Arrapetta Estate, Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. v. Suseela
2018-04-04
ALEXANDER THOMAS
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : The prayers in this Writ Petition (Civil) filed under the enabling provisions contained in Art.226 of the Constitution of India are as follows: “(i) call for the records leading to Ext.P-4 award and to quash the same by the issue of a writ of certiorari. (ii) issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the 3rd respondent to re-hear the matter afresh and pass fresh award in I.D.No. 4/2009. (iii) pass an ad-interim order staying the operation and implementation of Ext.P-4 award passed by the 3rd respondent.” 2. Heard Sri. M. Gopikrishnan Nambiar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-management and Sri. P.K. Ramkumar, learned counsel appearing for R-1 (worker) & R-2 (Trade Union of the worker). Since the 3rd respondent is the Labour Court, Kannur, formal notice to that party has been dispensed with. However, the lower court records have been made available by the said Labour Court for the perusal of this Court. 3. The petitioner is the management of the Arapetta Estate of the M/s. Harrisons Malayalam Ltd., and the said estate is situated in Meppadi in Wayanad district. It is stated by the petitioner that the 1st respondent is a worker of the petitioner management since 10.8.1984. It is the case of the petitioner management that the 1st respondent worker had committed certain misconducts inasmuch as she had unauthorizedly made constructions in the land, which was allotted to her for the purpose cultivation and that she was charge-sheeted for such alleged misconducts and a domestic enquiry in that regard was conducted, in which she was found guilty of such charges of delinquency and the management had issued orders on 3.7.2003/7.7.2003 dismissing her from the service of the petitioner company. 4. Aggrieved thereby, the worker through her union had taken up the matter with the District Labour Officer concerned and the efforts of the District Labour Officer for conciliation with the petitioner management ended in failure, based on which the State Government had issued G.O(Rt.)No. 221/279/LBR dated 18.2.2009 in exercise of the powers conferred under Sec.10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whereby the industrial dispute regarding the legality and correctness of the dismissal of the worker by the management was referred to the competent Labour Court concerned for adjudication. 5.
5. Earlier, the Labour Court had considered the issue as to the legality and illegality of the domestic enquiry conducted by the management, which led to the dismissal of the worker and also as to whether there is sufficient evidence to prove the alleged delinquency of the worker. After hearing both sides, the Labour Court, Kannur, had passed a detailed order dated 8.1.2011 on the said preliminary point and has found that though the enquiry has been conducted in compliance with the principles of natural justice, the evidence adduced in the domestic enquiry through MW-1 to MW-4, etc. does not disclose necessary and sufficient evidence so as to prove the delinquency of the worker and held that the finding of the enquiry officer in the domestic enquiry that the sufficient evidence has been adduced by the management to prove the delinquency of the worker, is perverse and bad and is based on no evidence. In that view of the matter the Labour Court, as per the said preliminary order dated 8.7.2011 had set aside the domestic enquiry report and in view of the plea made by the management to give them another opportunity to adduce fresh evidence to establish the charge of misconduct, the Labour Court had allowed the management an opportunity to adduce fresh evidence to prove the gravamen of the charges of misconducts raised against the workman. 6. The Labour Court, Kannur had registered the Industrial Dispute, as I.D. No. 4/2009. Ext.P-1 claim statement was filed on behalf of the 1st respondent worker and the petitioner management had filed Ext.P-2 written statement thereto. The management had adduced oral evidence through MW-1 to MW-4 and had marked Ext.M-1 to M-9 documents. The 1st respondent (worker) had given evidence as WW1 and Exts.W-1 to W-4 documents were marked on the side of the worker. 7. After adducing evidence and after hearing both sides, the Labour Court has passed the impugned Ext.P-4 award dated 10.8.2012 in I.D. No. 4/2009, wherein it was found conclusively after evaluation of the evidence on record that there is no necessary and sufficient evidence to prove the allegations of misconducts on the part of the worker and that there is no acceptable evidence to prove the alleged misconducts against the worker and therefore it was ordered that the order of dismissal imposed on the worker is illegal and unjustifiable.
On this basis, it was ordered by the Labour Court as per the impugned Ext.P-4 award that the worker is thus entitled to be reinstated with continuity of service and that she is entitled to get all the arrears of wages from the management with all attendant benefits. The management was directed to reinstate the worker with continuity of service from the date of dismissal within thirty days from the date of pronouncement of the award and arrears and backwages were also directed to be disbursed to the worker. Since the civil litigation between the parties regarding the land dispute was pending, it was made clear by the Labour Court that Ext.P-4 award will not in any manner affect the rights of the parties in respect of Ext.M-7 judgment dated 31.10.2005 of the Munsiff's Court, Kalpetta, in O.S. No. 218/2000. 8. Aggrieved by Ext.P-4 award, the petitioner management had filed the instant Writ Petition (Civil). This Court had admitted the Writ Petition on 22.7.2013 and had granted stay of operation of Ext.P-4 award for two months, making it clear that the worker will be entitled to invoke the remedy under S.17B of the Industries Disputes Act, 1947. 9. On a perusal of the docket sheet of the Writ Petition (Civil) it is seen that after the grant of the interim stay order on 22.7.2013, the said interim order has not been extended, though the matter had subsequently been listed before this Court on 20.3.2017, 7.4.2017, 6.6.2017, 4.8.2017, 16.8.2017, 29.8.2017, 25.9.2017, 3.10.2017, 11.10.2017, 16.10.2017, etc. On 16.10.2017, this Court had passed an order directing the Registry to list the case for final hearing. It is thereafter that this case was listed before this Court for final hearing and disposal. But it appears from a reading of the proceedings sheet that, after the issuance of the interim stay order for two months on 22.7.2013, the petitioner has not moved this Writ Petition (Civil) for extension of the stay order until 20.3.2017. In all the postings after 20.3.2017, the interim stay order was not extended. 10. It is also common ground that after the rendering of the order dated 8.7.2011 on the said preliminary point by the Labour Court, the petitioner management has not challenged the said order and has thus accepted the legality and correctness of the said order. 11. Both sides have been extensively heard.
10. It is also common ground that after the rendering of the order dated 8.7.2011 on the said preliminary point by the Labour Court, the petitioner management has not challenged the said order and has thus accepted the legality and correctness of the said order. 11. Both sides have been extensively heard. The main contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner management is that the finding rendered by the Labour Court in the impugned Ext.P-4 award dated 10.8.2012 that there is no necessary and sufficient evidence to prove the alleged delinquency of the worker is untenable and unsustainable and that the management has led proper evidence, which would certainly satisfy the standard of proof based on preponderance of probabilities to establish the guilt of the worker in terms of the allegations raised in the memo of charges issued against her. Alternatively, it is urged by the petitioner that the allegations against the worker will stand proved in view of the conclusive findings in Ext.P-3 judgment dated 31.10.2005 of the Munsiff's Court, Kalpetta, in O.S. No. 218/2000, in which the petitioner herein was the plaintiff and the worker herein was defendant No.1 therein and her husband was arrayed defendant No.2 therein and that the land which is the subject matter of the memo of charges is the same as the one in the plaint schedule property involved in Ext.P-3 judgment of the civil court and that the findings of the civil court in Ext.P-3 judgment would therefore prove the allegations of misconducts on the part of the employee inasmuch as there is a clear finding in Ext.P-3 judgment that the worker had made unauthorised construction in the plaint schedule property and had constructed a temporary shed in the plaint schedule property, etc. 12. Per contra, Sri. P.K. Ramkumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 and 2 (worker and union) would contend that the findings made by the Labour Court regarding “no evidence” are after careful and full evaluation and appraisal of the entire evidence on record and those findings can never be said to be tainted by perversity or illegality and merely because another view is reasonably possible, is no ground for this Court acting in exercise of powers conferred under Art.226 of the Constitution of India to disturb those findings and to hold that there is sufficient and necessary evidence to prove the delinquency against the worker.
It is also contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the finding made by the Labour Court in the preliminary order dated 8.7.2011 that there is no minimal sufficient and necessary evidence so as to prove the allegations in the charge sheet as per the evidence adduced in the domestic enquiry has become final and conclusive inasmuch as the management has not chosen to challenge the said order and has accepted the subsequent opportunity granted by the Labour Court to adduce evidence before the said court to independently prove the allegations of delinquency of the worker. Therefore, it is urged that it is not open to the management to contend that even if the independent evidence adduced through MWs-1 to 4 before the Labour Court, does not satisfy the minimal standard of proof based on preponderance of probability that the allegations against the workman will stand proved solely on the basis of Ext.M-7 judgment dated 31.10.2005 of the civil court. In that regard it is urged by Sri. P.K. Ramkumar, learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2 that the legal approach in Governmental service that a civil servant could be dismissed or terminated from service for misconducts solely based on the conviction imposed for such conduct, in a judgment of a criminal court as envisaged in Art.311 of the Constitution of India, etc. cannot be imported in the case of an employee, who is employed by a private employer and that too, based on the judgment of the civil court. 13. It is also submitted by Sri. P.K. Ramkumar, learned counsel appearing for R-1 and R-2 that in view of the judgments of the Apex Court in the decisions as in Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 , Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423 ), etc., the decision/award of the Labour Court cannot be challenged by invoking the powers conferred under Art.226 of the Constitution of India and could be challenged only by taking recourse to the visitorial superintendence under Art.227 of the Constitution of India.
In that regard, it is also pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for R-1 and R-2 that pursuant to judgment dated 23.7.2010, in Civil Appeal No.5896/2010 of the Apex Court in the abovesaid judgment in Shalini Shyam Shetty's case supra, the Registry of this Court based on the decision of the competent authority of this Court taken on the administrative side, has issued circular No.D1-69978/2010 dated 22.9.2010, wherein it has been notified that in view of the abovesaid judgment of the Apex Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty's case supra, petitions filed before this Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India should be nomenclatured as “Original Petition” and such Original Petitions filed under Art.227 of the Constitution of India to challenge the decision of the Labour Court should be nomenclatured as O.P(Labour Court)/O.P(LC) and that of the civil court, criminal court Family Court, M.A.C.T., C.A.T/DRT, O.P(Wakf Tribunal) etc. should be nomenclatured as O.P(Cvl), O.P(Crl), O.P.(FC), O.P(MAC), O.P(CAT)/O.P(DRT), O.P(WT), etc. Therefore, it is urged that the present petition, which is filed under Art.226 of the Constitution of India to challenge the award of Labour Court by seeking writ of certiorari under Art.226 of Constitution of India is not maintainable and that, at best the remedy of the petitioner management is only to challenge Ext.P-4 award of the Labour Court by taking recourse to the provisions contained in Art.227 of the Constitution of India, which confers visitorial power of superintendence on this Court over the civil courts, criminal courts, tribunals, etc. 14. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner management would submit that the said dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions as in Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 ), Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423 ), etc. would pertain to civil courts stricto sensu and criminal courts strict sensu and will not be applicable in the case of other Tribunals like Labour Court and Industrial Tribunals constituted under the provisions of special enactments like the Industrial Tribunals Act, in the light of the judgments of the Apex Court in cases as in Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh & Ors. reported in (2015) 7 SCC 373 , para 16, etc.
Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh & Ors. reported in (2015) 7 SCC 373 , para 16, etc. and that it is now well settled that the awards and orders of the Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals constituted under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, could be challenged by taking recourse to the remedies not only under Art.227 of the Constitution of India, but also under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, subject to the satisfaction of the parameters of the exercise of power in that regard. 15. The abovesaid point regarding the maintainability of the petition filed under Art.226 of the Constitution of India to challenge the award of the Labour Court constituted under the provisions of the Industrial Tribunals Act, 1947, could be taken as the initial point to be considered in this judgment. 16. The Apex Court in the judgment in Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 , has held that writs under Art.226 of the Constitution of India can be issued to persons, who have some statutory public duty to perform and it may be filed by any person but main respondent should be either the Government, governmental agencies or State or instrumentalities of the State within the meaning of Art.12, but it cannot be filed when all the respondents are private parties and the only exception in that regard is in the matter of writ of habeas corpus. That there is generally a tendency of High Courts in entertaining Writ Petitions under Art.226 of the Constitution of India in pure civil/private disputes and in matters like rent control, eviction, etc. and that such approach is only to be disapproved. It has also been held that even in civil/private disputes, the High Court can interfere if there is violation of some statutory duty on the part of some statutory authority or any infraction of statute or it can be shown that a private individual is acting in collusion with a statutory authority, etc.
It has also been held that even in civil/private disputes, the High Court can interfere if there is violation of some statutory duty on the part of some statutory authority or any infraction of statute or it can be shown that a private individual is acting in collusion with a statutory authority, etc. It was also held in Shalini Shyam Shetty's case supra (paras 49, 48 etc.) based on the 7-Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 ) that Art.226 of the Constitution of India is also a part of the basic structure of the Constitution and that statutory amendment of a provision like Sec. 115 of the C.P.C. can neither cut down or expand the ambit the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Art.227. That Art.227 could be invoked by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice, but that an improper and frequent exercise of this power will be counter productive and will divest this extra ordinary power of its efficacy and that power thereunder is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly. That this reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for the grant of relief in individual cases, but should be directed for promotion of the public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest, whereas Art.226 is meant for protection of individual grievances. That therefore the power under Art.227 will be unfettered, but its exercise requires a high decree of judicial discipline and that the object of superintendence under Art.227 is both administrative and judicial and is to maintain efficiency, smooth and ordinary functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring to any disrepute and the power of interference under Art.227 is to be kept with minimum to ensure that delivery of justice does not come to a halt and the streams of justice remains pure and unpolluted to maintain public confidence in the functioning of courts subordinate to the High Courts. (see paras 30, 37 to 43, 48, 49, etc. of SCC report in Shalini Shyam Shetty's case supra). 17. Earlier a 2-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors.
(see paras 30, 37 to 43, 48, 49, etc. of SCC report in Shalini Shyam Shetty's case supra). 17. Earlier a 2-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors. reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675 ), has held that a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India would also lie to challenge appropriately orders of the civil courts, apart from the remedy conferred under Art.227 of the Constitution of India. Later a 3-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the decision in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423 ), held that the prerogative writs envisaged under Art.226 of the Constitution of India will not lie against the decisions and orders of the civil courts stricto sensu and if the statutory remedies under the C.P.C. are not invokable in the facts of the particular case, then the remedy of such an aggrieved person is to challenge such orders of the civil court by invoking the jurisdiction of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India, but subject to strict satisfaction of the parameters in the exercise of powers thereunder. Accordingly, the 3-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423 ), after placing reliance on the celebrated 8-Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1 , has held that the prerogative writ jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India could not be invoked to challenge the decisions of a civil court and has thus overruled the aforecited 2-Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 675 ). Therefore, it is now well settled that the decision of a civil court stricto sensu cannot be challenged by invoking the prerogative writ remedy envisaged under Art.226 of the Constitution of India and in appropriate cases, the remedy is to invoke the jurisdiction of visitorial superintendence conferred on the High Courts under Art.227 of the Constitution of India, but subject to strict satisfaction of the parameters regarding the exercise of the discretionary powers thereunder. Later the Apex Court has held in the decision in Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh & Ors.
Later the Apex Court has held in the decision in Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh & Ors. reported in (2015) 7 SCC 373 ), in para 16 thereof, as follows: “16. The scope and extent of power of the writ court in a petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution came up for consideration before a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the recent case of Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath ( (2015) 5 SCC 423 ). This Court observed that the writ of certiorari under Article 226 though directed against the orders of an inferior court would be distinct and separate from the challenge to an order of an inferior court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The supervisory jurisdiction comes into play in the latter case and it is only when the scope and ambit of the remedy sought for does not fall in the purview of the scope of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 could be invoked.” 18. It can thus be seen that based on the decision in Radhey Shyam's case supra reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423 , it has been held that writ of certiorari under Art.226 of the Constitution of India from the challenge directed against the orders of an inferior court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India and supervisory jurisdiction comes into play in the latter case and it is only when the scope and ambit of the remedy sought for does not fall in the purview of the scope of supervisory jurisdiction under Art.227, that the jurisdiction of the court under Art.226 would be invoked. Therefore, from a reading of the abovesaid judgments of the Apex Court in Radhey Shyam's case reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423 as well as Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society's case reported in (2015) 7 SCC 373 , it can be seen that there is clear distinction made between other inferior courts and Tribunals from judicial courts stricto sensu like a civil court or a criminal court stricto sensu, which is exercising powers under the provisions as in Civil Courts Act, C.P.C., Cr.P.C. and special enactments dealing with special criminal offences, etc.
Therefore, it cannot be said that a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India is barred as far as challenge as against the award or order of a Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is concerned inasmuch as, a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal constituted under that special enactment cannot be said to be a civil court stricto sensu or criminal court stricto sensu as understood in the abovesaid judgments of the Apex Court. Moreover, para 16 of Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society's case ( (2015) 7 SCC 373 ) would also amplify that in such a situation where the challenge is directed as against orders and decisions of other inferior courts or tribunals, the remedies under Art.226 as well as under Art.227 of the Constitution of India could be befittingly invoked so long as the parameters for the exercise of such discretionary powers are strictly satisfied. But that it is only when the scope and ambit of the remedy sought for does not fall in the purview of the scope of the supervisory jurisdiction under Art.227, that the prerogative writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 could be invoked. 19. The scope and ambit of exercise of powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to challenge appropriately the decisions of the Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, have been dealt with in a series of cases by the Apex Court in the decisions as in K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation, reported in (2015) 12 SCC 39 ), State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Bhanji Gopal Karchhar, reported in (2016) 12 SCC 645, Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 192 ), Naresh Kumar Thakur & Ors. v. Principal/Executive Director, Civil Aviation Training College, Allahabad, reported in (2016) 15 SCC 701, Mavji C.Lakum v. Central Bank of India, reported in 2009 (3) L.L.N. 1 , para 12, etc. It will be profitable to refer to para 12.4 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Mavji C. Lakum v. Central Bank of India Central Bank of India, reported in 2009 (3) L.L.N. 1 , p.4, , which reads as follows: “12.4. These observations were made by this Court after, taking into consideration the observations made in Umaji Keshao Meshram & Ors.
These observations were made by this Court after, taking into consideration the observations made in Umaji Keshao Meshram & Ors. v. Radhikabai, Widow of Anandrao Banapurkar & Anr. ( 1986 SCR 731 ). In the present matter apart from the fact that the petition is labeled under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, it is clear that the grounds raised in the petition suggest that the petition is not only under Art. 227 but also under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is to be seen that in the grounds raised against the order of the Tribunal, it is specifically suggested that the order passed by the Tribunal was arbitrary, unreasonable, unjust and perverse. The further complaint made against the Tribunal's order pertain to failure on the part of the Tribunal to appreciate certain facts and eventualities thereby complaining non application of mind on the part of the Tribunal. Complaint has also been made against the approach of the Tribunal and it is suggested that the said approach was perverse. After reading the writ petition we are convinced that the contentions raised and the facts stated in the petition justify the respondent herein to file an application both under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.” Therefore, in the light of the legal principles discernible from the aforecited judgments, it can be seen that for challenging the directions/ orders/awards of the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the remedies conferred not only under Art.227 of the Constitution of India but also the writ jurisdiction of superintendence conferred under Art.226, could be invoked in appropriate cases, but subject to the satisfaction of the parameters for the exercise of the discretionary powers in that regard. 20. The scope and ambit of maintainability of intra-court appeals to challenge judgments of the Single Bench of the High Court rendered in exercise of the powers under Art.226 and/or Art.227 of the Constitution of India has been dealt with the judgment of the Apex Court in Jogendrasinghji Vijayasinghji v State of Gujarat, reported in (2015) 9 SCC 1 . 21. In the light of these aspects, it is only to be held that the said preliminary objection raised by Sri.
21. In the light of these aspects, it is only to be held that the said preliminary objection raised by Sri. P.K. Ramkumar, learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2 that the present petition filed under Art.226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable, is only to be overruled and it is so ordered. 22. Now the merits of the rival contentions have to be dealt with. The specific allegation of misconduct raised against the worker by the petitioner management is that she had misused the permission granted to her to cultivate the land allotted to her by the management for the purpose farming/cultivation, by unauthorisedly constructing a temporary shed therein without the permission of the management and that the said act of the worker would amount to an act of delinquency and misconduct as envisaged in the Standing Orders issued by the management of the petitioner company. 23. The specific charges levelled against the worker, which led the earlier domestic enquiry proceedings including the proceedings, have been quoted in para 13 of the impugned Ext.P-4 award, which read as follows: “(1) Wilful insubordination or disobedience whether alone or in combination with another or others of any lawful and reasonable order of a superior ? (2) Theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the employer's business or property? (3) Wilful damage to or loss through negligence of the employer's goods or property?” 24. The case of the management is that the land in question was earlier allotted to the mother of the worker for the limited purpose of effecting paddy cultivation/farming in that land and for no other purpose and later the said land was allotted to the worker herein and that without the permission from the management, she had unauthorisedly constructed a temporary shed therein and she had disobeyed the instructions of the management to remove such unauthorised temporary constructions and that the said action on the part of the worker would amount to a misconduct or delinquency as envisaged in the applicable Standing Orders of the management, which regulate the conduct of their workers and employees. It is also the case of the petitioner management that earlier they had filed a civil suit for recovery of the said property by filing Original Suit, O.S.No.218/2000 before the Munsiff's Court, Kalpetta, wherein respondent No.1 herein (worker) was arrayed as the original defendant and later, her husband Sri.
It is also the case of the petitioner management that earlier they had filed a civil suit for recovery of the said property by filing Original Suit, O.S.No.218/2000 before the Munsiff's Court, Kalpetta, wherein respondent No.1 herein (worker) was arrayed as the original defendant and later, her husband Sri. K. Ramaswami, was arrayed as supplemental defendant No.2 therein and that the Munsiff's Court, Kalpetta had rendered Ext.P-3 judgment dated 31.10.2005, wherein it was found that the 1st respondent (worker) had made unauthorised constructions as alleged by the plaintiff and consequently had decreed the suit, by directing that the defendants shall surrender vacant possession of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff within three months and the defendants were also directed by mandatory injunction to remove the temporary shed in the plaint schedule property within three months. A reading of Ext.P-3 judgment would disclose that the extent of land covered by the plaint schedule property comes to 32.5 cents. It is also not in dispute that after Ext.P-3 judgment, the 1st respondent herein had filed Appeal Suit A.S.No.5/2006 before the Court of Sub Judge, Sulthanbathery, to impugn Ext.P-3 judgment and the said appeal suit was dismissed as per the judgment dated 25.5.2013. Thereafter, the 1st respondent and her husband had filed Regular Second Appeal, RSA No.1017/2013 before this Court to impugn the said judgments in O.S. and A.S. and the said RSA has been admitted by this Court on 29.8.2013, after framing two substantial questions of law. 25. As stated hereinabove, after careful evaluation of the entire evidence adduced before the Labour Court, the said court in the instant impugned Ext.P-4 award, has taken the considered view that the said evidentiary materials on record do not even fulfil the inferior standard of proof based on preponderance of probabilities so as to establish the allegations of misconduct and delinquency raised against the 1st respondent-workman in the charge sheet and that therefore it is a case of “no evidence”, etc. These considered findings of the Labour Court could be interdicted by this Court only if the petitioner could successfully establish before this Court as those findings are perverse and unreasonable in the sense that no reasonable person properly instructed on the facts and law regulating the subject could take such a view.
These considered findings of the Labour Court could be interdicted by this Court only if the petitioner could successfully establish before this Court as those findings are perverse and unreasonable in the sense that no reasonable person properly instructed on the facts and law regulating the subject could take such a view. It is to be noted that the management has fully accepted the legality and correctness of the order dated 8.7.2011 rendered by the Labour Court in the instant industrial dispute on the preliminary point, wherein it has been categorically held that Ext.M-1 enquiry report on the domestic enquiry proceedings initiated against the worker do not disclose the minimum norms of acceptable evidence so as to prove the alleged charges and that the findings of the enquiry officer in Ext.M-1 domestic enquiry report are perverse and unreasonable. The management sought for an opportunity to adduce evidence before the Labour Court to prove the alleged charges. As the management has not challenged the said preliminary decision of the Labour Court rendered on 8.7.2011 and as the management has opted to accept the subsequent opportunity granted to them by the Labour Court to adduce evidence before that court to prove the charges against the workman, the management is obliged to prove the charges against the worker atleast on the basis of the inferior standard of proof based on preponderance of probabilities. The management has examined 4 witnesses before the Labour Court, viz, MWs-1 to 4 and has marked Exts.M-1 to M-9 documents. MW-1 is the enquiry officer, who conducted Ext.M-1 domestic enquiry and as the said enquiry was held to be bad, it has been set aside by the preliminary order dated 8.7.2011 by the Labour Court and there is no necessity to examine the evidence of MW-1. Then what remain are the oral evidence tendered by MWs-2 to 4. MWs-2 to 4 have submitted their proof affidavit in lieu of examination in chief. In the proof affidavit submitted by MWs-2 to 4 in their chief examination they have stated about the survey number of the disputed property in question. MWs-2 & 3 would state that the extent of the property involved is only about 0.70 cents. MW-4 has not stated about the extent of the disputed land in his proof affidavit.
In the proof affidavit submitted by MWs-2 to 4 in their chief examination they have stated about the survey number of the disputed property in question. MWs-2 & 3 would state that the extent of the property involved is only about 0.70 cents. MW-4 has not stated about the extent of the disputed land in his proof affidavit. However, in cross-examination, MWs-2 & 3 would clearly admit that they are not aware about the survey number of the property in dispute. Still further, MW-2 (superintendent) in his cross-examination would venture to state that he knows the 4 boundaries of the property and that the northern boundary is “P.K.Road” and the southern boundary is the property of one Saidalavi and Ibrahim, given by the company for conducting cultivation. That the western boundary is field No.12 and forest area and the eastern boundary is vested forest. Whereas MW-3 (Assistant Field Officer) would submit that he also knows the 4 boundaries of the property. He would assert that the forest/vested forest would not form 2 of the boundaries of the property in question and only one of the boundaries of the property is vested forest and that is the western boundary. He would also concur with MW-2 that the southern boundary is the property of Saidalavi and Ibrahim. However, he would say that the northern boundary is Panchayath road. He has not stated anything about the eastern boundary of the property in dispute. MW-4 (Assistant Manager-Survey) would assert that he also knows the boudaries of the property in dispute and 2 of the boundaries of the property in dispute are part of vested forest and other 2 boundaries are properties in the possession of the petitioner/company. They admit in cross-examination that they are not aware of the survey or resurvey number of the property in dispute. All of them would also submit that the company has not adduced any document before the Labour Court to show the title of the company in respect of the property in dispute. Therefore, though all the 3 witnesses would assert in their proof affidavit about the survey number, they have candidly admitted in their cross-examination that they are not aware of the survey number of the property in dispute. Further that all the 3 witnesses are in variance regarding the boundaries of the property in dispute.
Therefore, though all the 3 witnesses would assert in their proof affidavit about the survey number, they have candidly admitted in their cross-examination that they are not aware of the survey number of the property in dispute. Further that all the 3 witnesses are in variance regarding the boundaries of the property in dispute. MW-2 would state that the northern boundary is “P.K.Road” and MW-3 would assert that northern boundary is Panchayath Road. MW-4 would assert that western boundary is field No.12 and forest and the eastern boundary is vested forest. MW-3 would state that the western boundary alone is vested forest area. Whereas MW-2 would state that the western filed No.12 as well as the vested forest areas and eastern boundary is vested forest. MW-4 would assert that 2 boundaries exclusively pertain to the vested forest. Thus, it can be seen that MWs-2 to 4 are at variance regarding the description of even the boundaries of the property in dispute. All of them have candidly admitted that they are not aware of the survey number or resurvey number of the property in dispute. Further MW-2 would even further candidly admit that he is not only unaware about the survey number but also the extent of the property in dispute. 26. Further the case projected by the petitioner-management in the charge sheet as well as in Ext.P-3 civil suit proceedings is that a temporary shed has been constructed unauthorisedly by the worker without the permission of the management. Whereas MW-2 would admit that there is a tiled house in the property in dispute. MW-4 would also admit in cross-examination that the house in question is a tiled one. Therefore, the management witnesses MWs-2 to 4 are at a loss even to depose before the Labour Court as to the basic identity of the property in dispute and to properly establish before the Labour Court that the property in dispute covered by the charge sheet served on the employee in the disciplinary proceedings is the same as the one in the plaint schedule property covered by the civil suit. 27. Further, most importantly, it is to be seen that the management witnesses in their cross-examination have candidly admitted that they are not aware of the extent of the land in respect of the property in dispute.
27. Further, most importantly, it is to be seen that the management witnesses in their cross-examination have candidly admitted that they are not aware of the extent of the land in respect of the property in dispute. Whereas in the proof affidavit MWs-2 to 4 would assert that the extent of the property is only about 0.70 cents, which is hardly 300 sq.m. Learned counsel for the petitioner-management submits that the said aspect mentioned in the proof affidavit of MWs-2 to 4 is only a typographical error and that the case set up in the domestic enquiry is that the extent of land is actually 70 cents. To a specific question posed by this Court as to the extent of land as per the charge sheet, the learned counsel for the management would submit that he is not having a copy of the charge sheet and that he is not in a position to furnish those details to this Court. However, on a reading of Ext.P-4 award, it is seen that the version of the management projected before the Labour Court is that the extent of land of the disputed property is 70 cents. Even if it is assumed that the description of the extent of land in the proof affidavit of all the management witnesses shown as 0.70 cents is a typographical mistake and what they intended is 70 cents, it is to be crucially noted that the specific case projected by the management in Ext.P-3 civil suit about the extent of land in the plaint schedule property in respect of the said suit is 23.5 cents. In these circumstances, the Labour Court cannot be found fault with in any manner for coming to the considered conclusion that the management has not been able to lead any proper and cogent evidence before that court as to the identity, survey number and extent of the disputed property in question and that therefore, there is no sufficient minimum acceptable evidence to show that the property covered by the plaint schedule property in the civil suit is the same as the one in the domestic enquiry proceedings against the delinquent employee. No explanations were given by the management witnesses to show that the plaint schedule property covered by the civil suit is the one and the same in the domestic enquiry proceedings and as to the discrepancies in the extent of land.
No explanations were given by the management witnesses to show that the plaint schedule property covered by the civil suit is the one and the same in the domestic enquiry proceedings and as to the discrepancies in the extent of land. Merely because MWs-2 to 4 have stated about the survey numbers in their proof affidavit, which are presumably prepared on the basis of the assistance of their legal adviser, it will not lead to a situation that the said boundaries therein would amount to acceptable evidence inasmuch as the veracity of the same could be assessed based on the process of cross-examination undergone by the witnesses. In the cross-examination of all the management witnesses, they have candidly admitted that they are unaware about the extent of land, survey number, etc. Further they have also admitted before the Labour Court in cross-examination that the management has not produced any materials to show the title of the management over the property in question. Therefore, the above said findings of the Labour Court by no stretch of imagination could be held to be perverse or arbitrary or unreasonable. 28. On the other hand, R-1 worker has adduced detailed evidence as can be seen from Exts.W-1 to W-8 and W-10. The case of R-1 worker is that her father-in-law had acquired possessory right over the property, wherein a tiled house has been constructed, which is not the property of the petitioner-company and that her father-in-law had acquired possessory right over the property which originally pertains to forest area as early as in 1960 and later the said possessory right has been transferred to her husband, which was subsequently used by her for cultivation and residence. Earlier, the Forest Department has lodged a complaint against her and her husband as per O.R.No.69/1993 and the said case was compounded and penalty imposed by the Forest Department was remitted as per Ext.W-1 challan receipt. Ext.W-2 is the ration card issued to the worker and her husband and others, wherein the number of the house building in question has been shown. Ext.W-3 is the ration card issued to the worker and her family for the period from 1991-95 and Ext.W-4 is the ration card issued to the worker and her family for the period from 1996-2001.
Ext.W-3 is the ration card issued to the worker and her family for the period from 1991-95 and Ext.W-4 is the ration card issued to the worker and her family for the period from 1996-2001. It is the specific case of the worker in her evidence that Exts.W-2 to W-4 ration cards have been issued by the competent authority of the State Government in respect of the house situated in the disputed property. Exts.W-5 & W-6 are the extracts of the Assessment Register in respect of their house situated in the disputed property for the period from 1994-95 to 1998-99 and 1989-90 to 1993-94 respectively. Ext.W-7 is the registration certificate issued by the Inspector of Central Excise of Government of India, Meppadi Section in favour of her husband, Ramaswami, as per which her husband Ramaswamy was authorised to produce, manufacture, carryon, wholesale/sale of excisable goods for special industrial purposes. WW-1 worker has deposed that her husband was engaged in curing/drying coffee. That as per Ext.W-8, WW-1 would depose that her husband had conducted coffee curing/drying activities as per Ext.W-7 registration certificate. Her specific case is that the said activities have been done by her husband on the basis of Ext.W-7 in the disputed land. WW-1 worker further deposes that Ext.W-10 is the land revenue tax receipt issued by the revenue authorities, Village Office, Kottapadi, in respect of the disputed land in question. The case of WW-1 is that her predecessor-in-interest had acquired possessory right over the property in question though it originally pertained to forest area and that even the said Revenue authorities have accepted land tax in respect of the land though it is essentially based on possessory rights. On this basis, WW-1 (worker) would contend that the disputed land in question covered by the charge sheet in the domestic enquiry report in which the company has no right and it is the one in which the worker through her predecessor-in-interest had acquired the possessory right though it originally pertains to forest area. 29. In the light of these aspects, it can be seen that the Labour Court cannot be found fault with for having taken the view that no minimal acceptable evidence has been adduced by the management to show that the disputed land in question is the one which belongs to the company and that the worker has unauthorisedly constructed temporary shed therein. 30.
30. The learned counsel for the petitioner-management would strongly contend that even if the entire evidence of MWs 1 to 4 and the documentary evidence in that regard is eschewed, still the Labour Court should have held that the allegations against the respondent-worker have been proved on the basis of the findings rendered by the civil court in Ext.P-3 judgment and that in view of those aspects, the Labour Court should not have been interfered with the order of dismissal imposed on the worker by the management. The said contention raised by the management is not tenable for reasons more than one. Firstly, even the management has accepted the legality and correctness of the preliminary order rendered by the Labour Court wherein it has been held that there is no acceptable independent evidence adduced by the management to prove the delinquency of the worker and that the evidence tendered by the five management witnesses in the domestic enquiry proceedings would not constitute legally acceptable evidence so as to find that the worker is guilty of the alleged charges and on this basis the Labour Court has even set aside Ext.M-1 domestic enquiry report. The management themselves pleaded before the Labour Court that they should be given yet another opportunity before the Labour Court so as to prove the charges against the worker. The management has not challenged the preliminary order of the Labour Court and so the same has become final. In that view of the matter, the management is bound to prove the charges against the worker at least on the basis of inferior standards of preponderance of probabilities by adducing independent evidence. Certainly, they are at liberty to rely on Ext.P-3 judgment of the civil court. But their contention that even if independent evidence adduced through MWs 1 to 4 is eschewed, still the worker is liable to be found to be guilty solely on the basis of Ext.P-3 judgment, is plainly untenable for the reasons mentioned hereinabove. Even the identity of the property, extent and survey number are seriously under clouds of suspicions and doubts in the evidence tendered through MWs-1 to 4 as revealed from their cross-examination. Relevancy of Ext.P-3 judgment could be decided on the basis of the legal principles as importable from the provisions contained Sec.43 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
Even the identity of the property, extent and survey number are seriously under clouds of suspicions and doubts in the evidence tendered through MWs-1 to 4 as revealed from their cross-examination. Relevancy of Ext.P-3 judgment could be decided on the basis of the legal principles as importable from the provisions contained Sec.43 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Sec.41 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with relevancy of certain judgments in probate, which is not applicable in the instant case. Sec.42 is also not applicable, which deals with relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in Sec.41, if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry. Even in Sec.42, it is stipulated that such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state. Sec.43 deals with judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in Secs.40 to 42, when relevant. It is stipulated in Sec.43 that judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some provisions of the Evidence Act. Therefore, at best, it could be contended that Ext.P-3 judgment of the civil court is relevant for the determination of the issues in the present case. But certainly, it cannot be contended that the findings in Ext.P-3 judgment of the civil court would be conclusive and would clinch the issue regarding the guilt of the delinquent even if the entire other independent evidence adduced by the management is eschewed. The contention raised by the management that the dismissal order should be upheld solely on the basis of Ext.P-3 judgment of the civil court is not sustainable in law. The provision as in 2nd proviso to sub clause (2) and clause (a) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, which empowers that requirement of conduct of enquiry will not apply where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction by a criminal court, will only apply to Government civil servants and that too when it is on the basis of conviction on the basis of criminal charge and not on the basis of a judgment of civil court of law.
Certainly, Ext.P-3 judgment would also be a relevant circumstance, to be taken into account, after evaluating the cumulative evidence adduced by the parties before the trial court. The contention that even if other entire evidence of the management is eschewed, still the delinquent is found to be guilty merely on the basis of Ext.P-3 judgment of civil court is to say the least not sustainable in law. That apart, even now, Ext.P-3 has not attained finality. The First Appeal filed by the worker has been dismissed by the lower appellate court. Regular Second Appeal, R.S.A.No.1017/2013 has already been admitted by this Court on 29.8.2013 and this Court has framed the following 2 substantial questions of law: “(i) Simply because the Deed of Indenture (Ext.A3) shows a survey number, does it mean that plaintiff has title to the suit property? (ii) When the plaintiff itself had no idea about the extent of the land and survey number and when the suit was filed simply because the Commissioner has demarcated a plot of land, are the courts below correct in holding that the plaintiff has established title so as to grant a decree as prayed for?” Therefore, to contend that this Court should set aside the considered award of the Labour Court holding that the worker is found guilty of charges inspite of the setting aside of the domestic enquiry report solely on the basis of Ext.P-3 judgment of the civil trial court, which has not even attained finality, would be to invite this Court to transgress the well defined limits of the exercise of the powers under Article 227/226 of the Constitution of India. In these circumstances, this Court is constrained to hold that the above said submission made on behalf of the petitioner company is bereft of any merit and the said contention based on Ext.P-3 judgment of the civil trial court is overruled. In these circumstances, can this Court hold that the above considered findings of the Labour Court that there is no acceptable minimal evidence based on the inferior standard of proof based on preponderance of probabilities on the guilt of the worker is perverse and unreasonable? This Court has no hesitation to answer emphatically “No” to such a question.
In these circumstances, can this Court hold that the above considered findings of the Labour Court that there is no acceptable minimal evidence based on the inferior standard of proof based on preponderance of probabilities on the guilt of the worker is perverse and unreasonable? This Court has no hesitation to answer emphatically “No” to such a question. This Court would be deviating and transgressing the well defined legal principles on the discretionary powers of Constitution conferred on this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India in the facts and circumstances of the present case, if the said management plea is accepted. In this view of the matter, this Court is consequently constrained to take the view that no legal grounds have been disclosed by the petitioner to invoke the discretionary constitutional power conferred on this Court so as to interdict the said considered findings of facts rendered by the Labour Court in Ext.P-4 award. 31. Lastly, Sri. M. Gopikrishnan Nambiar, learned counsel for the petitioner-management would contend that the directions given by the Labour Court to reinstate the worker with continuity of service and with full back wages and attendant benefits are uncalled for and that this Court may appropriately interdict with the said directions given by the Labour Court. It is urged by the petitioner-management that it is well established that grant of full back wages is not automatic. It is fully within the discretion of the Labour Court to decide whether or not reliefs in that regard should be granted, with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case, etc. It is further contended that even till date, the respondent worker has not claimed any wages under Sec.17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, and on the basis of said conduct of the worker, this Court could presume that she had other sources of income and grant of back wages is untenable, etc. It is common ground that the respondent-worker has already attained superannuation at the age of 57 in the year 2017 and there is no question of actual reinstatement of service to the worker at this point of time and this has arisen only because of the pendency of this Writ Petition, which was filed on 17.7.2013. Interim stay was granted in this Writ Petition (Civil) for 2 months on 22.7.2013.
Interim stay was granted in this Writ Petition (Civil) for 2 months on 22.7.2013. In respect of the above said contention of the petitioner it is to be noted that this Court had granted interim stay but it was made clear that the workman will be entitled to invoke remedy under Sec.17B of the Industrial Disputes Act. The said stay order has not been extended after 21.9.2013 at any point of time. The petitioner has not moved this Court for extension of the said interim order at any point of time and after the grant of the interim stay for 2 months on 22.7.2013, the case was posted for the first time only on 20.3.2017 and thereafter, at no point of time, during the pendency of this Writ Petition has the management made any motion for extension of the said interim stay. Therefore, the said interim stay has expired as early as on 21.9.2013. Therefore, it could be inferred from the conduct of the management that they were not really interested for the extension of the interim order. If that be so, the employer could have gracefully and fairly taken action for Sec.17B back wages to the worker, without further orders from this Court. Sri. P.K. Ramkumar, learned counsel for respondents 1 & 2 would submit that the entire case bundle was lost by him and respondents 1 & 2 were not in a position to get the case papers in that regard and that he could reconstruct the case papers only recently and it is due to these reasons that he was not in a position to advise his party to move for Sec.17B back wages. From a perusal of the evidence, none of the management witnesses has a case that the worker was gainfully employed after her dismissal on 7.7.2003 and that therefore she is not entitled for back wages. No such question was put to WW-1 in cross examination that she was gainfully employed during that period. For cases like this, a doctrinaire approach cannot be taken. This Court should make an assessment based on the ground realities pertaining to the facts of each case concerned instead of adopting a straight jacket formula. The question is whether the worker was gainfully employed after her dismissal on 7.7.2003. The petitioner-plantation company is situated in Meppadi and owns vast extent of plantation property in the area concerned. Sri.
This Court should make an assessment based on the ground realities pertaining to the facts of each case concerned instead of adopting a straight jacket formula. The question is whether the worker was gainfully employed after her dismissal on 7.7.2003. The petitioner-plantation company is situated in Meppadi and owns vast extent of plantation property in the area concerned. Sri. P.K. Ramkumr, learned counsel for the worker would vehemently contend that the worker was not gainfully employed and she does not have much formal education and she was solely depending on the income of her husband and she is not in a position to claim Sec.17B wages only because of the above stated circumstances. The area in question of the plantation company is a remote area in Wynad District. Therefore, this Court cannot be found fault with for inferring that the worker could not have got any employment of any nature in the plantations of the petitioner-company. The worker was engaged by the company for the activity of tea plucking and therefore her main avocation is in the area of tea plucking. The nearest Tea plantation may be quite far off from her residence and it may not be reasonably possible for her to secure other employment in any other plantation, which would have been situated far away. The worker's residence is very close to the petitioner plantation company. If, as a matter of fact, the worker was gainfully employed elsewhere it would have come to the knowledge of the petitioner company and they could have easily adduced evidence regarding employment, which they have not chosen. No proper explanation has been offered by the Management. Therefore, it is only reasonable to infer that the petitioner-company has not adduced any evidence in that regard as they were convinced that the worker was not gainfully employed elsewhere. At best, it could be stated that the worker was having income through the business activities of her husband about which she has given details when she has deposed before the Labour Court as stated hereinabove. In these circumstances, this Court can reasonably hold that the worker was not gainfully employed elsewhere.
At best, it could be stated that the worker was having income through the business activities of her husband about which she has given details when she has deposed before the Labour Court as stated hereinabove. In these circumstances, this Court can reasonably hold that the worker was not gainfully employed elsewhere. Hence, this Court is not in a position to hold that the considered view taken by the Labour Court that the worker is entitled for full back wages with continuity of service and other attendant benefits can be said to be tainted by perversity, unreasonableness or illegality, etc. So long as this Court is not in a position to hold that such findings are perverse or unreasonable, it is not proper and right for this Court to interfere with the said discretionary reliefs granted by the Labour Court, which is a Special Tribunal created by the Parliament for adjudication of labour disputes as envisaged in the Industrial Disputes Act. In that view of the matter, this Court is constrained to hold that there are no legal grounds to interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court that the worker is entitled to full back wages and continuity of serve and other attendant benefits. But as stated hereinabove, it is stated by both parties that the worker has already attained superannuation at the age of 57 and it is not legally possible for the management to physically reinstate the worker in service. However, for effectuating compliance of the Labour Court award, it is for the management to issue orders reinstating the petitioner in service as ordered by the Labour Court and granting her all the benefits as ordered in the impugned Ext.P-4 award. Necessary action in this regard should be effected by the management within 6 weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. The consequential monetary and other attendant benefits should be granted by the petitioner management to the 1st respondent worker within 6 weeks thereafter. If the above amounts are not disbursed to R-1 within the abovesaid time limit, then those amounts will carry interest @ 10% p.a. from the date of expiry of the said time limit upto the date of actual payment.
If the above amounts are not disbursed to R-1 within the abovesaid time limit, then those amounts will carry interest @ 10% p.a. from the date of expiry of the said time limit upto the date of actual payment. Needless to say, as already ordered by the Labour Court in Ext.P-4 award, it is made clear that none of the observations and findings in the said impugned award as well as in this judgment will in any manner affect the contentions of the rival parties in the pending civil proceedings pursuant to Ext.P-3 judgment of the civil court on the issues raised in those civil proceedings. With these observations and directions, the above Writ Petition (Civil) will stand dismissed.