Sangeetha N. R. v. Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau
2018-04-09
K.ABRAHAM MATHEW
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : Petitions filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 2. The petitioners in Crl.M.C.No.896 of 2018 and 3680 of 2017 are father and daughter respectively. They are accused 3 and 4 in FIR VC 21/2015 MPM of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Kozhikode. In the FIR they are alleged to have committed the offence under Sections 120B and 409 IPC and under Section 13 (1)(e) and (d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In this order the petitioners are referred to as accused. 3. In 2012 the 4th accused was a 6th semester B.Tech. student in Nehru College of Engineering, Pampadi. Her batch consisted of 128 students. The semester examination was held in December 2012. The students were split into two batches for practical examination. One batch consisted of 60 students and the other 68 students. For the first batch, the examination was conducted by one Sri. Kiran Samuel and for the second batch, by one Dr. Binu. When the results were published, in the first batch only two students failed, whereas in the second batch 27 students including the 4th accused failed. 24 students of the second batch were given the minimum pass mark of 40. On the date on which the results were published, the students who failed in the practical examination sent an e-mail to the University requesting it to conduct a detailed enquiry and to order re-examination. The University did not take any action. So on 7.4.2012, on behalf of 26 students a complaint was submitted before the University. The Vice Chancellor, who is the first accused, sent it to the 'Pareeksha Bhavan', which received it on 9.4.2012. One Assistant Registrar made a suggestion to obtain remarks of the chairperson of the Board of Examinations. The chairperson obtained the remarks of the external examiner Dr. Binu. No attempt was made to obtain the remarks of the internal examiner of the college. Remarks of the external examiner of the other batch, Sri. Kiran Samuel, also were obtained. The chairperson sent it to the University on 15.6.2012. Ignoring the report submitted by Sri. Kiran Samuel, the chairperson recommended not to conduct any re-examination. He took almost two months for submitting his report. As there was delay in submitting the report, the then Controller of Examinations, Dr.
Kiran Samuel, also were obtained. The chairperson sent it to the University on 15.6.2012. Ignoring the report submitted by Sri. Kiran Samuel, the chairperson recommended not to conduct any re-examination. He took almost two months for submitting his report. As there was delay in submitting the report, the then Controller of Examinations, Dr. C.D. Sebastian, requested the System Administrator to conduct a comparative study of the marks scored by the students of both batches. This was complied with. It was revealed that the students of the second batch were 'not inferior to those of the first batch'. In the theory paper the students of both batches scored almost similar marks. The Controller of Examinations submitted the file to the Pro-Vice Chancellor. On 18.6.2012 the Pro-Vice Chancellor recommended to place the matter before the Standing Committee on Examinations. The matter was not placed before the Committee at its two subsequent meetings held in the next two months. Aggrieved by the decision taken by the Standing Committee on Examinations, the students made another representation to the Vice Chancellor on 6.8.2012, who forwarded it to the Pro-Vice Chancellor, who in his turn, examined the representation and recommended to conduct re-examination for the students who failed in the practical examination. The Vice Chancellor directed the Pro-Vice Chancellor to submit a panel of examiners, which was done. The file was sent to the 'Pareeksha Bhavan'. As there occurred much delay in conducting the examination, the 4th accused filed W.P(C) No. 20451 of 2012. The University submitted in the High Court that the re-examination would be conducted within ten days, as seen from Annexure-6 judgment. The re-examination was held on 7.9.2012. 26 students took the examination. The result was not approved by the chairperson of the Board of Examiners as the re-examination was conducted against her recommendations. In W.P.(C) No.24991 of 2012 filed by one student by name Sreejith, this court directed the University to publish the result and issue mark lists. On 22.9.2012 the University published the result. Out of the 26 students who took the re-examination 24 students passed. The average mark was 64%. The 4th accused scored 72%. The second respondent filed Annexure-8 complaint before the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thrissur alleging corruption in deciding to conduct the re-examination. The court ordered a preliminary enquiry and directed registration of case if the enquiry disclosed commission of any offence.
The average mark was 64%. The 4th accused scored 72%. The second respondent filed Annexure-8 complaint before the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thrissur alleging corruption in deciding to conduct the re-examination. The court ordered a preliminary enquiry and directed registration of case if the enquiry disclosed commission of any offence. The Vice Chancellor and the Pro-Vice Chancellor were the first and second accused respectively. In W.P.(C) No.31792 of 2013 filed by the first and second accused this court observed that the direction to register a case and to investigate into the allegation was not proper. Annexure-10 is a copy of the judgment. After receiving the report of the enquiry the Special Judge passed Annexure-11 order directing registration of case and investigation into the allegations. He observed that there was nepotism and favoritism in ordering the re-examination and it is an act of dishonesty and the accused public servants abused their official position. Thereupon, Annexure-13 FIR under challenge was registered for the offences under Sections 120B and 409 IPC and Section 13(1)(c) and (d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Thereupon, the Vice Chancellor ordered cancellation of the re-examination. In W.P(C) No. 22120 of 2015 filed by the 4th accused this court passed Annexure-15 order. The decision to cancel the re-examination was set aside by this court by Annexure-17 judgment in W.P.(C) No. 22120 of 2015. In May 2016 the investigating officer filed a report before the Special Judge informing him that the facts of the case did not disclose commission of any offence under the P.C. Act and that further action was dropped. Annexure-18 is a copy of the report. Immediately, the second respondent/ complainant filed an application to direct further investigation. By Annexure-20 order the learned Special Judge allowed it. He took the view that the allegations are sufficient to attract the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act and the offence of forgery. In the order the learned Special Judge has made adverse comments about the standing counsel for the University who appeared in the Writ Petitions referred to above. The facts of the case do not attract any offence under the P.C. Act or any other penal statute. On these allegations, in Crl. M.C No. 3680 of 2017 the 4th accused prays for setting aside Annexure-20 order.
The facts of the case do not attract any offence under the P.C. Act or any other penal statute. On these allegations, in Crl. M.C No. 3680 of 2017 the 4th accused prays for setting aside Annexure-20 order. Same is the relief prayed for in Crl.M.C.No.896 of 2018 filed by the third accused. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the second respondent and the learned Public Prosecutor. 5. The University had first taken a decision not to conduct reexamination. But, later, after the third accused was posted as Personal Assistant to the second accused Pro-Vice Chancellor, the decision was changed. It is alleged that there were many irregularities and illegalities in taking the decision. The learned Special Judge has taken the view that the decision to conduct re-examination was illegal and invalid. According to him, the authority to take the decision was the Academic Council of the University and not the Vice Chancellor or the Pro-Vice Chancellor, and the order to conduct re-examination was passed only to help the 4th accused. 6. In the report filed by the Dy.S.P, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, Malappuram on 16.12.2013 the following irregularities were noted. “1. The matter of conducting a re-examination was once considered by the concerned Chair Person of the Board of Examiners in detail and she recommended to not to conduct the re-examination. 2. The re-examination was not recommended by the Controller of the Examination. 3. The matter was referred to the Syndicate Standing Committee and the committee rejected the request of the students and recommended to not to conduct the reexamination. 4. Both Vice Chancellor and Pro-Vice Chancellor approved the recommendation of the Syndicate Standing Committee to not conduct the re-examination on 31.07.12. 5. Vice Chancellor directed Pro-Vice Chancellor to examine the new petition of the students on 08.08.2012, then Pro-Vice Chancellor recommended for re-examination on 09.08.2012, Vice Chancellor again directed Pro-Vice Chancellor to furnish the panel of examiners on 09.08.2012 itself and again Pro-Vice Chancellor submitted the Panel of Examiners to Vice Chancellor on 09.08.2012 itself.” (sic) 7. It was on the basis of a representation purported to have been made by about 23 students the decision to conduct re-examination was taken. The enquiry revealed that the representation was drafted by the third respondent and the students who allegedly put their signatures in it did not sign them, the report said. 8.
It was on the basis of a representation purported to have been made by about 23 students the decision to conduct re-examination was taken. The enquiry revealed that the representation was drafted by the third respondent and the students who allegedly put their signatures in it did not sign them, the report said. 8. The primary question that requires consideration is whether the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is attracted if all the irregularities and illegalities allegedly committed by accused 1 to 3 are considered true. 9.
8. The primary question that requires consideration is whether the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is attracted if all the irregularities and illegalities allegedly committed by accused 1 to 3 are considered true. 9. Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 runs as follows: Criminal misconduct by a public servant-(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct- (a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person any gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7; or (b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person, any valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate from any person whom he knows to have been, or to be, or to be likely to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by him, or having any connection with the official functions of himself or of any public servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related to the person so concerned; or (c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do; or (d) if he,- (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or (e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income.
(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than four years but which may extent to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. 10. The common expression appearing in the three Sub Clauses in Clause(d) in Section 13(1) is 'obtains for himself or for any other person any in valuable thing or pecuniary advantage'. Nobody has a case that any of the accused including the petitioners or anyone else obtained any pecuniary advantage by ordering re-examination. What remains to be considered is whether any of them obtained any valuable thing. 11. Relying on the definition of 'thing' given in Black's Law Dictionary and on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Abhyanand vs. State of Bihar, ( AIR 1961 SC 1698 ), Ishwarlal Girdharilal Parekh v. State of Maharashtra and others (AIR 1969 Supreme Court 40) and Nrisingha Murari Chakraborty and others v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1977 SC 1174 ) the learned Special Judge held that an admit card which entitles a person to take an examination is a valuable thing. 12. Black's Law Dictionary defines 'thing' as 'subject matter of a right, whether it is the material object or not; any subject matter of ownership within the sphere of proprietary or valuable right'. 13. In Abhyanand vs. State of Bihar ( AIR 1961 SC 1698 ) the accused was prosecuted for the offence u/s.420 r/w Section 511 IPC. On the basis of forged documents he applied for permission to appear at M.A examination of a University in Bihar. Before the admit card was sent to the school in which he allegedly was working as a teacher the university received a report that he had not passed B.A degree and he was not working as a teacher in that school. The defence was that Section 415 IPC was not attracted in as much as the admit card was not a property. The Supreme Court held: “The admission card as such has no pecuniary value, but it has immense value to the candidate for the examination. Without it he cannot secure admission to the examination hall and consequently cannot appear at the Examination”. In Ishwarlal Girdharilal Parekh's case ( AIR 1969 SC 40 ) the prosecution of the accused was for the offence u/s.420 IPC.
Without it he cannot secure admission to the examination hall and consequently cannot appear at the Examination”. In Ishwarlal Girdharilal Parekh's case ( AIR 1969 SC 40 ) the prosecution of the accused was for the offence u/s.420 IPC. One company was an assessee under the Income Tax Act. The allegation was that the accused, some of whom were officers of the Income Tax Department, entered into a conspiracy to cheat the Income Tax authorities in respect of income tax assessment of the company, which led to issuance of assessment orders by the department. A contention was raised that the assessment order is not a property covered by S.420 IPC. The Supreme Court held that it is a property covered by the said Section of the Penal Code. It observed: “In our view the word property occurring in S.420 IPC does not necessarily mean that the thing of which a delivery is dishonestly desired by the person who cheats, must have a money value or a market value, in the hand of the person cheated. Even if the thing has no money value, in the hand of the person cheated, but becomes a thing of value, in the hand of the person, who may get possession of it, as a result of the cheating practised by him, it would still fall within the connotation of the term property in S.420 IPC.” The decision in Nrisingha Murairi Chakraborty's case (AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1174) was rendered by a three judge bench. The question that arose for consideration was whether a passport is a property covered by Sections 415 and 420 IPC. The three judge bench approved the earlier decisions of the court in Commissioner Excess Profits Tax vs. Rayaloo Iyer (AIR 1961 SC 698) and Ishwarlal Girdharilal Parekh v. State of Maharashtra and others case ( AIR 1969 SC 40 ). The court held: “So as passport was a tangible thing, and was a useful document and could be the subject of ownership or exclusive possession, it was property within the meaning of Ss.415 and 420 IPC.” 14. The word the meaning of which was examined in the above three decisions of the Supreme Court was 'property' and not 'valuable thing'. It is also pertinent to note that the same word used in different statutes may have different connotation. 15.
The word the meaning of which was examined in the above three decisions of the Supreme Court was 'property' and not 'valuable thing'. It is also pertinent to note that the same word used in different statutes may have different connotation. 15. 'Valuable thing' has not been defined in the Prevention of Corruption Act. Should the 'thing' have money value or market value to call it a 'valuable thing'. What is the intention of the legislature. The words 'valuable thing' appear in Clause (b) in Sub Section 1 in Section 13 also. The first part of the Clause runs thus: 'valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate'. This helps in ascertaining the intention of the legislature. The expression 'valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate' definitely indicates that it is a thing which should have money value or market value. 16. It may also be noted that the order to conduct reexamination did not result in the university's issuing admit card (hall ticket) to the 4th accused (petitioner in Crl. M.C.No.3680 of 2017). She had already been issued it long ago. The right she got was only the right to appear at the re-examination. 17. Even if it is assumed that the 4th accused was given a document to enable her to appear at the reexamination, it cannot be held that it was a valuable thing. I disagree with the learned Special Judge that the facts of the case attract Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 18. Since Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not attracted, the learned Special Judge was wrong in ordering further investigation. If the facts of the case do not disclose commission of any offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, an investigation cannot be conducted into any offence allegedly committed under the Indian Penal Code also. The learned Special Judge should have accepted the closure report filed by the investigating officer. 19. The adverse comments made by the learned Special Judge about the Standing Counsel for the University who appeared in the Writ Petitions referred to above are unwarranted. In the result, these Crl.M.Cs are allowed. The order passed by the court below directing further investigation is set aside.