JUDGMENT : A.K. RATH, J. 1. This is a defendant's appeal against confirming judgment. 2. Plaintiffs-respondents 1 and 2 instituted the suit for declaration of title, confirmation of possession or in the alternative recovery of possession, in the event they are dispossessed during pendency of the suit and permanent injunction. The case of the plaintiffs was that one Chaina Jena wife of Chintamani Jena was the absolute owner of the suit land. She died leaving behind her daughters, Chandri and Dukhi. After death of the parents, the daughters succeeded to the suit property. Chandri and Dukhi were in possession of the suit property. Chandri died issueless in the year 1982. Thereafter, Dukhi became the absolute owner. Dukhi died in the year 1989. After her death, her sons and daughter, plaintiffs 1 and 2 and defendants 4 and 5 succeeded to the property. On 6.3.1991 defendants 1 to 3 claimed that Chandri had gifted Schedule-B property to them. Chandri became feeble and weak because of her old age. Before her death, she was in coma. Chandri had not executed any gift deed at any point of time. The alleged gift deeds are inoperative and void. The suit property had not been partitioned between Chandri and Dukhi. With this factual scenario, they instituted the suit seeking the reliefs mentioned supra. 3. Defendants 1 to 3 filed written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. According to them, plaintiffs 1 and 2 and proforma defendants 4 and 5 are not the daughters of Dukhi. It was pleaded that the suit property described in Lot no. 1 of Schedule-A was the self-acquired property of Chandri. Lot nos. 2 and 3 were self-acquired properties of Chintamani. After death of Chintamani, both Chandri and Dukhi became owners of Lot nos. 2 and 3 of Schedule-A property. After death of Dukhi, Chandri became the owner of the properties. On 5.8.1982, Chandri executed a registered gift deed in respect of Lot nos. 1 and 2 of Schedule-A property in favour of defendant no. 1. She had also executed a gift deed of plot no. 1548 in favour of defendant no. 2 and delivered possession. It was further pleaded that plaintiff no. 1 was the maid servant of Chandri and Dukhi. She was residing in their house. The plaintiffs as well as proforma defendants had no semblance of right, title and interest over the suit property. 4. 1548 in favour of defendant no. 2 and delivered possession. It was further pleaded that plaintiff no. 1 was the maid servant of Chandri and Dukhi. She was residing in their house. The plaintiffs as well as proforma defendants had no semblance of right, title and interest over the suit property. 4. Stemming on the pleadings of the parties, learned trial court framed five issues. Parties led evidence, oral and documentary, to substantiate their case. Learned trial court came to hold that the gift deed nos. 443/82 and 444/82 are inoperative and void. The plaintiffs and proforma defendants 4 and 5 have right, title, interest and possession over the suit land. The defendants 1 to 3 have no right, title, interest and possession over the suit property. Defendants 1 to 3 are trespassers over Schedule-B property. Held so, it decreed the suit. The unsuccessful defendants appealed before the learned District Judge, Sambalpur, which was subsequently transferred to the court of the learned Additional District Judge, Samablpur and renumbered as Title Appeal No. 46/2 of 93-97. During pendency of the appeal, an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC was filed to admit the certified copy of the gift deed no. 444 of 1982 as evidence. It was stated that an advocate was engaged by the defendants. During trial, he was gained over by the plaintiffs. He had not filed any application to declare DW-3 hostile and cross-examine him. The said advocate acted against the interest of the defendants. He had not advised the defendants to examine the attesting witness and scribe of the gift deeds. The same amounts to professional misconduct. The learned appellate court came to hold that appeal was filed in the year 1993. The application for additional evidence was filed four years after filing of the appeal. The Court is not competent to decide the question of misconduct of the counsel. There was no justifiable ground to admit the document as additional evidence. The application had been filed to patch up lacuna. Thereafter, it scanned the evidence on record, pleadings, concurred with the findings of the learned trial court and dismissed the appeal. It is apt to state here that during pendency of this appeal, appellants 1 and 3 died, whereafter their legal heirs have been substituted. 5. The application had been filed to patch up lacuna. Thereafter, it scanned the evidence on record, pleadings, concurred with the findings of the learned trial court and dismissed the appeal. It is apt to state here that during pendency of this appeal, appellants 1 and 3 died, whereafter their legal heirs have been substituted. 5. The Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: “(i) Whether the appellate court can allow additional evidence to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause? (ii) Whether the appellate court is correct in rejecting the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code without any reason while the appellants have suffered due to the laches on the part of their counsel?” 6. Heard Mr. Sanjeev Udgata, learned Advocate along with Mr. Satyabrata Udgata, learned Advocate for the appellants and Mr. J.R. Dash, learned Advocate for the respondents. 7. Mr. Udgata, learned Advocate for the appellants submitted that the advocate of defendants had not conducted the suit properly. DW-3 was hostile, but then he had not filed the application to declare the witness hostile. The registered gift deed is a relevant document and can be admitted as additional evidence. The appellate court is within its jurisdiction to entertain the material documents sought to be taken as additional evidence. The appellate court can allow the evidence to pronounce the judgment or any other substantial cause. For the latches of the lawyer, the party should not suffer. He placed reliance on the decisions of the apex Court in Union of India vs. K.V. Lakshman and Others, AIR 2016 SC 3139 and this Court in Sankar Pradhan vs. Premananda Pradhan (dead) and Others, 2016 (1) ILR Cut. 1151. 8. Per contra, Mr. Dash, learned Advocate for the respondents submitted that the defendants have made unnecessary allegations against their counsel. No petition was filed in the trial court to disengage him. Rather the counsel conducted the case on their behalf. Three numbers of witnesses including the attesting witness had been examined by defendants 1 and 2. DW-3 did not support the case of defendants 1 and 2. Further eleven documents including gift deed no. 443/82 had been exhibited. After lapse of four years in filing of the appeal, application for additional evidence was filed to patch up lacuna. Three numbers of witnesses including the attesting witness had been examined by defendants 1 and 2. DW-3 did not support the case of defendants 1 and 2. Further eleven documents including gift deed no. 443/82 had been exhibited. After lapse of four years in filing of the appeal, application for additional evidence was filed to patch up lacuna. Provisions of Order 41, Rule 27 C.P.C. are not designed to help parties to patch up weak points. He relied on a decision of the apex Court in the case of N. Kamalam (dead) and Another vs. Ayyasamy and Another, (2001) 7 SCC 503 . 9. In K. Venkataramiah vs. A. Seetharma Reddy and Others, AIR 1963 SC 1526 , Order 41, Rule 27 C.P.C. was the subject-matter of interpretation before the apex Court. The Constitution Bench of the apex Court held that section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the appellate court to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken, subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed. Rule 27 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribe the conditions and limitations in the matter. The rule first lays down that the parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate court. It then proceeds to lay down two classes of cases where the appellate court may allow additional evidence to be produced. One class is where the Court appealed from has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted. The other class is where the appellate court requires such additional evidence for itself-either to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The second class of the rule requires that when additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an appellate court the court shall record the reason for its admission. It was further held that the appellate court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment but also for any other substantial cause. It was further held that the appellate court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment but also for any other substantial cause. There may well be cases where even though the court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of the record as it is, and so, it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment, it still considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence "for any other substantial cause under R.27 (1) (b) of the Code. 10. Another Constitution Bench of the apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs. Lala Pancham and Others, AIR 1965 SC 1008 held that under Rule 27, the High Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined. But the requirement of the High Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. The provision does not entitle the High Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate court is empowered to admit additional evidence. The power under clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 cannot be exercised for adding to the evidence already on record except upon one of the ground specified in the provision. If the documents on record are relevant on the issue, the court could well proceed to consider them and decide the issue. It further held that the appellate cannot order a fresh trial. Such a course is not permissible under Order 41, Rule 27 C.P.C. when it has not proceeded under Order 41 Rule 25 or remanded the case under Order 41 Rule 23. 11. It further held that the appellate cannot order a fresh trial. Such a course is not permissible under Order 41, Rule 27 C.P.C. when it has not proceeded under Order 41 Rule 25 or remanded the case under Order 41 Rule 23. 11. In N. Kamalam (dead) (supra), the apex Court held that the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 have not been engrafted in the Code so as to patch up the weak points in the case and to fill up the omission in the court of appeal-it does not authorize any lacunae or gaps in evidence to be filled up. 12. Reverting to the facts of the case and keeping in view the enunciation of law laid down by the apex Court in the decisions cited supra, this Court finds that three witnesses had been examined on behalf of defendants 1 and 2. The gift deed no. 443 of 1982 was not proved. There is no material on record that gift deed no. 444 of 1982 was handed over to the counsel for the defendants. Attributing misconduct on the part of the counsel per se is not a ground to admit the additional evidence. Four years after filing of the appeal, an application for additional evidence was filed. The provisions contained in Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. are not intended to patch up lacuna. The substantial questions of law are accordingly. 13. K.V. Lakshman (supra) and Sankar Pradhan (supra) are distinguishable on facts. In K.V. Lakshman (supra), an application for additional evidence was filed. The same was not opposed by the respondents. Since the application contained necessary averment as to why additional evidence was necessary to decide real controversy involved in appeal, the apex Court allowed the same. In Sankar Pradhan (supra), this Court placed reliance on the oft quoted decision of the Privy Council in the case of Persotim Thakur vs. Lal Mohar Thakur and Others, AIR 1931 PC 143 and held that the legitimate occasion for the exercise of this discretion is not whenever before the appeal is heard a party applies to adduce fresh evidence, but when on examining the evidence as it stands some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent. 14. A priori, the appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.