ORDER 1. Petitioners, who are the defendants-tenants before the trial Court, have filed this piscellaneous petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India being aggrieved by order dated 13.10.2017 passed in RCS No.32-A/14 by the Court of learned Third Civil Judge Class-II, Morena, whereby the learned Third Civil Judge Class-II, Morena has allowed the application under section 65 of the Evidence Act permitting the plaintiff to produce photocopy of the resolution authorizing the Secretary of the Trust to carry out legal proceedings in the matter of recovery of rent and eviction of the tenants. 2. It is contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that photocopy of the resolution as contained in Annexure P-5 could not have been allowed to be taken on record by the trial Court without fulfilling the requirements of ascertaining the fact as to whether the original of the said document is available or not. 3. He has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar and another, as reported in 2009(III) MPJR 211, wherein in para 12, the High Court has held that the secondary evidence of a document is admissible when original is proved to be in existence, it cannot be given as a matter of course. 4. Similarly, reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of Narsingh and others v. Shripat Singh and others, as reported in 2014(4) MPLJ 578. In this judgment, reliance has been placed on para 13, wherein it has been held that in absence of establishing the existence of original, the photocopy cannot be treated as secondary evidence. 5. Similarly, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of H. Siddiqui (dead) by LRs v. A. Ramalingam, as reported in 2011(3) MPLJ 83, wherein the ratio of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that the secondary evidence relating to the contents of a document is inadmissible, until the non-production of the original is accounted for. Court must decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence before making endorsement thereon. 6. Court must decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence before making endorsement thereon. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Y. Narasimha v. Y. Venkatalakshmi, as reported in (1991)3 SCC 451 , and submits that the provisions contained in section 63(1) and (2) read with section 65(e) and (f) permits certified copies and copies made from the original by mechanical process to be tendered as secondary evidence. He submits that in fact in terms of the provisions contained in section 63 of the Evidence Act, section 63(2) provides for copies made from the original by mechanical processes, which in themselves ensure accuracy of the copy and copies compared with such copies. Further, section 65(c) provides that the secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in the following cases, namely, when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time. 7. In this backdrop, the impugned order passed by the trial Judge is to be examined. The fact of the matter is that photocopy of a resolution of the Trust has been placed on record as Ex.P-5 authorizing the person for undertaking legal proceedings for eviction and arrears of rent. There is police report on record to show that loss of Proceedings Register was reported to the T.I. City Kotwali, Morena on 4.2.2014, which is duly supported by an affidavit of the Secretary of the Trust. There is police report on record to show that loss of Proceedings Register was reported to the T.I. City Kotwali, Morena on 4.2.2014, which is duly supported by an affidavit of the Secretary of the Trust. There is a public notice published in the newspaper regarding loss of such Register as is available alongwith Annexure P-3, which demonstrates that the requirements of section 65(c) have been fulfilled in the present case and in the light of the law laid down in the case of H. Siddiqui (supra), since the plaintiff has accounted for non-production of the original by producing the aforesaid documents, namely, complaint to the police and newspaper publication and also the fact that such authorization can be proved by producing the trustees in the witness box, it cannot be said that the nature of the document was such that in absence of its original its contents cannot be read or will become inadmissible and also in the light of the fact that since the plaintiff has been able to account for nonproduction of the original, this Court is of the opinion that the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Narsingh and others (supra), is distinguishable inasmuch as the only requirement in the case of Narsingh and others (supra) is establishment of existence of original document. Plaintiff has produced the document to show that the original was lost and its existence has not been challenged by the present petitioner in his reply to the application under section 65 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, the ratio in the case of Narsingh and pthers (supra), is not applicable in the present case. 8. Similarly, the ratio in the case of Rajesh Kumar (supra), is to the effect that the secondary evidence of a document is admissible when original is proved to be in existence. In the present case, existence of the original has been in fact admitted by the defendants-petitioners by saying that the plaintiff had produced this document in several other proceedings and as per the case of the plaintiff, he had lost it while taking it back from the Court in some other case. Therefore, this ratio is also not helpful to the case of the petitioners. 9. Therefore, this ratio is also not helpful to the case of the petitioners. 9. Thus, in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Y. Narasimha (supra), this Court is of the opinion that the trial Court has not committed any illegality in permitting leading of secondary evidence and, thus, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. R.K. Soni for petitioners; Santosh Agarwal for respondent.