JUDGMENT : RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD, J. Heard Sri Pramod Kumar Singh, learned counsel representing the appellant and Sri S.B. Verma, learned counsel for the State. 2. The sole appellant has filed this criminal appeal for setting aside the judgment dated 23.08.1994 passed by learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Patna in Session Trial No. 140/1992 whereby the present appellant has been held guilty and accordingly convicted under Sections 304B, 4989A and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, he has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 304B I.P.C. and rigorous imprisonment for three years under Section 498A and three years under Section 201 I.P.C., all the sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. 3. Before we proceed to decide the matter it would also be proper to place on record that in this very case the co-accused Sidheshwar Yadav was also found guilty and was convicted accordingly in terms stated hereinabove. He had preferred Cr.APP (DB) No. 429/1994 before this Court but during pendency of the appeal the said Sidheshwar Yadav expired on 17.01.2009. This Court vide order dated 30.01.2018 passed in Cr.APP.(DB) No. 429/1994 has held the said appeal stood abated due to the death of the sole appellant in the said case. 4. In the present appeal, the perusal of records of the trial court would show that on 13.06.1991, the informant Bimal Kumar Yadav (P.W.2) lodged a written complaint (Ext.3) with the Officer-in-Charge of Bikram Police Station alleging that his sister Chandramani Devi was married to Bindeshwari Mandal (Appellant), however she was killed on 12.06.1991 by the accused Bindeshwari Mandal, his father Sidheshwar Yadav, his younger brother Ram Raj Yadav and the another brother Ram Karan Yadav, all named in the F.I.R. by burning her to death. It is alleged that the accused persons were asking for Hero Honda Motorcycle which was never agreed to at the time of marriage. The informant alleged that on 11.06.1991 when he had gone to get the Bidaigiri of his sister, the accused persons ill-treated him and asked him to leave the house. The informant allegedly reached his house at 10.00 A.M. but on the same day at about 3.00 P.M. his sister was burnt to death by kerosene oil. The informant is said to have reached village Andhrachowki, his sister was not found there. The informant allegedly reached his house at 10.00 A.M. but on the same day at about 3.00 P.M. his sister was burnt to death by kerosene oil. The informant is said to have reached village Andhrachowki, his sister was not found there. He came to know from the co-villagers that his sister had been burnt to death. 5. After investigation police submitted a charge-sheet under Sections 498A, 304(B), 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Since the offences were triable by court of session, the learned A.C.J.M., Danapur vide his order dated 12.03.1992 committed the records to the court of session and thereupon vide order dated 31.03.1992, the learned Sessions Judge, Patna registered the session case. It appears that ultimately vide order dated 10.01.1994 charges were framed under Section 302 I.P.C. read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused alternatively under Sections 304(B), 498A and Section 201 I.P.C. Both the charge-sheeted accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried. 6. Before the learned Sessions Judge in course of trial only 3 witnesses could be examined on behalf of the prosecution. P.W.1 is Rajdeo Prasad who happens to be the uncle of the deceased. P.W.2 is Bimal Kumar Yadav (informant) and P.W.3 is Shiv Narayan Yadav. In course of trial, prosecution proved Exhibit-1, i.e., signature of Rajdeo Prasad on seizure list; Exhibit-2 the signature of Siasaran Yadav on seizure list and Exhibit-3 is the written report. 7. The defence produced through D.W.1 Upendra Kumar some documentary evidences which have been marked Exhibit-A to A/3, those are medical examination report with respect to the treatment of the deceased. Exhibit-B to B/3 are the prescription of the various doctors and Exhibit-C is copy of Annexure-1, i.e., report of death in Patna Municipal Corporation by the appellant on 12.06.1991. Finding of the Trial Court 8. The learned trial court has recorded a finding that the prosecution witnesses have consistently proved the prosecution case although they have not seen the occurrence with their eyes. The trial court came to a conclusion that the evidence of the witnesses and the circumstances of the case show that marriage of the victim girl took place with accused Bindeshwari Mandal (Appellant) in the year 1985 which according to the learned trial court has been proved. The trial court came to a conclusion that the evidence of the witnesses and the circumstances of the case show that marriage of the victim girl took place with accused Bindeshwari Mandal (Appellant) in the year 1985 which according to the learned trial court has been proved. The learned trial court also recorded that admittedly Chandramani Devi was burnt to death on 12.06.1991 within 7 years of her marriage. In ultimate analysis the trial court rejected the contention of the defence that the marriage took place in the year 1983 saying that the contention of the defence does not seem probable and natural in view of the documentary evidence produced by the accused persons. 9. The learned trial court has also rejected the medical reports of the deceased which were brought by way of Annexure-A series and Annexure-B series through the D.W.1, as according to the learned trial court, D.W.1 happened to be a formal witness and hence no reliance could have been placed on these documents, the case of the defence that the deceased died due to heart disease has been rejected by the trial court. Since the author of Exhibit-A and B series were not examined the trial court was of the view that no reliance can be placed on those documents. So far as Exhibit-C is concerned, it has been held that the same is a public document which shows that the victim was cremated at Bansghat at 13.06.1991 and it cannot be said that deceased died due to Heart disease. 10. The trial court also rejected the contention of the defence on the point that no independent witnesses had been examined by the prosecution, as according to the learned trial court, it is not necessary for the prosecution to examine each and every witness in support of their case rather the testimony of these interested witnesses has been examined carefully. The learned trial court observed that on careful examination of the deposition of prosecution witnesses they are found to be consistent and have proved the prosecution case. 11. The learned trial court observed that on careful examination of the deposition of prosecution witnesses they are found to be consistent and have proved the prosecution case. 11. It has been held that the non examination of the Investigating Officer (in short the “I.O.”) has not caused any prejudice to the defence as admittedly in this case, according to the learned trial court, the marriage had taken place within 7 years of death of the victim and she was burnt to death by the accused persons due to non fulfillment of demand of Hero Honda Motorcycle in dowry. 12. The trial court also held that the prosecution has been able to prove the case that prior to the death the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment by the accused persons in connection with demand of Hero Honda Motorcycle in dowry. The prosecution case under Section 201 I.P.C. has been believed by the trial court. So far as the charge under Section 302 I.P.C. was concerned, the trial court held that in view of the finding that the accused persons were guilty under Section 304(B) I.P.C., the charge under Section 302 I.P.C. became redundant and do not need any comment and as such accused persons were not found and held guilty of the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. and they have been acquitted of the same. Submission in Appeal 13. Sri Pramod Kumar Singh, learned counsel representing the sole appellant has assailed the impugned judgment of the trial court on the grounds inter alia that the very finding of the learned trial court that marriage had taken place within 7 years from the date of alleged occurrence has no basis to stand. Learned counsel has pointed out that a bare perusal of the written report (Ext.3) would show that the informant did not disclose either the date of marriage of the appellant with the deceased or the year in which they were married. The written report is therefore totally silent as to the date of marriage. 14. In course of evidence, when the informant (P.W.2) was examined, he came with a statement that his sister was married with the appellant in the year 1985. P.W.2 has stated that he cannot produce any documentary evidence of marriage and he did not remember the date of birth of the deceased. 14. In course of evidence, when the informant (P.W.2) was examined, he came with a statement that his sister was married with the appellant in the year 1985. P.W.2 has stated that he cannot produce any documentary evidence of marriage and he did not remember the date of birth of the deceased. In course of cross examination, this P.W.2 was specifically suggested by the defence that he was not speaking the truth and in fact the marriage had taken place in the year 1983 in the month of May, P.W.2 denied the suggestion. In further cross examination, he has stated that he did not remember whether there was any mediator in the marriage because at that point of time he was a child and did not even remember his own age at the time of the marriage between the appellant and his deceased sister. 15. Learned counsel has submitted that at the time of deposition in course of trial this witness was aged about 25 years as per records on 01.07.1994, if it was so, then it cannot be believed that P.W.2 was a child in the year 1985 when he claimed that the marriage had taken place but did not remember his own age. According to an estimate if P.W.2 was aged about 25 years on 06.04.1994 (on the date of deposition) then in the year 1985 he was about 16 years old and a boy of 16 years cannot claim that he did not remember as to what was his age. 16. Learned counsel submits that it was the specific case of the defence that the marriage had taken place in the month of May, 1983 and in such circumstance the prosecution was obliged to prove the date or year of the marriage to bring home the case within the ambit of section 304(B) I.P.C. 17. Learned counsel further submits that none of the prosecution witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution that the marriage had taken place within 7 years from the date of alleged occurrence. Learned counsel further submits that none of the prosecution witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution that the marriage had taken place within 7 years from the date of alleged occurrence. He thus submits that when no disclosure of the year of marriage was made in the written report (Exhibit-3), it would have been all the more important to examine the I.O. to prove that immediately after registration of the F.I.R. P.W.2 or other prosecution witnesses had disclosed the year of marriage to the I.O. Learned trial court, according to the learned counsel representing the appellant, has committed a grave error in recording that the marriage within 7 years from the alleged occurrence has been proved, and therefore non examination of I.O. would not be prejudicial to the case of the prosecution. According to learned counsel the non-examination of I.O. in this case is bound to prove fatal to the prosecution. 18. Learned counsel further submits that in this case no evidence at all was led to prove that soon before the alleged occurrence the deceased was tortured and if that was not proved by bringing cogent evidences in course of trial, the same would prove fatal for the prosecution. He has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Bajaj Vs. State of M.P. reported in 2002 (1) Patna Criminal Cases Reporter (S.C.) 257 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to consider the parameters required to be proved for convicting the accuse under Section 304(B) of the I.P.C. The relevant part of the judgment shall be quoted in the concluding part of the judgment. 19. Learned counsel has further submitted that the appellant has already been acquitted under Section 302 I.P.C., and therefore, conviction of the appellant under Section 304(B) cannot be sustained, as there is absolutely no evidence to show that there was any demand of Hero Honda Motorcycle and for that reason the deceased was burnt to death. 19. Learned counsel has further submitted that the appellant has already been acquitted under Section 302 I.P.C., and therefore, conviction of the appellant under Section 304(B) cannot be sustained, as there is absolutely no evidence to show that there was any demand of Hero Honda Motorcycle and for that reason the deceased was burnt to death. According to learned counsel, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the burn injury in this case because as per defence the deceased as ill and had been treated by some doctors but the I.O. neither investigated those doctors nor collected any material to show that the deceased died due to any burn injuries and the doctor was not examined, therefore, the very case of the prosecution that the deceased was burnt to death is without any evidence. It is also submitted that neither the alleged burnt blouse nor the alleged burnt hair of the deceased which were seized were sent for forensic examination nor those seized articles could be proved in course of evidence. 20. Learned counsel has lastly submitted that in this case the provision of Section 313 Cr.P.C. has not at all been followed and the appellant was never informed of the incriminating materials which had come against him in course of trial so that he could have explained the circumstances. Attention of this Court has been drawn to the formal statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. whereunder only some formal questions were put to the accused-appellant which he denied. 21. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor representing the State submits that there is no infirmity in the judgment of the learned trial court and on the basis of the evidences and material available on the record, the learned trial court has correctly reached to a conclusion that the appellant is guilty of the offences under Section 304(B), 498A and 201 I.P.C. Consideration 22. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the records, we find that the finding of the learned trial court that marriage between the appellant and the deceased had taken place within 7 years from the date of alleged occurrence has no basis to stand. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the records, we find that the finding of the learned trial court that marriage between the appellant and the deceased had taken place within 7 years from the date of alleged occurrence has no basis to stand. The learned trial court could not appreciate that P.W.2, who happened to be the own brother of the deceased, did not whisper a single word in the written report about the date or year of the marriage, as also the I.O. in this case has not been examined and therefore it could not be proved that he ever disclosed the date or year of marriage to the I.O. In absence of the I.O. even the case diary recorded by him under Section 161 Cr.P.C. has not been exhibited through any other witnesses. P.W.2 has never said in course of his deposition that he had disclosed the date or year of marriage to the I.O. at any point of time. The defence had specifically suggested to P.W.2 in course of his cross examination that he was not telling a truth and in fact the marriage had taken place in the month of May, 1983, therefore, it was beyond a period of 7 years, hence according to the defence Section 304(B) I.P.C was not attracted. The trial court negatived this contention without referring to any material on the basis of which the trial court could reach to a conclusion that the marriage had taken place within 7 years of the death of the victim. 23. A finding of the learned trial court that non examination of the I.O. would not cause any prejudice and shall not be fatal to the prosecution is equally wrong. It seems that the learned trial court proceeded on the presumption that the marriage within 7 years has already been proved, and therefore, the non examination of I.O. would not be fatal but from the records we find that not only the prosecution has failed to prove the marriage within 7 years but non-examination of the I.O. has proved fatal inasmuch as in this case there is no independent witness to support the case of the prosecution. All the three prosecution witnesses examined in this case on this point are interested and related witnesses, and in such circumstance, it was all the more necessary for the prosecution to bring an independent witness who could have been the I.O. 24. We further find from the records that the prosecution did not prove that the deceased died due to burn injuries save and except the oral statement of the witnesses that they heard about the cause of death of the deceased because of burn injuries, there was no material at all to demonstrate that the deceased in this case had died due to burn injury. Even the doctor who had treated the deceased in Patna Medical College and Hospital, Patna or whose prescriptions were brought on record by defence were not examined. It was for the prosecution to bring the doctor in the dock and prove the fact as alleged that the deceased died due to burn injuries. 25. On the other hand, the defence proved Exhibit-A & B series as also Exhibit-C to show that the deceased was suffering from heart ailment and she died of that disease only. Exhibit-C shows that on the date of death itself when she was cremated at Bansghat, Patna, it was brought to the notice of the registering authority for purpose of issuance of death certificate. In Exhibit-C the cause of death has been shown as due to disease. The trial court rejected these documents only because those were proved by a formal witness. But on perusal of the evidence of D.W.1 it would appear that this witness has stated that he works with the doctor and was engaged in giving injection and providing medicines. The learned trial court could not appreciate that because this witness was attached with the doctor, he claimed that he was acquainted with the handwriting of Dr. B.N. Yadav, Dr. Ranjana as also Dr. Rajiv Ranjan Singh. This witness had an access to the doctors because of his engagement of like nature. If the prosecution had any doubt with respect to those reports which were proved by the defence through D.W.1, it was for the prosecution to bring the doctors in the dock for the purpose of examination/cross examination. The trial court thus erred even on this point in rejecting the defence documents. 26. If the prosecution had any doubt with respect to those reports which were proved by the defence through D.W.1, it was for the prosecution to bring the doctors in the dock for the purpose of examination/cross examination. The trial court thus erred even on this point in rejecting the defence documents. 26. On perusal of the records, we also find that there is no evidence at all to show that soon before the alleged occurrence the deceased was tortured or ill-treated. In the case of Sunil Bajaj (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down certain parameters to be looked into in a case under section 304(B) I.P.C. which are enumerated as under: - (i) The death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (ii) Such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (iii) Soon before her death, the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by the relatives of her husband; (iv) Such cruelty or harassment must be for or in connection with demand of dowry. 27. The word ‘soon before’ is a comparative word. The informant (P.W.2) has himself stated in his deposition that his sister Chandramani Devi was coming to her Naihar only sometime (yada kada) and when he had gone to meet his sister on 11.06.1991, she was looking healthy. This witness clearly gives an impression that his sister was well settled in her sasural and had been visiting her Naihar only occasionally. She was also looking healthy on 11.06.1991, therefore, save and except that the witness claimed in his deposition that his sister had told him that due to non fulfillment of the demand of Hero Honda Motorcycle she was being harassed, there was no evidence at all to show that his sister (deceased) was being physically or mentally tortured for non fulfillment of demand of dowry. 28. We are, therefore, of the view that one of the parameters required to be proved in a case under Section 304(B) I.P.C. has not been proved by the prosecution. 29. We have also perused the statement of the accused-appellant recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. A perusal of the Statement shows that only three formal questions were put to the accused. We are, therefore, of the view that one of the parameters required to be proved in a case under Section 304(B) I.P.C. has not been proved by the prosecution. 29. We have also perused the statement of the accused-appellant recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. A perusal of the Statement shows that only three formal questions were put to the accused. The materials which were brought by the prosecution against the accused-appellant in course of trial were not at all pointed out to the appellant. The questions put to the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. are recorded hereunder for a ready reference: - Question: aapke virudh shakchya hai ki dinank 12.06.91 ko gaon Andhara Chowki, thana – Vikram, Zila – Patna me Chandramani Devi jo aapki patni thi, dahej me Hero Honda Motorcycle ki mang karte the thatha Hero Honda Motorcycle dahej me nahi milne par aap apni patni ko pratarit kiya karte the? Kya kahana hai” Answer: Jee Nahi. Question” yah bhi shakchya hai ki aap dinank 12.06.91 ko aap ooparokt dahej nahi milne ke karan anya mudalehoom se milkar aap apni patni Chandramani Devi ki hatya tel chhirakkar jala kar kar di thatha laash ko cheepa diya, kya kahana hai? Answer: Jee Nahi. Question: Safai me kya kahana hai? Answer: Jee Likheet denge. 30. At this stage, we are reminded of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sukhjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2014) 10 SCC 270 , wherein their Lordship have discussed the earlier judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court on this point whereunder it has been held that the accused while being given an opportunity to make a statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. must be questioned separately about the material circumstance which is intended to be used against him. The whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him. Apparently in the present case the requirement of Section 313 Cr.P.C. has also been given a go-bye. 31. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion that this case seems to be a case of no evidence. The prosecution has failed to prove that the marriage of the appellant with the deceased had taken place within 7 years from the date of alleged occurrence. 31. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion that this case seems to be a case of no evidence. The prosecution has failed to prove that the marriage of the appellant with the deceased had taken place within 7 years from the date of alleged occurrence. Non examination of any independent witness, non examination of the I.O., non examination of the doctor are the other reasons to take a view that the prosecution has not only failed to prove the charges by bringing independent witnesses but have also failed to prove the cause of death due to burn injuries. The trial court could not appreciate that there is no evidence at all to show that soon before the alleged occurrence the deceased was ill-treated or tortured in terms as envisaged in the case of Sunil Bajaj (supra). The trial court has also failed to see that in absence of the I.O. even the case diary was not exhibited. Further we have found that the mandatory requirement of Section 313 Cr.P.C. has not been followed in its term and spirit. The cumulative effect of all these lacunas in the case of the prosecution would be that the judgment of the trial court holding the appellant guilty under Section 304(B), 498A and 201 I.P.C. cannot be sustained. The petitioner is entitled to get the benefit of doubt in a case where no independent witness has come. 32. For the reasons mentioned hereinabove, we set aside the impugned judgment of the trial court and conviction of the accused-appellant in this case and discharge him from the obligations of the bail bond. 33. This appeal is allowed, accordingly.