Bal Wa Mahila Kalyan Mandal, Pandharkawada v. Baburao
2018-02-02
S.B.SHUKRE
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT S.B. Shukre, J -Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent. 2. By the order passed on 11/09/2009, the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandrapur passed on order for issuance of search warrant. By this order, the learned Magistrate also directed the concerned Police Officer to take search of the house of respondent no.1, seize the record of the petitioner and file his report before the Court. 3. It appears that this order to be precisely, the search warrant, was not executed by the concerned Police Officer and that it was not verified by the learned Magistrate as to whether it was executed or not. It also appears that the concerned Police Officer did not file his report before the learned Magistrate, even though he was directed to do so by the order passed on 11/09/2009. 4. On the backdrop of the above referred facts, the learned Magistrate suddenly passed an order on 26/02/2015 closing the proceedings initiated under Section 93 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). The proceedings so initiated were for taking the search of the house of respondent no.1 on a search warrant and the search was to be carried by the Police Officer. The only reason stated in the order dated 26/02/2015, which is under challenge in the present petition, is that in the opinion of the learned Magistrate, the purpose of proceedings initiated under Section 93 of Cr.P.C. appeared to be served and that the petitioner was not interested to proceed further in the application, which was concluded by long absence of the petitioner before the Court of the learned Magistrate. In doing so, it is seen, the learned Magistrate has turned a blind eye to the provisions of Section 70 of Cr.P.C., which are made applicable even to a search warrant by another provision which is Section 99 of Cr.P.C. Section 70(2) prescribes that every such warrant shall remain in force until it is cancelled by the Court which issued it, or until it is executed. This procedure of law, mandatory in it''s nature, has not been followed by the learned Magistrate in the present case. 5.
This procedure of law, mandatory in it''s nature, has not been followed by the learned Magistrate in the present case. 5. When the law prescribes that every warrant whether it is a warrant of arrest or warrant of search remains in force unless and until it is cancelled or executed, there is no power conferred upon the Court issuing the warrant, in the present case the search warrant, to close the proceedings in respect of issuance of search warrant unless it is satisfied that the search warrant is executed or is un-executable for the reasons to be recorded in writing, and the search warrant is consequently recalled by that Court. Nothing of this sort has occurred in this case and no such order has been passed by the learned Magistrate and, therefore, the impugned order dated 26/02/2015 would have to be termed as patently illegal requiring interference. 6. It may be added here that absence of the petitioner, who had applied for issuance of search warrant under Section 93 of Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate, would have been relevant only after the Magistrate was satisfied that search warrant was executed or could not be executed and report in that regard was field by the concerned Police Officer. In this case, no such report was filed and so the learned Magistrate could not have found that petitioner''s absence indicated his lack of interest in the case. 7. In the circumstances, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. It is allowed accordingly. The order dated 26/02/2015 is quashed and set aside. Application under Section 93 of Cr.P.C. is remanded back to the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandrapur for fresh consideration of the matter in accordance with the provisions of Section 70 of Cr.P.C. Rule is made absolute in the above terms.