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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 323 (MP)

Union of India v. State of M. P.

2018-03-16

ANAND PATHAK

body2018
ORDER 1. Writ Petition No. 5794/2013 and 6619/2013 were heard on same date and kept reserved for orders. After keeping those writ petitions reserved, on a later date, Writ Petition No. 238/2014 was also heard and looking to similar nature of controversy, all the petitions are decided by a common order, just to avoid the repetition and to preserve the resources. 2. Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 6619/2013 (respondent No. 2 in Writ Petition No. 5794/2013) is seeking relief in the form of direction to respondents No.1 to 4 to make payment of compensation to the petitioner along with penal interest. 3. Facts of Writ Petition No. 5794/2013 are taken into consideration initially. Thereafter, facts of Writ Petition No. 238/2014 are taken separately in succeeding paragraphs. 4. The present petition has been preferred by the petitioners/ Union of India being crestfallen by the order dated 30th July, 2013 (Annexure P-1) passed by the Collector and District Magistrate, Gwalior whereby as per the allegations, respondent No. 1 proceeded with the order without noticing the petitioners and without giving any opportunity of hearing and the amount of Rs. 4,60,00,000/- has been awarded as compensation to respondent No. 2 and petitioners have been directed to make payment of the said amount to respondent No. 2 within fifteen days from the date of award with default stipulation. 5. Precisely stated facts of the case as narrated in the pleadings are that respondent No. 2 owns a plot ad measuring 6000 sq. ft. situate at survey No. 474 min. at village Mahalgaon, Gwalior which was purchased by her by registered sale deed dated 5.11.2007 against consideration of Rs.17,00,000/- only, vide annexure P-2. It is submitted that on the left side of the petitioners’ plot after the railway track, campus of petitioner No. 3/ Defence Research & Development Establishment, Gwalior (for short “DRDE”) is situated which is a unit under the control of petitioners No. 1 and 2. 6. It is submitted that on the left side of the petitioners’ plot after the railway track, campus of petitioner No. 3/ Defence Research & Development Establishment, Gwalior (for short “DRDE”) is situated which is a unit under the control of petitioners No. 1 and 2. 6. Respondent No. 2 applied to Municipal Corporation, Gwalior for construction of an eye hospital over the said plot which was refused on account of a notification dated 30.8.2005 issued under the provisions of section 3 of the Works of Defence Act, 1903 (for short “Defence Act”) by the Central Government whereby restrictions deemed necessary under Clause (c) of section 7 of the Defence Act upon the use and enjoyment of the said land comprised in the area lying within a distance approximately 200 mtrs. (218 yards) from the crest outer parapet of petitioner No. 3 was imposed. 7. It appears that respondent No. 2 filed a writ petition before this Court vide Writ Petition No. 3114/2012 seeking direction for the petitioners to grant NOC to respondent No. 2 herein. In the said petition, petitioners No. 1 to 3 were also impleaded as respondents. After completion of pleadings, petition was listed for hearing on 29.7.2013 and on that date, petition was withdrawn by respondent No. 3. It further appears that on 5.8.2013, petitioner No. 3 was served with the impugned order dated 30.7.2013 (Annexure P-1) whereby award of compensation to respondent No. 3 was passed with a direction to petitioners to make the payment of the said award to respondent No. 2. On examination, it was revealed that during pendency of Writ Petition No. 3114/2012, respondent No. 3 on 8.7.2013, filed an application before respondent No. 2/ Collector/ District Magistrate for award of compensation under the Defence Act and respondent No.1 without noticing petitioners and without giving any opportunity of hearing, passed the impugned order which according to petitioners is arbitrary and illegal. 8. According to counsel for the petitioners, Union of India issued a notification on 30th August, 2005 in SOR No.105 while using the power conferred under section 3 of the Defence Act to impose restrictions specified in Clause (c) of section 7 of the Defence Act, therefore, on account of aforesaid provision, restriction was imposed. 8. According to counsel for the petitioners, Union of India issued a notification on 30th August, 2005 in SOR No.105 while using the power conferred under section 3 of the Defence Act to impose restrictions specified in Clause (c) of section 7 of the Defence Act, therefore, on account of aforesaid provision, restriction was imposed. Respondent No. 2 was deprived of using the aforesaid land and if the restrictions have been imposed then it is the duty of the Collector to cause the land to be marked out and measured and shall also prepare a register and detail plan which shall be on scale not smaller than 6 inch to the mile showing accurately building, tree and other obstructions as per section 9 of the Defence Act. Period of limitation is also prescribed in the said provision. 9. As per the provisions of section 9 of the Defence Act, it is the duty of the Collector to issue notice to the persons interested within the period prescribed in the Defence Act which according to counsel for the petitioners is maximum 3 years. After the said period, provisions of section 12 of the Defence Act comes into play which deals in respect of inquiry and award by the Collector. The Collector has to inquire into the objections further, in which any person interested has filed response to the notice given under section 9 of the Defence Act and thereafter on the basis of measurement made under section 8 of the Defence Act, Collector may pass the award or grant compensation subject to satisfaction of the provisions of sections 6,7,8 and 9 of the Defence Act. 10. It is submitted that in the present case, that notification was issued in the month of August, 2005 and thereafter, no action has been purportedly taken by any of the parties claiming the compensation as required under section 12 of the Defence Act so the process which has been contemplated in the Act, has not been followed and abruptly, the Collector has taken the application for compensation in year 2013 and passed the award in a hurried manner and that too without granting opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. 11. 11. It is further submitted that the Collector had no authority to entertain any application after prescribed period of limitation that has been given under section 9 of the Defence Act especially when earlier owner, who was in the possession of the land in question at the relevant point of time when notification was issued in August, 2005, never raised any compliant or objection on the basis of restrictions imposed under section 7(c) of the Defence Act. It appears that earlier owner sold the property to the present owner i.e. respondent No. 2 vide sale deed dated 5.11.2007, more than two years after promulgation of the notification and the said owner preferred the application before the Collector in the month of July, 2013 i.e. after 8 years of notification therefore, same is not maintainable as per section 9 of the Defence Act. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners pressed repeatedly on the point of opportunity of hearing because petitioners were never afforded any opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order whereas, petitioners are affected and interested parties. They will have to pay the compensation and therefore, they were ought to be given an opportunity of hearing by the Collector before passing the impugned order. 13. It is also the submissions of the counsel appearing for the petitioners that property in question on which the impugned order has been passed, has not been acquired at all, only certain restrictions have been imposed as prescribed under section 7 of the Defence Act. At the time when notification was issued (August, 2005), the property was agricultural land and the earlier owner Smt. Sabana Rihan and Rihan Ahmad did not file any objection and now the assessment of the property has been made on the basis of commercial nature of property, which is bad in law because property was for agricultural use at the time of notification and respondent No. 2, tried to get undue advantage by seeking compensation on restrictions imposed over the land. 14. Another objection regarding the impugned order raised by the petitioners is in respect of intention of the Municipal Corporation Gwalior. The sale deed placed as Annexure P-2 whereby respondent No. 2 has purchased the suit property indicates that the land use of the plot in question is residential, then how Municipal Corporation Gwalior accorded permission to build eye hospital for commercial purpose. The sale deed placed as Annexure P-2 whereby respondent No. 2 has purchased the suit property indicates that the land use of the plot in question is residential, then how Municipal Corporation Gwalior accorded permission to build eye hospital for commercial purpose. The Collector has ignored this aspect and tried to give undue advantage to respondent No. 3 by treating the land as commercial. The amount assessed by the Collector was excessive in nature and therefore, cannot be permitted to withstand. The order is tainted with malafide because, in absence of any measurement of the area owned by respondent No. 2, the impugned order has been passed. The compensation is excessive in nature looking to the amount mentioned in the sale deed wherein sale consideration is Rs.17,00,000/- only. 15. It is submitted that the impugned order reflects that office of the Collector tried to cover up its own non-compliance, if any, committed earlier and publication of notification and therefore, the impugned order is arbitrary and illegal and suffers from jurisdictional error. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners referred the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Union of India v. District Judge, Udhampur [ 1994(4) SCC 737 ], Joura Begam and Another v. State of M.P. and others [ 2016(1) MPLJ 138 ] and Delhi Development Authority v. Bhola Nath Sharma (dead) by LRs. and others, [ (2011)2 SCC 54 ]. 16. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 contesting party opposed the prayer made by the petitioners with equal vehemence. According to him, the land use of the plot (land in question) was commercial and therefore, compensation was assessed accordingly. According to counsel for the respondents, Defence Act nowhere puts any restrictions on sale of any land after publication of notification therefore, the land purchased by respondent No. 2 was legal and not an illegal affair. 17. While referring sections 2(f),(5),(8),(9),(12),(13),(14),(15) and (19) of the Defence Act, it is submitted that these provisions empower the Collector to undertake necessary proceedings and pass the order for award thus the Collector is working on behalf of the Central Government and therefore, he being the Chief Revenue Officer of the District has necessary knowledge and agencies to verify the validity of claims made by the affected land owners. Therefore, the order passed by the Collector is the order on behalf of the Central Government and therefore, the petitioners who are instrumentality of the Central Government, cannot challenge the order in High Court. Respondent No. 1 has wrongly been impleaded as party in the petition as the respondent No. 1 had no role to play. 18. Respondent No. 2 has purchased the land through registered sale deed dated 5.11.2007 and she happens to be the owner and possessor of the said plot and she has right to hold and enjoy her property. Notification puts the restrictions over the use within the vicinity of 200 mtrs. because various constructions have been made in the said vicinity. The said construction including the administrative block of the municipal corporation are running whereas respondent No.2 has been restrained to use the land. 19. Through narration of the events in the return, respondent No. 2 stressed over the fact that the Municipal Corporation earlier granted permission to construct the building and thereafter resisted the same which was an arbitrary exercise. Respondent No. 2 has right to property as her legal and constitutional right and therefore, she is entitled to use the land as per her wish and if any restrictions are imposed, then she is entitled for due compensation. The Collector has rightly passed the award of compensation considering the fact situation of the case. In support of her submissions, she referred judgment rendered by the apex Court in the case of P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and others v. Revamma and others [ (2007)6 SCC 59 ]. It is further submitted that during pendency of Writ Petition No. 3114/2012, the answering respondent was advised to press the alternative relief of compensation in lieu of permission and to move before respondent No. 1, seeking compensation and later on allowed by respondent No. 2 therefore, the writ petition No. 3114/2012 was withdrawn with liberty to approach concerned authority. 20. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 also opposed the prayer of the petitioners regarding grant of opportunity of hearing. According to respondent No. 2, no opportunity of hearing was required to be given to the petitioners because the Collector is an officer of Central Government and he was there to take care of the instrumentality of the central government (DRDE in the present case) and therefore, it cannot be said that petitioners are necessary parties. According to respondent No. 2, no opportunity of hearing was required to be given to the petitioners because the Collector is an officer of Central Government and he was there to take care of the instrumentality of the central government (DRDE in the present case) and therefore, it cannot be said that petitioners are necessary parties. Respondents relied upon the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of M/s Travels Star Hotels (India) Limited v. Union of India and others, passed in CWP No. 8707 of 1999, the same is filed as Annexure R-(3)-7. Respondents also referred the judgment of the Hon’ble apex Court in the case of Dr. G.H. Grant v. State of Bihar, [ AIR 1966 SC 237 ] and Kanpur Jal Sansthan and another v. Bapu Constructions, [(2015)5 SCC 8], Writ Petition No. 238/2014 and Writ Petition No. 5794/2013 and Writ Petition No. 6619/2013 267 as well as Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar and another, [ (2003)3 SCC 128 ], and through these judgments, it is submitted that no jurisdictional error is caused by the Collector by passing the impugned order because payment of compensation is legal obligation on the part of the State and until and unless amount of compensation is deposited by a body corporate, hearing cannot be made. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. Facts of Writ Petition No. 238/2014 (Union of India and Others v. State of M.P. and others) are as under : 21. The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred by the petitioners against the respondents seeking quashment of the order dated 30.11.2013 (Annexure P-1) passed by the Court of Collector/ District Magistrate, Gwalior whereby application preferred by respondent No. 3 on 16.7.2013 for award of compensation in view of the restrictions imposed by the Central Government on use of his land was allowed and compensation to the tune of Rs.6,69,28,717.50 (Rs. Six Crore Sixty Nine Lacs Twenty Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Seventeen and Fifty Pese only) has been awarded. 22. Precisely stated facts of the case in Writ Petition No. 238/2014 is that respondent No. 3 was given a plot admeasuring 0.097 hect./ 10437 sq. ft. Six Crore Sixty Nine Lacs Twenty Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Seventeen and Fifty Pese only) has been awarded. 22. Precisely stated facts of the case in Writ Petition No. 238/2014 is that respondent No. 3 was given a plot admeasuring 0.097 hect./ 10437 sq. ft. belonging to survey No. 700 at village Mahalgaon, Tehsil & District-Gwalior on lease which belonged to Nazul Department of respondent No. 2 (Collector/ District Magistrate, Gwalior) for a period of 30 years commencing from 30.3.2010 ending on 31.3.2039, vide letter dated 12.4.2010. Subsequently vide letter No. 17.8.2012 of Nazul Department of respondent No. 2, free hold rights were given to respondent No. 3 with diversion of the land for commercial purpose on payment of Rs.78,93,375/-. Accordingly, a registered transfer deed of the said plot has been executed in favour of respondent No. 3. The said documents are placed on record by the petitioners. 23. Respondent No. 3 applied for permission of construction over the said plot to Municipal Corporation, Gwalior and the Building Officer Municipal Corporation, Gwalior vide letter dated 9.7.2013 rejected the application of respondent No. 3 on the ground that according to the notification dated 30th August, 2005 published under section 3 of the Works of Defence Act, 1903 (hereinafter referred as “Defence Act”) in which permission of construction was withheld and was directed to be kept the land free from building and other obstructions and corporation asked the respondent No. 3 to submit No Objection Certificate of D.R.D.E. (petitioner No. 3). 24. When petitioner No. 3 on 11.12.2013, received a letter dated 3.12.2013 alongwith copy of award dated 13.11.2013 passed by respondent No. 2 in avour of respondent No. 3 then on scrutiny and examination, it was noticed that without noticing the petitioners and without giving any opportunity of hearing, impugned award has been passed and a huge sum of more than 6 crores as referred in the award for the disputed land which was a Nazul land (later on converted into free hold rights) was awarded. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioners takes exception to the impugned order on the ground that opportunity of hearing was must to the petitioners before proceeding against them. In this regard the petitioners relied upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi (Dead) By LRs. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioners takes exception to the impugned order on the ground that opportunity of hearing was must to the petitioners before proceeding against them. In this regard the petitioners relied upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi (Dead) By LRs. and others [(1995)2 SCC 326] and submits that the legal authority or a company for which the land has been acquired has actually to pay the compensation therefore, authority /petitioners are necessary parties. 26. He further relied upon the judgments of the apex Court in the case of His Highness Maharaja Pratap and Others v. Her Highness Maharani Sarojini, 1994 Supp. 3 SCC 734 , D.D.A v. Bholanath Sharma(Dead) By LRs. and others, (2011)2 SCC 54 and case of Union of India and anr v. Sher Singh and others., [ (1993)1 SCC 608 . It is further submitted that notification was passed in year 2005 and the land was leased to respondent No. 3 in 2010 and free hold rights were given to him in year 2012. Thereafter, respondent No. 3 preferred application for compensation. The whole gamut of facts smacks malafide in away that respondent No. 3 has no locus to challenge the same after notification published in 2005. Once the notification was published in 2005 and respondent No. 2 i.e. Collector/ District Magistrate, District-Gwalior was supposed to know the implication of the said provision then how the land has been allotted to respondent No. 3 (initially on lease and thereafter on free hold right) are the questions which were required to be considered by the respondent No.2 but in absence of opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, the said aspect could not have been raised. He referred section 9 as well as section 12 and other provisions of Defence Act and submits that the limitation for any claim is only 3 years and after that, no claim could have been entertained. 27. Through the provisions of section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for brevity “Act of 1882”), learned counsel for the petitioners submits that rights and liabilities of the seller should to be categorically mentioned by the seller to the buyer. Therefore, State should have apprised respondent No. 3 about the status of the land. The said proceedings smacks malafide. 28. Therefore, State should have apprised respondent No. 3 about the status of the land. The said proceedings smacks malafide. 28. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.3 who is contesting respondent, opposed the prayer made by the petitioners. According to him, respondent No. 3 has free hold rights and is in possession of the said plot. He has right to hold and enjoy the property. He wanted to construct a press for which Municipal Council, Gwalior refused the permission because of the restrictions imposed by the Defence Act and therefore, he moved an application before the Collector who rightly passed the impugned order. It is further submitted that right to property is not only a legal right but also internationally recognized as human rights. In this regard, he referred the judgment of the apex Court in the case of P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and others v. Revamma and others [ (2007)6 SCC 59 ]. Through the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of M/s Travels Star Hotels (India) Limited v. Union of India and others, passed in CWP No. 8707 of 1999, respondent No. 3 assert that respondent No. 3 deserves compensation on the basis of restrictions imposed. 29. According to counsel for respondent No. 3, petitioners/Union of India and Collector/ respondent No. 2 represent one and the same authority under the Defence Act, authorized to function their distinct functions and duties. The Collector is authorized to pass the award on behalf of the petitioner and as such, opportunity of hearing to itself (petitioners), is not required. On the basis of sections 12 and 31 of the Defence Act, respondent No. 3 submits that opportunity of hearing is not required while passing the award. Taking reliance over the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 2013, counsel for the petitioners submits that provisions of Defence Act are analogous to Land Acquisition Laws except vesting part. He submits that the Collector has proceeded under the proceedings, as if, under the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, he prayed for dismissal of the petition. 30. Heard the learned counsel for the parties of all the three petitions at length and perused the record. 31. He submits that the Collector has proceeded under the proceedings, as if, under the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, he prayed for dismissal of the petition. 30. Heard the learned counsel for the parties of all the three petitions at length and perused the record. 31. The first and foremost question needs consideration is; opportunity of hearing to the petitioners (petitioners of Writ Petition No. 5794/2013 and 238/2014 and respondents of Writ Petition No. 6619/2013/ Union of India, hereinafter referred as “petitioners”). Petitioners stressed over this aspect the most. Consideration over this question as first and foremost question would further pave the path of proceedings because if this Court ultimately comes to the conclusion about the locus of the petitioners as necessary parties before the Collector then question of opportunity of hearing would automatically be answered. 32. Preamble of the Defence Act shows that the Act permitted all the restrictions of the Act upon enjoyment of the land in the vicinity of the works of defence so that the land may be kept free from building and other obstructions, and for determining the amount of compensation to be made on account of such imposition, whereas, it is expedient to provide for imposing restrictions upon the use and enjoyment of the land in the vicinity of works of defence in order that such land may be kept free from buildings and other use and for determining the amount of compensation to be made on account of such imposition. 33. Relevance of the Defence Act is still intact because the establishment of national security or defence are to be treated differently vis-a-vis other commercial establishments. In the defence establishment, certain set of equipments and high grade chemicals/ weapons and vehicles are prepared which need to be kept away from the public glare specially from the V Columnist therefore, to senitise the establishments and its vicinity, by the effect of section 3 of the Defence Act, public notification is issued and by the effect of said public notification, restrictions come into play as per section 7 of the Defence Act. Thereafter, provisions of sections 8, 9 and 12 of the Defence Act follow. The whole gamut of scheme, legislative intent and present fact situation are to be considered in conjunction so as to reach to the conclusion about the locus of the petitioners as necessary parties. Thereafter, provisions of sections 8, 9 and 12 of the Defence Act follow. The whole gamut of scheme, legislative intent and present fact situation are to be considered in conjunction so as to reach to the conclusion about the locus of the petitioners as necessary parties. section 2(b) of the Defence Act gives the expression “Person Interested” which is reproduced for ready reference as under : “(b) the expression “person interested” includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the imposition of restrictions upon the use and enjoyment of land under this Act; and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land.” 34. It includes all the persons claiming an interest in the compensation to be made on account of imposition of restrictions. In other words, the expression is “Inclusive in nature “and” not Exhaustive in nature.” Once the expression is inclusive in nature then scope of “Person Interested” gets widened or the periphery becomes broader. This wider scope would include the present petitioners in the expression person interested.” Even otherwise, expression as contained in section 2(b) itself includes those persons who are claiming interest in compensation and it does not mean that the persons who are interested in getting the compensation but it includes those persons also who have to disburse the compensation or those persons who want to protect the exact status of the land and the provisions of the Defence Act before Collector to reach to just and proper conclusion. Therefore, inclusive nature of definition gives sufficient leverage for the petitioners to be accommodated into the fold of person interested. The definition of expression “person interested” is inclusive and not exhaustive. The difference between exhaustive and inclusive has been discussed by the apex Court in the case of P. Kasilingam and others v. P.S.G. College of Technology and others, 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 348. 35. A particular expression is often defined by the legislature by using the word ‘means’ or the word ‘includes’. Sometimes the word ‘means and includes’ are used. Use of the word ‘means’ indicates that “definition is a hard-and-fast definition, and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than as put down in definition”. (See: Gough v. Gough; Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court [(1891) 2 QB 665)]. Sometimes the word ‘means and includes’ are used. Use of the word ‘means’ indicates that “definition is a hard-and-fast definition, and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than as put down in definition”. (See: Gough v. Gough; Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court [(1891) 2 QB 665)]. The word ‘includes’ when used, enlarges the meaning of the expression defined so as to comprehend not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also, those things which the clause declares that they shall include. The words “means and includes”, on the other hand, indicate “an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions”. {See: Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps (Lord Watson); Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of A.P., 1899 AC 99}. 36. “The Hon’ble apex Court in the case of D.D.A. v. Bholanath Sharma (D) Lrs. (supra), has clarified that : “the word “Includes” has different meaning in different contexts. Standard dictionaries assign more than one meaning to the word “include”. Webster’s Dictionary defines the word “include” as synonymous with “comprise” or “contain”. Illustrated Oxford Dictionary defines the word “include” as: (I) comprise or reckon in as a part of a whole; (ii) treat or regard as so included. Collins Dictionary of English Language defines the word “includes” as (I) to have as contents or part of the contents; be made up of or contain (ii) to add as part of something else; put in as part of a set, group or a category; (iii) to contain as a secondary or minor ingredient or element. It is no doubt true that generally when the word “include” is used in a definition clause, it is used as a word of enlargement, that is to make the definition extensive and not restrictive. But the word “include” is also used to connote a specific meaning, that is, as “means and includes” or “comprises” or “consists of”. Thus, the preponderance of judicial opinions seem to favour the view that the definition of “person interested” must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. Thus, the preponderance of judicial opinions seem to favour the view that the definition of “person interested” must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. In our opinion, this view accords with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. How can it be said that a person for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is to pay the compensation is not a person interested even though its stake may be extremely vital ? For instance, the land acquisition proceedings may be held to be invalid and thus a person concerned is completely deprived of the benefits which is proposed to be given to him. Similarly, if such a person is not heard by the Collector or a Court, he may have to pay a very heavy compensation which, in case he is allowed to appear before a Court, he could have satisfied it that the compensation was far too heavy having regard to the nature and extent of the land.” (Emphasis supplied).” 37. In Union of India v. District Judge [ (1994) 4 SCC 737 ], this Court held that the Union of India for whose benefit the land was acquired was a person interested ‘ in the fixation of the proper and just compensation and was entitled to challenge the determination made by the competent authority/ Court. 38. The judgments relied upon by the petitioners in W.P. No.238/2014, in the cases of U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra), His Highness Maharaja Pratap (supra), D.D.A v. Bholanath Sharma (Dead) (supra), and Union of India and another (supra), are applicable in the present fact situation of the case and supports the case of the petitioners. Petitioners are necessary parties in the case and, therefore, they ought to have heard by respondent No. 2, breach of which caused legal infirmity and therefore, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. 39. Petitioners are necessary parties in the case and, therefore, they ought to have heard by respondent No. 2, breach of which caused legal infirmity and therefore, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. 39. As far as judgments relied upon by the respondents in the case of Sharda Devi (supra), the same is not applicable in the present fact situation of the case because the said judgment moves in different factual realm as the same was in respect of Land Acquisition Act, 1994 and therein the sole question which arose for decision in the said appeal was in respect of a reference under section 30 of the Act of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and competence of the reference proceedings at the instance of the State. Here, the said facts are not available to derive analogy as binding precedent therefore, the said judgment is of no help to respondent No. 2 as binding precedent. 40. Section 9 of the Defence Act and its applicability were to be seen by the Collector, but from perusal of the order it appears that the question of limitation, its effect over the fact situation of the case, have not been looked into by the Collector. Besides that the question of entitlement of the respondents after delay of 8 years for seeking compensation is also over looked by the Collector. Similarly, once, the original owner who was at the time of publication of notification was at the helm qua the land, did not object the sale deed executed in 2007 in favour of respondent No. 3 then in that condition, what would have been the effect, was also overlooked by the Collector. Therefore, in the cumulative analysis, the Collector passed the order in a slip shod and casual manner without ascertaining the above referred legal aspects and without affording opportunity of hearing. Petitioners seek to avail the opportunity of hearing to raise those grounds which go to the core of the controversy, therefore the order impugned is liable to be set aside because petitioners are necessary parties, who are required to be heard before proceeding further and for raising such questions referred above. 41. The objections regarding authority of the Collector as representative of the State Government, does not hold good as a ground. 41. The objections regarding authority of the Collector as representative of the State Government, does not hold good as a ground. The Collector is the authority with certain responsibilities of different provisions of the Defence Act but it does not take away the rights of the petitioners into oblivion wherein they cannot raise any ground in respect of proceeding at all. 42. The judgment relied upon by respondent No. 2 in case of M/s. Travels Star Hotels (India) Limited (supra), in fact supports the cause of petitioners rather than respondents. The said judgment not only upheld the validity of the notification issued under section 3 of the Defence Act (in the said factual context) but also dismissed the petition preferred by the claimants. Only aspect was compensation which was directed to be determined in the facts and circumstance of the said case. Said factual matrix is missing in the present case. 43. Resultantly, Writ Petition No. 5794/2013 and Writ Petition No. 238/2014 preferred by the petitioners/ Union of India are hereby allowed and impugned order dated 30.7.2013 and order dated 30.11.2013 respectively passed by the Court of Collector/ District Magistrate, Gwalior are hereby set aside. 44. However, parties are at liberty to move before the Collector by way of appropriate application which shall be decided by the Collector in accordance with law taking into account all the legal prepositions involved in the controversy by affording adequate opportunity of hearing to all the parties concerned including the petitioners. 45. Similarly, Writ Petition No. 6619/2013 filed by the petitioner Dr. (Smt.) Benu Dubey is hereby dismissed. 46. Resultantly, Writ Petition No. 5794/2013 (Union of India and others v. State of M.P. and others) and Writ Petition No. 238/2014 (Union of India and others v. State of M.P. and Others), preferred by Union of India are allowed and Writ Petition No. 6619/2013 (Dr. (Smt.) Benu Dubey v. Union of India and others) is hereby dismissed. 47. Be noted accordingly.