ORDER : Heard Ms. P. Dhar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners as well as Mr. M. Debbarma, learned Addl. G.A. and Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel for the respondents No.4, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 12. There is no representation for the other respondents despite due notice from this court. 2. All these writ petitions being WP(C) No.539 of 2017 [Mamata Debnath versus State of Tripura & Others], WP(C) No.540 of 2017 [Ripan Bhowmik versus State of Tripura & Others], WP(C) No.541 of 2017 [Rupan Sharma versus State of Tripura & Others] & WP(C) No.668 of 2017 [Ashish Bhowmik versus State of Tripura & Others] are consolidated for disposal by a common judgment inasmuch as the challenge as projected against the selection and appointment of the respondents No.4 to 12 is set up in the identical resume of facts and the question of law. 3. There is no dispute that by the advertisement dated 06.07.2015 [Annexure-2 to the writ petition] which is a combined employment notification for the posts of Lower Division Clerk, Tehashildar, Surveyor, Amin and Mohrar. This batch of writ petitions is concerned with the selection and appointment in the post of Mohrar [18 vacancies- SC-3, ST-6, UR-9] in the fixed pay of Rs.5,925/- [in the scale of pay of Rs.5,700-24,000/- with GP Rs.2,200/-]. The essential and the preferential qualifications for the said post are as under: Essential Qualifications Madhyamik or equivalent having minimum typing speed minimum 30 words per minute. Preferential Qualifications Preference will be given to persons whose hand writing is good. The selection was proposed on walk on interview basis. The interested candidates were requested to appear before the interview board between 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. on the fixed date with his or her application in plain paper as per format as prescribed, along with two passport size photographs and photo copies of testimonials with the originals. It had been clearly provided that the essential documents will be verified before appearing in the interview board. 4. Even, there is no dispute that the petitioners had applied for the said post of Mohrar as UR candidates and appeared in the interview having substantively adverted to the mode and means of selection. It had been clearly provided that the essential documents will be verified before appearing in the interview board. 4. Even, there is no dispute that the petitioners had applied for the said post of Mohrar as UR candidates and appeared in the interview having substantively adverted to the mode and means of selection. It has been admitted by the petitioners that when they came to know that the petitioners were not selected by the interview boards they took initiative to unearth the information about the outcome by disclosure under the Right to Information Act. From the said disclosure it had surfaced to the fore that the petitioners obtained the marks in the interview as recorded hereunder : Sl. No. Name of Candidate ID No. Total marks obtained 1. Ripan Bhowmik, the writ petitioner in WP(C) No.540 of 2017 SDR-864 30 2. Mamata Debnath, the writ petitioner in WP(C) No.539 of 2017 SDR-298 38 3. Rupan Sharma, the writ petitioner in WP(C) No.541 of 2017 MNP-1579 44 4. Ashish Bhowmik, the writ petitioner in WP(C) No.668 of 2017 SDR-850 27 5. The respondents have filed the original score sheet signed by the members of the interview Board and also a statement in a tabular form showing that none of the respondents got less mark than the writ petitioners. For purpose of reference, the relevant part of the table is extracted hereunder : Respondent Name Sl. No. in the Panel ID SL Total Mark Sheet No. of the original score sheet Surja Prasad Dhar, Respondent No.4 13 KLS-1292 73 P-2 Tushar Kanti Das, Respondent No.5 40 UDP-1052 70 P-4 Sudip Sarkar, Respondent No.6 44 UDP-2957 70 P-4 Lokesh Ranjan Debnath, Respondent No.7 46 SDR-4909 70 P-4 Gautam Baidya, Respondent No.8 47 JRN-1331 70 P-4 Ankita Bhowmik, Respondent No.9 48 SDR-655 70 P-5 Biplab Kanti Sarma, Respondent No.10 50 DMN-1161 69 P-5 Kirti Roy, Respondent No.11 51 SDR-1171 69 P-5 Lipi Debnath (Saha), Respondent No.12 53 SDR-3176 69 P-5 6. The official-respondents in terms of the order dated 27.11.2018 have as well produced the original applications of the petitioners and the entire original scoring sheets for inspection by this court. On the basis of these scoring sheets the above table has been formed. The official-respondents in terms of the order dated 27.11.2018 have as well produced the original applications of the petitioners and the entire original scoring sheets for inspection by this court. On the basis of these scoring sheets the above table has been formed. On scrutiny of the application forms it evinces that the writ petitioner of WP(C) No.539 of 2017 did not even submit any certificate in recognition of her tying skill whereas three other writ petitioners have submitted such certificate along with their application. 7. Ms. P. Dhar, learned counsel has strenuously contended for the petitioners that how by a walk in interview the typing skill or a good hand writing can adjudged by the interview Board. Even the little time that was allotted for the interview was not enough for any other mean to assess those skills. According to the writ petitioners, no separate tests were conducted for assessment of the type writing skills and assessment of good hand writing. Thus, the interview has turned into an eye-wash visited by discretion and whims of the interviewers. Such process cannot be treated as fair and transparent process. Hence, the interference of this court is essentially required for setting aside the selection and appointment of the respondents No.4 to 12 in the post of Mohrar in terms of the said advertisement dated 06.07.2015 [Annexure-2 to the writ petitions]. 8. The official respondents have filed their reply and contested the allegations by stating that there is no specific provision for selection by a written test in the recruitment rules. They have produced the recruitment rules (Annexure R/2 with their reply). From examination of the said recruitment rules it appears that no specific process for selection has been prescribed. In terms of the existing policy as framed by the General Administration (Personal and Training) Department, Government of Tripura as reflected in the memorandum No. F.23(8)-GA(P&T)/14 dated 12.01.2015 [Annexure R/1 to the reply], the said selection was carried out. The selection process was carried out in terms of the said memorandum. The detail procedure has been prescribed therein and according to the said procedure the marks have been allotted to the candidates. There is no challenge against the said memorandum dated 12.01.2015. The selection process was carried out in terms of the said memorandum. The detail procedure has been prescribed therein and according to the said procedure the marks have been allotted to the candidates. There is no challenge against the said memorandum dated 12.01.2015. On examination, this court finds that a detailed procedure/guide lines has been provided to be followed strictly, even how to evaluate and allot marks by the interview Board has been provided for various categories of candidates. Since there is no challenge against the said memorandum, this court will not essay on scrutinising its legality or constitutionality. 9. Mr. M. Debbarma, learned Addl. G.A. appearing for the official respondents has quite emphatically submitted that to maintain the objectivity and reduce the subjectivity, the said method had been chosen and followed. Thus, the allegation of whim or unbridled discretion cannot sustain. Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel assisted Ms. P. Sen, learned counsel appearing for the private-respondents has adopted the submission of Mr. M. Debbarma, learned Addl. G.A. Mr. Debbarma, learned Addl. G.A. has raised a serious jurisprudential objection that all the writ petitioners having participated with full knowledge of the process as adverted in details and later on having found themselves unsuccessful, cannot turn around and challenge the selection process. They are estopped to challenge the said process in the circumstances of this case. 10. Finally, Mr. Debbarma, learned Addl. G.A. has submitted that the question as raised as regards consideration of the essential qualification of type writing skill or the preferential qualification of good hand writing is without substance. The assessment in respect of the type writing skill has been made on the basis of the certificate for type writing skills issued by the competent institutions. But the handwriting since is a preferential qualification, unless the equal marks scored by the candidates, one of which is supposed to get berth in the select panel, then only the said question would have been relevant. But from the score sheet it would be apparent clearly that no such circumstance had emerged. Therefore, for all good reasons, the preferential qualification could have played no role in the selection. Mr. Debbarma, learned Addl. G.A. and Mr. But from the score sheet it would be apparent clearly that no such circumstance had emerged. Therefore, for all good reasons, the preferential qualification could have played no role in the selection. Mr. Debbarma, learned Addl. G.A. and Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel have submitted in unison that all these questions have been taken care of by this court in a batch of writ petitions challenging the selection and appointment emanated from the said advertisement in Gopal Saha versus State of Tripura and Others etc. [Judgement and order dated 03.01.2018 in WP(C) No.875 of 2016 etc.]. 11. Having read the said judgment this court is of the view that all the questions, as above stated, raised in these writ petitions are squarely covered by the proposition based on which those cases were decided. For that purpose, the reference is made to the relevant passages, [see lis] extracted comprehensively hereunder : “[7] Mr. A. Bhowmik, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the entire selection process has turned to be mockery for dismal lack of the fairness in the state action. A minimal time has been spent for interviewing each of the candidates. If the total time is divided by the number of candidates interviewed in a day, it would come to one and half minute per candidate. The basis of such submission is the notified day and time, but there is no reliable survey. This statement thus falls in the category of ‘unverified’ general statement. Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel has further submitted that the petitioners are having better comparative merit but by manipulation of the process, the persons with the lesser merit have been accommodated. As it is apparent that there is no written examination, the merit was assessed by the marks secured in the public examinations or experience gathered in the formal training or by field training. Even the applications were received on the very day of the interview. Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel has further submitted that, so far the recruitment relating to the posts of Tehsildar, Surveyor and Amin are concerned, the practical field training as the Surveyor and the certificate issued by the Regional Survey Training Institute [RSTI in short] were not taken into consideration-which itself shows that interview was an eye wash. That apart, for holding walk-in-interview, there was no exigencies. Mr. That apart, for holding walk-in-interview, there was no exigencies. Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel has further submitted that the marks were not allotted in the selection, in terms of the guidelines dated 12.01.2015 [Annexure-P/6 to the writ petition being W.P(C) No.874 of 2016]. Having confronted that after participating in the process which is well adverted and after waiting for its outcome whether the petitioners can be permitted to question the said selection. Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel has relied initially on a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Geeta Sharma vs. DAV College Managing Committee & others [judgment and order dated 16.07.2013 delivered in CWP No.2609 of 2013] where Punjab and Haryana High Court had occasion to observe thus : “the rule of ‘estoppel’ is intended to be applied to unscrupulous litigants who attempt to take benefit in all situations i.e. firstly by participating without any reservation and then after having failed, make a challenge. In some cases without participation in the selection process it is impossible for a candidate to know the illegality Gupta Sanjay 2013.09.06 12:48 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court Chandigarh CWP No.2609 of 2013 [12] or irregularity, biased or arbitrariness committed during the process of selection. If in every case, the principle of estoppels is applied, no candidate will be able to challenge the selection despite the fact that there are established violations of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In case a person opts to stay away from the selection process and challenge the selection on the ground of Article 14 of the Constitution, he would loose half the battle merely on the ground that he opted to stay away from the selection. In that situation, the principle of estoppels will not operate against him, in case he challenges the selection process or the selections being arbitrary. It is not an absolute rule of law that in all cases where the candidate had participated in the selection process, he would be debarred to challenge the selection. The facts and circumstances of each case are be seen while applying the ratio of the judgments in Madan Lals case (supra) and Dhanajay Malik’s case (supra).” [Emphasis added] [8] Mr. It is not an absolute rule of law that in all cases where the candidate had participated in the selection process, he would be debarred to challenge the selection. The facts and circumstances of each case are be seen while applying the ratio of the judgments in Madan Lals case (supra) and Dhanajay Malik’s case (supra).” [Emphasis added] [8] Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel has emphatically submitted that when there is arbitrariness, in contrast to the fairness action as espoused under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, if revelation made later, the further action cannot be stopped. Someone can challenge the action of the state which is tainted by arbitrariness. A decision of the apex court has been pressed in this regard in Munindra Kumar & others Vs. Rajib Govil & others, reported in (1991) 6 SCC 368. In Munindra Kumar (supra) the apex court has observed that the person who had full knowledge of the percentage of marks kept for interview and group discussion participated in the selection process, there cannot be any amount of doubt that they cannot be also estopped for challenging the rule which is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. But in moulding the relief their conduct and equities of those who have been selected are relevant for consideration. Though Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel has not referred the final conclusion drawn in the said judgment, it would be apposite to refer that the result of the selection process was not ordered and even some candidates who did not participate in all the phases of the interview, were selected. In that background, the apex court interfered the selection process. Reference has also been made to Nar Singh Pal vs. Union of India and others, reported in (2000) 3 SCC 588 , to rely on the observation of the apex court that no estoppel can operate against the fundamental rights under the constitution. Even though Rajesh Kumar Gupta and others vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 172 has been relied by Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel but the context of that case was entirely different as would be apparent from Para-13 where the apex court has observed that the criteria for merit was changed subsequently, meaning after the applications were received. Bhowmik, learned counsel but the context of that case was entirely different as would be apparent from Para-13 where the apex court has observed that the criteria for merit was changed subsequently, meaning after the applications were received. “Consequently, no candidate had any occasion to protest since the criterion was abruptly changed by the State Government. Thus, the Division Bench overruled the objection to the maintainability of the writ petitions by taking the view that there was no question of estoppel and the candidates who had applied and were not selected could not be said to be estopped from challenging the process of selection, nor could there be any plea of promissory estoppel invoked by the writ petition, as nothing was established to show that they had altered their position to their detriment by applying pursuing to the advertisement. In our view, the finding of the Division Bench on this point is justified.” [9] Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel has further submitted that in Raj Kumar & others vs. Shakti Raj & others, reported in (1997) 9 SCC 527 , the apex court has clearly laid down the laws having examined Madanlal vs. State of J & K : (1995) 3 SCC 486 , in the manner as under : “.......It is true, as contended by Shri Madhava Reddy, that this Court in Madan Lal vs. State of & K : (1995) 3 SCC 486 and other decisions referred therein had held that a candidate having taken a chance to appear in an interview and having remained unsuccessful, cannot turn round and challenge either the constitution of the Selection Board or the method of Selection as being illegal; he is estopped to question the correctness of the selection. But in his case, the Government have committed glaring illegalities in the procedure to get the candidates for examination under the 1955 Rules, so also in the method of selection and exercise of the power in taking out from the purview of the Board and also conduct of the selection in accordance with the Rules. Therefore, the principle of estoppel by conduct or acquiescence has no application to the facts in this case.” [Emphasis added] [10] In furtherance of the assertion that the petitioners are not estopped for challenging the selection process in terms of the advertisement for walk-in-interview, Annexure-P/1 to the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.874 of 2016, Mr. Therefore, the principle of estoppel by conduct or acquiescence has no application to the facts in this case.” [Emphasis added] [10] In furtherance of the assertion that the petitioners are not estopped for challenging the selection process in terms of the advertisement for walk-in-interview, Annexure-P/1 to the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.874 of 2016, Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel has made reference to Ashok Kumar and another vs. State of Bihar & others, reported in (2017) 4 SCC 357 . True it is that in Ashok Kumar, Raj Kumar (supra) has reconsidered the precedents and observed as under : “20. The decision in Raj Kumar v. Shakti Raj : (1997) 9 SCC 527 (which was relied upon by the appellants) involved a case where the Government was found to have committed glaring illegalities in the procedure. Hence, it was held that the principle of estoppel by conduct or acquiescence had no application. The decision is distinguishable.” [11] Mr. A. Acharjee, learned counsel appeared for a set of the writ petitioners who had appeared in the selection process for the posts of Amin, Surveyor and Tehsildar. The petitioners, whom Mr. Acharjee, learned counsel have represented in W.P.(C) No.901/2016, W.P.(C) No.902/2016, W.P.(C) No.898/2016, W.P.(C) No.1209/2016, W.P.(C) No.1206/2016 and W.P.(C) No.34/2017 had two years’ surveyorship certificate and 6 months’ RSTI certificates. But the writ petitioners in W.P.(C) No.534 of 2017 and W.P.(C) No.535 of 2017 had four months’ RSTI certificate. Mr. Acharjee, learned counsel has referred to the recruitment rules, the relevant part of which has been provided in the said advertisement and extracted hereinabove. The relevant part has been shown in the table, formed below Para-5 of this judgment. For the post of Surveyors, there is requirement of the certificate of surveyorship. But for the post of Amin, it has been provided that ‘preference’ will be given to those who have passed two years course in survey/draftsmanship. [12] Ms. P. Dhar, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners has submitted that a set of the writ petitioners have the adequate qualifications and good handwriting but they were not selected in the walk-in-interview contrary to their expectation and the rules. Ms. Dhar, learned counsel, as she had appeared for some of the petitioners who applied for the post of the Moharar, has adopted the submission of the learned counsel of the other sets of the writ petitioners on lack of transparency and fairness. Ms. Dhar, learned counsel, as she had appeared for some of the petitioners who applied for the post of the Moharar, has adopted the submission of the learned counsel of the other sets of the writ petitioners on lack of transparency and fairness. By and large, the grounds projected by Ms. Dhar, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners are the same in relation to those were raised by the learned counsel for the other sets of the petitioners. [13] Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has supported the contention of Mr. A. Bhowmik, learned counsel appearing for a set of the writ petitioners on the aspect of estoppel. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has submitted that no preference has been shown to the petitioners, whereas such preference “has been shown to the private respondents.” The respondents have filed the assessment sheets, but the petitioners could not locate how the private respondents were favoured, either in deviation to the process or on observance of the espoused policy. By the Government Policy, the walk-in-interview has been declared as a valid process. The petitioners have adverted only about the process. They, without raising any reservation and demur had participated in the selection process. Mr. Bhwomik, learned senior counsel has submitted that the entire selection process is arbitrary and such process has been adopted for manipulation. Thus, this court should interfere in the process. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel having referred to the memorandum dated 12.01.2015 [Para-6] has categorically stated that this provision is entirely against the constitutional mandate of selection. Para-6 of the said memorandum dated 12.01.2015 does authorize to recruit, by means of walk-in-interview in the exigencies of service. In the said Para-6 of the memorandum it has been clearly observed that ‘this method will exempt the requirement of inviting and processing written applications. But the method of walk-in-interview if adopted shall be given wide publicity.’ Having scrutinized all the writ petitions, this court does not find any informed challenge against the said Para-6 of the memorandum dated 12.01.2015. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has laid much emphasis for not appreciating the technical qualification of the surveyorship while making appointments in the posts of Amin and Surveyor. For the post of Amin, the recruitment rules clearly provides that preference to be given to the persons who have passed two years’ course in survey/draftsmanship. Though Mr. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has laid much emphasis for not appreciating the technical qualification of the surveyorship while making appointments in the posts of Amin and Surveyor. For the post of Amin, the recruitment rules clearly provides that preference to be given to the persons who have passed two years’ course in survey/draftsmanship. Though Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has submitted that no such preference has been provided, but the persons having no experience or training in surveyor/draftsmanship has been appointed. Be that as it may, that no records or illustrations could be made be by the petitioners whom Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel are representing. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has submitted that these are the gross violation of the recruitment rules and as such, the persons who have been appointed, they are not to be protected under equity. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has submitted that, since the espoused policy of preference was not followed, the entire process is liable to be declared invalid. [14] Mr. P.K. Biswas, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.1328 of 2016 has submitted that even the fairness process has been tweaked and bullied by the respondents. The said petitioner has the knowledge of typing and all other qualifications sought by the said advertisement. The petitioner appeared before the interview board and she was interviewed but the petitioner got “0” marks in the extracurricular activities when she was entitled to get 10 marks. Thus, the petitioner has suffered serious detriment. Even the petitioner had applied for the post of Tehsildar, but no mark was given to the petitioner for the post of Tehsildar. When this court has scrutinized the averments, the said averment is not available that the petitioner has not been given any mark for the post of Tehsildar. The petitioner had collected the assessment sheet and found that she secured only 7 marks in General Knowledge [G.K.] though she has passed B.Sc. Honours and secured First Division in Madhyamik Examination. It is really strange that how there can be any relation of getting lesser marks in General Knowledge [G.K.] with passing of the B.Sc. honours or securing first division marks in Madhyamik Examination. The petitioner has made some comparative assessment between the private respondents and the petitioner without any foundation. Mr. Honours and secured First Division in Madhyamik Examination. It is really strange that how there can be any relation of getting lesser marks in General Knowledge [G.K.] with passing of the B.Sc. honours or securing first division marks in Madhyamik Examination. The petitioner has made some comparative assessment between the private respondents and the petitioner without any foundation. Mr. Biswas, learned senior counsel has submitted that firstly, the entire process is arbitrary and secondly, the outcome is belying, the basic tenets of fairness. [15] From the other side, Mr. B.C. Das, learned Advocate General has appeared for the official respondents on making reference to the compilation sheet for the various posts as produced by the respondents or partly by the petitioners, has submitted that the petitioners have utterly failed to show any glaring mistakes even though they have not left any stone unturned to show that the process was not fair. Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has submitted that there is challenge in some of the writ petitions that the zonal interview is anathema to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. But the petitioners who raised that plea failed to refer that the final merit was determined by compilation by the appointing authority in the central level. Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has candidly submitted that selecting the best from such huge participants is really a difficult and arduous task. There cannot be any mechanism which is foolproof. The state-respondents have taken all initiatives to fairly select the candidates in accordance the policy adopted by the State. Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has stated that the policy which was followed has been struck down by this court not as a whole but for some clauses. The said judgment was pronounced after the selection was over. The particular clauses as extracted above were not questioned. Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has strongly pleaded that the petitioners are estopped from challenging the outcome of the selection process on participating in the selection process knowing its method as the petitioners have miserably failed to show any arbitrariness or abrupt change in the process or any glaring illegality and hence, they are totally restricted by estoppel. Mr. Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has strongly pleaded that the petitioners are estopped from challenging the outcome of the selection process on participating in the selection process knowing its method as the petitioners have miserably failed to show any arbitrariness or abrupt change in the process or any glaring illegality and hence, they are totally restricted by estoppel. Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has referred to a decision of the apex court in Sadananda Halo and others vs. Momtaz Ali Sheikh and others, reported in (2008) 4 SCC 619 where the apex court had occasion to dwell upon the method of interview in the following terms : “40. However, in Sardara Singh's case : (1991) 4 SCC 355, this Court specifically observed in para 6 : ‘6......The selection is for the Patwaris in the class III service. The ratio in Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana : (1985) 4 SCC 417 has no application to the facts in the case. Therein the selection was to the Class I service of the State Service and sufficient time was required to interview each candidate. In this case, on calculation, we found that on an average three minutes were spent for each candidate for selection. Rule 7 of the Rules provides the qualifications, namely, pass in the Matriculation or Higher Secondary Examination; knowledge in Hindi and Punjabi upto the middle standard and good knowledge of rural economy and culture. The educational qualifications are apparent from record and need no interview in this regard. It could be seen that candidates normally hailing from rural backgrounds had presumptively good knowledge of rural economy and culture. Therefore, there is no need for special emphasis to ascertain their knowledge of the rural economy or culture. Under those circumstances much time need not be spent on each candidate for selection except asking some questions on general knowledge and aptitude for work as Patwari etc.’ The observations are extremely telling and need no further elaboration. In the present case the qualifications were known. The physical standards of each candidate were very much there before the interviewing Board and, therefore, in our opinion, there was no necessity to test the knowledge of maintenance of revenue records, rural economy and culture as was required for the post of Patwari. The merits of the candidates were also recorded regarding their physical efficiency. The physical standards of each candidate were very much there before the interviewing Board and, therefore, in our opinion, there was no necessity to test the knowledge of maintenance of revenue records, rural economy and culture as was required for the post of Patwari. The merits of the candidates were also recorded regarding their physical efficiency. Therefore, even less than three minutes time was enough for each candidate. We would also have to give due credit to the expertise of Selection Committee. 41. The question of large number of candidates appearing for the selection process again came up before this Court in Joginder Singh and others v. Roshan Lal and others : (2002) 9 SCC 765 . A complaint was made in this case that 323 candidates appeared for the test in two days and on that basis a select list was prepared by the Departmental Promotion Committee. The High Court called this selection process as a farce on the ground that fair chance was never given to the candidates to show their worth. The Court observed in para 5 as under : “On the facts on record we see no justification for the High Court to have come to this conclusion. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not supposed to act as an appellate authority over the decision of the Departmental Selection Committee. If the Committee has been properly constituted, as in this case, and the post is advertised and a selection process known to law which is fair to all, is followed then the High Court could have no jurisdiction to go into a question whether the Departmental Selection Committee conducted the test properly or not when there is no allegation of malafides or bias against any member of the Committee. Merely because there were a large number of candidates who appeared on two days, cannot ipso facto lead to the conclusion that the process of selection was a farce and fair chance was not given. Normally experienced persons are appointed as members of the Selection Committee and how much time should be spent with a candidate would vary from person to person. Merely because only two days were spent in conducting the interviews for the selection of Class IV posts cannot lead to the conclusion that the process of selection was not proper.” 42. Normally experienced persons are appointed as members of the Selection Committee and how much time should be spent with a candidate would vary from person to person. Merely because only two days were spent in conducting the interviews for the selection of Class IV posts cannot lead to the conclusion that the process of selection was not proper.” 42. To sum up, these were the interviews for the post of Constables and the minimum educational standard was prescribed as 7th class pass. There were no requirements of testing the administrative or management capacity of the candidates and/or any other quality which is required for the higher posts. All that was necessary was firstly to see their physical fitness in terms of physical endurance, their smartness in appearance and further to test their intelligence level as required for the post of constable including their general knowledge. We cannot ignore that thousands of candidates had turned up and what we find from the guidelines was, firstly these candidates had to fulfil physical standards in terms of height, etc. as also the minimum educational qualification. Obviously all the candidates could not have had those physical standards.” [Emphasis added] Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has emphatically submitted that in the writ jurisdiction a roving inquiry on the factual aspect is not permissible or to look into the mathematical exactness of appreciation. For this purpose, he has referred the following passages from Sadananda Halo (supra) : “58. It is settled law that in such writ petitions a roving inquiry on the factual aspect is not permissible. The High Court not only engaged itself into a non permitted fact finding exercise but also went on to rely on the findings of the amicus curiae, or as the case may be, the scrutiny team, which in our opinion was inappropriate. While testing the fairness of the selection process wherein thousands of candidates were involved, the High Court should have been slow in relying upon such microscopic findings. It was not for the High Court to place itself into a position of a fact finding commission, that too, more particularly at the instance of those petitioners who were unsuccessful candidates. The High Court should, therefore, have restricted itself to the pleadings in the writ petition and the say of the respondents. It was not for the High Court to place itself into a position of a fact finding commission, that too, more particularly at the instance of those petitioners who were unsuccessful candidates. The High Court should, therefore, have restricted itself to the pleadings in the writ petition and the say of the respondents. Unfortunately, the High Court took it upon itself the task of substituting itself for the Selection Committee and also in the process assumed the role of an appellate tribunal which was, in our opinion, not proper. Thus, the High Court converted this writ petition into a public interest litigation without any justification. 59. It is also a settled position that the unsuccessful candidates cannot turn back and assail the selection process. There are of course the exceptions carved out by this Court to this general rule. This position was reiterated by this Court in its latest judgment in Union of India & Ors. v. S. Vinod Kumar & Ors : (2007) 8 SCC 100 where one of us (Sinha, J.) was a party. This was a case where different cut off marks were fixed for the unreserved candidates and the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes candidates. This Court in para 10 of its judgment endorsed the action and recorded a finding that there was a power in the employer to fix the cut off marks which power was neither denied nor disputed and further that the cut off marks were fixed on a rationale basis and, therefore, no exception could be taken. The Court also referred to the judgment in Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla & Ors. : 1986 Supp. SCC 285 where it has been held specifically that when a candidate appears in the examination without protest and subsequently is found to be not successful in the examination, the question of entertaining the petition challenging such examination would not arise. : 1986 Supp. SCC 285 where it has been held specifically that when a candidate appears in the examination without protest and subsequently is found to be not successful in the examination, the question of entertaining the petition challenging such examination would not arise. The Court further made observations in para 34 of the judgment to the effect: [Union of India vs. S. Vinodh Kumar : (2007) 8 SCC 100 ] 19......34.There is thus no doubt that while question of any estoppel by conduct would not arise in the contextual facts but the law seems to be well settled that in the event a candidate appears at the interview and participates therein, only because the result of the interview is not 'palatable' to him, he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair or there was some lacuna in the process. “In para 20 this Court further observed that there are certain exceptions to the aforementioned rule. However, the court did not go into those exceptions since the same were not material. 60. In our opinion the first basic thing for such a selection process would be the lack of bona fides or, as the case may be, malafide exercise of powers by those who were at the helm of selection process. Both the courts below have not recorded any finding that they found any malafides on the part of any of the State officials who headed the interviews. On the other hand the tenor of the judgments shows that the whole process did not suffer from malafides, lack of bonafides, bias or political interference. In Union of India & Others vs. Bikash Kumar: (2006) 8 SCC 192 this Court observed in para 14 thus : 14. When a Selection Committee recommends selection of a person, the same cannot be presumed to have been done in a mechanical manner in absence of any allegation of favouritism or bias. A presumption arises in regard to the correctness of the official act. The party who makes any allegation of bias or favouritism is required to prove the same. In the instant case, no such allegation was made. The selection process was not found to be vitiated. No illegality was brought to our notice.” 61. A presumption arises in regard to the correctness of the official act. The party who makes any allegation of bias or favouritism is required to prove the same. In the instant case, no such allegation was made. The selection process was not found to be vitiated. No illegality was brought to our notice.” 61. The learned Single Judge relying upon the decision in Raj Kumar & Others v. Shakti Raj & Others : (1997) 9 SCC 527 seems to have found an exception to this Rule and has more particularly relied on the observation made in para 16 to the following effect : “16....But in his case, the Government have committed glaring illegalities in the procedure to get the candidates for examination under the 1955 Rules, so also in the method of selection and exercise of the power in taking out from the purview of the Board and also conduct of the selection in accordance with the Rules. Therefore, the principle of estoppel by conduct or acquiescence has no application to the facts in this case. Thus, we consider that the procedure offered under the 1955 Rules adopted by the Government or the Committee as well as the action taken by the Government are not correct in law.” We do not think that this case is apposite for the present controversy. In the reported decision the court found a clear cut breach of the 1955 Rules. It also found that the names, though were required to be called from the employment exchange, were not so called. The Court also found fault with the procedure involved. We are afraid such is not the case in the present situation. No deviation from the rules or no inherent defect in the selection process which would render the whole selection illegal have either been alleged or proved. 62. We have already shown in the earlier part of our judgment that there were proper advertisements issued and reasonable procedure was chalked out in the earlier meetings held by the authorities, even the guidelines were defined and the interviews proceeded along those guidelines. A mere expression of doubts only on the ground of large number of candidates appearing and their not being objectively and properly tested without any further material, in our opinion, cannot by itself render the whole selection process illegal.” [Emphasis added] [16] Mr. A mere expression of doubts only on the ground of large number of candidates appearing and their not being objectively and properly tested without any further material, in our opinion, cannot by itself render the whole selection process illegal.” [Emphasis added] [16] Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has submitted specifically that the procedure of selection was clearly laid down in the advertisement for walk-in-interview [Annexure-P/1 of W.P.(C) No.874 of 2016] and all the writ petitioners being aware of the process appeared and waited till the select list was published. When they found they were not selected, they started filing the writ petitions questioning the very process. Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has contended that the writ petitioners are estopped now to challenge the outcome of the process as they participated in the process without any demur. He has relied a very recent decision in Madras Institute of Development Studies and another vs. K. Sivasubramaniyan and others, reported in (2016) 1 SCC 454 where the apex court having considered Om Prakash Shukla vs. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla : 1986 Supp. SCC 285 and Manish Kumar Shahi vs. State of Bihar : (2010) 12 SCC 576 , has reiterated the position of law that having taken part in the process of selection knowingfully well how the process would be conducted the petitioner is not entitled to challenge the criteria or process of selection. If the petitioner’s name had appeared in the merit list he would not even dreamed of challenging the selection. Only when the petitioners have found that their names do not figure in the merit list they invoked the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The apex court has held that in that report: “the conduct of the petitioner clearly disentitles him from questioning the selection”. That apart, Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has relied on Ashok Kumar (supra) to make the position of law clear as to when the principle of Raj Kumar (supra) would apply. He has submitted that Ashok Kumar (supra) has clearly laid down that unless there is a glaring arbitrariness or violation of law, the selection process can hardly be challenged. The petitioners in this case were also clearly on notice how the selection process would be carried out. Without any demur, they had participated in the selection process and they could not locate any glaring or patent illegality in the process. The petitioners in this case were also clearly on notice how the selection process would be carried out. Without any demur, they had participated in the selection process and they could not locate any glaring or patent illegality in the process. So far the assessment of comparative merits is concerned it is in the domain or prerogative of the interview board. If there were any specific allegation against them [the members of the selection board committee] they should have been made party in the proceeding. On making sweeping comments without concrete materials the petitioner cannot achieve the relief as prayed for, as it has been observed in Ashok Kumar (supra) as under : “19. In the present case, regard must be had to the fact that the appellants were clearly on notice, when the fresh selection process took place that written examination would carry ninety marks and the interview, ten marks. The appellants participated in the selection process. Moreover, two other considerations weigh in balance. The High Court noted in the impugned judgment [(Anurag Verma vs. State of Bihar : LPA No.1991 of 2010, decided on 16.12.2011(pat)] that the interpretation of Rule 6 was not free from vagueness. There was, in other words, no glaring or patent illegality in the process adopted by the High Court. There was an element of vagueness about whether Rule 6 which dealt with promotion merely incorporated the requirement of an examination provided in Rule 5 for direct recruitment to Class III posts or whether the marks and qualifying marks were also incorporated. Moreover, no prejudice was established to have been caused to the appellants by the 90:10 allocation.” [Emphasis added] [17] Finally, Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has submitted that the petitioners have approached this court with unclean hands when the petitioners have stated that the zone-wise was interview and selection was carried out. On the basis of a structured module the interview boards conducted the interviews in various parts of the State and later on the marks on various heads were compiled for purpose of inter se merit list for the entire state and on the basis of the said merit list, the selections were made. On the basis of a structured module the interview boards conducted the interviews in various parts of the State and later on the marks on various heads were compiled for purpose of inter se merit list for the entire state and on the basis of the said merit list, the selections were made. That apart, the persons who were recommended for the recruitment for the post as adverted have already been appointed In the writ petitions the petitioners should have disclosed all the material facts but they have not done so. Even the letters of appointments are not challenged in any manner. The apex court in Amar Singh vs. Union of India and others, reported in 2011 AIR SCW 3297 has clearly observed as under : “53. Courts have, over the centuries, frowned upon litigants who, with intent to deceive and mislead the courts, initiated proceedings without full disclosure of facts. Courts held that such litigants have come with ‘unclean hands’ and are not entitled to be heard on the merits of their case. 54. In Dalglish v. Jarvie [2 Mac. & G. 231, 238], the Court, speaking through Lord Langdale and Rolfe B., laid down : “It is the duty of a party asking for an injunction to bring under the notice of the Court all facts material to the determination of his right to that injunction; and it is no excuse for him to say that he was not aware of the importance of any fact which he has omitted to bring forward.” The court is abhorrent of such practice. In Dalip Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 114 , the apex court has further crystallised the law on consideration of the precedents as under : 10. In K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others, (2008) 12 SCC 481, the Court held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands and put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. The same rule was reiterated in G. Jayshree and others v. Bhagwandas S. Patel and others, (2009) 3 SCC 141 .” [18] Finally, Mr. Das, learned Advocate General, while refuting the interpretation of preference on the basis of 6(six) months’ certificate issued by the RSTI or 2(two) years’ certificate of surveyorship for the post of Surveyor, Amin and Tehshildar as advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, has submitted that in the service jurisprudence how the preference to apply is no more res integra. The apex court has enunciated the law very categorically. In State of U.P. & another vs. Om Prakash and others, reported in (2006) 6 SCC 472, the apex court has observed as under : “16. This Court has consistently held that when selection is made on the basis of merit assessed through the competitive examination and interview, preference to additional qualification would mean other things being qualitatively and quantitatively equal, those having additional qualification would be preferred. It does not mean en bloc preference irrespective of inter se merit and suitability. 17. In Secy.(Health) Deptt. of Health & F.W. vs. Dr. Anita Puri : (1996) 6 SCC 282 , this Court held that preferential qualification do not as of right entitle to selection. In that case the advertisement inviting applications for the post of Dental Officers prescribed B.D.S. as the minimum qualification but stipulated preference for higher dental qualification. This Court held at SCC p.285-86, para 7 as under :- 7. Admittedly, in the advertisement which was published calling for applications from the candidates for the posts of Dental Officer it was clearly stipulated that the minimum qualification for the post is B.D.S. It was also stipulated that preference should he given for higher dental qualification. There is also no dispute that M.D.S. is a higher qualification than the minimum qualification required for the post and the Respondent No. 1 was having that degree. The question then arises is whether a person holding a M.D.S. qualification is entitled to be selected and appointed as of right by virtue of the aforesaid advertisement conferring preference for higher qualification? The answer to the aforesaid question must be in the negative. The question then arises is whether a person holding a M.D.S. qualification is entitled to be selected and appointed as of right by virtue of the aforesaid advertisement conferring preference for higher qualification? The answer to the aforesaid question must be in the negative. When an advertisement stipulates a particular qualification as the minimum qualification for the post and further stipulates that preference should be given for higher qualification, the only meaning it conveys is that some additional weightage has to be given to the higher qualified candidates. But by no stretch of imagination it can be construed to mean that a higher qualified person automatically is entitled to be selected and appointed. In adjudging the suitability of a person for the post, the body like Public Service Commission in the absence of any statutory criteria has the discretion of evolving its mode of evaluation of merit and selection of the candidate. The competence and merit of a candidate is adjudged not on the basis of the qualification he possesses but also taking into account the other necessary factors like career of the candidate throughout his educational curriculum, experience in any field in which the selection is going to be held; his general aptitude for the job to be ascertained in course of interview, extra-curriculum activities like sports and other allied subjects personality of the candidate as assessed in the interview and all other germane factors which the expert body evolves for assessing the suitability of the candidate for the post for which the selection is going to be held. In this view of the matter, the High Court in our considered opinion was wholly in error in holding that a M.D.S. qualified person like Respondent No. 1 was entitled to be selected and appointed when the Government indicated in the advertisement that higher qualification person would get some preference. The said conclusion of the High Court, therefore, is wholly unsustainable and must be reversed.” 18. This Court again considered the same question in Secretary, A.P. Public Service Commission vs. Y.V.V.R. Srinivasulu : (2003) 5 SCC 341 and held at SCC p.348, para 10 as under :- The word "preference" in our view is capable of different shades of meaning taking colour from the context, purpose and object of its use under the scheme of things envisaged. Hence, it is to be construed not in an isolated or detached manner, ascribing a meaning of universal import, for all contingencies capable of an invariable application. The procedure for selection in the case involves a qualifying test, a written examination and an oral test or interview and the final list of selection has to be on the basis of the marks obtained in them. The suitability and all-round merit, if had to be adjudged in that manner only, what justification could there be for overriding all these merely because, a particular candidate is in possession of an additional qualification on the basis of which, a preference has also been envisaged. The rules do not provide for separate classification of those candidates or apply different norms of selection for them. The 'preference' envisaged in the rules, in our view, under the scheme of things and contextually also cannot mean, an absolute en bloc preference akin to reservation or separate and distinct method of selection for them alone. A mere rule of preference meant to give weightage to the additional qualification cannot be enforced as a rule of reservation or rule of complete precedence. Such a construction would not only undermine the scheme of selection envisaged through the Public Service Commission, on the basis of merit performance but also would work great hardship and injustice to those who possess the required minimum educational qualification with which they are entitled to compete with those possessing additional qualification too, and demonstrate their superiority merit wise and their suitability for the post. It is not to be viewed as a preferential right conferred even for taking up their claims for consideration. On the other hand, the preference envisaged has to be given only when the claims of all candidates who are eligible are taken for consideration and when anyone or more of them are found equally positioned by using the additional qualification as a tilting factor, in their favour vis-a-vis others in the matter of actual selection". [Emphasis added] [19] Mr. Das, learned Advocate General, therefore, contended that on the basis of the essential qualification and the assessment in the selection process, if 2(two) candidates are positioned equal, then the person who has been possessing the preferential qualification would be preferred for selection. It would not add any weightage in the selection except in the manner as stated in Om Prakash (supra). It would not add any weightage in the selection except in the manner as stated in Om Prakash (supra). [20] Learned counsel appearing for the private respondents have adopted the submissions of learned Advocate General on the question of the maintainability of the writ petitions and on enunciation of ‘preference’. As such, this court having regard to brevity will not specifically record their submissions. [21] Having scrutinized the records and appreciated the submissions as advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, 3(three) pertinent questions have emerged for consideration of this court. Those are (i) whether the court can make a roving inquiry to find out the illegality or per function in the process, unless glaring illegalities or unfairness are pleaded and proved by the petitioners who seeks to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India; (ii) whether in regard to applying the preference as provided in the recruitment rules any illegality has been committed or there are any record in support of that illegality and (iii) whether the writ petitioners are estopped by their conduct to maintain these writ petitions after participating in the process with full knowledge how the process would be conducted and finding that they were not selected particularly when there is no abrupt change in the process beyond their knowledge? [22] In Sadananda Halo (supra), the apex court has clearly restated the law that in such kind of writ petitions, a roving inquiry on the factual aspect is not permissible. The High Court cannot embark on non-permitted fact finding exercise. It has been clearly laid down in Sadananda Halo (supra) that while testing the fairness of the selection process wherein thousands of candidates were involved there is no room for microscopic inquiry and finding as such. When the petitioners have failed to produce any records showing there was glaring deviation of the adverted procedure, there is no scope for further inquiry in the matter. Moreover, since a large number of candidates appeared for an interview on a single date it cannot itself render the recruitment process illegal. There is no allegation of mala fide on the part of the members of the interview board. There is no allegation of bias or favouratism. Moreover, since a large number of candidates appeared for an interview on a single date it cannot itself render the recruitment process illegal. There is no allegation of mala fide on the part of the members of the interview board. There is no allegation of bias or favouratism. Almost in a similar circumstances, Calcutta High Court in State West Bengal and others vs. Chandra Kanta Ganguli [judgment and order dated 26.04.2017 delivered in MAT 949 of 2016] has held as under : “22. In the writ petition there is no allegation that proper notice was not issued for participation in the recruitment process. Equal opportunity was given to all to participate in the selection process. From the document at annexure 'R5' of the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondent No.2 it appears that certificates towards representation in school/club level sports and experience as NCC Cadet/Boy Scouts/NSS Guide/Civil Defence Volunteers were not insisted upon in respect of all the candidates who participated in the interview. The petitioner No.2 also did not have the said certificates but he was allowed to participate in the interview. Considering the nature of duty to be discharged, the candidates were judged on the basis of physique, alertness and smartness in appearance. Such selection ought not to have been found fault with in a mathematical manner. An expression of doubt only on the ground of large number of candidates appearing for an interview on a single date cannot by itself render the entire recruitment process held at the said police stations to be illegal. 23. In the pleadings there is no allegation of any malafide on the part of any of the State officials who were in the interview board. There is also no allegation of any bias or favouritism. The recruitment process was set aside since it appeared to the learned Judge that it was an impossibility on the part of the selection committee to interview 1351 candidates at Sarenga police station and 875 candidates at Barikul police station respectively on a single date. Before arriving at such finding, the learned Judge did not perhaps, notice the contents of the order dated 28th April, 2016 in which it stood recorded that ‘the petitioner says that he participated in one of the group interviews with fifty persons being asked common questions and some persons being arbitrarily selected on such basis’. Before arriving at such finding, the learned Judge did not perhaps, notice the contents of the order dated 28th April, 2016 in which it stood recorded that ‘the petitioner says that he participated in one of the group interviews with fifty persons being asked common questions and some persons being arbitrarily selected on such basis’. In the case of Sadananda Halo (supra) it has been observed that no bench mark can be set as regards the highest number of candidates to be interviewed on a single date. It depends upon the post for which such interview is conducted, the nature of duty attached to such post, the nature of test to be applied and other ground realities.” [23] It has been further observed by Calcutta High Court relying on Sadananda Halo (supra) that interference by the court is warranted only when there are oblique motives or there is miscarriage of justice. In Sadananda Halo (supra) the High Court set aside the recruitment process on the ground that more than 2000 candidates were called for an interview on a single day and as such, the selection was farcical. Taking into consideration of the principle laid down in Satpal vs. State of Haryana, reported in 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 206 and Ashok Kumar Yadav vs. State of Haryana, reported in (1985) 4 SCC 417 , the apex court had observed that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the recruitment process mechanically and in a mathematical manner by setting a benchmark that not more than 250 candidates ought to have been interviewed on a single day. It has been observed by the apex court that instated of testing the matter on the basis of the ground realities for each district on the basis of material made available by the state a mechanical approach could not have been taken by the High Court. Thus, there was interference unless serious illegality or high degree of extraneous consideration is located in the process, usually the court shall not interfere in the recruitment process. In view of the law as enunciated by the apex court, this court is of the view that the petitioners have failed to produce any materials to demonstrate glaring irregularities in the process as adverted or substantive illegality or high degree of extraneous intervention to manipulate the entire process. In view of the law as enunciated by the apex court, this court is of the view that the petitioners have failed to produce any materials to demonstrate glaring irregularities in the process as adverted or substantive illegality or high degree of extraneous intervention to manipulate the entire process. In such circumstances, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution cannot step out for further inquiry or for a roving inquiry into the facts relating to the selection. [24] So far the appreciation of ‘preference’ for those who are having 2(two) years surveyorship certificates is concerned, this court does not find that any case has been made out where the petitioners or any one of them and the selected persons, for that matter the private respondents were equally positioned in respect of merit and despite the petitioners having the preferential qualification, the petitioners or any of them were denied the preferential treatment. As such, the law as laid down by the apex court in Om Prakash (supra) the ground as projected by the petitioners and its foundation is bereft of substance. No case has been made out to bulwark the tilt in favour of the petitioners or any one of them. [25] As regards, the final question in respect of the estoppel, this court does not have any hesitation to hold that the petitioners have consciously participated in the process having substantively informed and took chance to find out whether they were selected. When they found that they were not selected, they came to the court after selection of the private respondents or immediate thereafter their participation was without any reservation or any demur. In absence of gross or grave irregularities or extraneous intervention, the petitioners are estopped from challenging the outcome of the selection process in the manner they have challenged the selection. By their conduct they have waived their right to challenge the selection process including the structured module in the aftermath of the discovery of their failure as in Vijendra Kumar Verma vs. Public Service Commission, Uttarakhand and others, reported in (2011) 1 SCC 150 it was enunciated by the apex court in clear terms as under : “24. By their conduct they have waived their right to challenge the selection process including the structured module in the aftermath of the discovery of their failure as in Vijendra Kumar Verma vs. Public Service Commission, Uttarakhand and others, reported in (2011) 1 SCC 150 it was enunciated by the apex court in clear terms as under : “24. When the list of successful candidates in the written examination was published in such notification itself, it was also made clear that the knowledge of the candidates with regard to basic knowledge of computer operation would be tested at the time of interview for which knowledge of Microsoft Operating System and Microsoft Office operation would be essential. In the call letter also which was sent to the appellant at the time of calling him for interview, the aforesaid criteria was reiterated and spelt out. Therefore, no minimum benchmark or a new procedure was ever introduced during the midstream of the selection process. All the candidates knew the requirements of the selection process and were also fully aware that they must possess the basic knowledge of computer operation meaning thereby Microsoft Operating System and Microsoft Office operation. Knowing the said criteria, the appellant also appeared in the interview, faced the questions from the expert of computer application and has taken a chance and opportunity therein without any protest at any stage and now cannot turn back to state that the aforesaid procedure adopted was wrong and without jurisdiction.” [Emphasis added] [26] The cumulative result of those findings as above, is that there is no substance in these writ petitions for interference by this court and hence, all these writ petitions are dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 12. Even though, at the first blush, the challenge appears very attractive but for inherent deficiency of substantive nature and supervening principle of estopple by conduct, these writ petitions are bound to fail and accordingly, those are dismissed. However, in the circumstances there will be no order for costs. Records, as produced by Mr. M. Debbarme, learned Addl. G.A. be returned forthwith.