JUDGMENT & ORDER : Heard Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners as well as Mr. M. Debbarma, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the State-respondents. 2. Both the writ petitions are taken up together for final disposal by way of this common judgment. 3. By means of filing the present writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have raised their grievance to the notification dated 23.07.2014 wherein the respondents were pleased to regularize the period of absence in service under the Government of Tripura by way of granting extra-ordinary leave w.e.f. 08.10.2002 to 09.04.2012, but, with a rider that the said period will be treated as ‘break in service’. For convenience, the notification dated 23.07.2014 is reproduced here-in-below, in extenso : GOVERNMENT OF TRIPURA HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPARTMENT No. F.13(701)-HFW/90 Dated, the 23/07/2014 NOTIFICATION The Governor of Tripura is pleased to grant Extra-ordinary Leave without pay with effect from 08.10.2002 to 09.04.2012 with break in service of Dr.(Mrs.) Anuradha Majumder, Gr.IV of THS, Belonia Sub Divisional Hospital, South Tripura. Certified that Dr.(Mrs.) Anuradha Majumder, Gr.IV of THS would have continued to officiate in the same post had she not proceeded on leave and that Dr. Majumder has resumed her duties at the same place of posting after expiry of leave. Sd/- Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tripura 4. The facts in brief are that the petitioner Dr. Kinsuk Datta had first joined in service on 10.04.1989 under the Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of Tripura as Medical Officer, Gr.V and the petitioner no.2, Dr. Anuradha Majumder (Datta) had joined as Medical Officer, Gr. V on 14.05.1990. During their continuation in service they expressed their desire to join in the Army Medical Corps and the competent authority of Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of Tripura had issued a memorandum dated 03.06.1997 stating inter alia that the government have No Objection for appearing before the interview board for the post of Medical Officer under the Staff Selection Commission under Army Medical Corps subject to condition that in case of his/her selection for appointment to the post, he/she would tender resignation from service under Tripura Health Service before joining the post under Army Medical Corps. Being selected both the petitioners were insisting for grant of lien, but since the State-respondents were not allowing them to retain lien, they approached the High Court and the High Court while disposing of the writ petition bearing no. WP(C) 370 of 1998 vide order dated 02.06.2008 has observed thus : “Be that as it may, now the prayer of the petitioner before this Court is that this writ petition may be disposed of directing the respondents to consider and dispose of the representation dated 5th December, 1997 within a time frame by taking into consideration FR 12A and the Government of India’s orders, as extracted above. Accordingly, the writ petitioners are directed to submit fresh representations to the respondent No.1 within a period of one month from today and the respondent no. 1 on receipt of the representation from the petitioners, shall consider and dispose of the representation by taking into account the provisions of FR 12A of the FR & SR and the Government of India’s orders, as extracted above, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the representation. With the above direction, the writ petition stands disposed of”. 5. In compliance of the order as aforestated, both the petitioners submitted their respective representations before the appropriate authority and on receipt of those representations, the competent authority of the State-respondent had issued a memorandum dated 15.03.2011, one of which is reproduced here-in-below : GOVERNMENT OF TRIPURA HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPARTMENT No. F.13(680)-HFW/89 Dated, 15/03/2011 MEMORANDUM With reference to application dated 04.10.97 in connection with retention of lien in his parent department (Health & Family Welfare Department) of Dr. Kinsuk Datta, Grade V of THS (Now Gr-IV of THS) the Governor, Tripura is pleased to allow his lien in Army Medical Corps from 08.10.1997 to 07.10.2002 and is also pleased to permit Dr. Datta to return in his parent Department under the State Government of Tripura with immediate effect. Dr. Kinsuk Datta, Grade-V of THS (now Gr. IV of THS) on return to his parent Department should report to SDMO, Belonia Sub-Divisional Hospital, South Tripura. By order and on behalf of the Governor Sd/- (Dilip Kanti Roy) Under Secretary to the Government of Tripura 6. Dr. Kinsuk Datta, Grade-V of THS (now Gr. IV of THS) on return to his parent Department should report to SDMO, Belonia Sub-Divisional Hospital, South Tripura. By order and on behalf of the Governor Sd/- (Dilip Kanti Roy) Under Secretary to the Government of Tripura 6. So, with the issuance of those memorandums dated 15.03.2011 in favour of the writ petitioners, the appropriate authority of the State-respondents was pleased to allow their lien in Army Medical Corps from 08.10.1997 to 07.10.2002 and was also pleased to permit both the writ petitioners to return to their parent department under the Government of Tripura with immediate effect. In pursuance of the said memorandum dated 15.03.2011 both the writ petitioners had joined to their respective services under the State-respondents. 7. All on a sudden, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tripura of Health and Family Welfare Department had issued a notification dated 23.07.2014 to both the writ petitioners that the Government of Tripura was pleased to grant extra-ordinary leave without pay w.e.f. 08.10.2002 to 09.10.2012 but, with a rider that the said period of service should be treated as ‘break in service’. 8. Indisputably, the retention of lien of both the petitioners were allowed by the State-respondents. 9. Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has posed a question as to whether the State-respondents can declare the service of the petitioners for the period of absence from 08.10.2002 to 09.04.2012 as ‘break in service’. The main contention of Mr. Roy Barman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that ‘break in service’ is a major penalty which cannot be imposed upon any government employee without following the established procedure of law and in violation of the principle of natural justice. Mr. Roy Barman, further submits that on one hand the State-respondents had regularized the service of the entire period of the writ petitioners by way of granting extra-ordinary leave, but at the same time, they have treated the service period of both the writ petitioners as ‘break in service’. According to Mr. Roy Barman, this action of the State-respondent is totally illegal, arbitrary and they have contradicted themselves in declaring the said period as ‘break in service’. In this backdrop, Mr. Roy Barman, prays for quashing the said order dated 23.07.2014 so far it relates to ‘break in service’. According to Mr. Roy Barman, this action of the State-respondent is totally illegal, arbitrary and they have contradicted themselves in declaring the said period as ‘break in service’. In this backdrop, Mr. Roy Barman, prays for quashing the said order dated 23.07.2014 so far it relates to ‘break in service’. Placing reliance on some decisions of this court passed in Arunangsho Roy vs. State of Tripura reported in (2001)1 GLR 204 ; Tapan Majumder vs. State of Tripura and others reported in (2007) 3 GLR 444 as well as the decisions of the apex court in Shri B.D. Gupta vs. State of Haryana reported in (1973) 3 SCC 149 wherein the learned apex court has observed as under : “16. The decision in M. Gopala Krishna Naidu's case, (supra) had been cited before the High Court. The High Court, however, sought to distinguish that case from the instant case on facts. The High Court held that since in M. Gopala Krishna Naidu's case, (supra) the proceedings had been dropped and the officer concerned reinstated, he never got an opportunity to show to the appointing authority that his suspension had been unjustified and that he was entitled to full pay and allowances, while in the instant case the appellant has already, according to the High Court, received all reasonable opportunity to show cause against the punishment that has been meted out against him. With respect, we do not think that there is any real difference in substance between the facts of the instant case and those in M. Gopala Krishna Naidu's case, (supra). The appellant in the instant case did not really get an opportunity to defend himself against Charge 1 (b). It will be remembered that in this case also the Government abandoned the proceedings against the appellant with regard to Charge 1, (b). Had the proceedings been completed, it is into altogether impossible that the appellant would have been exonerated also of that charge just as he had been exonerated of Charge 1 (a) earlier. To That extent the appellant did not get any opportunity to show that the suspension order against him had been unjustified and that he was, therefore, entitled to full pay and allowances. From this point of view there is really no difference between the instant case and the case of M. Gopala Krishna Naidu's case, (supra). 19. This Court held that cl. From this point of view there is really no difference between the instant case and the case of M. Gopala Krishna Naidu's case, (supra). 19. This Court held that cl. (b) of the Fundamental Rule 54 would be applicable in all cases where the officer concerned is not honourably acquitted. Since in that case the Government servant had clearly not been fully exonerated of the charges levelled against him, it was open to Government to decide what period of absence from duty during the period of suspension should be treated as period spent on duty and, also, what proportion of pay and allowances should be given to him. This decision cannot apply to the instant case for the simple reason that Government, by withdrawing the proceedings initiated against the appellant in respect of Charge 1 (b), made it impossible for the appellant to get himself fully exonerated. Since the appellant had been exonerated of Charge 1 (a) and since Charge 1 (b) was withdrawn, it is impossible for Government to proceed on the basis as if the appellant has not been fully exonerated or to assume that the order of suspension was one which was not wholly unjustified. In that view of the matter we do not think that the case of State of Assam and another v. Raghava Rajagopalachari case (supra) can be of any assistance to the respondents. 20. In the result this appeal succeeds. The judgment and order of the High Court are set aside. The orders dated 27 February 1967 impugned in the appellant's petition before the High Court are quashed. The appellant will get the costs of this appeal as well as the costs incurred below”. Mr. Roy Barman, also has placed reliance upon a decision of the apex court in Canara Bank and others vs. Debasis Das and others reported in (2003) 4 SCC 557 wherein the apex court has held as under : “Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. Expression 'civil consequences' encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations, and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life”. 10. Per contra, Mr. M. Debbarma, learned Additional GA appearing for the State-respondent submits that the writ petitioners did not submit resignation in terms of the memorandum dated 03.06.1997. The learned Addl. GA has drawn my attention to paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit and further submits that in memorandum dated 03.06.1997 it clearly stipulates that No-Objection certificate can be issued in the event of submitting resignation, and the lien was granted w.e.f. 08.10.1997 to 07.10.2002 only for compliance of the order of the High Court. The learned counsel further submits that the period of absence after the expiry of 07.10.2002 was unauthorized and without sanction of any law, however, the State-respondents in their own wisdom has decided to regularize the service of the petitioners by way of granting extra-ordinary leave with ‘break in service’ and notification was also issued in regard to that effect. 11. In the backdrop of the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed hereinabove, this court will decide the legality in the action of the State-respondents declaring certain period of the service of the writ petitioners as ‘break in service’ being a major penalty where principle of natural justice has to be followed for the reasons that the ‘break in service’ will directly affect the service condition vis-a-vis the pensionary benefits of the writ petitioners. Mr. Mr. Debbarma, learned counsel has assailed to a decision passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 4969 of 2008 arising out of SLP(C) 13011 of 2006 decided on 31.07.2018 between State of Punjab vs. Dr. P.L. Singla wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 8 has observed thus : “Unauthorized absence (or overstaying leave) is an act of indiscipline. Whenever there is an unauthorized absence by an employee, two courses are open to the employer. The first is to condone the unauthorized absence by accepting the explanation and sanctioning leave for the period of the unauthorized absence in which event the misconduct stood condoned. The second is to treat the unauthorized absence as a misconduct, hold an enquiry and impose a punishment for the misconduct”. 12. In the case at hand, the retention of lien of the writ petitioners expired on 08.10.2002, but none of the writ petitioners had returned to their post under the State-respondents. They only joined on 11.12.2011 and 09.04.2012 respectively. The competent authority had accepted their joining without any imputation. After that, they submitted representations for condonation and regularization of the period of absence and to sanction continuity of service without any break. The petitioners had submitted their last representation on 18.08.2012. Thereafter, the State-respondents issued notification dated 23.07.2014 stating inter alia that the period of absence of Dr. Anuradha Majumder with effect from 08.10.2002 to 09.04.2012 (Annexure 33 to the writ petition) and the period of absence of Dr. Kinsuk Datta with effect from 08.10.2002 to 11.12.2011 (Annexure 34 to the writ petition) were condoned, but, with break in service. 13. Admittedly, the petitioners were allowed to go on lien for a certain period as stated above, but, they did not join after expiry of their retention of lien period. They were allowed to join, as stated above and vide notification dated 23.07.2014 the State-respondents had condoned their period of absence from duty by sanctioning extra-ordinary leave without pay w.e.f. 08.10.2002 to 09.04.2012 in case of Dr. Anuradha Majumder and w.e.f. 08.10.2002 to 11.12.2011 in case of Dr. Kinsuk Datta. 14. The solitary question to be determined in these writ petitions is whether the penalty of ‘break in service’ can be imposed without initiation of any disciplinary proceeding. 15. Anuradha Majumder and w.e.f. 08.10.2002 to 11.12.2011 in case of Dr. Kinsuk Datta. 14. The solitary question to be determined in these writ petitions is whether the penalty of ‘break in service’ can be imposed without initiation of any disciplinary proceeding. 15. I have given my anxious consideration to the submission of learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that ‘break in service’ results in forfeiture of past service of the petitioners as well as it will affect the service benefits as well as pensionary benefits, which, the petitioners are entitled to get for their past service under the respondents. 16. Indisputably, before declaring the period of service as ‘break in service’, the respondents even did not issue any show-cause notice against the petitioners. Had the State-respondents wanted to impose any punishment upon the petitioners, they would have liberty to impose appropriate punishment as the period of ‘unauthorized absence’ is undoubtedly a misconduct and further, who resisted the respondents to initiate the disciplinary proceeding against the writ petitioners? The State-respondents in their own wisdom thought it proper to condone the period of absence and regularized the services of the petitioners for the said period of absence by way of granting ‘extra ordinary leave’ w.e.f. 08.10.2002 to 09.04.2012 in case of Dr. Anuradha Majumder and w.e.f. 08.10.2002 to 11.12.2011 in case of Dr. Kinsuk Datta upto the date of rejoining to their respective services under the respondents. 17. At this juncture, I may refer to a decision passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dayal Saran Sanan vs. Union of India and others reported in (1980) 3 SCC 25 wherein the apex court has held that with the ‘break in service’ one employee has to forfeit his entire past service and it will affect his pensionary benefit as well as gratuity and other service benefits like seniority etc. In Shiv Shanker and another vs. Union of India and others reported in (1985) 2 SCC 30 , the Hon’ble apex court has held that the declaration of “break in service” in one’s service career amounts to imposition of major penalty, which cannot be made without issuing any notice to the petitioners and without giving them opportunity by way of issuing show-cause notice asking for explanations. 18. The principle of the above cited case was applied by the High Court of Rajasthan to cases of “break in service”. 18. The principle of the above cited case was applied by the High Court of Rajasthan to cases of “break in service”. In one of the cases namely Karan Singh vs. Union of India, S.C. Agarwal, J., after referring to the decision of this court in Dayal Saran Sanan (supra) observed : “in view of the decisions aforesaid, it must be held that an order with regard to the break in service which results in forfeiture of the past service of a Railway employee, cannot be made without observing the principles of natural justice”. 19. I also have perused the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jai Shankar vs. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1966 SC 492 and Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha reported in (1980) 2 SCC 593 and after considering those decisions, I am of the considered view that before imposition of penalty of “break in service”, it was an obligation upon the State-respondents to afford an opportunity of hearing to the affected writ petitioners. The State-respondents being the employer of the writ petitioners had the liberty to issue show-cause notice, hold an inquiry and impose punishment for the mis-conduct, but, they did not do so. 20. Since such opportunity was not afforded to the petitioners, the impugned notifications dated 23.07.2014 issued by the State-respondents in respect of imposition of penalty of break in service w.e.f. 08.10.2002 to 09.04.2012 in case of Dr. Anuradha Majumder and w.e.f. 08.10.2002 to 11.12.2011 in case of Dr. Kinsuk Datta, are not sustainable and accordingly, are set aside. 21. In the result, the writ petitions stand allowed. Needless to say, that the writ petitioners will be entitled to all the consequential service benefits, as if, they were in uninterrupted service, since this court has interfered with the order of penalty of “break in service” in respect of the writ petitioners.