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2018 DIGILAW 310 (GAU)

Rameswar Rabha, S/o Late Deba Kanta Rabha v. State of Assam

2018-02-20

MIR ALFAZ ALI

body2018
JUDGMENT AND ORDER : MIR ALFAZ ALI, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 20.06.2009 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur in Sessions Case No. 53(NL)2001. By the said judgment the learned Sessions Judge convicted the accused/appellant U/S-201 IPC and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for 7 (seven) years and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000.00/- (Rupees one thousand) with default stipulation. 2. As per prosecution case, a GD Entry was made with the Lakhimpur Police Station on 01.02.1995 on the basis of a missing entry, to the effect that one Sri. Indrajit Singh, after going out from his home in the evening of 31.02.1995, did not return and his vehicle was found abandoned. On the basis of the said GD entry, proved as Exhibit-3, police conducted a preliminary enquiry and after conducting the enquiry a report was submitted that it was a case of kidnapping and treating the said report as FIR, a case was registered as NL P.S Case No. 53/1995, U/S-365 IPC. In course of the investigation, some accused persons including the present appellant were arrested and the dead bodies of the said Indrajit Singh and another person were recovered on the basis of the information received from the arrested accused persons. The confessional statements of the arrested accused persons were also recorded. After completion of investigation charge sheet was laid against 7 (seven) accused persons including the present appellant, out of whom one Nurul Hoque Choudhury died and some of the charge sheeted accused persons absconded. Eventually the trial proceeded against the accused/appellant Rameswar Rabha as well as Pradip Barpatra Gohain, Rafiqul Hussain and Nekibur Rahman. 3. Learned sessions Judge framed charges against all the 4 (four) accused persons U/S-364(A)/302/34 IPC as well as Section 201/34 IPC to which they pleaded not guilty. 4. In order to establish the charges, prosecution examined 17 witnesses and on appreciation of evidence learned trial court acquitted the accused Pradip Barpatra Gohain, Rafiqul Hussan and Nekibur Rahman. However, having found the charge U/S-201 IPC established against the present accused/appellant, the learned Sessions Judge convicted him U/S-201 IPC and awarded sentence as indicated above. 5. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence, the present appellant preferred the instant appeal. 6. I have heard the learned Senior Counsel Mr. However, having found the charge U/S-201 IPC established against the present accused/appellant, the learned Sessions Judge convicted him U/S-201 IPC and awarded sentence as indicated above. 5. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence, the present appellant preferred the instant appeal. 6. I have heard the learned Senior Counsel Mr. M. Choudhury for the appellant and learned Additional Public Prosecutor S. Jahan for the State and also considered the evidence and materials brought on record. 7. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Chouhdury submitted that the conviction of the present appellant was solely based on the evidence of PW8, PW9, PW12 and PW15 relating to recovery of the dead body on being led by the present accused/appellant. The contention of the learned counsel was that the dead body was recovered at the instance of three accused persons out of whom two were dead and it was therefore, not clear as to who in fact, led the police to the place, where from the dead body was recovered. Further contention of the learned counsel was that the disclosure statement except to the extent, directly and distinctly related to the recovery of the incriminating fact, no other statement in this regards is admissible U/S-27 of the Evidence Act. There was no evidence sufficient to draw a conclusion that the accused/appellant buried the dead body of the victim or concealed the evidence to screen the perpetrator of offence and as such, mere recovery of the dead body at the instance of the appellant was not sufficient to draw such a conclusion, submits Mr. Choudhury. In support of his submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Mohmed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra (1976) 1 SCC 828 . The Apex Court dealing with the necessary conditions for bringing the Section 27 of the Evidence Act into operation held in Para 12 as under: 12.“The expressions “provided that” together with the phrase “whether it amounts to a confession or not” show that the section is in the nature of an exception to the preceding provisions particularly Section 25 and 26. It is not necessary in this case to consider if this section qualifies, to any extent, Section 24, also. It is not necessary in this case to consider if this section qualifies, to any extent, Section 24, also. It will be seen that the first condition necessary for bringing this section into operation is the discovery of a fact, albeit a relevant fact, in consequence of the information received from a person accused of an offence. The second is that the discovery of such fact must be deposed to. The third is that at the time of the receipt of the information the accused must be in police custody. The last but the most important condition is that only “so much of the information” as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible. The rest of the information has to be excluded. The word “distinctly” means “directly, “indubitably”, “strictly”, “unmistakably”. The word has been advisedly used to limit and define the scope of the provable information. The phrase “distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered” is the linchpin of the provision. This phrase refers to that part of the information supplied by the accused which is the direct and immediate cause of the discovery. The reason behind this partial lifting of the ban against confessions and statements made to the police, is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by the accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of that part, and that part only, of the information which was the clear, immediate and proximate cause of the discovery. No such guarantee or assurance attaches to the rest of the statement which may be indirectly or remotely related to the fact discovered. 8. It is the settled position that the provision of Section 27 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rules provided in Section 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act regarding inadmissibility of confession made before police or while in custody. Since the learned Sessions Judge essentially relied on the testimony of PW8, PW9. PW12 and PW15 to convict the accused/appellant U/S-201 IPC, it is time to scan the evidence of the said prosecution witnesses, in order to ascertain whether the necessary preconditions were present in the instant case for invoking Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 9. PW8 was an Executive Magistrate who was present at the time of exhuming the dead body. PW12 and PW15 to convict the accused/appellant U/S-201 IPC, it is time to scan the evidence of the said prosecution witnesses, in order to ascertain whether the necessary preconditions were present in the instant case for invoking Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 9. PW8 was an Executive Magistrate who was present at the time of exhuming the dead body. He stated in his evidence that the dead body was dug out in his presence and other witnesses. According to him, the accused Abdul Kadir, Julhas Ali, Sabur Ali, Rafiqul Hussain, Rameswar Rabha showed the place where the bodies were buried and as shown by them, the dead body was dug out from under the earth. After recovery of the dead body it was identified to be of deceased Indrajit Singh and he prepared the inquest report. Although PW9 was also cited as a witness to the recovery of the dead body, this witness turned hostile, as he only stated that the bodies of a Punjabi and a Marowari persons were dug out. He, however, did not state anything as to who led the police to the said place. 10. PW12 who happened to be a witness of exhuming the dead body deposed that the police asked the accused persons Rafiqul, Kadir, Sabur and another person about dead body. Rafiqul declined and stated that he had no knowledge. However, Sabur showed a place where from one dead body was recovered. Kadir also showed the place where from another body was recovered. 11. According to PW15, after arrest of the accused/appellant Rrameswar Rabha on 07.02.1995, at about 8.00 PM, the accused Rameswar Rabha led them to Nadirka village where Rameswar Rabha showed the place where the dead body of Indrajit was kept buried. As it was already dark, they could not proceed further and therefore, kept the place guarded by police. On the next morning again they went to the said place near the house of the accused Rafiqul Hussain, which was shown by the accused Rameswar Rabha on the previous night and as shown by Rameswar Rabha on the previous night, the place was dug and a dead body was found which was identified to be of the deceased Indrajitt Singh. At the time of recovery of the dead body, the accused persons Rameswar Rabha, Rafiqul, Sabur Ali, Abdul Kadir were also present and all of them showed another place nearby where from the dead body of one Dipak Agarwala was also dug out as shown by all the accused persons as mentioned above. 12. What is therefore evident from to testimony of witness No. 15 is that the place, where the dead body of the victim Indrajit Singh was buried was shown by the accused Rameswar Rabha on the previous night for the first time. As it was only the accused Rameswar Rabha who led the police to the place of occurrence for the first time, though later on other accused persons were also taken to the place, there was no scope for thinking that the place was shown by all the accused persons. 13. Thus, from the evidence it is apparent that the dead body of the deceased Indrajit Singh was recovered on being shown and led by the accused Rameswar Rabha. Learned Senior Counsel placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Mohmed Inayatullah, contended that from the mere fact that the dead body was recovered on being shown by the accused, except the recovery of the dead body, nothing more could be inferred and on the basis of the above evidence, it was not possible to conclude that the dead body was kept concealed by the accused/appellant himself. The Apex Court in Inayatullah's case laid down the necessary conditions for attracting Section 27 of the Evidence Act and the first requirement for bringing the Section 27 into operation is the discovery of the relevant fact. In the instant case, the dead body of the victim was certainly material and relevant fact and such recovery was made in consequence of information received from the accused Rameswar Rabha, as evident from the testimony of PW15 and therefore, first requirement was satisfied. Second condition is that the discovery of such fact must be deposed to. The prosecution witnesses, more particularly PW15 had deposed about such discovery of the body on the basis of the information provided by the accused Rameswar Rabha. The third ingredient is that the accused must be in the police custody. There is no dispute on this fact that the accused was in police custody as deposed to by all the witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, more particularly PW15 had deposed about such discovery of the body on the basis of the information provided by the accused Rameswar Rabha. The third ingredient is that the accused must be in the police custody. There is no dispute on this fact that the accused was in police custody as deposed to by all the witnesses. Lastly but the most important condition is that only so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible. The rest of the information has to be excluded. Thus, all the preconditions for attracting section 27 of Evidence Act is found exist in the present case. 14. Now the question arises whether only on the above fact of recovery of the dead body, on being shown by the accused is sufficient to attribute the criminal liability to the accused/appellant that it is the accused Rameswar Rabha, who buried the dead body or concealed evidence for screening the offender from legal punishment. 15. Section 201 IPC reads as under: 16. From the above provision of Section 201 IPC, it appears that following are the ingredients necessary for convicting a person U/S-201 IPC. (i) The accused new that an offence has been committed or (ii). He had the reason to believe that an offence has been committed. Secondly, intentionally omits to give any information respecting that offence and he is legally bound to give. 17. The Apex Court in Mohmed Inayatulla while clarified that the fact of discovery is not restricted to physical or material fact but also includes the knowledge of the accused with regards to such fact and observed as under: “At one time it was held that the expression “fact discovered” in the section is restricted to a physical or material fact which can be perceived by the senses, and that it does not include a mental fact. Now it is fairly settled that the expression “fact discovered” includes not only the physical object produced, but also the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this.” 18. Thus, when material fact being the dead body and the clothes and other articles were recovered on being led by the accused, such discovery is not restricted to the mere physical fact, but also included the knowledge of the accused persons to such discovery. Thus, when material fact being the dead body and the clothes and other articles were recovered on being led by the accused, such discovery is not restricted to the mere physical fact, but also included the knowledge of the accused persons to such discovery. To put it differently, the accused Rameswar had the knowledge that the facts were concealed in a particular place. When an incriminating fact is discovered on being lead and shown by the accused, there may be three possibilities, so far knowledge is concerned, as rightly indicated by the learned trial court that firstly, either the accused himself kept the fact concealed, secondly he had seen somebody else doing so and thirdly he had been informed or heard about the same. 19. The Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471 dealing with such a situation held, that when discovery of the fact raises the above three presumptions and it is only within the knowledge of the accused, on the basis of whose information, the incriminating fact was discovered, as to how he could know, that the incriminating fact was concealed in a certain place and he failed to tell the criminal court that either he has seen somebody else hiding the body or he had heard from somebody else regarding such concealment, the criminal court can very reasonably presume that it was he, who led the discovery, also concealed the fact. The Apex Court in para 26 observed as under: “26. We too countenance three possibilities when an accused points out the place where a dead body or an incriminating material was concealed without stating that it was concealed by himself. One is that he himself would have concealed it. Second is that he would have seen somebody else concealing it. And the third is that he would have been told by another person that it was concealed there. But if the accused declines to tell the criminal court that his knowledge about the concealment was on account of one of the last two possibilities the criminal court can presume that it was concealed by the accused himself. And the third is that he would have been told by another person that it was concealed there. But if the accused declines to tell the criminal court that his knowledge about the concealment was on account of one of the last two possibilities the criminal court can presume that it was concealed by the accused himself. This is because the accused is the only person who can offer the explanation as to how else he came to know of such concealment and if he chooses to refrain from telling the court as to how else he came to know of it, the presumption is a well justified course to be adopted by the criminal court that the concealment was made by himself. Such an interpretation is not inconsistent with the principle embodied in Section 27 of the Evidence Act.” 20. The facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the evidence clearly established that it was the accused Rameswar Rabha, on the basis of whose information the dead body was recovered and he did not come forward to tell as to the source of his knowledge. In absence of any explanation from the accused showing that either he had seen somebody else concealing the dead body or he heard from somebody else, the inference drawn by the trial court that the accused/appellant, who led to the discovery, also concealed the dead body or intentionally omits to give the information regarding the offence cannot be criticised. Thus, in the above facts and circumstances of the case, the findings of the learned trial court holding the accused/appellant guilty of committing the offence U/S-201 IPC cannot be faulted and therefore, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence requires no interference by this court. 21. Accordingly the appeal is found to be devoid of merit and dismissed accordingly. 22. Send back the LCR along with a copy of this judgment.