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2018 DIGILAW 323 (GAU)

Kamal Malla Bujarbaruah S/o Lt. A. M Bujarbaruah v. State of Assam and Ors. Rep. by the Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Dispur, Guwahati

2018-02-21

SUMAN SHYAM

body2018
JUDGMENT AND ORDER : SUMAN SHYAM, J. Heard P.N Goswami, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner. I have also heard Mr. K.N Choudhury, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 11 to 14 and Mr. T.J Mahanta, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent no. 3. Mr. D. Nath, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, Assam, has appeared for the respondent nos. 1 and 2 whereas Mr. S.K Goswami, learned counsel has appeared for the respondent no. 7. None appears for the other respondents. 2. The writ petitioner is presently serving a second term in the office of Vice-Chancellor of the Assam Agricultural University (hereinafter referred to as ‘the University’). The petitioner was initially appointed as the Vice Chancellor of the University by notification dated 06/12/2008 for a period of five years. Since the term of the petitioner was coming to an end, the respondent authorities had issued a fresh advertisement on 27/05/2014 for appointment of a new Vice-Chancellor for the University. Responding to the said advertisement, the writ petitioner here-in had also applied for the post and on conclusion of the selection process, the petitioner was again selected for appointment as Vice Chancellor of the University for a second term. Accordingly, vide Government notification dated 01/08/2014, the petitioner was appointed as the Vice Chancellor of the University for a period of another five years. 3. It appears that on 29/12/2014, the respondent nos. 4 to 10 had submitted a written complaint before the Hon'ble Governor of Assam, who is also the Chancellor of the University, making certain allegations against the writ petitioner. The petitioner was thereafter, summoned by the Chancellor of the University for holding a discussion on the issues raised in the complaint. On 07-03-2015, the petitioner had submitted a written reply clarifying his stand in the matter. Not being satisfied with such reply, the Deputy Secretary to the Governor, Assam had issued the notification dated 18/04/2015 under Section 8 of the Assam Agricultural University Act, 1968 (as amended up-to-date), constituting a 3 (three) member Enquiry Committee so as to enquire into the allegations brought against the petitioner by the complaint dated 29/12/2014. Aggrieved by the notification dated 18/04/2015, the petitioner has approached this court assailing the legality and validity of the said notification. 4. By referring to the pleadings contained in the writ petition, Mr. Aggrieved by the notification dated 18/04/2015, the petitioner has approached this court assailing the legality and validity of the said notification. 4. By referring to the pleadings contained in the writ petition, Mr. P.N Goswami submits that the complaint dated 29/12/2014, which forms the basis of the impugned notification, has been engineered by the rivals of the petitioner i.e the respondent nos. 11 to 14 who had on an earlier occasion also submitted a similar complaint before the Chancellor on 23/11/2013, making certain frivolous allegations against the writ petitioner. The said complaint was enquired into by the Board of Management (Board) of the University, where-after, it was found that the allegations were all baseless. According to Mr. Goswami, having failed to achieve the desired result which was to remove the petitioner from the post of Vice-Chancellor, the respondent Nos 11 to 14 had set up the respondent No 4 to 10 to submit a fresh complaint on 29/12/2014 making a second attempt to cause injury to the petitioner out of professional rivalry. It is also the submission of the learned counsel that the complaint did not furnish the proper identity of the respondent nos 4 to 10 and that the complainants are in no way connected with the university. Under the circumstances, according to Mr. Goswami, the Chancellor ought not to have acted on the basis of such an anonymous complaint without arriving at a satisfaction regarding the bonafide of the complainants. 5. Mr. Goswami has further argued that the power under Section 8 of the Act of 1968 can be invoked only when there is an extraordinary circumstance and that too only for the purposes mentioned in the said provision. But in the present case, according to the learned counsel, the said power has been invoked in a routine manner so as to conduct a disciplinary enquiry against the writ petitioner which, according to Mr. Goswami, is impermissible under the Act. Mr. Goswami, further submits that since no notice, as contemplated under Section 8(2) of the Act of 1968, had ever been served upon the University nor has the University been provided with an opportunity to submit its reply through an appointed representative, the notification dated 18/04/2015 is un-sustainable in the eye of law on such count alone. 6. Mr. K.N Choudhury, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent nos. 6. Mr. K.N Choudhury, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent nos. 11 to 14, on the other hand, has argued that regardless of the provision mentioned in the notification, power in this case has been exercised by the Chancellor under subsection 6 of section 8 which does not require service of prior notice upon the University. Referring to the non-obstante clause in section 8(6), the Learned Senior Counsel submits that the said provision confers swiping powers upon the Chancellor to make an inquiry into the affairs of the University at any time and take all such remedial measures as may be necessary in the interest of the University. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pournami Oil Mills v. State of kerela, reported in 1986 Supp SCC 728 Mr. Choudhury submits that where the authority making the order has the power conferred under the statute, even if an order is made without indicating the correct provision, the order would be deemed to have been made under the enabling provision of the statute. 7. While denying any covert role of his clients in the matter, Mr. Choudhury has further argued that the reply submitted by the petitioner has been duly considered by the Chancellor before constituting the three Member Enquiry Committee and as such, there has been sufficient compliance of the principles of natural justice in this case. According to Mr. Choudhury, the satisfaction of the Chancellor in a case of this nature is subjective satisfaction and as long as the same is based on objective materials, the writ Court would not interfere with exercise of such discretionary power of the Chancellor conferred under the statute. In support of his arguments, the learned Senior counsel has also relied upon another decision of the Supreme Court in Income Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M.K Mohammed Kunhi reported in AIR 1969 SC 430 . 8. Mr. D. Nath, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, Assam has produced the records and submitted that the purpose of constituting the Enquiry Committee is to carry out a fact finding exercise so as to ascertain the truthfulness of the allegations and not to take any disciplinary action against the writ petitioner. Since, the Chancellor was not satisfied with the reply submitted by the writ petitioner on 07/03/2015 a decision was taken to constitute an Enquiry Committee vide notification dated 18/04/2015. 9. Mr. Since, the Chancellor was not satisfied with the reply submitted by the writ petitioner on 07/03/2015 a decision was taken to constitute an Enquiry Committee vide notification dated 18/04/2015. 9. Mr. T.J Mahanta, learned senior counsel appearing for the University i.e the respondent no. 3 submits that the allegations brought against the writ petitioner are totally baseless and is nothing but an attempt to malign the reputation of the petitioner by his rivals. Since the University was never given an opportunity to clarify the issues in terms of sub-section 2 of Section 8 of the Act of 1968, the correct facts could not be placed before the Chancellor. 10. Mr. S.K Goswami, learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 7 has adopted the arguments advanced by the learned senior counsel for respondent nos. 11 to 14. 11. I have bestowed my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have also meticulously gone through the materials available on record. 12. Section 17 of the Act provides the list of Officers of the University which includes the Chancellor at the top and just below him, the Vice-Chancellor. 13. As per 18 the Governor of the State of Assam, shall by virtue of his office, be the Chancellor of the University. Sub-section 2 of Section 18 provides that the Chancellor shall be the head of the University. As per subsection 4 of section 18, the Chancellor is required to exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be conferred or imposed on him by the Act or the Statute. 14. Section 9 contains the list of Authorities of the University which includes the Board of Management (Board) and the Academic Council. Section 11 of the Act lays downs the powers and duty of the Board which includes the power to review and consider the financial requirements and estimates for the University and approve its budget. The Board is also entrusted with the responsibility to provide for administration of any fund placed at the disposal of the University for the purpose intended. 15. As per section 19 of the Act, the Vice-Chancellor shall be a whole time officer of the University. By virtue of the authority conferred under section 20 the Vice-Chancellor is the Principal Executive and Academic Officer of the University and is also the ex-officio Chairman of the Board and the Academic Council. 15. As per section 19 of the Act, the Vice-Chancellor shall be a whole time officer of the University. By virtue of the authority conferred under section 20 the Vice-Chancellor is the Principal Executive and Academic Officer of the University and is also the ex-officio Chairman of the Board and the Academic Council. The Vice-Chancellor is also responsible for presentation of the annual financial estimate, annual accounts and the balance sheets to the Board. 16. Since the validity of the notification dated 18/04/2015 constituting the three member Enquiry Committee is under challenge in this writ petition it would be necessary to reproduce section 8 of the Act of 1968 here-in below for ready reference:— “8. Inspection and inquiry. - (1) The Chancellor shall have the right under extraordinary circumstances to cause an inspection to be made by such person as he may direct, of the University, its buildings, laboratories, libraries, farms, museums, workshops and equipments and any institutions, college or hostel maintained or administered by the University, of the teaching and other work conducted by the University or under its auspices and of the conduct or any other functions including all matters connected with the administration and finances of the University. (2) The Chancellor shall in every case give due notice to the University of his intention to cause an inspection or inquiry to be made, and the University shall be entitled to appoint a representative who shall have the right to be present and be heard at such inspection or inquiry. (3) The Chancellor shall communicate to the University the views of the State Government with reference to the result of such inspection or inquiry, and may after ascertaining the opinion thereon of the University advise the University upon the action to be taken and fix a time limit for taking such action. (4) The University shall, within the time limit so fixed, report to the Chancellor, the action which has been taken or proposed to be taken on the advice so rendered. (5) The Chancellor may, where action has not been taken by the University to the satisfaction of the Chancellor within the time limit fixed, and after considering any explanation furnished or representation made by the University, issue such directions as the Chancellor may think fit and the University shall comply with such direction. (5) The Chancellor may, where action has not been taken by the University to the satisfaction of the Chancellor within the time limit fixed, and after considering any explanation furnished or representation made by the University, issue such directions as the Chancellor may think fit and the University shall comply with such direction. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding subsections of this section, if at any time the Chancellor is of opinion that in any manner the affairs of the University are not managed in furtherance of the objects of the University, or in accordance with the provisions of this Act, or the statutory regulations or the special measures desirable to maintain the standards of the University, teaching, examinations or research extensions, he may indicate to the University any matter in reward to which he desires an explanation, and call upon the University to offer such explanations within such time as may be specified by the Chancellor. If the University fails to offer any explanations within the time specified or offers an explanation which in the opinion of the Chancellor is not satisfactory he may issue such instructions as appeared to him to be necessary and desirable in the circumstances of the case, and may exercise such powers as may be necessary for giving effect to these instructions. (7) The University shall furnish such information relating to the administration of the University as the Chancellor may require.” 17. A plain reading of section 8(1) of the Act of 1968 makes it apparent that the said provision confers a right upon the Chancellor to cause an inspection or inquiry to be made by such person as he may direct, concerning the University, its building, laboratories, libraries, farms, college or hostel or any other matter referred to in the said sub-section including all matters connected with the administration and finances of the University. The use of the expression “under extra-ordinary circumstances” in sub-section 1 makes it clear that the power under the said provision is required to be exercised by the chancellor only under special circumstances and not in a routine manner. 18. Subsection 2 of section 8 provides that the Chancellor would be required to give a notice to the University intimating about his intention to cause an inspection or inquiry and the University would be entitled to appoint a representative to present its case before the inspection or inquiry. 18. Subsection 2 of section 8 provides that the Chancellor would be required to give a notice to the University intimating about his intention to cause an inspection or inquiry and the University would be entitled to appoint a representative to present its case before the inspection or inquiry. 19. Subsection 6 of section 8 confers power upon the Chancellor to call for an explanation from the University if at any time he is of the opinion that the affairs of the University is not being managed in furtherance of the object of the University or the provisions of the Act or the statutory regulations or the desirable special measures to maintain the standards of teaching, examination or research extensions. The non obstante clause in subsection 6 of section 8 makes it clear that the said provision would have an over-riding effect over the preceding sub-sections of section 8. 20. From a conjoint reading of sections 8(1) and 8(6) it is apparent that while sub-section 1 deals with the right of the Chancellor to cause an inquiry or inspection in relation to any of the matters indicated in the said provision under extra-ordinary circumstances, sub-section 6 deals with his power to issues instruction regarding any matter including those that relate to the conduct of the affairs of the University if he is of the opinion that such affairs are not being conducted in furtherance of the object of the University. The power under section 8(6) is independent of that conferred under section 8(1) of the Act. Having regard to the language employed in subsection 6 of section 8, this court is of the considered opinion that the power of the Chancellor under section 8(6) is plenary and residuary in nature and therefore, would confer authority upon the Chancellor to seek an explanation from the University as regards any matter relating to conduct of the affairs of the University. 21. Having held as above, what must also be noted that section 8(2) casts an obligation upon the Chancellor to give due notice to the University of his intention to cause an inspection or inquiry under section 8(1). Likewise, section 8(6) also provides that before initiating any action under the said provision, the Chancellor is required to call upon the University to offer an explanation within such time as may be specified by him for the purpose. Likewise, section 8(6) also provides that before initiating any action under the said provision, the Chancellor is required to call upon the University to offer an explanation within such time as may be specified by him for the purpose. It is only on failure on the part of the University to offer an explanation or when the explanation so offered is found to un-satisfactory that the Chancellor may issue instructions as may appear to him to be necessary and desirable in the circumstances of the case. 22. In the present case, it is not in dispute that no notice, as contemplated under sections 8(1) had been issued to the University by the Chancellor nor any explanation as per section 8(6) had been called for by him from the University. Although Mr. Choudhury has forcefully argued that furninshing a copy of the complaint dated 29/12/2014 to the Vice-Chancellor and his reply dated 07/03/2015 would amount to substantial compliance with the requirement of sections 8(2) and 8(6), I am afraid, such an argument, if accepted, would negate the very scheme of section 8 of the Act. 23. Section 8 requires the Chancellor to issue notice and/or call for explanation from the University. “University” is a defined expression under section 2(22) of the Act. As per section 3, the University is a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal and can sue and be sued by the said name. The “Authorities of the University” have also been defined under section 9 which includes the Board of Management and the Academic Council but does not include the Vice-Chancellor. Therefore, a notice to the University, for the purpose section 8 of the Act of 1968, would mean notice issued by the Chancellor to any of the designated authorities of the University and not to any other person. 24. Therefore, a notice to the University, for the purpose section 8 of the Act of 1968, would mean notice issued by the Chancellor to any of the designated authorities of the University and not to any other person. 24. As apparent from the record, what has happened in the present case is that a copy of the complaint dated 29/12/2014 had been submitted by the respondent No. 11 through a forwarding letter dated 28/02/2015 addressed to the Private Secretary to the Vice-Chancellor mentioning that the same was being forwarded for consideration of the Vice-Chancellor “as per verbal instruction of His Excellency the Governor of Assam and Chancellor, Assam Agricultural University in the discussion held on 24/02/2015 at Raj Bhavan, Guwahati-781001.” But no communication from the Chancellor to the University on the issue is available on record. 25. It is no doubt correct that on 07/03/2015, the writ petitioner had submitted his reply before the Chancellor but from a reading of the letter dated 07/03/2015, I find that responding to the complaint, the writ petitioner had forwarding his comments as to the manner in which a particular contract work had been awarded by the University authority. The said action on the part of the writ petitioner appears to have been taken in his personal capacity, more with the intention of exposing his detractors by appraising the Chancellor about the true state of affairs rather than furnishing any explanation to the allegations contained in the complaint dated 29/12/2014. An explanation can be furnished if and when the same is called for by a superior authority and the same cannot be equated with any comment voluntarily offered by an individual responding to certain allegations brought against him. Therefore, in the opinion of this court, neither can the letter dated 28/02/205 submitted by the respondent No. 11 be treated as notice under section 8(2) nor can the reply of the writ petitioner submitted on 07/03/2015 be treated as an explanation offered by the University within the meaning of subsection 6 of section 8. 26. It is a well established principle of law that when a statute prescribes the manner in which power has to exercised, the power must be exercised in that manner alone and in no other manner. [see J.N Ganatra v. Morvi Municipalty (1996) 9 SCC 495 ]. 26. It is a well established principle of law that when a statute prescribes the manner in which power has to exercised, the power must be exercised in that manner alone and in no other manner. [see J.N Ganatra v. Morvi Municipalty (1996) 9 SCC 495 ]. The use of expressions such as “Shall in every case give due notice to the University” in section 8(2) would make it mandatory for the Chancellor to give notice to the University informing about his intentions to conduct an inspection or inquiry before any action is initiated under section 8(1). Similarly, fulfilment of the condition precedent, as contained in the proviso to section 8(6) would be essential before an instruction under the said provision can be issued. Since the statute expressly prescribes service of notice under section 8(2) and/or giving an opportunity to offer an explanation under section 8(6), specifying a particular manner of doing so, the said requirements have to be treated as absolute and any deviation in respect thereof, would, in the opinion of this court, invalidate all consequential actions taken thereunder. 27. There is no wrangle at the bar that the Act of 1968 does not contain any provision for initiation of disciplinary proceeding against the Vice-Chancellor on the ground of misconduct or on any other ground. However, the impugned notification constituting the Enquiry Committee makes it clear that the same has been constituted to enquire into the allegations brought against the writ petitioner by the complaint dated 29/12/2014. Save an except referring to the complaint dated 29/12/2014, there is no mention in the said notification as to the nature of allegations that would be enquired into by the Enquiry Committee. 28. A careful scrutiny of the complaint dated 29/12/2014 goes to show that the same contains certain vague allegations, based on omnibus assertions, which are completely bereft of material facts and particulars. 29. It is the fundamental rule of audi alteram partem that a person against whom an enquiry is being sought to be conducted must be informed about the charges giving him an opportunity of submitting an explanation thereto. He is also entitled to know the evidence by which the allegations are proposed to be established against him. 29. It is the fundamental rule of audi alteram partem that a person against whom an enquiry is being sought to be conducted must be informed about the charges giving him an opportunity of submitting an explanation thereto. He is also entitled to know the evidence by which the allegations are proposed to be established against him. But in the present case, not to speak of any evidence in support of the allegations, the complaint dated 29/12/2014 does not even disclose the material facts making out a case for conducting an Enquiry against the writ petitioner. Not only that, save and except the respondent No. 7 there is nothing on record to establish the identity of the remaining complainants. That apart, I do not find anything on record to show that the writ petitioner was ever made known about the charges he is being made to face. The above issue assumes great significance in the factual back drop of this case where a similar complaint earlier brought against the writ petitioner at the instance of his rivals i.e the respondent nos. 11 to 14 was found to be baseless by the Chancellor after conducting a domestic enquiry in the matter through the Board. It would be significant to note here-in that although notices were issued in this proceeding upon the respondent Nos. 4 to 10(complainants) yet, save and except the respondent No 7, none of the other complainants have appeared in this case. Moreover, it is also the admitted position of fact that the copy of the complaint was served upon the writ petitioner by the respondent no. 11 against whom malafide has been alleged. 30. Even assuming that an enquiry in the matter was permissible under section 8(2) or 8(6) of the Act of 1968, even then this court is of the view that the writ petitioner cannot be made to face an enquiry based on such vague and amorphous personal allegations, more so, when there is considerable doubt over bonafide of action initiated by the complainants. Therefore, viewed from this angle also, the impugned notification dated 18/04/2015 is found to be not in order. 31. For the reasons stated here-in-above, this court is of the un-hesitant opinion that the notification dated 18/04/2015 is unsustainable in law and the same is accordingly set aside. 32. This writ petition stands allowed. 33. Therefore, viewed from this angle also, the impugned notification dated 18/04/2015 is found to be not in order. 31. For the reasons stated here-in-above, this court is of the un-hesitant opinion that the notification dated 18/04/2015 is unsustainable in law and the same is accordingly set aside. 32. This writ petition stands allowed. 33. The respondent authorities would, however, be at liberty to proceed in the matter afresh, in accordance with law, if so advised. 34. The records be returned back forthwith. 35. There would be no order as to cost.