JUDGMENT J. Nisha Banu, J. This appeal has been filed against the award dated 21.04.2011 made in W.C.No.96 of 2007 on the file of the Workmen Compensation Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Madurai. 2. It is the case of the respondents 1 and 2/claimants that on 26.03.2007, about 03.30 a.m., when the deceased Muthukumaran was working as workman under the 3rd respondent/contractor in Bagasse yard/Feeding area of M/s.Sakthi Sugars Factory, a Lorry bearing registration No.KA.34-A-7550 while coming in the backward direction for loading in Bagasse yard, came negligently and dashed against the deceased, in which, the deceased sustained multiple injuries and died on the way to hospital. The respondents 1 and 2 who are parents of the deceased, had filed W.C.No.96 of 2007 on the file of the Workmen Compensation Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Madurai, claiming compensation of Rs. 6,00,000/-. The appellant filed counter, contending that the deceased was not the workman under the 3rd respondent and the accident had not occurred arising out of and in the course of employment under the 3rd respondent and since the deceased was a cleaner in the offending Lorry, compensation, if any, has to be paid only by the owner of the Lorry. Considering the oral and documentary evidence adduced on either side, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour held that the deceased died during the course of employment under the 3rd respondent and awarded compensation of Rs. 2,68,144/- to the respondents 1 and 2/claimants. Aggrieved by the said award, the appellant has filed this appeal and this Court by order dated 27.03.2012 admitted this appeal on the following substantial questions of law:- ''(1) Whether the finding of the Commissioner that the deceased sustained injury in an accident arising out of and in the course of employment under the insured of the appellant is sustainable in law in the absence of acceptable evidences on record? (2) Whether the Commissioner is justified in holding that the deceased sustained injury in an accident arising out of and in the course of employment under the insured of the appellant as against the contents in Ex.P2-FIR? (3) Whether the claimants may be permitted to turn around and contend that the contents in the FIR which was marked by them had not been proved when the same was relied upon by them? (3) Whether the claimants may be permitted to turn around and contend that the contents in the FIR which was marked by them had not been proved when the same was relied upon by them? (4) Whether the Commissioner is justified in directing the appellant to pay the default interest when there is no liability under the policy? (5) Whether the default interest is payable from the date of accident or from the date of award? and (6) Is not the Commissioner's finding and the award obtained by the claimant by playing fraud?'' 3. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the Deputy Commissioner of Labour has erred in holding that the deceased died due to the accidental injuries during the course of employment. Further, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour has failed to note that the deceased was working as a Cleaner in the offending Lorry and therefore, the appellant is not liable to pay compensation. The learned counsel further contended that the Commissioner failed to consider the FIR in prospective, wherein, it was stated that the deceased was working as a loadman only and not Bagasse yard/feeding area. 4. It is further submitted that the parents of the deceased along with other legal heirs-wife, minor son and minor daughter had earlier filed MCOP.No.1361 of 2007 on the file of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuddalore, and later, it was settled before the Lok Adalat in Lok Adalat Case No.282/10 on 13.05.2010 for a sum of Rs. 3,75,000/- towards compensation. Thereafter, they have moved the Deputy Commissioner of Labour and obtained compensation of Rs. 2,68,144/-, thereby the claimants have abused the process of the Court. In support of his contention that the claimants are not entitled to double compensation for the same cause of action, learned counsel for the appellant relied on the following decisions:- (i) United India Insurance Co.Ltd., vs. Anthony Selvam, (2014) 2 TNMAC 227. (ii) United India Insurance Co.Ltd., vs. Mariadasan(Died) and Others, (2015) 4 LW 916 . 5. In support of his contention that the claimants are not entitled to double compensation for the same cause of action, learned counsel for the appellant relied on the following decisions:- (i) United India Insurance Co.Ltd., vs. Anthony Selvam, (2014) 2 TNMAC 227. (ii) United India Insurance Co.Ltd., vs. Mariadasan(Died) and Others, (2015) 4 LW 916 . 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 would submit that there is no legal bar from claiming compensation by the claimants invoking both the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Motor Vehicles Act, as the claimants filed MCOP against the owner of the Lorry in the capacity of tort-feasor who is not the employer and his insurer and also filed W.C case against the employer and his insurer, which cannot be said that the claimants have availed double compensation for the same cause of action. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 relied on the following decisions:- (i) Nasimbanu vs. Ramjibhai Bachubhai Ahir (ii) New India Assurance Co.Ltd., vs. Bidami, 2010 1 TNMAC 645 (Raj.) 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, respondents 1 and 2 and perused the materials available on record. 7. Perusal of record shows that the Supervisor working under the 3rd respondent at the time of accident was examined as PW2, who has deposed that the deceased was working as a labour under the 3rd respondent and paid Rs. 80/- per day and he died during the course of his employment in the yard due to hitting of Lorry. The claimants have also marked Ex.P1-FIR, which proves that the deceased was working under the 3rd respondent and sustained fatal injuries due to hitting of Lorry in the yard. Considering the evidence of PW2, Ex.P1-FIR and Ex.R2-Motor Legal Claims Investigation Report, wherein, it is stated that the deceased was working as Bagasee feeding labour in Sakthi Sugars, Unit II, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour held that the deceased died while working as Bagasee feeding labour due to the hitting of Lorry bearing registration No.KA.34-A-7550. 8. Though the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the Commissioner failed to consider the FIR in prospective, wherein, it was stated that the deceased was working as a loadman only and not Bagasse yard/feeding area, it is well settled that FIR is not an encyclopedia. 8. Though the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the Commissioner failed to consider the FIR in prospective, wherein, it was stated that the deceased was working as a loadman only and not Bagasse yard/feeding area, it is well settled that FIR is not an encyclopedia. It can be relied on, for the purpose of setting the criminal law in motion, and all that is stated in the FIR, cannot be said to be the facts admitted, and if there is any omission in the FIR to state any fact, it does not mean that evidence cannot be adduced, either at the time of investigation, by the Police, for laying a charge against the accused or pleaded in the claim petitions, when compensation is claimed. Though Senior Assistant of the appellant company was examined as RW1 who deposed that the deceased was working as loadman in the Lorry, Ex.R2-investigation report of the investigating officer of the appellant company would reveal that the deceased was working as Bagasee feeding labour. Therefore, it is clear that based on the evidence of PW2 and Ex.R2, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour rendered a finding that there was employer and employee relationship between the 3rd respondent and deceased. In my considered opinion, the said finding is based on evidence and hence the same is confirmed. 9. Before considering the contention of the appellant that the claimants by filing MCOP case and W.C. case under two enactments, have abused the process of law, this Court is inclined to extract the following passages from the judgments relied on either side:- (i) Nasimbanu vs. Ramjibhai Bachubhai Ahir, 2005 1 TN MAC (Guj):- ''Even otherwise, there is no force in the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company. Section 110A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is applicable to a person who has two remedies against the joint tort feasers while object of Section 3(5) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, is to save the employer from double jeopardy, meaning thereby, from multiplicity of litigation, one under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, and other under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Where a claimant can avail one remedy against the employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, he is not debarred from raising/claiming compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, against the tort feaser. Where a claimant can avail one remedy against the employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, he is not debarred from raising/claiming compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, against the tort feaser. Present is a case where claimants are receiving compensation from the employer who is statutorily bound to pay the same on the death of deceased being his Master. This is separate relationship and liability and has nothing to do with the liability of a tort feasor under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. In the claim petition before the Claims Tribunal, employer and insurer of Tanker are not party, therefore, no claim has been raised against them. Submission raised by the appellant, if accepted, would mean that claimants should feel satisfied with whatever is paid to them under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, by the employer, and thereby, tort feaser escaping liability under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which remedy is independently available to the claimants as third party qua the offending vehicle. ................... ................... It is also contended that claimants offered undertaking before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation vide Application No. 149 of 1988 confining the claim to Rs. 80,664/-. Therefore, no further compensation is payable to the claimants. It is found that claim under Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is prior in point of time, filed on 6.4.1988. It was pending. Learned counsel for the claimants submits that the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner was approached on 20.7.1988 for payment of compensation under the Act. Therefore, a contract, which is unconscionable, defeats the provisions of law is neither enforceable nor creates bar against statute and statutory right. Claimants right to raise the claim under the two statutes has already been answered. Further, there is no substance in this contention also as the right of claimant cannot be set at naught by unconscionable bargain; undertaking is not against the offending owner of vehicle and its Insurance Company nor it could be entertained by the Commissioner. Therefore, deduction is not permissible. Further, there is no substance in this contention also as the right of claimant cannot be set at naught by unconscionable bargain; undertaking is not against the offending owner of vehicle and its Insurance Company nor it could be entertained by the Commissioner. Therefore, deduction is not permissible. In these circumstances, it is open for the claimants to approach the Commissioner for more compensation as per section 4(1)(a) read with Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, in the light of observations made in the preceding part of the judgment or take such other legal steps which may be available to them, and Court/ Tribunal, Commissioner shall consider the matter and decide in accordance with law.'' (ii) New India Assurance Co. Ltd., vs. Bidami,2010 1 TNMAC 645 (Raj.):- ''23. The intention of creating bar of estoppel in the form of doctrine of election in Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is also only to save same person viz. the employer where such employer happens to be tort- feasor also, being vexed twice over for the same cause of action. Intention of bar created either under Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 akin to Section 110-AA of the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or Section 3(5) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 or Section 53 of the ESI Act, 1948 is the same. Said bar nowhere provides nor it could be possibly intended to provide for any exemption or immunity to other tort-feasor even if he was negligent and liable in tort law to pay damages for causing death or bodily injury to other person or the claimants. Even if the injured or the deceased person as workmen have received compensation under the provisions of Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 or the ESI Act, 1948, there is no question of same cause of compensation i.e. death or injury resulting in double benefit to the claimants if separate compensation under Motor Vehicles Act is also given to such claimants. Such two sets of compensation if provided by two separate legislations against different persons under different contracts of insurance enures to the benefit of the claimants, there is no prohibition in law nor it can be said to be amounting to unjust enrichment or unfair and excessive or double compensation to the claimants. Such two sets of compensation if provided by two separate legislations against different persons under different contracts of insurance enures to the benefit of the claimants, there is no prohibition in law nor it can be said to be amounting to unjust enrichment or unfair and excessive or double compensation to the claimants. The payment of just and fair compensation under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act as determined by the Tribunal does not impede, curtail, restrict or prohibit in any manner, the compensation payable to the claimants for the same death or injury under the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act or the ESI Act. The payment of compensation under the one Act at prior point of time or later depending upon the forum the claimants choose to first approach also does not matter. Since the benefits accruing and flowing from two different enactments flow in two different streams and such claim is made against two different parties; employer in one case and tort-feasor other than employer in another case, one compensation does not militate or offend against other compensation. The claimants also are rightly entitled to both the compensations in such cases and one cannot be set off or deducted from the other.'' (iii) United India Insurance Co.Ltd., vs. Anthony Selvam, (2014) 2 TNMAC 227:- ''23. The claimants also are rightly entitled to both the compensations in such cases and one cannot be set off or deducted from the other.'' (iii) United India Insurance Co.Ltd., vs. Anthony Selvam, (2014) 2 TNMAC 227:- ''23. From an analysis of the above said judgments and the reasoning assigned by this court, the principles governing the election provided under Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the corresponding bar can be deduced as follows: (1) In case the accident arises out of the use of the motor vehicle and it results in death or injury, the legal heirs of the deceased or the injured shall be entitled to claim compensation under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the owner, driver and insurer of the offending vehicle on the basis of the tortuous liability which has been made statutory; (2) In case the owner of the offending vehicle happens to be the employer of the deceased or injured, as the case may be, then the legal heirs of the deceased or the injured may make a claim either under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 or under the Employees Compensation Act, 1923; (3) If the claim is made under the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 and it is allowed by the Commissioner, then the claimants cannot make a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; (4) If the claim made under the Employees' Compensation Act is dismissed holding that the deceased or the injured was not a workman under the alleged employer or that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the employment of the deceased or injured, then the dismissal of the claim under the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 will not be a bar for making a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; (5) In case the claim is made at the first instance under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, there is no possibility of the claim being negatived in toto if the accident had resulted in death or permanent disability attracting the no- fault liability clauses found in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In such cases, the claimants cannot make a claim under the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 after getting an award in the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal; (6) In case the claim is made under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the owner of the offending vehicle, who was not the employer of the deceased or injured, as the case may be, and the driver or insurer of the said vehicle, after an award is passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, a claim against the employer of the deceased or the injured, as the case may be, under the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923, who was not a respondent in the claim will be maintainable, but after ascertaining the amount payable under the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923, the Commissioner shall direct the employer and its insurer to pay only the difference between the amount calculated under the Employees Compensation Act and the amount awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, only if the compensation payable under the Employees' Compensation Act exceeds the amount awarded under the Motor Vehicle Act; (7) In case claim is made under the Employees' Compensation Act against the employer and an award is passed and a claim for compensation is made under the Motor Vehicles Act against the owner of the offending vehicle not being the employer of the deceased or injured and against the driver and insurer of the offending vehicle on the basis of tort, then while determining the compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, the amount obtained as compensation under the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 shall be taken into account and that should be deducted. After deducting the same, the balance amount alone shall be awarded as compensation in the MCOP before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.'' (iv) United India Insurance Co.Ltd., vs. Mariadasan(Died) and Others, (2015) 4 LW 916 3. The F.I.R. has been registered against the Crane driver (Ex.P.1). After investigation, the Crane driver was charge sheeted (Ex.R.4), He also admitted his guilt and paid the fine (See Ex.R.3). In the circumstances, the Tribunal held that the Crane driver was guilty of negligence. However, it had considered the matter under Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 and granted compensation to the claimants applying the principles relating to determination of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and ultimately awarded the entire Rs. In the circumstances, the Tribunal held that the Crane driver was guilty of negligence. However, it had considered the matter under Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 and granted compensation to the claimants applying the principles relating to determination of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and ultimately awarded the entire Rs. 1,60,800/- with 9% interest p.a. and directed the 6th respondent and the appellant to pay the said amount. 12. But the Scheme under the W.C. Act basically differ. The Scheme under the W.C. Act is not based on negligence. It is based on employer - employee relationship. The accident should have arose out of and in the course of employment. W.C. Act also contains a structured formula. One may get more under M.V. Act, but will get lesser under W.C. Act. But sometimes, a case may fall both under W.C. Act and M.V. Act. A claim cannot be maintained at the same time before both the authorities. One may get compensation under the M.V. Act. If he feels less, again he cannot go to W.C. Act. The choice is his, but not both. Once claim is filed under W.C. Act again they cannot go to M.V. Act. 13. Now, in this case, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, once negligence has been fastened on the part of the Crane driver, on that basis, the appellant cannot be called to satisfy the award because on that basis the lorry owner cannot be asked satisfy award. 14. But the Claims Tribunal followed a different procedure, because the Tribunal wanted to do justice to the dependants of the deceased. When the accident took place, the deceased worked as a driver of the 6th respondent. Hence, there is employer - employee relationship, the accident arose out of and in the course of employment. In the circumstances, the Tribunal is right in awarding compensation under W.C. Act. The vehicle has been insured with the appellant. So, appellant is bound to satisfy the award amount. 15. When the Claim is worked under the W.C. Act, the amount determined fell short of Rs. 14,000/-. The Tribunal awarded 9% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition. Grant of interest under the W.C. Act is very important. The vehicle has been insured with the appellant. So, appellant is bound to satisfy the award amount. 15. When the Claim is worked under the W.C. Act, the amount determined fell short of Rs. 14,000/-. The Tribunal awarded 9% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition. Grant of interest under the W.C. Act is very important. Under the W.C. Act the interest at 12% p.a. has to be paid from the date of accident till deposit, when there is default to deposit the amount in time. Neither the 6th respondent nor the claimants thought of making the claim under W.C. Act. Only the Tribunal on the date of judgment thought of applying the provisions of W.C. Act and the appellant also deposited the entire amount as awarded by the Tribunal. Further, the Tribunal while passing the award did not include the default clause as provided under W.C. Act.'' 10. Perusal of the judgment in Anthony Selvam's case relied on by the appellant shows that it is in favour of the case of the claimants. Admittedly, both MCOP and WC cases were filed and numbered in 2007. The claimants have filed MCOP against the owner of the Lorry and its insurer and settled the case in Lok Adalat on 13.05.2010 for a sum of Rs. 3,75,000/- as compensation, which is prior in point of time. Thereafter, WC case has been disposed of on 21.04.2011 by awarding compensation of Rs. 2,68,144/-. Even as per paragraph 23(6) in Anthony Selvam's case relied on by the appellant, only if compensation awarded in WC case exceeds the compensation awarded under MCOP case, the Commissioner shall direct the employer to pay the difference between the two amounts. In this case, the amount awarded by the Commissioner is less than the amount settled in MCOP case through Lok Adalat. Therefore, there cannot be any direction to pay the difference amount. The further judgment in Mariadasan's case relied on by the appellant, is not applicable to the present case, since in the said case, there was no dual claim before two forums and the Tribunal therein considered the MCOP case under Workmen Compensation Act and granted compensation applying the principles relating to determination of compensation under Motor Vehicles Act. The further judgment in Mariadasan's case relied on by the appellant, is not applicable to the present case, since in the said case, there was no dual claim before two forums and the Tribunal therein considered the MCOP case under Workmen Compensation Act and granted compensation applying the principles relating to determination of compensation under Motor Vehicles Act. On appeal, this Court holding that the Tribunal followed a different procedure and that there is a distinction between the claims under the Motor Vehicles Act and Workmen's Compensation Act, modified the award. Perusal of the said judgment would show that the facts of the said case are not relevant to the present case. 11. As rightly held in Nasimbanu's case relied on by the claimants, where a claimant can avail one remedy against the employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act, he is not debarred from claiming compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act against the tort-feasor. In Bidami's case relied on by the claimants also, it has been held that since the benefits accruing and flowing from the two different enactments flow in two different streams and such claim is made against different parties; employer in one case and tort-feasor other than employer in another case, one compensation does not militate or offend against other compensation and that the claimants are entitled to both compensation and one cannot be set off or deducted from the other. 12. In the present case on hand, the claimants have rightly filed MCOP case against the owner of Lorry who is not the employer and insurer of the Lorry which hit the deceased and obtained compensation through Lok Adalat and also filed WC case against the employer of the deceased and obtained compensation which in my considered opinion does not amount to double compensation or double jeopardy to the employer in the light of the above judgments. 13. In the light of the above discussion, the substantial questions of law are answered against the appellant. The respondents 1 and 2/claimants are permitted to withdraw the deposited award amount by filing necessary application before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour. Accordingly, this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.