JUDGMENT & ORDER : By means of this petition filed under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. to grant bail in favour of the accused-person, namely Amit Debbarma in connection with Bodhjungnagar P.S. Case No.2017/BJN/050 corresponding to Case No. S.T.(T-1)16 of 2018 under Section 302/109 and 120B of the IPC read with Section 27 of the Arms Act, has been pursuaded. 2. The accused-person is in the custody since 24.11.2017 and on the day of filing of this petition, he had completed 303 days in custody. 3. On perusal of the records what appears that a serious development has taken place in the midst of the trial. The State Government has provided consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 by the Notification No.21(2)-PD/12(P)/873 dated 17.03.2018 [issued by the Home Department, Govt. of Tripura]. Pursuant thereto, the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, DOPT, Govt. of India, has asked the CBI by their Notification No.228/15/2018-AVD.II dated 06.06.2018 to take up the investigation of Bodhjungnagar P.S. Case No.2017/BJN/050 dated 21.11.2017 under Section 302 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) registered the regular case bearing No. RC 02/S/2018/Kolkata dated 29.06.2018 under Section 302 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act by treating the FIR No.2017/BJN/50 dated 21.11.2017 under Section 302 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act as the original FIR of their case No. RC 02/S/2018/Kolkata dated 29.06.2018 under Section 302 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. 4. On 29.06.2018, the CBI has commenced reinvestigation of the case and from the records of the Case No. S.T.(T-1)16 of 2018, it appears that all the original documents, the charge-sheet [filed under Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C.], the supplementary charge-sheet [filed under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C.], forensic report and the prosecution papers were withdrawn from the trial court by the CBI in terms of the order dated 10.08.2018. 5. It is pertinent to note that the chargesheet filed earlier has been withdrawn by the CBI probably for purpose of paving the way for submitting the final report on termination of their investigation. 5. It is pertinent to note that the chargesheet filed earlier has been withdrawn by the CBI probably for purpose of paving the way for submitting the final report on termination of their investigation. It is on record that the accused-person was facing trial from the custody and on numerous time he approached the trial court as well as this court seeking his release on bail, but those petitions did not succeed. 6. Mr. J. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that from the former charge-sheet it was apparent that there was no evidentiary material which could invite conviction of the accused-person. Now for re-investigation, to the extreme prejudice to the accused-person that has been taken up by the CBI, the accused-person has been forced to suffer the detention for uncertain period. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has submitted that elongation of detention would cause hardship and infringement of liberty without any reasonable basis. He has relied on a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Kaniram & Ors. Vs. State of M.P., reported in 1991 JLJ 273 , where it has been observed as under: 20. It was with a view to do away with the practice which had grown up with the police to file, before a Magistrate, a preliminary or incomplete report and praying him from time-to-time for adjournment report and further while the investigation went on in leisurely manner. The object and reason in introducing the proviso to sub-section 167 Cr.P.C.: “There is persistent complaint that investigations are not being completed quickly by the police and that in many cases accused persons are kept in detention on remand for very long periods causing hardship and misery to such under-trial prisoners and their families. Although stringent provisions are already there in the existing Code requiring investigations to be completed quickly, they have not had the desired effect. The Committee feels that a drastic remedy is called for in this behalf.” 21. This object stands defeated by filing incomplete charge-sheets and delaying the trial, consequently delaying the committal and trial of serious cases. 22. Shri Desai, however, submitted that expert reports for which invariably passing of committal order is delayed or postponed, can be filed even at the time of trial. No doubt there are provisions but the practice of filing incomplete charge-sheets, without such reports, cannot certainly be approved of. 23. 22. Shri Desai, however, submitted that expert reports for which invariably passing of committal order is delayed or postponed, can be filed even at the time of trial. No doubt there are provisions but the practice of filing incomplete charge-sheets, without such reports, cannot certainly be approved of. 23. To conclude, I am fully conscious that no inflexible rule can be laid down as regards the length and lapse of time which would entitle an accused in custody facing serious charge triable by the Court of Sessions, 'to be released on bail. However, a general guide line, on the basis of Supreme Court judgment, can well be given. The Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatun's case ( AIR 1979 SC 1360 ) indicated that even delay of one year is bad enough. In Nimeon Sangma's case (supra) a period of six months has been laid down. Keeping in view the pendency of large number of cases, a post charge-sheet period of six months, would be fair to both the accused as well as the State. 24. It is also made clear that in a given case where bail is claimed on the ground of delay, it is open to the Court to consider exceptional peculiarities of the case and refuse to grant but in that event the case should be given priority in the matter of trial. [Emphasis supplied] That apart, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has quite emphatically submitted that from the evidence that has been already recorded, it has surfaced that the allegation of the accused-person’s participation in the commission of crime is in the realm of conjuncture. 7. From the other side, Mr. B. Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the CBI has vehemently opposed that proposition as advanced by Mr. J. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner. He has categorically stated that the CBI in their reply has clearly stated that they have carried out the custodial interrogation of all the accused persons and the murder for commission of which the accused-person is implicated, has taken place within the headquarters of 2nd Bn. TSR. The accused-person is an accomplice and he is very influential. Against him one FIR vide No.0047 dated 16.06.2018 in the Kumarghat police station has been registered alleging of threat against a vital witness (name withheld) in that order. TSR. The accused-person is an accomplice and he is very influential. Against him one FIR vide No.0047 dated 16.06.2018 in the Kumarghat police station has been registered alleging of threat against a vital witness (name withheld) in that order. Thus, if his bail is allowed he would interfere in the fair investigation by coercing or by threatening the witnesses. 8. This court in the emerged circumstances had directed production of the Case Diary of that case against the accused-person. It has been on examination found that threat-call was generated from the mobile phone being No.8837230163. 9. From the special report submitted before this court by the Investigating Officer of Kumarghat P.S. Case No.2018 KGT 047 dated 16.06.2018 under Section 195(A)/506 IPC, it is confirmed that the said mobile phone is registered in the name of one Brujan Debbarma, of Barkathal, P.S. Sidhai, West Tripura. However, it has been asserted that the person whose name has been withheld could recognize the voice of the accused-person. The accused-person is in the jail custody. Therefore, unless the evidence of serious breach is accepted by this court it has to be assumed that a person from the judicial custody cannot make a call to any other person unless permitted by the competent authority. This is not the case here. 10. However, Mr. B. Majumder, learned counsel has referred a few decisions to contend that mere submission of the chargesheet would not allow a person to have bail. It is trite law that the societal interests vis-a-vis personal liberty are to be countenanced while adhering to the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence. It has to be presumed that the accused is innocent till he is found guilty by the competent court. 11. In Virupakshappa Gouda & Anr. Vs. The State of Karnataka & Anr. (judgment dated 28.03.2017), the apex court in no uncertain terms has observed that deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty. The necessity of elongation of detention is the operative test. 12. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty. The necessity of elongation of detention is the operative test. 12. It has been further observed in Virupakshappa Gouda (supra) that to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson is highly improper. Usually the factors which are considered in granting the bail are : (i) the nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence, (ii) reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant and (iii) prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. 13. In Neeru Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., reported in (2014) 16 SCC 508 , the apex court has observed that “the liberty of an individual” is not absolute. The society by its collective wisdom through process of law can withdraw the liberty that it has sanctioned to an individual when an individual becomes a danger to the collective and to the societal order, but that has to be done within the process as authorized by law. 14. Mr. Majumder, learned counsel has placed reliance on State of Bihar vs. Rajballav Prasad @ Rajballav Pd. (judgment dated 24.11.2016 in Criminal Appeal No.1141 of 2016), where the apex court has observed that, ‘threat and intimidation’ has been one of the major causes of concern in the investigation. Where there is a possibility there is a fear or danger rather likelihood that the witnesses may be put on threat. In such circumstances no bail may be considered without considering the witness protection. 15. Mr. Where there is a possibility there is a fear or danger rather likelihood that the witnesses may be put on threat. In such circumstances no bail may be considered without considering the witness protection. 15. Mr. Majumder, learned counsel has also relied on a decision of the apex court in Shahzad Hasan Khan vs. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 684 , where the apex court has observed that, liberty is to be secured through process of law, which is administered keeping in mind the interest of the accused, the near and dear of the victim who lost his life and who feel helpless and believe that there is no justice in the world as also the collective interest of the community so that parties do not lose faith in the institution and indulge in private retribution. 16. ‘Threat and intimidation’ has been one of the major causes for the hostility of witnesses as Bentham said “witnesses are the eyes and ears of justice”. When the witnesses are not able to depose correctly in the court of law, it results in low rate of conviction and many times even hardened criminals escape the conviction. It shakes public confidence in the criminal justice delivery system. It is for this reason there has been a lot of discussion on witness protection and from various quarters demand is made for the State to play a definite role in coming out with witness protection programme, at least in sensitive cases involving those in power, who have political patronage and could wield muscle and money power, to avert trial getting tainted and derailed and truth becoming a casualty. A stern and emphatic message to this effect was given in Zahira Habibullah's case as well. 17. Mr. Majumder, learned counsel has referred Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan allias Pappu Yadav & Anr., reported in (2004) 7 SCC 528 , where the apex court had occasion to observe that the period of incarceration already undergone by the accused and the unlikelihood of trial concluding in the near future as grounds sufficient to enlarge the accused on bail, in spite of the fact that the accused stands charged of offences punishable with life imprisonment or even death penalty. In such cases, in the opinion of the apex court, the mere fact that the accused has undergone certain period of incarceration (three years in that case) by itself would not entitle the accused to being enlarged on bail, nor the fact that the trial is not likely to be concluded in the near future either by itself or coupled with the period of incarceration would be sufficient for enlarging the appellant on bail when the gravity of the offence alleged is severe and there are allegations of tampering with the witnesses by the accused during the period he was on bail. 18. Further reliance has been placed on Kanwar Singh Meena vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., reported in (2012) 12 SCC 180 , where the apex court has observed that the primary considerations which weigh with the court are whether the accused is likely to tamper with the evidence or interfere or attempt to interfere with the due course of justice or evade the due course of justice. But, that is not all. The High Court or the Sessions Court can cancel bail even in cases where the order granting bail suffers from serious infirmities resulting in miscarriage of justice. Therefore, in absence of supervening circumstances such as the propensity of the accused to tamper with the evidence, to flee from justice, etc. would not deter the court from cancelling even the bail. The High Court or the Sessions Court is bound to cancel such bail orders particularly when they are passed releasing accused involved in heinous crimes because they ultimately result in weakening the prosecution case and bring adverse impact on the society. Needless to say that though the powers of this court are much wider, the apex court has observed that it is equally guided by the above principles in the matter of grant or cancellation of bail. 19. Mr. Majumder, learned counsel has placed reliance on another decision of Central Bureau of Investigation vs. V. Vijay Sai Reddy, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 452 , where the apex court has observed as under: 34. 19. Mr. Majumder, learned counsel has placed reliance on another decision of Central Bureau of Investigation vs. V. Vijay Sai Reddy, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 452 , where the apex court has observed as under: 34. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the legislature has used the words "reasonable grounds for believing" instead of "the evidence" which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. [Emphasis supplied] According to Mr. Majumder, learned counsel, there are prima facie materials against the accused-person on referring to the materials available in the case diary as produced from the investigating agency (CBI). Therefore, he has urged this court not to grant bail in favour of the accused-person. 20. When this court queried Mr. B. Majumder, learned counsel representing the CBI that the re-investigation of the case coupled with withdrawal of the earlier charge-sheet from the court, whether would invite the statutory imperative of granting bail as provided under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C., he has not attended the said question. Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. provides that, the Magistrate may authorize the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorize the detention of the accused person in custody under the said paragraph for a total period exceeding (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years etc. 21. 21. In a recent judgment in Achpal & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 2018 SC 4647 , it has been observed by the apex court that the letter of and spirit behind enactment of Section 167 of the Code as it stands thus mandate that the investigation ought to be completed within the period prescribed. Ideally, the investigation, going by the provisions of the Code, ought to be completed within first 24 hours itself. Further, in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 167, if it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by Section 57 of the Cr.P.C., the concerned officer ought to transmit the entries in the diary relating to the case and at the same time forward the Accused to such Magistrate. Thereafter, it is for the Magistrate to consider whether the accused be remanded to custody or not. Sub-section (2) of Section 167 then prescribes certain limitations on the exercise of the power of the Magistrate and the proviso stipulates that the Magistrate cannot authorize detention of the accused in custody for total period exceeding 90 or 60 days, as the case may be. It is further stipulated that on the expiry of such period of 90 and 60 days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail, if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. The provision has a definite purpose in that. The Magistrate ought to be in a position to proceed with the matter. It is thus clearly indicated that the stage of investigation ought to be confined to 90 or 60 days, as the case may be, and thereafter the issue relating to the custody of the accused ought to be dealt with by the Magistrate on the basis of the investigation. Matters and issues relating to liberty or whether the person accused of a charge ought to be confined or not, must be decided by the Magistrate and not by the Police. The further custody of such person ought not to be guided by mere suspicion that he may have committed an offence or for that matter, to facilitate the pending investigation. 22. The proposition of Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam, reported in (2017) 15 SCC 67 has been approved in Achpal (supra). The further custody of such person ought not to be guided by mere suspicion that he may have committed an offence or for that matter, to facilitate the pending investigation. 22. The proposition of Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam, reported in (2017) 15 SCC 67 has been approved in Achpal (supra). In Rajesh Kumar Paul (supra), it has been observed by the apex court as under: “11. Unfortunately, all laws tend to be misused whenever opportunity knocks, and Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was no exception. Since there was a practical difficulty in completing investigations within the 15-day time-limit, the prosecution often took recourse to the provisions of Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and filed a preliminary or incomplete report before the Magistrate to keep the Accused in custody. The Law Commission of India noted this in its 41st Report (after carefully studying several earlier Reports) and proposed to increase the time-limit for completion of investigations to 60 days, acknowledging that: 14.19. ... such an extension may result in the maximum period becoming the Rule in every case as a matter of routine; but we trust that proper supervision by the superior courts will prevent that.” 23. In Achpal (supra) it has been further observed as under: 10. The law on the point as to the rights of an Accused who is in custody pending investigation and where the investigation is not completed within the period prescribed Under Section 167(2) of the Code, is crystallized in the judgment of this Court in Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : (2001) 5 SCC 453 . This case took into account the decision of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.: (1994) 4 SCC 602 , Sanjay Dutt v. State through C.B.I., Bombay (II) : (1994) 5 SCC 410 and Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat: (1996) 1 SCC 718 . Justice Pattanaik (as the learned Chief Justice then was) speaking for the majority recorded conclusions in para 13 of his judgment. For the present purposes, we may extract conclusions 3 and 4 as under: ... 3. Justice Pattanaik (as the learned Chief Justice then was) speaking for the majority recorded conclusions in para 13 of his judgment. For the present purposes, we may extract conclusions 3 and 4 as under: ... 3. On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the Accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and the Accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate. 4. When an application for bail is filed by an Accused for enforcement of his indefeasible right alleged to have been accrued in his favour on account of default on the part of the investigating agency in completion of the investigation within the specified period, the Magistrate/court must dispose of it forthwith, on being satisfied that in fact the Accused has been in custody for the period of 90 days or 60 days, as specified and no charge-sheet has been filed by the investigating agency. Such prompt action on the part of the Magistrate/court will not enable the prosecution to frustrate the object of the Act and the legislative mandate of an Accused being released on bail on account of the default on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation within the period stipulated. .... 11. The principles laid down in Uday Mohanlal Acharya (supra) have been consistently followed by this Court namely in State of W.B. v. Dinesh Dalmia: (2007) 5 SCC 773 ; Sanjay Kumar Kedia v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Control Bureau and Anr. : (2009) 17 SCC 631 ; Union of India v. Nirala Yadav : (2014) 9 SCC 457 and in Ranbeer Shokeen v. State (NCT of Delhi): (2018) 4 SCC 405 . : (2009) 17 SCC 631 ; Union of India v. Nirala Yadav : (2014) 9 SCC 457 and in Ranbeer Shokeen v. State (NCT of Delhi): (2018) 4 SCC 405 . It must therefore be taken to be well settled that in terms of 3rd conclusion as recorded in Uday Mohanlal Acharya (supra), on the expiry of the period stipulated, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the Accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the period stipulated and the Accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate. [Emphasis added] 24. In Rajesh Kumar Paul (supra), the apex court has further observed that “default bail” would be granted on such terms and conditions as may be reasonable. If someone is granted the default bail it does not prohibit or otherwise prevent the arrest or re-arrest of the person who has been granted bail on cogent grounds in respect of the subject charge and upon arrest or re-arrest, the petitioner may also be granted regular bail considering the materials as might be placed by the prosecution. 25. This court has examined the Case Diary as produced by the CBI. It appears that the investigation is being carried out leisurely and that is the reason that even if the FIR was registered on 29.06.2018 the Investigating Officer who was present in person in the court has failed to indicate to a possible time frame when the investigation might be completed, though the said query did not have material relevance on the aspect, as covered by Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. Now, the pertinent question that falls for consideration of this court is that for starting a de novo investigation by withdrawing all the charge-sheet and supplementary charge-sheet from the court whether after expiry of the statutory period as provided by Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. the accused-person is entitled to the default bail or not. No doubt about it that at this stage there is no charge-sheet before the court as those were withdrawn and the fresh investigation has been launched. In this regard, there is no divergent view. No doubt about it that at this stage there is no charge-sheet before the court as those were withdrawn and the fresh investigation has been launched. In this regard, there is no divergent view. In the considered opinion of this court, such investigation is also covered within the meaning of ‘investigation’ as provided under Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. Thus, the accused-person is entitled to the default bail. Accordingly, it is directed that the accused-person shall be released on bail on furnishing a bail bond of Rs.1,00,000 (rupees one lakh) supported by 2(two) sureties of the like amount, one of whom shall be a Government employee having permanent residence within the territory of Agartala Municipal Corporation, to the satisfaction of the Addl. Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala. That apart, the accused-person shall report to the Investigating Agency or the Investigating Officer at their office at Agartala on every Monday, Wednesday and Friday. If any of those days is found to be a Government holiday, the accused-person shall report on the next following day without fail. Further, the accused-person shall not in any manner try to threaten, coerce or intimidate any witness or any person seized of the material information or object of the investigation. Further, the accused-person shall not leave the territorial limit of Agartala Municipal Corporation without prior permission of the Addl. Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala. If any breach is reported, the bail will be liable to be cancelled and for that purpose the investigating agency or any of its designated officers may approach the court of the Addl. Sessions Judge for appropriate order. In terms of the above, this bail application stands allowed and disposed of. Send down the LCRs forthwith.