JUDGMENT Amit Rawal, J. - The appellants-plaintiffs are in regular second appeal against the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court dated 20.11.1999 whereby the appeal preferred by the Notified Area Committee/defendant against the judgment and decree dated 20.12.1994 decreeing the suit, has been allowed, in essence, judgment and decree of the trial Court has been set aside. 2. The appellants-plaintiffs instituted the suit in 1989 for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from forcible dispossession from the land measuring 25 kanals 9 marlas comprised of Khewat/Khatoni No.61/74, 61/73, 61/70, 61/69, 61/66, 61/78, Khasra No.270/4min (7-15), 270/4 min (5-7), 270/4min (1-12), 270/4min (4-1), 270/4min (2-0), 270/1(3-1), 271/2(1-13) situated in the area of village Ajauli, Tehsil Anandpur Sahib, District Ropar, Hadbast No.237 on the premise that they are owners in possession of the land in dispute. Village Ajauli before reorganization was part of the Punjab but thereafter some portion fell in Punjab and other in Himachal Pradesh. In the year 1955, the land of the plaintiffs including the suit land was acquired for construction of Fertilizer Corporation of India i.e. National Fertilizer Ltd. Plant. In the year 1965, the Fertilizer Corporation of India finding the land to be surplus, released the excess land and the revenue entry was recorded as shamlat. The Gram Panchayat admitted rights of the plaintiffs and surrendered the same in their favour as it already vested in the plaintiffs. Since then, the plaintiffs had been in cultivating possession of the suit land. Since the defendants intended to encroach upon the suit land illegally and forcibly, injunction was sought. 3. Defendant No.1 i.e. Punjab State through Collector, Ropar was proceeded ex parte, however, defendant No.2, Notified Area Committee, contested the suit and took numerous preliminary objections. It was averred that the Notified Area Committee was recorded as owner in the revenue record and part of the land measuring 12 kanals was taken by the Town Planning Committee along with land in other village and even the possession of the plaintiffs was denied. On merits, it was contended that the suit land was owned by Gram Panchayat at the time of acquisition and compensation was paid to the Gram Panchayat. Later on, part of the land measuring 85 kanals 13 marlas was released by the Fertilizer Corporation of India in favour of the Gram Panchayat and certain amount was returned back through the office of Gram Panchayat. Later on, part of the land measuring 85 kanals 13 marlas was released by the Fertilizer Corporation of India in favour of the Gram Panchayat and certain amount was returned back through the office of Gram Panchayat. Gram Panchayat never recognized the title of the plaintiffs. In fact, mutation bearing No.1592 and 1519 was sanctioned in favour of the Notified Area Committee when the land vested vide notification dated 30.04.1976, thus, Gram Panchayat was superseded by formation of the Notified Area Committee. 4. Since both the parties were at variance, the trial Court framed following issues:- "1. Whether the suit land was released by FCI to the owners and they are in possession of the same as such? OPP 2. Whether the suit is not maintainable in view of preliminary objections No.1 and 2 in the written statement? OPD 3. Whether the suit is bad for want of notice under Section 80 CPC? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the injunction prayed for? OPP 5. Relief." 6. Plaintiffs in support of evidence examined PW1, Balwant Singh, Halqa Patwari, Naya Nangal, PW2 Prem Nath, PW-3 Kashmira and produced on record Ex.P1 to P27 i.e. khasra girdawaries and jamabandies. 7. On the other hand, defendants examined DW1 Sh. H.L. Shaad, Junior Estate Officer, DW2 Charanjit Kumar and produced Ex.D1 to D11. 8. On the basis of evidence brought on record, the trial Court decreed the suit by holding that defendants could not produce any data vis-a-vis Town Planning Scheme allegedly promulgated and also with regard to receipt of compensation by the Notified Area Committee and held that no title passed on to the Gram Panchayat and therefore, land was never vested in the Notified Area Committee as it was not proved. Reliance was also laid to Rule 3 of the Gram Panchayat Rules, 1965 to hold that land was not vested in the Notified Area Committee. 9. Defendants challenged the aforementioned decree before the lower Appellate Court. Reliance was also laid to Rule 3 of the Gram Panchayat Rules, 1965 to hold that land was not vested in the Notified Area Committee. 9. Defendants challenged the aforementioned decree before the lower Appellate Court. The lower Appellate Court rendered the finding in favour of the defendants by reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court on the ground that the Gram Panchayat was succeeded by Notified Area Committee, Naya Nangal, therefore, all assets and liabilities of the Gram Panchayat including the suit land had vested in it and therefore, the same cannot revert to the co-sharers or the owners as per the claim of the plaintiffs, though it noticed that revenue record produced on file recorded plaintiffs to be in possession. 10. Mr. Amit Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted it was simplicitor suit for injunction seeking restraint against the defendants qua forcible interference and dispossession as possession of the land concededly was found with the plaintiffs. The land belonging to the Gram Panchayat cannot be vested in the Notified Area Committee without following the procedure being in violation of Section 300-A of the Constitution of India. In support of aforementioned contention, he laid reliance upon Full Bench judgment of this Court in Suraj Bhan and Others Vs. State of Haryana and another , (2017) 2 RCR(Civil) 934 wherein, while interpreting the provisions of Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 and Punjab Village Common Lands Regulations Act, 1961, it has been held that proprietary rights in the land Jumla Mushtarka Malkan or Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hasab Rasad Raqba cannot be vested in the Municipal Corporation or any other Notified Area Committee without payment of compensation by causing a notification or declaration. The lower Appellate Court ignored the fact that compensation of the suit land before acquisition of the plaintiffs' possession was also received by them, which was refunded to the Fertilizer Corporation of India on reversion of the land being surplus at the hands of Corporation. The Notified Area Committee failed to prove on record that compensation was repaid by the erstwhile Gram Panchayat. The Resolution Ex.D3 cannot be read in evidence as it was not proved in accordance with law, for, no member or officer of the Committee appeared. 11. Per contra, Mr. The Notified Area Committee failed to prove on record that compensation was repaid by the erstwhile Gram Panchayat. The Resolution Ex.D3 cannot be read in evidence as it was not proved in accordance with law, for, no member or officer of the Committee appeared. 11. Per contra, Mr. G.P.S. Bal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1 supported the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court on the premise that being last Court of fact and law, after examination of the oral and documentary evidence, it rightly differed with the finding rendered by the trial Court. Plaintiffs never came into possession of the property after the Fertilizers Corporation of India surrendered possession to the Gram Panchayat. Resolution, Ex.D3 showed that Gram Panchayat had released the amount in favour of the owners but it could not disburse to the land owners in the absence of any approval of the Resolution by the competent authority, thus, urges this Court for upholding the finding under challenge. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, appraised the paper book and of the view that there is force and merit in the submissions of Mr. Amit Jain. The vesting of the land in the Gram Panchayat, Notified Area Committee, Municipal Committee or Corporations came to be debated upon in the Full Bench judgment of this Hon'ble Court in Suraj Bhan's case (supra) wherein after discussion of the case laws at threadbare, it has been held that vesting of jumla mushtarka malkan or jumla malkan wa digar haqdaran arazi rasad raqba would be improper and invalid without payment of compensation. The entire finding has been referred in paragraph 218 of the judgment,which reads as under:- "218. In view of the above discussion, the legal position that emerges is as follows:- (a) The 'shamlat deh' lands as mentioned in Section 2 (g) of the VCL Act 1961 are the common lands of the village and are for the common use and benefits of the 'inhabitants of the village' as contemplated by Section 5 of the said Act. In view of the above discussion, the legal position that emerges is as follows:- (a) The 'shamlat deh' lands as mentioned in Section 2 (g) of the VCL Act 1961 are the common lands of the village and are for the common use and benefits of the 'inhabitants of the village' as contemplated by Section 5 of the said Act. In Gram Panchayat of village Jamalpur v. Malwinder Singh (supra) , it was said that though, the interest of the proprietors of other lands, in 'shamlat deh' lands, was incidental to their proprietary interests in those other lands, such interest in the 'shamlat' was not a mere appendage to their interest in the other lands and that lands so reserved were zealously guarded as the common property of the original body of settlers who founded the village or their descendants, and occasionally also those who assisted the settlers in clearing the waste and bringing it under cultivation were recognized as having a share in these reserved plots. It was said, "as a general rule, only proprietors of the village (malikan-deh) as distinguished from proprietors of their own holdings (malikan makbuza khud) are entitled to share in the shamlat deh". It was also noticed that while it appeared to have been laid down that the right to share in the Village Common Land was an incident attaching to the ownership of agricultural land in the village and that ordinarily those persons who held land on which revenue was assessed and who were cosharers in the 'khewat' were entitled to a share in proportion to the revenue paid by them. The ownership of land though was held to be in favour of the landowners; however, the VCL Act 1953 being a measure of agrarian reforms, it was held, would receive the protection of Article 31A of the Constitution; (b) With the enlargement of the municipal limits by including the 'shamlat deh' lands in the Municipal Corporation or Municipal Committee, as the case may be, the characteristics of the 'shamlat deh' lands cease to exist and they no longer are for the purpose of any agrarian reforms; (c) The acquisition of 'shamlat deh' lands of the village by enlarging the area of a Municipal Council or a Corporation deprives the 'inhabitants of the village' of their rights to enjoy the common property of the village. The 'shamlat deh' lands were the common lands of the village for use and enjoyment of the inhabitants and residents of the village. This has been the intent of the VCL Act 1961 as also of the Consolidation Act 1948 as amended from time. These were not for the domain of the public in the urban areas of a Municipality or a Municipal Corporation, as the case may be. (d) The purpose of reserving lands as 'shamlat deh' or 'Jumla Mushtarka Malkan' was to protect the rights of the holders and owners in the land against the competing claims of others, that is to say to avoid the claims of those who had not contributed towards the common purpose although they were/are entitled to full user and enjoyment of the same. With such lands vesting in a Municipality or a Municipal Corporation they assume the characteristics of a town or urban area with no connection for use and enjoyment for the inhabitants of the village. Their acquisition by the State for the rural economy and agrarian reforms in view of Article 31A (1) of the Constitution, protected the State from the payment of compensation. With the 'shamlat deh' lands now vesting in the Municipality or Municipal Corporation, as the case may be, and thus being a part of a town or an urban area, the protective shield against payment of compensation is no more there. In fact, the concept of 'shamlat deh' is absolutely foreign and alien in the context of an urban or a town area. The very use of the words 'shamlat deh' which is common land of the village for an urban area or a town falling within the limits of a Municipality or a Municipal Corporation is out of context. The town or an urban area may have its own common lands, but the same are not liable to be termed or called as 'shamlat deh' lands for the common use of the inhabitants of the village. The town or an urban area may have its own common lands, but the same are not liable to be termed or called as 'shamlat deh' lands for the common use of the inhabitants of the village. (e) In the event of lands forming part of the municipal limit by the enlargement of the municipal area, the 'shamlat deh' lands, which are recorded in the revenue records as 'shamlat deh' simpliciter, would not entail as a document for grant of any compensation and the same would escheat to the State and may be taken to be escheated to the State in terms of Article 296 of the Constitution of India; (f) However, where the lands are identifiable by title, semblance of ownership or vestige of title of a proprietor to the extent of his share by way of a document or by way of revenue records/jamabandis, the owner, so identified, shall be entitled for compensation as per his entitlement. Besides, if the lands come within the exclusionary clauses of Section 2 (g) of the VCL Act 1961, the owner of such lands would be entitled for compensation. It is, however, made clear that the onus to prove the right of ownership, semblance of ownership, vestige of title or that it comes within the exclusionary clauses of Section 2 (g) of the VCL Act 1961 shall be on the person so claiming, which he can establish on the basis of revenue records/jamabandis or other materials. The revenue records to which a presumption of truth is attached would, however, be subject to rebuttal; (g) The entries in the revenue records carry a presumption of truth, which, however, are rebuttable and can be shown to be wrong by other material (s) on record. The entries, however, in case based on fraud or manipulation of revenue records, the same would not confer any right or title on the person so entered as owner in the records; (h) The 'Jumla Mushtarka Malkan' lands are distinct and separate from the 'shamlat deh' lands. The entries, however, in case based on fraud or manipulation of revenue records, the same would not confer any right or title on the person so entered as owner in the records; (h) The 'Jumla Mushtarka Malkan' lands are distinct and separate from the 'shamlat deh' lands. The ownership and title of the 'Jumla Mushtarka Malkan' lands or the lands recorded as 'Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hasab Rasad Raqba' vest in the proprietary body of the village and not in the Panchayat; however, the management and control of these lands vest in the Panchayats in view of Section 2 (bb) and Section 23A of the Consolidation Act 1948; besides, Rule 16 (ii) of the Consolidation Rules 1949 as also the judgment of the Five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Ajit Singh's case (supra) ; (i) The 'Jumla Mushtarka Malkan' or 'Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hasab Rasad Raqba' lands have been carved out in consolidation proceedings and operations carried out in accordance with the Consolidation Act 1948 and the Consolidation Rules 1949 by imposing a pro rata cut on the lands of the proprietors. The cut that has been made is clearly identifiable and discernible as it is so mentioned in the 'Missal Haqiyat' (document of ownership), 'Naksha Haqdaran' (document of share of the proprietors), 'Khatauni Pamaish' (measurement of total land on the basis of its valuation) and 'Khatauni Istemal' (first jamabandi after consolidation which mentions the old khasra numbers and the new khasra numbers). Therefore, where the shares of the proprietors in the 'Jumla Mushtarka Malkan' or 'Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hasab Rasad Raqba' lands are identifiable and the land vests in the municipality, then the proprietors would be entitled for compensation to the extent of their share as they are admittedly owners of the same. Therefore, where the shares of the proprietors in the 'Jumla Mushtarka Malkan' or 'Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hasab Rasad Raqba' lands are identifiable and the land vests in the municipality, then the proprietors would be entitled for compensation to the extent of their share as they are admittedly owners of the same. In Ajit Singh's case (supra) , it has specifically been held that the ownership of such land vests in the proprietary body of the village to the extent of its share in the holdings in the village; (j) The judgment of Five Judge Bench of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Bhagat Ram's case (supra) invalidating the reservation of certain areas in a consolidation scheme for income of the Gram Panchayat and holding it to defeat the whole object of the second proviso of Article 31A, is applicable for lands that are carved out for common purpose in terms of Section 2 (bb) of the Consolidation Act 1948 and are recorded in the revenue records as 'Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hassab Rasad Raqba', 'Jumla Malkan' or 'Mushtarka Malkan' etc. and is not for lands that are recorded as 'shamlat deh'. This is for the reason that the proprietary body of the village is recorded as owners of the lands recorded in the revenue records 'Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hassab Rasad Raqba', 'Jumla Malkan' or 'Mushtarka Malkan' etc. and only the management and control vests with the Gram Panchayat in terms of Section 23-A of the Consolidation Act 1948 and Rule 16 (ii) of the Consolidation Rules 1949 while the ownership and title of the 'shamlat deh' lands vests with the Panchayat in terms of Section 4 of the VCL Act 1961. Therefore, the income derived from 'shamlat deh' lands can be used for common purposes while reservation of lands for income of the Panchayat cannot be made in respect of lands carved out for common purposes in a consolidation scheme. Therefore, the income derived from 'shamlat deh' lands can be used for common purposes while reservation of lands for income of the Panchayat cannot be made in respect of lands carved out for common purposes in a consolidation scheme. (k) Any observation in Jai Singh's case (supra) and Veer Singh's case (supra) to the extent it is taken as conferring a right, title and ownership in respect of 'Jumla Mushtarka Malkan' lands on the Gram Panchayat would be improper and invalid notwithstanding Section 4 of the VCL Act 1961 in view of Section 2 (bb) and Section 23A of the Consolidation Act 1948; besides, Rule 16 (ii) of the Consolidation Rules 1949 and the judgment of the Five Judge Bench of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Ajit Singh's case (supra) ; (l) The definition of 'shamlat deh' as has been defined in Section 2 (g) of the VCL Act 1961 includes 'shamlat deh' simpliciter; besides, 'shamlat tikkas' lands described in the revenue records as shamlat, tarafs, pattis, pannas and tholas and used according to revenue records for the benefit of the village community or a part thereof or for common purposes of the village. The said terms have been elucidated above and the proprietors having share in these sub-divisions of the village land shall be entitled to compensation as per their share, which is identifiable, but they would not be entitled to any compensation where it is not so identifiable; (m) At the cost of repetition, it is stated that the documents for the identification of the land would be the revenue records primarily, unless these are shown to be incorrect or are forged or fraudulent or have been invalidated by a competent Court of law; (n) The requirement for paying compensation for the land that is acquired and vests with the Municipal Committee or Municipal Corporation, as the case may be, in terms of Section 61 (h) of the Municipal Act 1973 and Section 161 (g) of the Municipal Corpn. Act 1994 shall be read into that effect and compensation shall be paid in accordance with law." 13. The Notified Area Committee failed to prove on record any material, much less, Resolution Ex.D3 that the payment of compensation was paid to the land owners on the vesting of the land particularly when the National Fertilizer Corporation surrendered back the surplus area. The Notified Area Committee failed to prove on record any material, much less, Resolution Ex.D3 that the payment of compensation was paid to the land owners on the vesting of the land particularly when the National Fertilizer Corporation surrendered back the surplus area. It also failed to prove whether the compensation was paid by the land owners or the Gram Panchayat. No account statement had been placed on record. The lower Appellate Court while reversing the finding also found possession of the suit property in favour of the plaintiffs as it was oblivious of the fact that the suit was not for declaration but simpliciter for injunction. It is settled position of law that a person, who has been found in long and settled possession cannot be dispossessed except in due course of law. This observation of mine is derived from the ratio decidendi culled out by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rame Gowda (D) by LRs Vs. M. Varadappa Naidu (D) by LRs , (2004) 1 SCC 769 . De hors of the fact, issue No.1 with regard to ownership in the absence of any declaration was framed. The focus of the lower Appellate Court should have been only on injunction and not upon the title. 14. No doubt, this Court, on earlier occasions had been framing the substantial questions of law while deciding the appeals but in view of the ratio decidendi culled out by five learned Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pankajakshi (dead) through LRs and Others Vs. Chandrika and Others , (2016) AIR SC 1213, wherein the proposition arose as to whether in view of the provisions of Section 97(1) CPC, provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 would apply or the appeal i.e. RSA would be filed under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure and decision thereof could be without framing the substantial questions of law. The Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the decision in Kulwant Kaur and Others Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by LRs and Others , (2001) 4 SCC 262 on applicability of Section 97(1) of CPC is not a correct law, in essence, the provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 had been restored back. 15. The Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the decision in Kulwant Kaur and Others Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by LRs and Others , (2001) 4 SCC 262 on applicability of Section 97(1) of CPC is not a correct law, in essence, the provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 had been restored back. 15. For the sake of brevity, the relevant portion of the judgment of five learned Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pankajakshi 's case (supra) reads thus:- "Since Section 41 of the Punjab Act is expressly in conflict with the amending law, viz., Section 100 as amended, it would be deemed to have been repealed. Thus we have no hesitation to hold that the law declared by the Full Bench of the High Court in the case of Ganpat , (1978) AIR(P&H) 137 : 80 Punj LR 1 (FB)] cannot be sustained and is thus overruled." [at paras 27 - 29]" "27. Even the reference to Article 254 of the Constitution was not correctly made by this Court in the said decision. Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act is of 1918 vintage. Obviously, therefore, it is not a law made by the Legislature of a State after the Constitution of India has come into force. It is a law made by a Provincial Legislature under Section 80A of the Government of India Act, 1915, which law was continued, being a law in force in British India, immediately before the commencement of the Government of India Act, 1935, by Section 292 thereof. In turn, after the Constitution of India came into force and, by Article 395, repealed the Government of India Act, 1935, the Punjab Courts Act was continued being a law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution of India by virtue of Article 372(1) of the Constitution of India. This being the case, Article 254 of the Constitution of India would have no application to such a law for the simple reason that it is not a law made by the Legislature of a State but is an existing law continued by virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution of India. This being the case, Article 254 of the Constitution of India would have no application to such a law for the simple reason that it is not a law made by the Legislature of a State but is an existing law continued by virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution of India. If at all, it is Article 372(1) alone that would apply to such law which is to continue in force until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority. We have already found that since Section 97(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 has no application to Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, it would necessarily continue as a law in force." 16. Therefore, I do not intend to frame the substantial questions of law while deciding the appeal, aforementioned. 17. As an upshot of my finding, the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. 18. The second appeal is allowed. 19. View of my finding in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff by reversing the finding rendered by the lower Appellate Court, I am of the view that no purpose would be served in passing a separate order in the contempt petition as injunction granted by the trial Court has been upheld by this Court. The petitioners can seek execution of the decree in accordance with law. 20. Contempt petition stands dismissed.