ORDER : R. Subbiah, J. 1. The learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli vide letter bearing Reference D. No. 749 dated 29.08.2017, addressed to the Registry of this Court, sought certain clarifications, as contemplated under Section 395 of The Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "The Code"), with respect to conduct of trial in S.C. Nos. 44 of 2014 and 161 of 2015 on its file. Such a clarification sought for by the learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli was ordered to be treated as a reference as contemplated under Section 395 (2) of the Code and placed before this Court for passing appropriate orders thereof. The facts leading to S.C. Nos. 44 of 2014 and 161 of 2015 on the file of the learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli and which necessitated the learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli to make the present reference are as follows:- 2. As per the letter dated 29.08.2017 of the Judicial Officer, it could be seen that there are three Sessions Case pending on his file namely Sessions Case No. 161 of 2015, 44 of 2014 and 20 of 2017. The sum and substance of the case of the prosecution in S.C. No. 44 of 2014:- S.C. No. 44 of 2014:- 3. On 17.11.2013 at about 08.00 hours, Tr. N. Prabhu, Village Administrative Officer in charge of Peramangalam Village received an intimation that foul smell is emanating from an oil barrel near Nambiappan rice mill. On the basis of such information, he proceeded to the mill and on opening the oil barrel, he found the dead body of an unidentifiable female aged about 25 years in blue colour nighty with cut injuries on her neck and body. On the basis of the complaint given by Village Administrative Officer, a case in Crime No. 141 of 2013 was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC in Pulivalam Police Station on the same day at 10.00 hours. Upon registration of the first information report, investigation commenced and during the course of such investigation, it came to light that the deceased in the case is Vinitha @ Sathiya and she was the daughter of the second accused Yamuna. Upon registration of the first information report, investigation commenced and during the course of such investigation, it came to light that the deceased in the case is Vinitha @ Sathiya and she was the daughter of the second accused Yamuna. It also came to light that the second accused Yamuna was living along with her son Selvakumar and daughter Vinitha @ Sathiya (deceased in the case) and the whereabouts of the husband of Yamuna was not known for the past ten years. It was further unfolded during the investigation that A-2 Yamuna was having an illicit relationship with Kannan (A-l) for the past 8 years and the frequent visit of A-1 to the house to meet A-2 was opposed by her son Selvakumar and daughter Vinitha @ Sathiya. They have also opposed the sale of the house by A-2 so as to develop the workshop of A-1. The son of A-2 namely Selvakumar and daughter Vinitha @ Sathiya also threatened A-2 that if she attempts to sell the house, they would reveal the murder of Durairaj and his driver (subject matter of Crime No. 27 of 2017 under Section 302 of IPC on the file of Vaiyampatti Police Station). Therefore A-1 and A-2 hatched a criminal conspiracy to do away with the life of the son of A-2 namely Selvakumar. With that intention, on 28.10.2013, A-1 with the active assistance of A-2 along with one Seethalakshmi A-3 murdered Selvakumar, son of A-2, on 28.10.2013 when he was sleeping inside the house, by inflicting cut injuries. On 15.11.2013, the daughter of A-2 questioned her mother as to the absence of her brother and confronted A-2. Enraged by this, A-1 Kannan and A-2, Yamuna conspired together and murdered Vinitha @ Sathiya on 15.11.2013 at 3.30 pm by stabbing her with a double edged knife when she was sleeping in the house resulting in her instantaneous death. Thereafter, A-1 transported the dead body in an oil barrel and disposed it of in Periyakulam Village, hence, the charge. This is the gist of allegations in S.C. No. 44 of 2014. The investigation in this case was transferred to the Deputy Superintendent of Police (C.B. C.I.D.) on 03.12.2013. In this sessions case, there are totally 69 witnesses. S.C. No. 161 of 2015 4. The 1st accused Kannan developed illicit intimacy with A-2 Yamuna. This is the gist of allegations in S.C. No. 44 of 2014. The investigation in this case was transferred to the Deputy Superintendent of Police (C.B. C.I.D.) on 03.12.2013. In this sessions case, there are totally 69 witnesses. S.C. No. 161 of 2015 4. The 1st accused Kannan developed illicit intimacy with A-2 Yamuna. A-2 Yamuna decided to sell the house in which she is living along with her children purportedly for developing the workshop run by A-1. The decision taken to sell the house was opposed by the son of A-2 namely Selvakumar and daughter Vinitha @ Sathiya. The said Selvakumar and Vinitha @ Sathiya also threatened A-2 that if she attempts to sell the house, they would reveal A-1 and A-2's involvement in the murder of Durairaj and his driver Sakthivel (subject matter of case in Crime No. 27 of 2007 under Section 302 of IPC on the file of Vaiyampatti Police Station). Hence, Kannan, A-l; Yamuna, A-2 and Seethalakshmi, A-3 hatched a conspiracy and murdered the son of A-2 namely Selvakumar on 28.10.2013. In this case, there are totally 54 witnesses. S.C. No. 20 of 2017 5. A-1 Kannan and A-2 Yamuna had developed illicit intimacy. While so, one Durairaj, who had advanced loan to A-2 Yamuna, frequently visited the house and made sexual advances towards A-2 Yamuna. Enraged by the attitude of Durairaj, A-1 and A-2 conspired together and murdered Durairaj and also his driver Sakthivel on 22.01.2007. In this case, there are totally 81 witnesses. 6. During the course of trial in this case, the prosecution has filed a Memo stating that all the official witnesses in S.C. No. 44 of 2014, S.C. No. 161 of 2015 and S.C. No. 20 of 2017 are same, therefore, it was prayed that the examination of non-official witnesses may be completed in all the three Sessions Case so that it will be convenient to examine all the official witnesses who are all one and the same in all the three sessions cases. On consideration of the said Memo, the learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli found that his predecessor has conducted a joint trial in S.C. Nos. 161 of 2015 and S.C. No. 44 of 2014. On consideration of the said Memo, the learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli found that his predecessor has conducted a joint trial in S.C. Nos. 161 of 2015 and S.C. No. 44 of 2014. It was further found that there were two sets of depositions in which one set of deposition had the signature of the witnesses as well as the Judicial Officer and whereas the other set of deposition did not contain either the signature of the witness or the Judicial Officer. It was also noticed that the occurrence, which is the subject matter of S.C. Nos. 161 of 2015 and 44 of 2014, have taken place at different time and place. It was also noticed that Pws 1 to 7 were examined as common witness and exhibits were also marked in common, which according to the Judicial Officer is non est in criminal jurisprudence. In this context, the learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli, by placing reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of (Ganesan and others v. State represented by Inspector of Police, R-2, Kodambakkam Police Station, Chennai) reported in 2011 (5) CTC 747 would state that the procedure hitherto followed by his predecessor appears to be contrary to the ratio laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decision of this Court. Therefore, the present reference is made seeking certain clarification with respect to the conduct of joint trial in S.C. Nos. 161 of 2015 and 44 of 2014. It was however stated that a separate trial has commenced with respect to S.C. No. 20 of 2017 and therefore, there is no anomaly in conducting trial in S.C. No. 20 of 2017. In effect, the reference is confined only with respect to the conduct of joint trial in S.C. Nos. 161 of 2015 and 44 of 2014 on the file of the learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli. 7. When the reference was taken up for consideration, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor placed reliance on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of (Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab and others) reported in (1985) 1 Supreme Court Cases 422 wherein it was held that in para No. 8 as follows:- 8. 7. When the reference was taken up for consideration, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor placed reliance on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of (Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab and others) reported in (1985) 1 Supreme Court Cases 422 wherein it was held that in para No. 8 as follows:- 8. In the facts and circumstances of this particular case, we feel that the proper course to adopt is to direct that the two cases should be tried together by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, but not consolidated i.e., the evidence should be recorded separately in both the cases one after the other except to the extent that the witnesses for the prosecution, who are common to both the cases, be examined in one case and their evidence be read as evidence in the other. The learned Additional Sessions Judge should after recording the evidence of the prosecution witness in one case, withhold his judgment and then proceed to record the evidence of the prosecution in the other case. Thereafter, he shall proceed to simultaneously dispose of the cases by two separate judgments taking care that the judgment in one case is not based on the evidence recorded in the other case." 8. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor also relied on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in (Mohan Baitha and others v. State of Bihar and another) reported in 2001 (2) Scc (SC) 534 wherein it was held that as follows:- "The expression "same transaction" from its very nature is incapable of an exact definition, it is not intended to be interpreted in any artificial or technical sense. Common sense and the ordinary use of language must decide whether on the facts of a particular case, it can be held to be in one transaction. It is not possible to enunciate any comprehensive formula of universal application for the purpose of determining whether two or more acts constitute the same transaction. But the circumstances of a given case indicates the proximity of time, unity of proximity of place, continuity of action and community of purpose or design are the factors for deciding whether certain acts form parts of the same transaction or not. 9. But the circumstances of a given case indicates the proximity of time, unity of proximity of place, continuity of action and community of purpose or design are the factors for deciding whether certain acts form parts of the same transaction or not. 9. Thus, it is the submission of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that whether or not the alleged offences committed by the accused in the instant case under reference largely depends upon the facts of each and every case and a straight jacket formula cannot be adopted to hold that the offences committed by A-1 and A-2 falls within the words "same transaction" warranting a joint trial. Therefore, it is submitted by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the reference sought for by the learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli shall be answered by holding that a joint trial of both the Sessions Case is not feasible and that a separate trial should be conducted in each case. 10. At this stage, since an authoritative pronouncement is required to be made in this reference, by considering the legal aspects, we have thought it fit to appoint Mr. Ajmal Khan, learned Senior Advocate of this Court as amicus curiae to assist us in this case. On such appointment, the learned Amicus Curiae has submitted a written arguments summarising the various legal aspects touching the reference. The learned Amicus Curiae placed reliance on the decision of the Privy Council in (Babulal Chaukani v. King Emperor) AIR 1938 PC 130 wherein it was held as follows:- "....The Criminal Procedure Code contains a collection of statutory rules. Section 5(1) provides that all offences under the Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to its provisions. The language of the Code is therefore conclusive and must be construed according to ordinary principles, so as to give effect to the plain meaning of the language used. No doubt in the case of an ambiguity, that meaning must be preferred, which is more in accord with justice and convenience, but in general the words used read in their context must prevail. Ss. 239 falls within Ch.19, which deals with the form of charges and the joinder of charges. Under the latter division fall S. 233 to 244 inclusive. Ss. 239 falls within Ch.19, which deals with the form of charges and the joinder of charges. Under the latter division fall S. 233 to 244 inclusive. S. 233 states the general rule that for every distinct offence of which any person is accused, there shall be a separate charge and each charge shall be tried separately, except in the cases mentioned in Ss. 234, 235, 236 and 239. Ss. 234, 235 and 236 deal with the joinder and trial of different offences against the same accused. Section 239 deals with the joinder in one charge and trial of several persons..... The clause is expressly an exception from S. 238 and enables a plurality of offences to be dealt with in the same trial. But it does not import either expressly or by implication the limitation set out in S. 234 according to which not more than three offences of the same kind committed within the space of 12 months can be tried together or the limitation contained in S. 235 (1) under which more offences than one committed by the same person can only be tried together, if they are in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, in which case there is no specific limit of number. Nor, is there any limit of number of offences specified in Section 239 (d). The one and only limitation there is that the accusation should be of offences 'committed in the course of the same transaction'. Whatever scope of connotation may be included in the words 'the same transaction', it is enough for the present case to sway that if several persons conspire to commit offences, and commit overt acts in pursuances of the conspiracy (a circumstance which makes the act of one the act of each and all the conspirators) these acts are committed in the course of the same transaction, which embraces the conspiracy and the acts done under it. The common concert and agreement which constitute the conspiracy, serve to unify the acts done in pursuance of it. So far seems clear; but the point of difficulty which has been strenuously argued in this appeal relates to the point of time in the proceedings at which the condition prescribed by the charge must be fulfilled. The common concert and agreement which constitute the conspiracy, serve to unify the acts done in pursuance of it. So far seems clear; but the point of difficulty which has been strenuously argued in this appeal relates to the point of time in the proceedings at which the condition prescribed by the charge must be fulfilled. To put it more exactly, is it enough if the conspiracy is to be found in the accusation or must it be found in the eventual result of the trial? Is the relevant point of time that of the accusation, or that of the eventual result? For the former view, there is an unbroken series of authorities in the Indian Courts, but the matter has not until now come before the Judicial Committee and must now be decided by them. It is a question of principle or, perhaps, more correctly, construction. 11. The learned Amicus Curiae has also placed reliance on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapatti Ganeswara Rao and another) reported in AIR 1963 SC 1850 wherein it was held as follows:- "22. Before considering these decisions, it will be useful to look at the scheme of Chapter XIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with the charge. The chapter is split up into two sub-heads. "Form of charges" and "joinder of charges". Sections 221 to 232 are comprised under the first sub-head and Ss. 233 to 240 in the second. Sections 221 to 223 deal with the framing and content of charge. S. 224 deals with the interpretation of the language of the charge and S. 225 with the effect of errors in the charge. Sections 226 to 231 deal with the power of the court with regard to framing and altering charges and the procedure to be adopted at the trial where a charge is found to be defective or there is no charge or where a new charge is to be framed. Section 232 deals with the power of the appellate Court or the High Court when it discovers that there is no material error in the charge. Then we come to the other sub-head of this chapter. Section 223 provides that for every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge. Section 232 deals with the power of the appellate Court or the High Court when it discovers that there is no material error in the charge. Then we come to the other sub-head of this chapter. Section 223 provides that for every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge. It thus lays down the normal rule to be followed in every case. But it also provides that this will be subject to the exceptions contained in Sections 234, 235, 236 and 239. The first three provisions relate to the framing of charges against a single accused person. Section 234(1) deals with the trial of a person for offences of the same kind not exceeding three committed within the space of 12 months from the first to the last of such offences and S. 234(2) deals with what is meant by the expression 'offences of the same kind'. This provision lifts partially the ban on the trial of a person for more than one offence at the same trial. Section 235 (1), however, goes a step further and permits the trial of a person for more offences than one if they are so connected together as to form the same transaction. Thus under this provision if the connection between the various offences is established the limitations placed by S. 234 (1) both as regards the number and the period during which the offences are alleged to have been committed will not apply. Full effect cannot possibly be given to this provision if we hold that it is subject to the limitation of S. 234 (1). Sub-section (2) of Section 235 deals with a case where an offence falls within two definitions and sub-section (3) deals with a case in which a number of acts are alleged against an accused person, different combinations of which may constitute different offences. Then we come to S. 236 which provides that if a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences and further provides that any number of such charges may be tried together. It also permits that charges could be framed against an accused person in the alternative if the court thinks fit. It also permits that charges could be framed against an accused person in the alternative if the court thinks fit. Thus, this is a special provision available in case of doubt and is neither subject to the limitations prescribed by S. 233 nor those of the other preceding provisions. 12. The learned Amicus Curiae also brought to the notice of this Court that the decision rendered by the Honourable Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapatti Ganeswara Rao and another) mentioned supra has been cited with approval by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case in Dinesh Kumar v. State (Criminal Appeal No. 454 of 2015 dated 16.03.2015) wherein it was held that it would be the absolute discretion of the trial court to hold joint trial in case of satisfaction of the conditions imposed under Section 223 of the Code, unless, such joint trial is likely to cause difficulty to the accused in defending himself and he is opposed to such joinder of trial in both the cases. 13. The learned Amicus Curiae would in effect contend that if the accused involved in an offence is more than one, then such persons can be tried together in respect of offences of the same nature or kind, if the offences thereof are committed within a period of 12 months. In the case under reference, being S.C. Nos. 44 of 2014, the offence of murder was alleged to have been committed by two accused namely A-1 Kannan and A-2 Yamuna and the offence in S.C. No. and S.C. No. 161 of 2015, the offence of murder was alleged as against A-1 Kannan, A-2, Yamuna and A-3, Seethalakshmi and both the offences were committed within 12 months. The motive for both the murders are intrinsically interconnected. Therefore, according to the learned Amicus Curiae, there is no bar for the trial Court to conduct joint trial in S.C. Nos. 44 of 2014 and S.C. No. 161 of 2015 and no prejudice will be caused to the accused therein in any manner. However, the trial Court, by placing reliance on the decision rendered by the learned single Judge of this Court in Ganesan's case sought the present clarification. 44 of 2014 and S.C. No. 161 of 2015 and no prejudice will be caused to the accused therein in any manner. However, the trial Court, by placing reliance on the decision rendered by the learned single Judge of this Court in Ganesan's case sought the present clarification. As far as facts covered in Ganesan's case are concerned, the accused therein namely Ganesan and other accused were charged with offence of same kind in connection with 4 criminal cases and the trial court, after holding 4 separate trials, delivered a common judgment in all 4 cases. On appeal, the learned single Judge of this Court held that the evidence let in one case in respect of one occurrence cannot be made use of against the accused in the other case. It was further held that delivering a common judgment in respect of four different occurrences, making out four different offences on four different occasions at four different places is a procedure unknown to Criminal law. It was further held that in such a circumstance there could not be any joint trial of all the four cases as Section 219 of Cr.P.C. restricts the number of offences which can be jointly tried to a maximum of three offences. The learned Amicus Curiae would however submit that while delivering the Judgment in Ganesan's case mentioned supra, this Court did not take note of the fact that Section 219 of the Code cannot be invoked as there were more than one accused in the said four case and only the provisions contained in Section 223 (c) ought to have been pressed into service. Section 223 (c) of the Code permits such joinder of cases in case an offence is committed by persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind, within the meaning of Section 219 committed by them jointly within the period of 12 months. 14. The learned Amicus Curiae would further contend that in Ganesan's case, the learned single Judge of this Court placed reliance on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Nathilal v. State of U.P. reported in 1990 Supplementary SCC 145 and the decision in Sudhir and others v. State of M.P. reported in 2001 AIR SCW 491, which relate to cases in counter and sought to make it mandatory the procedure evolved by the Honourable Supreme Court in that case. Therefore, the reliance placed by the learned single Judge of this Court and the resultant conclusion arrived thereon has to be held as not laying the correct proposition of law. In fact, in the present case, the accused 1 and 2 can be tried together in respect of offences of the same kind inasmuch as the offences were committed within a period of 12 months. Therefore, the trial court can be permitted to conduct joint trial in S.C. Nos. 44 of 2014 and S.C. No. 161 of 2015 by taking recourse to Section 223 (c) of The Code. 15. As regards the validity of the recording of common evidence, the learned Amicus Curiae invited our attention to Section 276 of The Code and would submit that the evidence let in by a witness has to be recorded and signed by the Presiding Officer of the Court. In the present case, in consonance with Section 276 of The Code, evidence was recorded, however, one set of evidence so recorded has been signed by the Presiding Officer and the photocopy of the same has been retained for the purpose of the connected Sessions Case. It is further contended that nowhere in the Code there has been any prohibition for such a procedure to be adopted. The recording of deposition of witnesses in respect of both the case can jointly be recorded and there is no embargo for doing so. Therefore, it is submitted that the procedure adopted by the predecessor of learned II Additional District cum Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli cannot be said to be not proper. 16. We have considered the submissions of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor as well as the learned Amicus Curiae. Therefore, it is submitted that the procedure adopted by the predecessor of learned II Additional District cum Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli cannot be said to be not proper. 16. We have considered the submissions of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor as well as the learned Amicus Curiae. For the purpose of issuing a clarification as sought for by the learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli, the following question emerges for our consideration as follows:- (i) Whether the conduct of joint trial in respect of persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind, committed by them jointly within a period of 12 months, would be against the principles laid down by this Court in (Ganesan and others v. State represented by Inspector of Police, R-2, Kodambakkam Police Station, Chennai) reported in 2011 (5) CTC 747 (ii) If answer is "Yes" to the above question, whether joint trial can be permitted to be conducted in Sessions Case in S.C. No. 44 of 2014 and S.C. No. 161 of 2015 on the file of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli (iii) Whether the procedure adopted by the predecessor of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli in recording common evidence in both the sessions case and retaining one set of evidence in one Sessions Case and placing the xerox copy of the evidence in the other case which does not contain the signature of the witnesses as well as the Presiding Officer is proper. 17. The present reference is made by the learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli mainly on the basis of the judgment rendered by the learned single Judge of this Court in Ganesan's case mentioned supra. Therefore, it will be appropriate to quote the relevant portion of the decision made in Ganesan's case which reads as follows:- "30. At the outset, I have to state that under Section 219 of Cr.P.C. There can be joinder of charges in respect of three offences of the same kind committed within a year. But in this case, the offences said to have been committed by these Accused on four different occurrences would not fall within the ambit of Section 219 of Cr.P.C. In these cases, rightly, there was no joint trial by charging the accused together in respect of all four occurrences. The trial Court had rightly conducted four separate trials. But in this case, the offences said to have been committed by these Accused on four different occurrences would not fall within the ambit of Section 219 of Cr.P.C. In these cases, rightly, there was no joint trial by charging the accused together in respect of all four occurrences. The trial Court had rightly conducted four separate trials. When that be so, the evidence let in one case in respect of one occurrence cannot be made use of against the accused in the other case. But the Trial court has committed very serious illegality in considering the evidences in all cases together and in delivering a common judgment. In my considered opinion, delivering a common judgment in respect of four different occurrences making out four different offences on four different occasions and at four different places is illegal and the same is a procedure unknown to Criminal law. Therefore, on this account, the entire judgment of the trial court is vitiated." 18. For the purpose of effectively deciding the present Reference, the provisions contained under Sections 218 to 223 of the Code, which are as follows:- "218. Separate charges for distinct offences:- (1) For every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge and every such charge shall be tried separately- Provided that where the accused persons, by an application in writing, so desires and the Magistrate is of opinion that such person is not likely to be prejudiced thereby, the Magistrate may try together all or any number of the charges framed against such person. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect the operation of the provisions of Sections 219, 220, 221 and 223. 219. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect the operation of the provisions of Sections 219, 220, 221 and 223. 219. Three Offences of same kind within year may be charged together :- (1) When a person is accused of more offences man one of the same kind committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last of such offences, whether in respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with and tried at one trial for, any number of them not exceeding three (2) Offences are of me same kind when they are punishable with me same amount of punishment under the same section of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or of any special or local law; Provided mat, for the purposes of this section, an offence punishable under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be deemed to be an offence of the same kind as an offence punishable under Section 380 of the sid Code, and that an offence punishable under any section of me said Code, or of any special or local law, shall be deemed to be an offence of the same kind as an attempt to commit such offence, when such an attempt is an offence. 220. Trial for more man one offence.- (1) If, in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, more offences than one are committed by the same person, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such offence. (2) When a person charged with one or more offences of criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of property, as provided in sub-section (2) of section 212 or in sub-section (1) of section 219, is accused of committing, for the purpose of facilitating or concealing the commission of that offence or those offences, one or more offences of falsification of accounts, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such offence. (3) If the acts alleged constitute an offence falling, within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, the person accused of them may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, each of such offences. (3) If the acts alleged constitute an offence falling, within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, the person accused of them may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, each of such offences. (4) If several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute when combined a different offence, the person accused of them may be charged with, and tried a one trial for the offence constituted by such acts when combined, and for any offence constituted by any one, or more, of such acts. (5) Nothing contained in this section shall affection Section 71 of The Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). 221. Where it is doubtful what offence has been committed;- (1) If a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences, and any number of such charges may be tried at once, or he may be, charged in the alternative with having committed some one of the said offences. (2) If in such a case the accused is charged with one offence, and it appears in evidence that he committed a difference offence for which he might have been charged under the provisions of sub-section (1), he may be convicted for the offence which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged for it. 222. When offence proved included in offence charged:- (1) When a person is charged with an offence consisting of several particulars, a combination of some only of which constitutes a complete minor offence, and such combination is proved, but the remaining particulars are not proved, he may be convicted of the minor offence, though he was not charged with it. (2) When a person is charged with an offence and facts are proved which reduce it to a minor offence, he may be convicted of the minor offence, although he is not charged with it. (3) When a person is charged with an offence, he may be convicted of an attempt to commit such offence although the attempt is not separately charged. (3) When a person is charged with an offence, he may be convicted of an attempt to commit such offence although the attempt is not separately charged. (4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise a conviction of any minor offence where the conditions requisite for the initiation of proceedings in respect of that minor offence have not been satisfied. 223. What persons may be charged jointly:-The following persons may be charged and tried together namely:- (a) persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction (b) persons accused of an offence and persons accused of abatement of, or attempt to commit, such offence; (c) persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind, within the meaning of Section 219 committed by them jointly within the period of twelve months; (d) persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction; (e) persons accused of an offence which includes theft, extortion, cheating or criminal misappropriation and persons accused of receiving or retaining, or assisting in the disposal or concealment of, property possession of which is alleged to have been transferred by any such offence committed by the first-named persons, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such last-named offence (f) persons accused of offences under sections 411 and 414 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or other of those sections in respect of stolen property the possession of which has been transferred by one offence; (g) persons accused of any offence under Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) relating to counterfeit coin and persons accused of any other offence under the said Chapter relating to the same coin, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such offence, and the provisions contained in the former part of this Chapter shall, so far as may be, apply to all such charges. Provided that where a number of persons as charged with separate offences and such persons do not fall within any of the categories specified in this section, the Magistrate or Court of Session, may, if such persons by an application in writing, so desire, and if he or it is satisfied that such persons would not be prejudicially affected thereby, and it is expedient so to do, try all such persons together. 19. 19. A reading of the provisions contained under Sections 218 to 223 of the Code, particularly Section 223(c) of the Code would indicate the intention of the legislators in ensuring that when more than one offence of same kind is committed by a group of person, within the meaning of Section 219 of the Code, then they can be jointly tried. The object of joint trial is to swiftly try both the cases in which the accused are one and the same, when the offences alleged to have been committed by them are similar in one and the same transaction within a period of 12 months. It is no doubt true that speedy dispensation of justice is part of Criminal Jurisprudence and even an accused is entitled to seek for speedy disposal of the criminal case initiated against him. Keeping this in mind, the legislature have framed Sections 218 to 223 of the Code to conduct joint trial of more than one Sessions Case of similar nature which are committed within a period of 12 months so as to reduce the offences of similar kind which are tried jointly to save the precious time of the Court. However, such joint trial has to be conducted by ensuring that it will not cause any prejudice to the accused in any manner. 20. Section 233 of the old Code corresponds to Section 218 of the present Code. Similarly, Sections 234, 235 and 239 of the old Code corresponds to Sections 219, 220 and 223 of the present Code. Referring to the provisions contained in the Code, with respect to conduct of joint trial, the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision rendered in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapatti Ganeswara Rao and another) reported in AIR 1963 SC 1850 in para No. 26, it was held as follows:- "26. Mr. Bhimasankaran contended that S. 239 must be read atleast subject to Ss. 234 (1) and 235 (1) on the ground that if there are certain restrictions with respect to the trial of a single accused, there is no reason why those restrictions will disappear if an accused is tried along with several other persons. Mr. Bhimasankaran contended that S. 239 must be read atleast subject to Ss. 234 (1) and 235 (1) on the ground that if there are certain restrictions with respect to the trial of a single accused, there is no reason why those restrictions will disappear if an accused is tried along with several other persons. Thus, he points out that where several persons are accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed by them jointly within a period of 12 months, the number of offences for which they could be tried cannot exceed three. In this connection, he relied upon the words "within the meaning of Section 234" occurring in cl. (c) of Section 239. These words, he contended, clearly show that cl. (c) of S. 239 is subject to the provisions of S. 234. In our opinion the words "within the meaning of S. 234" indicate that what was meant by the words "offence of the same kind" in cl. (c) of S. 239 is the same thing as was meant by the identical expression used in S. 234(1) and defined in S. 234 (2) and nothing more. If it was the intention of the Legislature to provide that the number of offences for which several accused could be tried under cl. (c) of S. 239 should be limited to three as provided in S. 234 (1), the Legislature would either have said "persons accused of more offences than one of the same kind not exceeding three in number" or may have used the words "persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind to that extent permissible under S. 234". Language of this kind would have made perfectly clear that cl. (c) of S. 239 was subject to S. 234 (1). As already stated, if S. 239 (c) is construed as being subject to S. 234 (1), there would be this anomaly that whereas the same accused persons could be charged with and tried jointly for any number of offences of different kinds committed by them, for more than three offences of the same kind committed by them jointly there will have to be a separate trial with respect to such offences. Surely such could not have been the intention of the legislature. Surely such could not have been the intention of the legislature. The object of enacting S. 239 was to avoid multiplicity of trials and the only limitation which could properly be placed on the trial of several persons for the same kind of or different offences would be that which considerations of justice and fairness would require. No doubt, such a construction would also give rise to the result that whereas so far as the trial of a single accused person is concerned the charges must be limited to three offences committed by him within the space of 12 months from the first to the last of such offences, there would be no such limitation when along with that accused persons there are one or more persons who have jointly committed those offences. The reason for this possibly is that the legislature did not want to differentiate between cases where any number of different offences were committed jointly by a group of persons from cases where any number of offences of the same kind were committed by a group of persons. 21. This decision of the Honourable Supreme Court was reiterated by the Supreme Court in a subsequent decision rendered in (Dinesh Kumar v. State) (Criminal Appeal No. 454 of 2015 dated 16.03.2015) wherein it was held that it would be the absolute discretion of the trial court to hold joint trial in case of satisfaction of the conditions imposed under Section 223 of the Code, unless, such joint trial is likely to cause prejudice to the accused in defending himself and he has opposed such joinder of trial in both the cases. In para-10 of this Judgment, it was held as follows:- "10. Section 223 (2) of the Cr.P.C. provides for the joint trial of different accused in certain circumstances. It enumerates different contingencies in which different persons may be charged and tried together. As rightly noticed by the High Court, the only cause, if at all relevant for the purpose of present case is Section 223 (d) which stipulates that persons accused of different charges committed in the course of the same transaction could be charged and tried together." 22. As rightly noticed by the High Court, the only cause, if at all relevant for the purpose of present case is Section 223 (d) which stipulates that persons accused of different charges committed in the course of the same transaction could be charged and tried together." 22. In this regard, one more reference can be made to the Judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of (Willie (William) Stanley v. State of Madhya Pradesh) AIR 1956 SC 116 wherein in Paragraph Nos. 96, it was held as follows:- "96. Section 233 of the Code expressly states that for every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge and every such charge shall be tried separately, except in the cases mentioned in Sections 234, 235, 236 and 239. There is no ambiguity in the language of this section. While it insists upon a separate charge for every distinct offence it permits a single trial on several charge in the cases mentioned in Sections 234, 235, 236 and 239....... 23. Therefore, from the aforementioned decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court, it is clear that if more than one person were accused of committing an offence, they can be tried jointly if the offences were committed in the course of the same transaction. Section 218 of the Code contemplates that for every distinct offence of which any person is accused, there shall be a separate charge and every such charge shall be tried separately except in the cases mentioned under Sections 219 to 223 of the Code. Section 218 of the Code deals with framing of separate charge against an accused and such accused shall be tried separately for each and every charge. However, as per Section 223 (c) of the Code, there is no bar or restriction in conducting joint trial if the offences are of the same kind committed by more than one accused jointly within a period of 12 months. However, as per Section 223 (c) of the Code, there is no bar or restriction in conducting joint trial if the offences are of the same kind committed by more than one accused jointly within a period of 12 months. We have noticed that while delivering the Judgment in Ganesan's case, the learned single Judge of this Court placed reliance on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in (Nathilal v. State of U.P.) reported in 1990 Supplementary SCC 145 wherein the Honourable Supreme Court dealt with a case and counter-case and therefore, it was held that both the cases, which are counter cases relating to same occurrence, should be tried by the same Judge. Therefore, we are of the view that the reliance placed by the learned single Judge to the case in Nathi Lal v. State of U.P. has nothing to do with the conduct of joint trial with respect of offences of same kind committed by the same accused in a transaction that took place within a period of 12 months. Further, the learned single Judge placed reliance on Section 219 of the Code which deals with various offences committed by a single accused. As far as plurality of the accused are concerned, as contemplated under Section 223 (c) of the Code, there is no bar or restriction in conducting joint trial if the offences of same kind are committed by more than one accused jointly within a period of 12 months. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapatti Ganeswara Rao and another) ( AIR 1963 SC 1850 ), while interpreting Section 219 (present Section 223) of the Code, it was held that the intention of the legislature in enacting Section 239 (c) (Section 223 (c) of the present Code) is not to limit or restrict the number of same kind of offences to be tried to three. In effect, as per Section 219 of the Code, when a person is accused of more offences than one of the same kind, committed within the space of twelve months, he may be charged with and tried at one trial for any number of them not exceeding three. Thus, Section 219 of the Code can be applied in case there is a single accused who was charged with different offences of the same kind. Thus, Section 219 of the Code can be applied in case there is a single accused who was charged with different offences of the same kind. For example, 'A' is accused of theft at Anna Nagar on 01.02.2017; at Saidapet on 01.05.2017 and at Mylapore on 01.12.2017. "A" can be tried for all those offences in one trial. On the contrary, Section 223 (c) clearly delineates that the 'persons', meaning thereby, more than one accused, who are alleged to have committed more than one offence of the same kind, within the meaning of Section 219 jointly, within the period of twelve months shall be tried jointly irrespective of any number of same kind of offences. To put it in other words, Section 219 of the Code shall be pressed into service if (i) a single person was accused of committing more offences than one of the same kind (ii) Such offences should have been committed within a period of 12 months (iii) The total number of offences in respect of which joint trial can be held shall not exceed three. 24. On the contrary, Section 223 (c) of The Code can be invoked and pressed into service when (i) there are more than one person accused of committing more offences than one, of the same kind. (ii) The offences complained of should have been jointly committed by all such persons within a period of 12 months. (iii) The offences said to have been committed by an accused can be more than three also, but it should have been committed within 12 months 25. For example, "A" and "B" jointly commits an offence of theft in Anna Nagar on 01.02.2017; at Saidapet on 01.05.2017; at Mylapore on 01.12.2017; at Royapuram on 01.01.2018; at Tondiapet on 10.01.2018 and at Triplicane on 20.01.2018. They can be tried jointly in one trial for all the six offences. To put it in other words, under Section 223 (c) of the Code, the number of same kind of offences committed within a period of 12 months is not restricted. They can be tried jointly in one trial for all the six offences. To put it in other words, under Section 223 (c) of the Code, the number of same kind of offences committed within a period of 12 months is not restricted. In this context, at the risk of repetition, it would be useful to refer to Section 223 (c) of the Code which clearly states that "persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind, within the meaning of Section 219 committed by them jointly within the period of twelve months, meaning thereby the number of same kind of offences committed by them within a period of 12 months is not restricted. In fact, in Ganesan's case, the trial Court had conducted separate trial in four Sessions Cases, but a common Judgment was delivered in all those four Sessions Case and that was held to be bad by the learned single Judge on the ground that common judgment in respect of four different occurrences making out four different offences on four different occasions and at four different places is illegal. In our opinion, the decision rendered by this Court in Ganesan's case does not apply to the present cases under reference and therefore it need not be dealt with by us any further. When the offences complained of are of the same kind having been committed within a period of 12 months by more than one accused, then joint trial is permissible. The words contained in Section 223 (c) of the Code to the effect "within the meaning of Section 219" is referable only to the same kind of offences mentioned in Section 219 of the Code and not with regard to the number of offences committed within a period of 12 months as has been held by the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision rendered in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapatti Ganeswara Rao and another) reported in AIR 1963 SC 1850 mentioned supra. 26. Keeping the submissions made by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor as well as the learned Amicus Curiae, let us examine as to whether Section 223 (c) of the Code can be pressed into service to order joint trial in the cases under reference. 26. Keeping the submissions made by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor as well as the learned Amicus Curiae, let us examine as to whether Section 223 (c) of the Code can be pressed into service to order joint trial in the cases under reference. The factual aspects in the present cases under reference would show that though the offences alleged against the accused are of the same kind having been committed within a period of 12 months, we find that Seethalakshmi, who is A-3 in S.C. No. 161 of 2015 is not an accused in S.C. No. 44 of 2014. Therefore, conducting joint trial in S.C. No. 44 of 2014 and S.C. No. 161 of 2015 would prejudice A-3 Seethalakshmi, who is one of the accused in S.C. No. 161 of 2015. The inclusion of Seethalakshmi in S.C. No. 161 of 2015 would change the character of the Cases and hence conducting joint trial in S.C. No. 44 of 2014 and S.C. No. 161 of 2015 is not feasible as it will not come within the purview of Section 223 (c) of the Code. However, we find that prosecution witnesses have already been examined jointly in S.C. No. 44 of 2014 and S.C. No. 161 of 2015 and it was not objected to by any of the accused, including A-3 Seethalakshmi on the ground that it would cause prejudice to them. We have also noted that certain witnesses who have been examined so far are common witness relating to both the Sessions Cases. In such circumstances, there is no need for eschewing the deposition of witnesses which was already recorded in S.C. No. 44 of 2014 and S.C. No. 161 of 2015 and to go for a de-novo trial. We are of the view that ends of justice will be met if the evidence of remaining witnesses in S.C. No. 44 of 2014 and S.C. No. 161 of 2015 are recorded separately by conducting a separate trial. 27. The learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli has also sought a clarification with respect to the procedure adopted by his predecessor in recording common evidence in both the sessions case and retaining one set of evidence in one Sessions Case and placing xerox copy of the evidence in the other case, which does not contain the signature of the witnesses as well as the Presiding Officer. At the outset, we do not find any infirmity in the procedure adopted by the predecessor of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge. As stated above, certain witness examined so far in both the Sessions Case are common and one and the same. The exhibits marked in both the Sessions Case are one and the same. In a joint trial, when common evidence is let in, the said evidence let in, in one of the sessions case, can be used in the other sessions case by retaining xerox copy of the same. The said procedure cannot be said to be unknown to law. If at all, the xerox copies of the depositions can be retained in one of the Sessions Cases, such xerox copies can be attested by the Presiding Officer of the Court, after comparing the same with the original deposition of witnesses. 28. In the light of the above, we answer the reference made by the learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli as under:- (i) The learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli is directed to conduct separate trial in Sessions Case in S.C. No. 44 of 2014 and S.C. No. 161 of 2015 by examining the remaining witnesses and to record the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code separately, in view of the inclusion of A-3 Seethalakshmi as an accused in one of the Sessions Case, who is not an accused in the other case and her inclusion would change the character of the case and it will not fall within the purview of Section 223 (c) of the Code. As mentioned above, since the exhibits were marked in both the Sessions case, in common, the prosecution shall file a memo to treat the exhibits already marked in one Sessions cases as exhibit for the other Sessions case. (ii) If it is a joint trial, the procedure adopted by the predecessor of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli in recording common evidence in both the sessions case and retaining one set of evidence in one Sessions Case and placing the xerox copy of the evidence in the other case which does not contain the signature of the witnesses as well as the Presiding Officer, is proper and it will not vitiate the conduct of joint trial in the two Sessions cases in any manner. If at all, the xerox copies of the depositions recorded in one case which contain the signature of witness as well as the Presiding Officer can be retained in the other Sessions Cases which can be attested by the Presiding Officer of the Court after comparing the same with the original deposition of the witnesses. However, as we have come to the conclusion that separate trial has to be conducted in both the sessions cases, the trial court may attest the xerox copies of the deposition of prosecution witnesses namely PW 1 to PW 7 recorded in one Sessions Case for being used as evidence in the other sessions case. We place on record our appreciation to Mr. M. Ajmal Khan, learned Senior Counsel for the assistance rendered to us in answering this reference.