JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioners seek to quash GR (A) Case No.154/2015 pending in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Shillong on the ground that cognizance has been taken without previous sanction as required in terms of Section 197(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [CrPC]. 2. The petitioners had filed a similar petition registered as Criminal Petition No.26 of 2015, same stands dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 06.12.2016, with liberty to the petitioners to raise all the pleas before the learned Trial Court and the Trial Court was directed to consider the same in accordance with law. 3. Again in the year 2017, Criminal Misc. Case No.1 of 2017 was filed by the petitioners with a prayer to set aside the said order dated 06.12.2016 same has also been dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 23.02.2017, with liberty to the petitioner to file fresh petition in accordance with law. Hence, the instant petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that the petitioners are entitled to the protection against prosecution as is guaranteed to them under Section 197 (2) CrPC. In support of his contentions has placed reliance on the judgments reported in: (i) (2004) 2 SCC 349 (ii) (2009) 8 SCC 617 (iii) (2012) 12 SCC 72 (iv) (2015) 12 SCC 231 (v) (2016) 2 SCC 143 (vi) (2016) 6 SCC 734 (vii) (2016) 12 SCC 87 (viii) (2016) 13 SCC 44 5. In opposition, learned PP highlighted that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioners are such for which no protection under Section 197 (2) CrPC is available. They have committed the offences which by no stretch of imagination could be in discharge of their duties. Further, added that same being a question of fact is to be proved/disproved during trial. The question of sanction under Section 197 (2) CrPC could be raised at any time even after cognizance is taken and to be determined at different stages of the proceedings/trial. In support of his contentions placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court reported in (2014) 13 SCC 70 . 6. The question of sanction under Section 197 (2) CrPC could be raised at any time even after cognizance is taken and to be determined at different stages of the proceedings/trial. In support of his contentions placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court reported in (2014) 13 SCC 70 . 6. Considered the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, for facility of reference, Section 197 (2) CrPC is relevant to be reproduced: “197(2) – No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government.” 7. The wording employed “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” is of paramount importance for availing protection against prosecution under Section 197(2) CrPC. Therefore, it has to be ascertained as to whether the alleged offences have been committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duties. It shall be advantageous to notice precisely as to what led to the registration of the case, filing of charge sheet and consequent proceedings initiated by the learned Magistrate. 8. From perusal of the record, it transpires that on 06.07.2013 H/C J. Rema, UBC/1485, V. Kr. Chetri and HGV R. Shah were doing traffic duty at Assam Bazar, Happy Valley. One vehicle Alto No.ML 04-6274 was wrongly parked causing obstruction from free flow of traffic. For its removal, they clamped the vehicle and the owner of the vehicle Smti. Daman Bareh appeared before them and started discussion. In the meanwhile, the accused (petitioner No.3) Sep Kamal Gurung appeared reportedly in an intoxication mood and uttered unbearable language and interfered with the functioning of Police. The information was passed to I/C traffic branch Madanriting PS, who deputed UBC/1491 H Kharmalki and UBC/1489 P Thapa to help them. On reaching the spot, UBC/1491 H Kharmalki was man handled by the Army personnel. 9. The information was passed to I/C traffic branch Madanriting PS, who deputed UBC/1491 H Kharmalki and UBC/1489 P Thapa to help them. On reaching the spot, UBC/1491 H Kharmalki was man handled by the Army personnel. 9. While, processing medical requisition for sending Sep Kamal Gurung to Civil Hospital, Shillong for medical examination and treatment, suddenly, a troop of Gorkha Regiment personnel under the leadership of Major Vikrant Sharma and Major Aman Agarwal petitioners No.1 and 2, appeared at Madanriting PS entered into a general room and ordered his men to load their sophisticated weapons inside the room causing criminal intimidation of death or grievous hurt. Major Vikrant then ordered to take away their Jawan Sep Kamal Gurung and at gun point took him forcibly from Police Station and did not allow the Police to send Sep Kamal Gurung for medical checkup. 10. Regarding the occurrence, Inspector N Thapa, I/C Madanriting traffic branch lodged a written report on the same day i.e. 06.07.2013 which was registered as PS Case No.53 (7) of 2013 under Sections 353, 186, 323, 506 (b), 225, 109/34 IPC. 11. SK Ganguly Capt. Adjutant for Commandant 58 GTC also lodged a written report regarding occurrence to the effect that Sep Kamal Gurung was reportedly beaten mercilessly by the Policemen inside the Police Station who were drunk. The said report was registered as Madanriting PS Case No.55 (7) of 2013 under Sections 325/34 IPC. 12. On completion of the investigation of Madanriting PS Case No.55 (7) of 2013 lodged by the Adjutant, it was concluded as not proved. The final report under Section 173 CrPC was filed on 19.10.2013 suggesting that registration of the case was treated to be by mistake for the reasons recorded therein. The closure of the said case has not been challenged. 13. Madanriting PS Case No.53 (7) of 2013 registered on the report of I/C N Thapa, Madanriting traffic branch, Shillong, on completion of investigation culminated in filing charge sheet under Section 173 CrPC for commission of offences punishable under Sections 353, 186, 323, 506 (b), 225, 109/34 IPC against the petitioners (accused), the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class has taken cognizance. Further, proceedings were in progress but hampered by the petitioners by filing earlier criminal petition under Section 482 CrPC bearing No.26 of 2015 which had been withdrawn and another Criminal Misc. Further, proceedings were in progress but hampered by the petitioners by filing earlier criminal petition under Section 482 CrPC bearing No.26 of 2015 which had been withdrawn and another Criminal Misc. Case No.1 of 2017 filed, too was also withdrawn on 23.02.2017 thereafter, the instant petition. 14. The offences allegedly committed by the petitioners precisely noticed hereinabove, at this stage, by no stretch of imagination can be said to be an act in discharge of official duties. The petitioner No.3 (Sep Kamal Gurung) unnecessarily as alleged has obstructed the Police in discharge of their duties as the vehicle being wrongly parked and causing obstruction from free flow of traffic and the vehicle belonged to a private party Smti. Daman Bareh, which was none of the business of petitioner No.3 to interfere with. The act of petitioner No.3 cannot be an act purported to be done in discharge of his official duty. The petitioners No.1 and 2 allegedly have exceeded their positions by rushing to the Police Station, where they have intimated the Police officers/officials and not only that, they asked the jawan accompanying them to load the sophisticated weapons and then, had allegedly taken away the petitioner No.3 (accused) from the Police Station. 15. Can such acts of the petitioners, said to be in discharge of their official duties at this stage, answer has to be in the negative. No material is available on the record to suggest that the petitioners in any manner were discharging any official duties or were acting purportedly to discharge their duties. The commission/omission directly or indirectly in discharge of duty or in operations may constitute offence for that protection is available under Section 197(2) CrPC. The petitioners were neither discharging any duty nor were carrying out any operation, allegedly misusing their position in the fit of egoistic approach have committed the alleged offences. 16. The judgment as relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners are not required to be discussed one by one as law laid down in all cited judgments is clearly noticed in the following judgments. (i) From the judgment reported in (2004) 2 SCC 349 following portion from paragraph 10 is advantageous to be quoted: “10. ....... In common parlance, it means taking notice of. (i) From the judgment reported in (2004) 2 SCC 349 following portion from paragraph 10 is advantageous to be quoted: “10. ....... In common parlance, it means taking notice of. A court, therefore, is precluded from entertaining a complaint or taking notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect of a public servant who is accused of an offence alleged to have been committed during discharge of his official duty. (ii) From the judgment reported in (2016) 2 SCC 143 , paragraph 27 is advantageous to be quoted: “27. In R.R. Charit2 referred to supra, while examining the scope of Section 197 CrPC, this Court held as follows: “19. … It is clear that the first part of Section 197(1) provides a special protection, inter alia, to public servants who are not removable from their offices save by or with the sanction of the State Government or the Central Government where they are charged with having committed offences while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duties; and the form which this protection has taken is that before a criminal court can take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by such public servants, a sanction should have been accorded to the said prosecution by the appropriate authorities. In other words, the appropriate authorities must be satisfied that there is a prima facie case for starting the prosecution and this prima facie satisfaction has been interposed as a safeguard before the actual prosecution commences. The object of Section 197(1) clearly is to save public servants from frivolous prosecution….” (emphasis supplied) (iii) In the judgment reported in (2016) 12 SCC 87 , after referring to various judgments, 9 principles have been summarized in para 39. For the purpose of this case, first four principles are advantageous to be quoted: “39.1. Protection of sanction is an assurance to an honest and sincere officer to perform his duty honestly and to the best of his ability to further public duty. However, authority cannot be camouflaged to commit crime. 39.2. Once act or omission has been found to have been committed by public servant in discharging his duty it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. Public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. However, authority cannot be camouflaged to commit crime. 39.2. Once act or omission has been found to have been committed by public servant in discharging his duty it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. Public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent Section 197 CrPC has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. 39.3. Even in facts of a case when public servant has exceeded in his duty, if there is reasonable connection it will not deprive him of protection under Section 197 CrPC. There cannot be a universal rule to determine whether there is reasonable nexus between the act done and official duty nor is it possible to lay down such rule. 39.4. In case the assault made is intrinsically connected with or related to performance of official duties, sanction would be necessary under Section 197 CrPC, but such relation to duty should not be pretended or fanciful claim. The offence must be directly and reasonably connected with official duty to require sanction. It is no part of official duty to commit offence. In case offence was incomplete without proving, the official act, ordinarily the provisions of Section 197 CrPC would apply.” 17. The principles as have been evolved and summarized while applying to the facts of the present case, at this stage, it can be safely concluded that the acts claimed to have been done or purported to be done on official duties is totally negatived by the facts and circumstances of the case. The petitioners as such, at this stage, are not entitled any protection of Section 197(2) CrPC. It has to be made clear that as per the materials collected by the Investigating Agency and records of the learned Trial Court as on date, nothing is forthcoming to suggest that the acts committed by the petitioners in any manner were in discharge of their official duties. 18. The factual position as it exists is open to be controverted by producing any contrary record or evidence which is still allowable during trial. Therefore, by declining exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, the petitioners shall not be precluded from raising the issue of sanction (protection under Section 197(2) CrPC) at any stage of the proceedings/trial on the strength of evidence if any produced in support thereof. Therefore, by declining exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, the petitioners shall not be precluded from raising the issue of sanction (protection under Section 197(2) CrPC) at any stage of the proceedings/trial on the strength of evidence if any produced in support thereof. Learned PP has rightly placed reliance on the judgment rendered in the case of Chandan Kumar Basu v. State of Bihar, (2014) 13 SCC 70 . Paragraph 11 of the judgment is advantageous to be quoted: “11. The above discussion will now require the Court to consider the question as to whether the acts giving rise to the alleged offences had been committed by the accused in the actual or purported discharge of his official duties. In a series of pronouncements commencing with K. Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab; Harihar Prasad v. State of Bihar and Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab it has been consistently held that it can be no part of the duty of a public servant or acting in the discharge of his official duties to commit any of the offences covered by Sections 406, 409, 420, etc. and the official status of the public servant can, at best, only provide an opportunity for commission of the offences. Therefore, no sanction for prosecution of the public servant for such offences would be required under Section 197 of the Code. Notwithstanding the above, the High Court had granted liberty to the appellant to raise the issue of sanction, if so required, depending on the evidence that may come on record in the course of the trial. Despite the view taken by this Court in the series of pronouncements referred to above, the opportunity that has been provided by the High Court to the benefit of the appellant need not be foreclosed by us inasmuch as in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim and Parkash Singh Badal this Court had consistently held that the question of sanction under Section 197 of the Code can be raised at any time after cognizance had been taken and may have to be determined at different stages of the proceeding/trial. The observations of this Court in this regard may be usefully extracted below: 11.1. Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari [ AIR 1956 SC 44 ] (AIR p. 50, para 20) “20. The observations of this Court in this regard may be usefully extracted below: 11.1. Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari [ AIR 1956 SC 44 ] (AIR p. 50, para 20) “20. … The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty; but facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case.” 11.2. P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim [ (2001) 6 SCC 704 ] (SCC pp.712-13, para 15) “15. ..... It is well settled that question of sanction under Section 197 of the Code can be raised any time after the cognizance; may be immediately after cognizance or framing of charge or even at the time of conclusion of trial and after conviction as well. But there may be certain cases where it may not be possible to decide the question effectively without giving opportunity to the defence to establish that what he did was in discharge of official duty. In order to come to the conclusion whether claim of the accused that the act that he did was in course of the performance of his duty was reasonable one and neither pretended nor fanciful, can be examined during the course of trial by giving opportunity to the defence to establish it. In such an eventuality, the question of sanction should be left open to be decided in the main judgment which may be delivered upon conclusion of the trial.” 11.3. Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab [ (2007) 1 SCC 1 ] (SCC p. 32, para 38) “38. The question relating to the need of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein. This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage.” 19. This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage.” 19. In the final analysis for the reasons, facts and the law as stated hereinabove, at this stage, no case for quashing the FIR/proceedings pending before the learned Magistrate is made out. The observations made hereinabove, shall remain confined only to the disposal of this petition. The learned Magistrate shall proceed in the matter on the basis of materials and evidences in accordance with law. 20. Petition being without merit is dismissed. 21. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for information.