JUDGMENT : Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. In this writ petition, the petitioner has given challenge to the order dated 01.11.2010, by virtue of which, the Executive Engineer, Sinchai Nirman Khand Shrinagar, District Pauri Garhwal, had rejected the representation of the petitioner claiming for including the services rendered by him in the work charge establishment and consequently for determining the retiral dues. 2. The brief backdrop under which this writ petition has reached to this Court after having been filed on 15.06.2018, are that the petitioner alleges that he was appointed as a Helper with the respondents as back as in the year 1972. His case is further that he was brought under the work charge establishment in the year 1997. He submits that after having attained the age of superannuation in January, 2005, he retired from the services of the respondents, thereafter, almost after three and a half years, he submitted a representation on 31.12.2008 before respondent no.2 praying for settling his pensionary benefits after including therein the services rendered by him in the work charge establishment i.e. for the period from 1997 till January, 2005 i.e. till his superannuation. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the representation thus submitted by the petitioner on 31.12.2008, was pending consideration before respondent no.2 and the same was not decided for considerable long time. The petitioner had to file a writ petition being WPSS No.358 of 2010, wherein, he has prayed for almost identical relief for payment of pension after including the period of service rendered in a work charge establishment. At that stage, when this Court disposed of the writ petition by its order dated 18.05.2010, this Court had directed to take into consideration the representation which was pending before the authorities at the relevant point of time. 4. On perusal of the judgment dated 18.05.2010 rendered by the Coordinate Bench of this Court it would be legally concluded that if the petitioner approaches to this Court for several reliefs and if the Court confines the relief grants on a relief on a particular issue which in the instant case is directing to decide the representation, it would be taken that the Court had in principle not agreed with the proposition floated for the other reliefs prayed for by the petitioner, and it would be treated to have been denied. Be that as it may. 5. Be that as it may. 5. In compliance of the order dated 18.05.2010 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court even the representation of the petitioner stood rejected by Respondent No.3 vide his order dated 01.11.2010. Yet again after the rejection of the representation, the petitioner did not seek an appropriate remedy challenging the validity of the order dated 01.11.2010, rejecting his claim for resettlement of the pensionary benefits after including the services rendered in the work charge establishment at an appropriate and within reasonable time provided under law. 6. Now, the petitioner has filed this writ petition after about eight years from the date of passing the order. This Court feels that a challenge given in the impugned order which had decided a right claimed by the petitioner as back as in 2010 cannot be scrutinized by the writ court at a belated stage, while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, more particularly, when its entertainment or adjudication ultimately leads to a situation which would cast upon financial implications and burden upon the respondents because of fault of petitioner by approaching court late and not being diligent to approach to the Court earlier. Because it is a considered view that due to delayed action the State’s Exchequer cannot be made to suffer by an action which entails financial implications. 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a case reported in (1995) 6 SCC 476 ‘Union of India & Others vs. Bhagwan Singh’ had dealt with the issue pertaining to the limitation required to be addressed to for filing of an application for seeking a compassionate appointment under the harness rules. It has held in its paragraph-5 that any application for compassionate appointment after five years from the date of the death of the bread winner would be barred by time. The Court has further held that if an application for appointment even if it is moved beyond one year after attaining the majority, it would be barred by limitation. Paragraph-5 is quoted hereunder: “It is common ground, that normally all appointments on compassionate grounds should be made within a period of five years from the date of occurrence of the event entitling the eligible persons to be appointed. In this case Ram Singh died on 12.9.1972. He left behind his wife, two major sons and the respondent, a minor aged 12 years then. In this case Ram Singh died on 12.9.1972. He left behind his wife, two major sons and the respondent, a minor aged 12 years then. The respondent attained majority in 1980/81. There is no material on record to show that the respondent applied within 5 years from "the event" or within one year from the date of his attaining majority. As early as 21.9.1987 an application filed by the respondent was dismissed. The subsequent applications filed in that behalf were dismissed on 19.6.1990 and 11.6.1991. There is material on record to show that the respondent was aged 33 years at the time of making the application and the last application which was allowed by the Tribunal was one filed nearly 20 years after the death of Ram Singh. Patently the application is barred.” 8. In the said judgment it has been held that the claim for harness appointment be negatived when the son of the deceased who claims for an appointment moves an application and that too after 20 years from the date of death, which happens to be identical in the instant case, since application had been moved after 19 years of the event. In this case, admittedly, application was filed after 19 years of the date of death, which in the instant case was on 04.06.1991. Paragraph-8 is quoted hereinbelow: “It is evident, that the facts in this case point out, that the plea for compassionate employment is not to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis or distress which resulted as early as September, 1972. At the time Ram Singh died on 12.9.1972 there were two major sons and the mother of the children who were apparently capable of meeting the needs in the family and so they did not apply for any job on compassionate grounds. For nearly 20 years, the family has pulled on, apparently without any difficulty. In this background, we are of the view that the Central Administrative Tribunal acted illegally and wholly without jurisdiction in directing the Authorities to consider the case of the respondent for appointment on compassionate grounds and to provide him with an appointment, if he is found suitable. We set aside the order of the Tribunal dated 22.2.1993. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.” 9. We set aside the order of the Tribunal dated 22.2.1993. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.” 9. In a judgment as reported in (2003) 7 SCC 511 ‘State of Manipur vs. Mohammad Rajaodin’ it has held that a claim of delayed appointment under the harness rules is dehors to the scheme or the statute, which intends to grant a compassionate appointment to redress the apathy of a family. Filing of an application after 17 years (in the said case) or even after reasonable period on attaining the majority the person applying for appointment is not entitled to any relief on such belated application. Paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 are quoted hereinbelow: “9. Admittedly, the respondent's father died before the Office Memorandum came into operation. In the memorandum a time period is stipulated. Since the scheme itself was not in operation when the respondent's father died, the time stipulation as provided in the scheme would not be strictly applicable to the case of the respondent and any one seeking for relief thereunder has to at least move within the time stipulated commencing from the date of the order. Nevertheless, keeping in view at any rate the object for which such appointments which are also compassionate appointments are made the minimum requirement is that the request for appointment should be made as expeditiously as the circumstances warrant. It could not be brought to our notice whether there was any scheme in operation prior to the scheme of 1984 referred to above. As the appointments of such nature envisaged under the said scheme are made to tide over immediate difficulties, there is an inbuilt requirement of urgency in making the application. Though it was contended that the respondent was a minor at the time of his father's death, it is to be noted that he was of 10 years of age in 1980 when his father died. Even if a reasonable period after he attained majority is taken, certainly the application on 25.7.1997 seeking appointment was highly belated. 10. As was observed in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Rani Devi and Anr. AIR 1996 SC 2445 , it need not be pointed out that the claim of person concerned for appointment on compassionate ground is based on the premises that he was dependant on the deceased employee. 10. As was observed in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Rani Devi and Anr. AIR 1996 SC 2445 , it need not be pointed out that the claim of person concerned for appointment on compassionate ground is based on the premises that he was dependant on the deceased employee. Strictly this claim cannot be upheld on the touchstone of Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India. However, such claim is considered as reasonable and permissible on the basis of sudden crisis occurring in the family of such employee who has served the State and dies while in service. That is why it is necessary for the authorities to frame rules, regulations or to issue such administrative orders which can stand the test of Articles 14 or 16. Appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Die-in harness scheme cannot be made applicable to all types of posts irrespective of the nature of service rendered by the deceased employee. In Rani Devi's case (supra) it was held that scheme regarding appointment on compassionate ground if extended to all types of casual or ad hoc employees including those who worked as a apprentices cannot be justified on constitutional grounds. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramchandra Ambekar (Mrs.) and Anr. (1994) IILLJ 173 SC it was pointed out that High Courts and Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic considerations to make appointments on compassionate grounds when the regulations framed in respect thereof do not cover and contemplates such appointments. It was noted in Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana and Ors. [1994] 3 SCR 893 that as a rule in public service appointment should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit. The appointment on compassionate ground is not another source of recruitment but merely an exception to the aforesaid requirement taking into consideration the fact of the death of employee while in service leaving his family without any means of livelihood. In such cases the object is to enable the family to get over sudden financial crises. But such appointments on compassionate ground have to be made in accordance with the rules, regulations or administrative instructions taking into consideration the financial condition of the family of the deceased. 11. In Smt. Sushma Gosain and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. In such cases the object is to enable the family to get over sudden financial crises. But such appointments on compassionate ground have to be made in accordance with the rules, regulations or administrative instructions taking into consideration the financial condition of the family of the deceased. 11. In Smt. Sushma Gosain and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1990) ILLJ 169 SC it was observed that in all claims of appointment on compassionate grounds, there should not be any delay in appointment. The purpose of providing appointment on compassionate ground is to mitigate the hardship due to death of the bread-earner in the family. Such appointments should, therefore, be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. The fact that the ward was a minor at the time of death of his father is no ground, unless the scheme itself envisage specially otherwise, to state that as and when such minor becomes a major he can be appointed without any time consciousness or limit. The above view was re-iterated in Phoolwati (Smt.) v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1991 SC 469 and Union of India and Ors. v. Bhagwan Singh (1996) ILLJ 1127 SC. In Director of Education (Secondary) and Anr. v. Pushendra Kumar and Ors. [1998] 3 SCR 432 it was observed that in matter of compassionate appointment there cannot be insistence for a particular post. Out of purely humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided the family would not be able to make both ends meet, provisions are made for giving appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for appointment. Care has, however, to be taken that provision for ground of compassionate employment which is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions does not unduly interfere with the right of those other persons who are eligible for appointment to seek appointment against the post which would have been available, but for the provision enabling appointment being made on compassionate grounds of the dependant of the deceased employee. As it is in the nature of exception to the general provisions it cannot substitute the provision to which it is an exception and thereby nullify the main provision by taking away completely the right conferred by the main provision. 12. In State of U.P. and Ors. As it is in the nature of exception to the general provisions it cannot substitute the provision to which it is an exception and thereby nullify the main provision by taking away completely the right conferred by the main provision. 12. In State of U.P. and Ors. v. Paras Nath (1999) IILLJ 454 SC it was held that the purpose of providing employment to the dependant of a government servant dying-in harness in preference to anybody else is to mitigate hardship caused to the family of the deceased on account of his unexpected death while in service. To alleviate the distress of the family, such appointments are permissible on compassionate grounds provided there are Rules providing for such appointments. None of these considerations can operate when the application is made after a long period of time. In that case also the delay was 17 years. 13. When case of the respondent is considered in the panorama of aforesaid legal principles, the inevitable conclusion is that he was not entitled for appointment. Even after 1984 scheme came into force, the application was filed after a long lapse of time. He, therefore, had no right much less a legal right to ask for an appointment. Learned Single Judge of the High Court was not justified in directing the appellant to give appointment. It is also on record that there was a ban on direct recruitment under Die-in-harness scheme as is evidenced by Office Memorandum dated 24th July, 2001. The scheme itself provided for a clearance from the Government in the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms (Personnel Division).” 10. In a judgment as reported in AIR (1999) SCC 564 ‘Dhalla Ram vs. Union of India & Others’ has held that a belated claim of compassionate appointment cannot be entertained as the delayed application itself defeats the object, what is intended to be achieved by the harness appointment of providing immediate sustenance to the dependants of the family of the deceased employee. An appointment under the harness rules, it is not a method of recruitment to bypass Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India but, rather it is a facility which is extended to provide immediate rehabilitation to the distressed family to save the family from destitution and if sufficient period has lapsed, it cannot be said that there exists any apprehension or possibility of destitution being continued for such a long time. 11. Though, the judgment as cited above relates to a situation where the Court was dealing with the issue of laches pertaining to the compassionate appointment, but the fact remains the said proposition for the purposes of including the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be relevant in all such cases where a litigant by not being diligent waives his rights to approach the Court at a belated stage. In the instant case too since the claim raised at a highly belated stage which would be entailing burden on the State’s Exchequer, it cannot be granted. 12. Accordingly, this Court does not find any merit in the present writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. 13. No other point was argued by the petitioner. 14. However, there would be no order as to costs.