JUDGMENT : I.P. MUKERJI, J. 1. In 2004 the writ petitioners filed a writ application in this court (WP 460 of 2004) challenging the vires of the second proviso to Section 179 (2) (d) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. They also challenged a demand for Rs. 1,93,34,726/-. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants/writ petitioners in that writ allegedly on a mistaken interpretation of the instruction given to him abandoned the point of vires. On 20th April, 2007, the writ application was disposed of, taking into account the above concession made by learned counsel. 2. After disposal of the first writ application, the appellants/writ petitioners applied before the first court to resile from the alleged statement of their learned Counsel in court. The court while disposing of the application on 31st August, 2007 simply recorded that the court, while disposing of the first writ application did not have any occasion to consider the validity of the said proviso to the said Act. It did not decide the issue as to whether this point had been deliberately withdrawn or was abandoned by learned Counsel due to inadvertence. Understandably, since there was no decision of this court on the issue the appellant could not take this point before the appeal court (APO 473 of 2017) on an appeal from the order dated 20th April, 2007. They also could not take the point because they did not urge it before the trial court. 3. But the question is whether they could have urged it in the instant writ (WP 1021 of 2011). 4. One part of the argument of Mr. Kapur is a little heavy. He says that the right to obtain a declaration that an Act is ultra vires is a fundamental right. Just because in a proceeding the point regarding validity of a proviso had been given up by a party, it does not mean he cannot take this point in another separate proceeding. 5. In Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors. reported in 1985 (3) SCC 545 cited by learned Counsel, a writ application was filed on the Original Side of the Bombay High Court on behalf of the pavement dwellers against the proposal of the Government of Maharashtra and the Bombay Municipal Corporation to demolish their huts on the pavement or public roads. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors. reported in 1985 (3) SCC 545 cited by learned Counsel, a writ application was filed on the Original Side of the Bombay High Court on behalf of the pavement dwellers against the proposal of the Government of Maharashtra and the Bombay Municipal Corporation to demolish their huts on the pavement or public roads. It appears that in an earlier writ on behalf of these pavement dwellers, it was contended in court that this action had not affected the fundamental rights of the petitioners. On the basis of their undertaking to vacate their dwellings by 15th October, 1981 and the state authorities not to demolish the structures by that date the writ application was disposed of. It was contended in the later case that this statement of learned Counsel operated as an estoppel preventing the pavement dwellers from “setting up their fundamental rights as defence to the demolition of the huts”. The Supreme Court ruled that there could be no estoppel against a fundamental right, even if such a right had been waived or conceded under a mistake of law or otherwise. 6. In Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan & Anr. reported in 1998 (6) SCC 538 the Supreme Court opined that a wrong concession made by counsel on a question of law was not binding on the client. This point was affirmed by the Supreme Court in P. Nallammal and Anr. V. State reported in 1999 (6) SCC 559 . 7. Therefore, we have two propositions of law. In an ordinary litigation between two parties a law point concerned with facts may not be taken or in other words may be given up. If it is so a party is not normally allowed to re-agitate the same point at that stage of the proceeding or at a higher stage like an appeal. (See Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim and others reported in AIR 1959 SC 24 ). The exception is when the point is a pure question of law and not taken in the first Court but not expressly given up (see Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel And vs Lalbhai Trikumlal Mills Ltd reported in AIR 1958 SC 512 and Additional Commissioner of Income-tax v. East Coast Floor Mills Pvt. Ltd. reported in AIR 1994 SC 1513 ). 8. The exception is when the point is a pure question of law and not taken in the first Court but not expressly given up (see Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel And vs Lalbhai Trikumlal Mills Ltd reported in AIR 1958 SC 512 and Additional Commissioner of Income-tax v. East Coast Floor Mills Pvt. Ltd. reported in AIR 1994 SC 1513 ). 8. But in our opinion, abandonment of a law point in a proceeding or a concession made on a point of law in a proceeding will not operate as an estoppel in a separate proceeding. A concession cannot be made abandoning or conceding forever a fundamental right granted by the constitution. If such a concession is made it would be viewed by the court as non-est and non-binding on the party. A person, in our view, has a fundamental right to say that a provision in an Act of the legislature is against the Constitution and ultravires. Such a right cannot be permanently abandoned, although it may not be pursued in a particular proceeding. Hence the concession made by learned Counsel cannot bind the petitioner in this subsequent proceeding. 9. More fundamentally although a substantive application was made in this court by the writ petitioners/appellants saying that their learned counsel made the concession on the law point by mistake there is no decision on that point. In that view of the matter, in our opinion it would be highly unjust and inequitable to disallow the appellants from raising an issue of ultra vires in this proceeding. Therefore, we come to a decision that the point of invalidity of the second proviso of Section 179 (2) (d) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 pleaded in the writ petition can be adjudicated upon. 10. However, Mr. Kapur with all the experience behind him submitted with emphasis that the court need not always strike down a statute. It had the power to read it down and interpret it in such a manner that its effects were reasonable. He cited Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Collie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy & ors. reported in 2003 (7) SCC 667 , Santosh Kumar Shivgonda Patil & Ors. v. Balasaheb Takuram Shevale & Ors. reported in 2009 (9) SCC 352 and Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and Another v. D. Narsing Rao and Others reported in 2015 (3) SCC 695 . 11. He cited Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Collie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy & ors. reported in 2003 (7) SCC 667 , Santosh Kumar Shivgonda Patil & Ors. v. Balasaheb Takuram Shevale & Ors. reported in 2009 (9) SCC 352 and Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and Another v. D. Narsing Rao and Others reported in 2015 (3) SCC 695 . 11. In the instant writ petition the appellants/writ petitioners have sought a declaration that the second proviso to Section 179(2)(d) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 is ultravires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Furthermore, the assessment orders dated 16th November, 1999 for the assessment periods 4th Quarter 1984-85 upto 3rd Quarter 1990-91, 4th Quarter 1990-91 upto 3rd Quarter 1996-97 and 4th Quarter 1996-97 upto 4th Quarter 1990-2000 be quashed. 12. It was heard before Mr. Justice Basak. On 12th March, 2015 the impugned judgment and order was made. By it the appellants/writ petitioners were not allowed to pursue their challenge to the vires of the said provision of the said Act, 1980. The learned Judge was of the view that instead of preferring a statutory appeal the appellants/writ petitioners had come directly to the Court to challenge the assessment orders. Furthermore, the new bills under challenge by the appellants/writ petitioners were on the basis of the assessment orders which were dealt with by the judgment and order dated 20th April, 2007. 13. First of all, a look at certain sections of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 is necessary. First we set out the second proviso to Section 179(2) (d). “179 (2)(d) may be revised on the expiration of each such period: ********* Provided further that the Municipal Commissioner may, on the expiry of such period, revise the annual valuation of such land or building at any time and such revised valuation shall take effect from the beginning of the quarter from which the annual valuation would have been revised under this clause.” 14. Their provisos was omitted with effect from 1st May, 2007. But the effect of the Sub-Section read with the proviso, when it was in the statute book, is what concerns us. 15. Mr. Kapur submitted that this provision was draconian. It empowered the municipal commissioner to revise the valuation retrospectively. According to the appellants/writ petitioners, this meant that today the commissioner could revise the annual valuation made in 1950 or even earlier. 16. 15. Mr. Kapur submitted that this provision was draconian. It empowered the municipal commissioner to revise the valuation retrospectively. According to the appellants/writ petitioners, this meant that today the commissioner could revise the annual valuation made in 1950 or even earlier. 16. Therefore, the annual valuation of premises from 1950 may be revised and rate bills claiming the differential tax raised upon the person liable to pay such tax. In that event he would be liable to pay that amount. Section 180 and 184 provide for general valuation of lands and buildings. Section 190 says that every valuation determined under chapter-XII shall be final subject to the power of the Commissioner under Section 192 of the said Act to alter the municipal assessment book if any fraud or mistake was discovered. 17. Mr. Kapur cited Section 573 of the said Act. It is in the following terms:- “573. Recovery of certain dues of Corporation—Save as otherwise provided in this Act or the rules or the regulations made thereunder, any sum due to the Corporation on account of any charge, cost, expense, fee, rate or rent or on any other account under this Act or the rules or the regulations made thereunder shall be recoverable from the person from whom such sum is due as if it were a consolidated rate: Provided that no proceedings for the recovery of any such sum under this Section shall be commenced after the lapse of three years from the date on which such sum becomes due.” 18. The proviso is very important. It says that no proceedings for recovery of inter alia municipal tax shall be commenced after the lapse of three years from the date on which such sum became due. Under the second proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section 179 of the said Act, the proviso to Section 573 would be rendered otiose by giving the Commissioner the power to collect unlimited tax by unrestricted revision of the annual valuation of the premises for an unlimited period of time. Theoretically, the tax would become due on the date of the revision made by the Commissioner but the real effect is that the persons liable to pay tax for a property could be fastened by the Commission with liability to pay tax, otherwise not realisable, long after the period of limitation. 19. In Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham Vs. Theoretically, the tax would become due on the date of the revision made by the Commissioner but the real effect is that the persons liable to pay tax for a property could be fastened by the Commission with liability to pay tax, otherwise not realisable, long after the period of limitation. 19. In Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham Vs. K. Suresh Reddy and Ors. reported in (2003) 7 SCC 667 the Supreme Court was concerned with the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana area) Tenancy And Agricultural Land Act, 1950. Section 50-B(4) of the said Act was under consideration by the Court. According to Mr. Justice Shivraj V. Patil delivering the judgment, it provided that the collector could suo motu “at any time” call for the record and pass such orders as he the fit. With regard to the power of the collector to revise the record “at any time” the Supreme Court remarked “but that does not mean” that “at any time” should be unguided and arbitrary. 20. Once again in Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil and Ors. Vs. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale and Ors. reported in (2009) 9SCC 352, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier view by saying that when no time limit was specified by a statute, a power had to be exercised within a reasonable period of time after the cause for exercise of that power had arisen. Mr. Justice, R. M. Lodha opined that the power to revise must be reasonably exercised within three years under Section 257 of Maharashtra Land Revenue Court. We incorporate paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment: “11. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statue does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. 12. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. 12. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub- Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of Tehsildar passed on March 30, 1976 is flawed and legally not correct.” 21. In State of H.P. and Ors. Vs. Rajkumar Brijender Singh and Ors. reported in (2004) 10 SCC 585 the Court was dealing with the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on landholding Act, 1972. In Section 20 of this Act the Financial Commissioner was given the power to call for the record at any time. The Supreme Court felt that the absence of a time limit did not mean that ad infinitum time had been granted to the commissioner to exercise his power. The power had to be exercised without unreasonable delay. Otherwise it would have the effect of undoing the matter which had attained finality. It found that in the fact of that case the Financial Commissioner had exercised his power after an unreasonable lapse of time. Such an action was declared null and void. 22. In Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and ANr. Vs. D. Narsing Rao and Ors. along with an analysing matter the matter reported in (2015) 3 SCC 695 held the view that exercise of power after inordinate delay amounted to an arbitrary Act. Mr. Justice T. S. Thakur added: 31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Mr. Justice T. S. Thakur added: 31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority. 23. In New Delhi Municipal Committee Vs. The Life Insurance Corporation of India reported in AIR 1977 SC 2134 , under the Punjab Municipal Act, the Municipal Committee was given the jurisdiction to amend the assessment list of previous orders “at any time”. In that case Mr. Justice Y. V. Chandrachud remarked “it is difficult to appreciate how any extra statutory limitation can be placed upon that power”. This decision was cited by Mr. Banerjee for the respondent corporation to support his argument that the power of the commissioner to revise the valuation was for an unlimited period of time. However, this judgment of the Supreme Court is claused with the condition that this unlimited period of time did not exclude the “concept of reasonableness”. Therefore, this decision also did not depart from the principle that any power granted by a statute to a statutory authority, without specifying the time limit has to be exercised within the reasonable time from the time, the need to exercise the power arises. 24. Mr. Banerjee, also cited a special bench judgment of our Court in the case of Sudhir Chandra Ghosh & Ors. Vs. Sachindra Nath Ghosh reported in 1982 (1) CLJ 436 which related to deposit of arrear rent with the Controller. 24. Mr. Banerjee, also cited a special bench judgment of our Court in the case of Sudhir Chandra Ghosh & Ors. Vs. Sachindra Nath Ghosh reported in 1982 (1) CLJ 436 which related to deposit of arrear rent with the Controller. The special bench laid down that the obligation to deposit arrear rent under Section 17(2) of the West Bengal Tenancy Act, 1956 was irrespective of operation of the ordinary laws of limitation. 25. The power conferred on the Municipal Commissioner to revise the annual valuation of land or building under Section 179(2), second proviso was indeed unlimited in point of time and very vide in its amplitude. Any piece of legislature where unguided or uncanalised power is given to an authority to that extent invalid. Therefore, the power conferred on the Commissioner in my opinion is indeed so unlimited that it falls foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 26. However, in the Supreme Court cases discussed by me above similar powers were conferred on the authority. In the case of New Delhi Municipal Committee Vs. The Life Insurance Corporation of India reported in 1977 SC 2134 similar power was conferred on the municipal committee under the Punjab Municipal Act to amend the assessment lists. In all these matters including the municipal matter the Supreme Court did not declare the provisions as ultravires but tried to “read down” the rigours of the provision by implying words into the offending provision so as to make a provision reasonable. It implied the words “within the reasonable time” after the phrase “at any time” to make the section workable. 27. We adopt the same procedure. The commissioner can only have the power to revise valuation within a reasonable period of time. In the case of Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil and Ors. Vs. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale and Ors. reported in (2009) 9 SCC 352 the Supreme Court computed reasonable time in the subject Act to be three years. In Section 573 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, the Corporation has the power to recover any sum by initiating a proceeding within three years from the date, such sum became due and payable. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale and Ors. reported in (2009) 9 SCC 352 the Supreme Court computed reasonable time in the subject Act to be three years. In Section 573 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, the Corporation has the power to recover any sum by initiating a proceeding within three years from the date, such sum became due and payable. Therefore, on a proper interpretation of the proviso, and upon reading it down to save it from unconstitutionalily, the period for which valuation of a property can be raised must not be more than three years before the date of the revising order. 28. In those circumstances this appeal is partly allowed by directing the respondent corporation to make a fresh assessment in relation to the period covered by prayer (b) of the writ petition on the basis of the observations made in this judgment within eight weeks of communication of this order and to raise final bills on the appellant/petitioner within a further period of one week and realise the same as soon as possible not later than four months from the date of service of this order. 29. Certified photocopy of this Judgment and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities. Md. Mumtaz Khan, J. - I Agree.