproductive to the argument as launched by Mr. Mahajan, learned counsel. It has been clearly held that if the property is held by a female in her name to secure her right of maintenance and she was in fact not the owner of the property as alleged in the plaint, then, in that case, the sale deed as executed by the said female was certainly one which purported to wrongfully deprive the plaintiffs who instituted the suit for their right over the property and they have certainly entitled to have it cancelled. Creating a right for maintenance does not always convert to a right of title. Creating a right for maintenance does not always convert to a right of title. It is well settled that if the property allocated for maintenance and is not transferred for the said purpose even then also, the proprietor can transfer the said property to any other person. However, on consideration of nature and conditions of arrangement for maintenance, at best the right of maintenance can devolve to the transferee. Thus this court does not find any infirmity in the finding returned by the first appellate court. Hence, this appeal being devoid of merit is dismissed. Draw the decree accordingly. Send down the records thereafter.