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2018 DIGILAW 330 (GUJ)

Bharatbhai Murubhai Modhwadia v. Development Commissioner, Gujarat State

2018-01-31

A.Y.KOGJE, AKIL KURESHI

body2018
JUDGMENT : AKIL KURESHI, J. 1. Petitioner has challenged an order dated 17.01.2018 passed by the respondent no.1 Development Commissioner rejecting his appeal against the resolution of the Porbandar District Panchayat disqualifying him as a member of the District Panchayat on the ground that he had remained absent in four consecutive Panchayat meetings without leave. 2. Brief facts are as under. 3. Petitioner was elected as a member of the said Panchayat for which election was held in November, 2015. The District Panchayat held four meetings on 14.07.2016, 23.01.2017, 16.03.2017 and 23.08.2017 which meetings, petitioner admittedly did not attend. In terms of section 86 of the Panchayat Act, 1993 ('the Act' for short), in absence of leave, the petitioner would cease to be the member of the said elected office and the post would fall vacant. The district Panchayat therefore initiated action against the petitioner for such purpose by issuing a notice dated 06.10.2017. The petitioner replied to such notice under a communication dated 13.10.2017 and mainly contended as under: A. None of the notices of the proposed meetings were served to the petitioner. The petitioner had also not received any of the agendas for such meetings. B. As per section 144 of the Act, general meeting must be held every three months. In none of the meetings this requirement was fulfilled. C. When the schedule of meetings itself was irregular and opposed to the statutory provisions, the petitioner cannot be removed from the office for not attending such meetings. D. Agenda of meetings is required to be supplied at least 10 days in advance. This requirement was not fulfilled in the present case. 4. Ignoring the petitioner's pleas, the Panchayat in its meeting dated 16.10.2017 passed a resolution holding that the petitioner had vacated the office for having remained absent in four consecutive meetings of the Panchayat. 5. Appeal against such order of the Panchayat lies before the Development Commissioner. The petitioner filed such appeal within the time permitted. In the appeal also, the petitioner took up similar defenses. He strongly disputed the stand of the Panchayat that notices for the meetings were served on the petitioner. He also highlighted that there was strong political rivalry due to which he has been victimized. He pointed out that his father was murdered on 16.11.2005 in which, some of the members of the opposite party were allegedly involved and were prosecuted. He strongly disputed the stand of the Panchayat that notices for the meetings were served on the petitioner. He also highlighted that there was strong political rivalry due to which he has been victimized. He pointed out that his father was murdered on 16.11.2005 in which, some of the members of the opposite party were allegedly involved and were prosecuted. 6. Before the Development Commissioner, the petitioner also filed an application for stay along with the appeal. Both of which were filed on or around 26.10.2017. In such application, he prayed that the impugned decision of the Panchayat dated 16.10.2017 be stayed pending final disposal of the appeal. The petitioner filed yet another application on 28.12.2017 before the Development Commissioner and repeated his prayer for interim relief. Yet another handwritten application was filed before the Development Commissioner on 04.01.2018 for the same purpose. 7. On 06.01.2018, the Development Commissioner issued a notice of hearing to the petitioner fixing the hearing of the appeal on 16.01.2018 at 12'O clock before himself. On 16.01.2018, the petitioner filed three applications before the Development Commissioner. In first such application, he stated that his apprehension that if no stay is granted, election would be declared for the vacant seat is proved to be correct. Since the dispute is pending before the Development Commissioner, appropriate order may be passed so that the election does not take place. In the second application dated 16.01.2018, the petitioner's advocate stated that he has been given a bunch of papers by the district Panchayat which furthers his case of serious dispute about service of notice and therefore interim relief may be granted. In the third application also dated 16.01.2018, the advocate of the petitioner pointed out that he had filed two applications for passing interim orders. He may be supplied copies of the orders that may have been passed in such applications. 8. According to the petitioner, no hearing on the appeal itself took place on 16.01.2018. The petitioner filed the present petition on 18.01.2018, in which initially the prayers made were concerning the action of the Development Commissioner for not granting the interim relief and for grant of a relief by which the resolution of the Panchayat would be suspended. However, by the time this petition could be taken up for hearing, the Development Commissioner had already supplied a copy of his impugned order dated 17.01.2018 to the petitioner. However, by the time this petition could be taken up for hearing, the Development Commissioner had already supplied a copy of his impugned order dated 17.01.2018 to the petitioner. Thereupon, such order was brought on record with additional averments and consequential prayers. In the amended form now in the petition, the petitioner has challenged the very order dated 17.01.2018 passed by the Development Commissioner. By such order, the Development Commissioner was pleased to reject the petitioner's appeal against the resolution of the Panchayat. 9. This petition was argued by Shri Mangukiya on limited ground of no hearing by the Development Commissioner before the final order was passed. He submitted that on 16.01.2018, final hearing of the appeal never took place. He appeared before the Development Commissioner and pressed the applications for interim relief. He had in fact pointed out that large number of documents are supplied to him by the opponents and he would take some time to argue the appeal finally. The Development Commissioner instead of passing any order either rejecting or allowing the prayer for interim relief, proceeded to dispose of the appeal finally which was done without hearing the petitioner or his advocate. 10. On the other hand, learned AGP refuted the allegations and submitted that after proper hearing, the appeal was disposed of by the Development Commissioner by a speaking order. She highlighted that all four notices for meetings of the Panchayat were dispatched through registered post which would give rise to a presumption that the notices were duly served. Same stand is also taken by Shri Gopinath Amin for the Panchayat. 11. Learned advocate Ms.Roopal Patel for the Election Commission stated that so far no election for the seat in question is declared and the Election Commission would act as per the outcome of the present proceedings. 12. Section 86 of the said Act pertains to leave of absence and reads as under: 86. 11. Learned advocate Ms.Roopal Patel for the Election Commission stated that so far no election for the seat in question is declared and the Election Commission would act as per the outcome of the present proceedings. 12. Section 86 of the said Act pertains to leave of absence and reads as under: 86. (1) Any member of a Panchayat who, during his term of office- (a) is absent for more than three consecutive months from the district, unless leave not exceeding four months so to absent himself has been granted by the Panchayat, or (b) absents himself from four consecutive meetings of the Panchayat without the leave of the said Panchayat, shall cease to be a member and his office shall be vacant and thereupon the Panchayat shall, as soon as may be, inform him that the vacancy has occurred. (2) Any dispute as to whether a vacancy has or has not occurred under this section, shall be referred for decision to the competent authority, whose decision shall be final: Provided that such reference shall not be entertained if it is made after the expiry of fifteen days from the date on which the Panchayat informs under subsection (1) to the member as to the vacancy. (3) Whenever leave is granted under subsection (1) to a member who is Vice President, another member shall, subject to the conditions to which the election of the Vice President, so absenting himself was subject, be elected to perform all the duties and exercise all the powers of a Vice President during the period for which such leave is granted. In terms of clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 86 thus, any member of the Panchayat who absents himself from four consecutive meetings of the Panchayat without leave would cease to be the member and consequently his office would fall vacant. In terms of subsection (2) of section 86, dispute about a vacancy having fallen would be decided by a competent authority. Such application, in terms of proviso to subsection (2) could be filed within 15 days from the date on which the Panchayat informs the member as to such vacancy. 13. Chapter-II of the Panchayat (Procedure) Rules, 1997 pertains to meeting of Panchayat. Rule 7 contained in the said chapter pertains to mode of delivery of notice. Sub rule (2) which is relevant for our purpose, reads as under: “(2). 13. Chapter-II of the Panchayat (Procedure) Rules, 1997 pertains to meeting of Panchayat. Rule 7 contained in the said chapter pertains to mode of delivery of notice. Sub rule (2) which is relevant for our purpose, reads as under: “(2). Every notice under these rules shall be sent to the members of a taluka or district Panchayat by ordinary post under a certificate of posting.” 14. It is in background of these provisions that the present controversy has arisen. Panchayat contends that the petitioner having remained absent during four consecutive meetings, though duly served, had ceased to be a member and the seat has fallen vacant. The petitioner has raised several disputes about such decision of the Panchayat in his appeal before the Development Commissioner. Such disputes, as noted, include the petitioner's contentions that the notices were not served, that agenda of the meetings was not supplied, that the meetings were not regularly held and others. 15. The Development Commissioner was required to hear the petitioner or his authorized representative before taking final decision. It is not even the case of the respondents that no personal hearing is envisaged before the competent authority while deciding the dispute as referred to in subsection (2) of section 86 of the Act. Even otherwise, looking to the nature of functions and duties that such competent authority would exercise which would include examination of the decisions of the Panchayat of a declaration that a certain vacancy has fallen on account of a member not attending the meetings consistently, a personal hearing cannot be discarded. When an elected member is sought to be ousted, may be because of incurring some disqualification or incapacity to continue to hold the elected post, bare minimum that is required is strict adherence to the principles of natural justice. 16. In the present case, the petitioner has contended that no hearing took place before the Development Commissioner on the final disposal of the appeal on 16.01.2018. This contention we are inclined to accept for the following reasons: (i) Along with the appeal itself, the petitioner had filed an application for interim relief which proceedings were filed on or around 26.12.2017. When no stay was granted, the petitioner filed yet another application for such purpose on 28.12.2017 followed by third application dated 04.01.2018. At all stages, the petitioner thus, was pressing hard for interim relief. When no stay was granted, the petitioner filed yet another application for such purpose on 28.12.2017 followed by third application dated 04.01.2018. At all stages, the petitioner thus, was pressing hard for interim relief. (ii) Even in response to the Development Commissioner's notice dated 06.01.2018 fixing the hearing of the appeal on 16.01.2018, the petitioner insisted on the interim relief application being taken up. This is clear from the petitioner's applications dated 16.01.2018, reference to which we have made earlier, in which applications, he once again prayed for interim injunction. (iii) In one of the written communications dated 16.01.2018, the advocate of the petitioner has taken a specific stand that bunch of papers were supplied to him by the District Panchayat on the basis of which also the petitioner's averment that notices were not served is fortified and therefore that the interim relief be granted. (iv) In the petition, the petitioner has made elaborate averments on this aspect of the matter. He has stated on oath that on 17.01.2018, no final hearing took place and the submissions were made only in addition to interim relief. The petitioner had in fact conveyed to the Development Commissioner that he would need more time to answer a large number of documents supplied to him. In fact, the petitioner has gone on oath to state that, thereupon, the Development Commissioner instructed his staff to grant time of one week. (v) None of these averments have been specifically denied in the affidavit in reply filed by one Shri Rakesh Vyas, Assistant Development Commissioner. Ideally, the Development Commissioner being a respondent and also being in the thick of things should have himself filed an affidavit. In any case, in the said affidavit dated 29.01.2018, no specific stand has been taken that the final hearing of the appeal took place on 16.01.2018 and it was clearly understood between the parties that the hearing is taking place for the disposal of the appeal and not for hearing of any interim application. In any case, in the said affidavit dated 29.01.2018, no specific stand has been taken that the final hearing of the appeal took place on 16.01.2018 and it was clearly understood between the parties that the hearing is taking place for the disposal of the appeal and not for hearing of any interim application. In such affidavit, it is stated as under: “5.13 That on date of hearing which was fixed on 16.01.2018, the advocate for the petitioner was supplied with bunch of copies of record of the respondent no.2 herein and the petitioner's advocate submitted three applications pressing for interim orders, more particularly, emphasizing about only two acknowledgment receipts of two agenda on record and for rest of the two agenda no postal acknowledgment receipts. (Annexure P, Q and R) 5.14 That on 16.01.2018, the advocate for the petitioner was substantially heard and it was mainly contended that his application would become in fructuous once election programme is declared. It was further argued that upon bare reading of the provisions of the act and the rules framed there under, the meetings of the Panchayat has not been held as per schedule. That even the representative of the Panchayat who was present with the record was heard. That after hearing the respective parties and upon perusal of the application with annexures supplied by the petitioner and the original record and remarks of the respondent no.2, the respondent no.1 herein passed the impugned order on 17.01.2018.” (vi) In the affidavit, deponent goes on stating that the respondent i.e. the Development Commissioner has taken into consideration all submissions of the petitioner raised in the written reply to the Panchayat and also those raised in his memo of appeals. This would, in fact, advance the petitioner's stand that no hearing on final disposal of the appeal took place on 16.01.2018. In addition to the petitioner's specific averments to this effect made in the amended petition not being denied, it was in fact suggested that the petitioner was substantially heard. This statement comes after references to three applications filed by the petitioner on 16.01.2018 for interim relief. This is followed by the averment that in any case the Development Commissioner has taken into account the averments made by the petitioner in his reply to the Panchayat and in the memo of the appeal. This statement comes after references to three applications filed by the petitioner on 16.01.2018 for interim relief. This is followed by the averment that in any case the Development Commissioner has taken into account the averments made by the petitioner in his reply to the Panchayat and in the memo of the appeal. Thus, clearly even the Development Commissioner has not seriously refuted the petitioner's averments that no final hearing took place on 16.01.2018. (vii) For our curiosity, we had also perused the original file of the Development Commissioner where we do not find any record of the arguments made by the two sides. Thus there was no minutes of the proceedings recording the contentions. This would be an additional reason to uphold the petitioner's contention in this respect. 17. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that serious breach of natural justice took place in the process of the Development Commissioner passing his order dated 17.01.2018. We are not suggesting that it was not open for the Development Commissioner to hear the appeal finally instead of deciding injunction application only. However, he had to have responded to the petitioner's persistent requests either by granting or rejecting or at least conveying to the petitioner in clear terms that in view of fixing of early hearing of the appeal, there was no need to decide such applications. At any rate, when the petitioner's advocate was not prepared to argue the appeal finally and prayed for time, it was at his risk and cost. In exercise of his judicial discretion, the Development Commissioner could as well have granted reasonable time making it clear that time may be granted but not with interim relief. We are therefore inclined to quash the order dated 17.01.2018 and place the matter back before the Development Commissioner for fresh hearing and disposal in accordance with law. In the interregnum, looking to the various controversies and contentions raised by the petitioner, we are also inclined to grant limited interim protection. If no such protection is granted, it would be open for the Election Commission to treat the seat as having fallen vacant and to proceed to conduct the election to fill such vacancy. In the interregnum, looking to the various controversies and contentions raised by the petitioner, we are also inclined to grant limited interim protection. If no such protection is granted, it would be open for the Election Commission to treat the seat as having fallen vacant and to proceed to conduct the election to fill such vacancy. If eventually however, the petitioner's appeal were to be succeed, a piquant situation would arise wherein, a newly elected member would have been installed and the petitioner's right to be rein ducted as a member would be revived. In facts of the case, looking to the contentions raised by the petitioner to the resolution of the Panchayat, we grant limited stay against such resolution. 18. In the result, petition is disposed of with following directions. I. Impugned order dated 17.01.2018 passed by the Development Commissioner is set aside. Appeal is remanded back to the Development Commissioner for hearing and disposal in accordance with law. The petitioner shall cooperate with disposal of such appeal which may be disposed of preferably by 30.04.2018. II. The resolution of the Panchayat dated 16.10.2017 declaring that the petitioner has ceased to be the member of Panchayat is stayed. Resultantly, there would be no vacancy for which the Election Commission would conduct the bye-election. However, this order would not enable the petitioner to act as a member of the Panchayat or to attend any of its meeting as a Panchayat member. 19. Petition is disposed of accordingly.